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ABSTRACT 
The debate on the expansionist policies of the Italian and German fascist regimes has been 
dominated by three questions. First, was the foreign policy of the two regimes programmatic or not? Second, 
was territorial expansion an ideological- political feature of generic fascism, applicable to both Italy and 
Germany? Third, was there a continuity or discontinuity between fascist expansionism and the pre- fascist 
Italian and German expansionist aims? This thesis challenges the rigidity of the above distinctions, arguing 
instead that the dynamism of fascist expansionism cannot be attributed to one particular element (ideology, 
domestic structures, international conditions) but originated from a constant interrelation between all these 
factors. The thesis analyses fascism as a "nationalism plus" phenomenon, which blended radical elements of 
each country's nationalist tradition with a specific novel commitment to a fascist new order. It aims to test 
two hypotheses: first, whether fascist expansionism was underpinned by specific "fascist" values; and, 
second, whether expansionism was a generic feature of fascist ideology and practice. It locates a number of 
pivotal similar features in the two regimes' ideology and practice, and discusses a series of dissimilarities in 
their expansionist policies. The thesis argues that these differences cannot be properly understood as derived 
solely from each leader's personal beliefs or each regime's worldview. They should also be related to chronic 
features of national traditions and aspirations which fascism assimilated and radicalised rather than produced. 
In this sense, a conjunction of comparative analysis of the two regimes with a similar analysis of national 
histories in the longue durée is needed. 
The thesis examines the three levels in which fascist expansionism was expressed - 
expansion as ideology; expansion and foreign policy -making; expansion as a joint enterprise for a fascist new 
order. On the level of ideology, it examines the ideological traditions in the Italian and 
unification societies and shows how fascist ideology achieved an ideological fusion of pre- existing radical 
traits in a new synthesis with an increased emphasis on action and a determination to unite reality with utopia. 
It also studies the expansionist ideologies of the two fascist movements -regimes as coherent systems of 
thought, with a number of similar underlying features (historic living space, elitism, cult of violence, unity of 
thought and action) which explain the rigidity and dynamism of the expansionist arguments in Italian and 
German fascism. 
On the level of foreign policy- making, the thesis analyses the domestic framework of 
foreign- policy making and assesses the success of the two regimes' efforts to produce conditions conducive to 
the realisation of their large -scale expansionist visions. It lays emphasis on the leader- oriented character of the 
two fascist systems, which led to the relegation of other powerful groups (traditional élites, fascist parties) to a 
functional status subject to the will of the leader. It also examines the practical forms of the two regimes' 
expansionist foreign policy (i.e. revisionism, colonialism, irredentism) and shows how ideology provided only 
a long -term framework for expansion. Lack of clear short- and medium -term strategies rendered the fascist 
foreign policies extremely flexible and opportunistic, alert to external opportunities and unbound by prior 
commitments. 
On the level of interaction, the thesis emphasises the neglected importance of the exclusive 
relation between the two fascist regimes for the radicalisation of their expansionist policies in the second half 
of the 1930s. It examines the process of fascism's internationalisation and analyses how both rivalry and co- 
operation between the two fascist regimes contributed to the radicalisation of their expansionist objectives and 
policies. 
War accentuated all the above tendencies and aspirations of the two fascist regimes. In 
1940 -41 they embarked upon the realisation of their extreme expansionist visions in a final attempt to unite 
reality with utopia. Failure, however, to balance means with ends and to achieve an effective form of domestic 
and international co- ordination transformed an ideological campaign into desperate war -making, pushing 
fascism to its eventual collapse in 1943 -45. 
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More than fifty years after the end of the Second World War, fascism still 
remains an extremely slippery terrain for research. Notwithstanding the numerous 
works on, and interpretations of, various aspects of the fascist phenomenon, fascism 
remains a "conundrum" for historians and political scientists alike'. Lack of 
conceptual clarity, failure to generate a solid theoretical framework for research, and 
a tendency to extract fascism from any framework of rationality and "historicity" 
have contributed to a conspicuous absence of a lasting consensus about what 
"fascism" really represents. Undoubtedly, recent developments in research have 
produced a more sophisticated methodology and a reasonable distance from the 
rigidity of many pioneer interpretations. The postwar "moral" obligation to castigate 
fascism as an aberration - of national histories, of the whole European civilisation, of 
capitalism and industrialisation, of modernity, of the human psyche' - has subsided, 
thus allowing for an acknowledgement of fascism's complexity, ambiguity and 
seductiveness. The plurality of approaches, however, neither produced unequivocal 
answers to the most fundamental questions about the nature of fascism, nor fostered 
any tendencies for consensus -building in key areas of research. We are still left with 
a plethora of abstruse questions that resist clear -cut responses: about the nature of 
fascism, about the utility of a generic definition or a comparative approach to it, 
about its geographical and historical boundaries, about its ideological significance, 
' Griffin, R., The Nature of Fascism (London & New York 1994), pp. lff 
2 See, amongst others, Collingwood, R. G., "Fascism and Nazism ", Philosophy, 15 (1940), pp. 170ff; 
Croce, B., Per la nuova vita dell'Italia. Scritti e discorsi 1943 -44 (Naples 1944), pp. 13ff. For a 
general assessment of this analysis of fascism see Vincent, A., Modern Political Ideologies (Oxford 




about its place in national and European history, about its relevance to our past and 
future. 
For a comparative study of the expansionist policies of the Italian and 
German "fascist" regimes the challenge of conceptual and methodological clarity 
embraces all the above complex issues, but is also magnified by a series of other 
questions intrinsic to a general theory of foreign relations. It is not coincidental that 
research on the two regimes' expansionist policies has generated heated controversies 
that epitomise the diversification of the existing approaches to the fascist 
phenomenon. Comparative interpretations are scarce and under constant criticism 
from the opponents of a generic definition of fascism. Emphasis on the dissimilar 
characteristics, structures and conditions of the two regimes appears to have rendered 
comparison and synthesis obsolete, if not methodologically questionable. Even for 
those interpretations that still subscribe to a generic notion of "fascism ", 
expansionism is often regarded as that vital differentia specifica which draws the 
final frontier of comparability'. The extreme racialist Weltanschauung of the Nazi 
regime with all its well- documented excesses (anti -Semitism, total war, genocide) 
have frequently served as the basis of the argument that the German case is singular 
and, therefore, defies categorisation. Rather than fostering the impression of 
similarity, expansionism has become a major liability for the comparative approach 
to generic "fascism ". 
On a more theoretical level, the study of fascist expansionism has 
stumbled upon a series of controversies about the process of foreign policy- making. 
The growing popularity of the "primacy -of- domestic- affairs" thesis has cast its 
shadow upon the relation between ideology and action in foreign policy. Emphasis 
on the latter's role as a diversion from domestic deadlocks or as an effective 
mechanism for consensus -building (the social imperialist thesis) has obscured the 
relative autonomy of foreign policy -making, especially in regimes whose leaders 
showed such an obstinate interest in the formulation of foreign policy. In turn, this 
has undermined the value of ideology in the shaping of foreign policy strategies and 
in guiding actions in this field. Differences of opinion about whether the expansionist 
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policies of the two regime were ideological, opportunistic or diversionary have again 
served to underline their dissimilarities - and thus torpedo the validity of comparison. 
In general, research has treated the Nazi regime more seriously than its Italian 
counterpart. The destructive force of Nazi policies, the brutality in implementing 
them, and the rigidity of the regime's expansionist objectives, have fostered an 
interest in the ideological aspects of Nazi territorial policies'. Such an interest is more 
limited in the case of the Italian expansionist policies, whose "flexibility" and 
constant re- orientation have been widely seen as reflections of an unprincipled, non - 
ideological handling of foreign affairs. The examples of A. J. P. Taylor, I. 
Kirkpatrick and D. M. Smith are indicative of a historiographical trend which had its 
roots in the polemical accounts of G. Salvemini but was subsequently pushed to 
extremes in its depiction of Mussolini's regime as the apotheosis of propaganda 
without substance or conviction'. However, the uncertainty about the role of ideology 
in shaping fascist foreign policies simply reproduces the lack of consensus that 
underlies the theory of foreign relations in this field; a lack of consensus that 
originates no less from the elusiveness of the concept of ideology, upon which such a 
theory is constructed. 
In this sense, the comparative stance of this study, and its focus on Italy 
and Germany as legitimate case studies for a theory of fascist expansionism, are far 
from self -evident choices. To state the obvious, namely that only the Italian and 
German interwar regimes nourished expansionist millenarian ideologies and 
possessed the material capabilities to implement them in an aggressive style, is 
completely different from claiming that fascist expansionism was derived from a 
fascist ideological commitment to territorial expansion or that such a commitment 
was a generic element of the fascist worldview. Before embarking on such a course, 
' Perfetti, P., I1 dibattito sul fascismo (Rome 1984), pp. 10ff; Organski, A. F. K., The Forms of 
Political Development (New York 1965); Payne, S., Fascism. Comparison and Definition (Madison 
1980), pp. 101 ff 
4 See, for example, Burleigh, M., Wippermann, W., The Racial State: Germany, 1933 -1945 
(Cambridge 1991); Epstein, K., "A New Study of Fascism ", in Turner, H. A. Jr. (ed.), Reappraisals 
of Fascism (New York 1975), pp. 2 -25 
Salvemini, G., Dal Patto di Londra alla Pace di Roma (Turin 1925); Mussolini Diplomatico (Bari 
1952); Preludio alla seconda guerra mondiale (Milan 1967), also translated in English as Prelude 
to the Second World War (London 1953); Taylor, A. J. P., The Origins of the Second World War 
(London 1961); Kirkpatrick, I. S., Mussolini. Study of a Demagogue (London 1964); Mack Smith, 
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however, it is vital to consider two pivotal methodological prerequisites. First, why it 
is meaningful to re- establish the validity of a generic concept of "fascism ", which in 
itself legitimises a comparative approach to its different - and idiosyncratic - 
manifestations. Second, why the scope of such an approach should be limited to 
these two countries - Italy and Germany - and to that specific span of time - the 
interwar period. 
II: The validity of a comparative approach to fascism: Italy and 
Germany 
In one of his last writings, Tim Mason criticised the lack of a "longer 
historiographical perspective" in the recent studies on National Socialism. The 
"decline of the Fascist paradigm ", he argued, and the emphasis on the singularity of 
the Nazi regime have obscured the fact that "National Socialism was a peculiar part 
of something larger "6. In a similar vein, Ernst Nolte concluded one of his most 
ambiguous and controversial papers by berating the futility of the recent trend in 
historiography to "demonise" National Socialism, presenting it as "unique, singular" 
and unparalleled in every respect'. Notwithstanding the dubious methodological and 
historical validity of his analysis', Nolte expressed a reservation towards the direction 
of research on National Socialism, a reservation which was reiterated by Mason: 
D., Italy: A Modern History (Aim Harbor 1969); Mussolini (London 1981); Mussolini's Roman 
Empire (London 1982) 
6 Mason, T., "Whatever Happened to Fascism ", in Childers, T., Caplan, J. (eds.), Reevaluating the 
Third Reich (New York & London 1993), pp. 254 -60 
Nolte, E., "Between Myth and Revisionism? The Third Reich in the Perspective of the 1980s ", in 
Koch, H. W. (ed.), Aspects of the Third Reich (Houndmills & London 1985), pp. 17 -38, and Das 
Europäische Bürgerkrieg, 1917 -1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschevismus (Berlin 1987) 
For a criticism of the methodological and analytical validity of Nolte's recent work, see Evans, R. J., 
In Hitler's Shadow. West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past 
(London 1989), pp. 24 -46. Note also Nolte's role in the Historikerstreit, as recorded in Knowlton, 
J., Cates, T. (eds.), Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? Original Documents of the Historikerstreit, the 
Controversy concerning the Singularity of the Holocaust (New Jersey 1993), pp. 1 -15, 149 -54; and 
in Kühn!, R. (ed.), Vergangenheit, die nicht vergeht (Cologne 1987) 
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namely, that focus on the genocidal and destructive aspects of National Socialism 
"makes critical distance [from fascism] more difficult "9. 
Where the two approaches radically diverge, however, is in their 
prescriptions for the broadening of the research focus. While Nolte's main objective 
was to relativise the destructive force of National Socialism by locating precedents 
and antecedents outside the context of the fascist regimes, Mason called for 
constructive comparisons in the framework of a generic `fascist" paradigm. The 
significance of his analysis, however, lies in his suggestions for the content and 
sample of such a comparative approach. Mason does not express nostalgia for the 
traditional definitions of generic "fascism" (for example, the "totalitarian" approach). 
The revival of the "fascist" paradigm for him has to be constructed upon a new 
conceptual basis that would guarantee the soundness and validity of comparison. In 
this respect, there is only one candidate for a comparative analysis of National 
Socialism: the under -explored reservoir of Italian fascism. Nolte's comparisons with 
such disparate cases as Pol Pot's Cambodia and the slaughter of the Armenians are 
"extraneous to any serious discussion of Nazism; Mussolini's Italy is not" I°. 
The demise of the "fascist" paradigm resulted from two completely 
different needs. The first, paradoxically, was a methodological prerequisite for a 
fruitful comparative analysis of fascism: namely, the demand for broader empirical 
research on the various aspects of each "fascist" regime. The second, however, 
emanated from the disorientation and mystification that the traditional comparative 
theories of fascism had generated. Lack of clarity about the nature and content of 
fascism resulted in a number of comparative studies, whose insufficiently justified 
sample of case studies left the concept of "fascism" in disarray ". The "totalitarian" 
approach focused on the political features of fascism as regime (i.e. Italy and 
Germany), but then subjected it to a broader definition which dovetailed with aspects 
of such a disparate socio- political phenomenon as communism''. Nolte's Three 
9 Mason, "Whatever Happened to Fascism ", pp. 255f. See also Payne, S. G., A History of Fascism, 
1914 -45 (London 1997) 
1° Mason, "Whatever Happened to Fascism ", p. 260; Evans, R. J., In Hitler's Shadow, pp. 25 -46, 86 -7 
The conceptual confusion about fascism is discussed in Griffin, Nature of Fascism, pp. 4 -8 
12 See, amongst others, Arendt, H., The Origins of Totalitarianism (London 1967, 3rd ed.); Friedrich, 
K. (ed.), Totalitarianism (Camridge Mass. 1954); Friedrich, K., Brzezinski, Z. K., Totalitarian 
Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge Mass. 1956); Schapiro, L., Totalitarianism (London 
12 
Introduction 
Faces of Fascism provided an insightful account of the ideological similarities 
between the Italian and German regimes, only to obfuscate his paradigm by including 
Action Française in his analysis13. The ideological affinities notwithstanding, the 
weaknesses of his generic definition are obvious. If "fascism" is a broad ideological 
phenomenon, then why are other case -studies excluded (Austria, Britain etc.)'4? If, on 
the other hand, "fascism" is both ideology and action, movement and regime, then 
why is Action Française comparable to the Italian and German regimes? Similarly, 
the all -inclusive studies of the 1960s and 1970s offered insight into numerous 
intricate aspects of fascism, but at the same time undermined its generic value 
through an excessive broadening of the sample". 
Finally, "fascism" suffered another stretch, this time more far -reaching 
and detrimental to its conceptual specificity. Instead of concentrating on fascism's 
historic (epochal) dimension - i.e. fascism as the result of the interwar crisis in 
Europe that established it as a dominant ideological and political force in the 1919- 
1945 period16 -, a number of works demolished chronological and geographical limits 
in favour of a much broader ideological definition of fascism as a universal and 
diachronic case. The introduction of terms like "proto- fascism ", "non- European 
fascism" and "post -1945 fascism ", however, has not simply been the result of the 
expanded focus. It also rests upon a fundamentally a- historical conception of 
fascism. This approach might have been useful in shedding light on the 
psychological" and social foundations of fascism'', but it also bears two highly 
1973). For a recent, interesting comparison between Nazism and Stalinism see Kershaw, I., Lewin, 
M. (eds.), Stalinism and Nazism. Dictatorships in Comparison (Cambridge 1997) 
" Nolte, E., Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche. Die Action Française, der Italienische Faschismus, 
der Nationalsozialismus (Munich 1963), and in English translation, Three Faces of Fascism. Italian 
Fascism, Action Française, National Socialism (London 1965) 
" Many of these cases are discussed in the anthology of Rogger, H., Weber, E. (eds.), The European 
Right (Berkeley 1966) 
is See, for example, Woolf, S. J. (ed.), European Fascism (London 1968), and The Nature of Fascism 
(London 1968); Larsen, S. U., Hagtvet, B., Myklebust, J. P. (eds.), Who Were the Fascists? Social 
Roots of European Fascism (Bergen, Oslo, Tromso 1980); Mosse, G. L. (ed.), International 
Fascism (London 1979); Hayes, P. (ed.), Fascism (London 1973); Turner, "Fascism and 
Modernisation" 
16 Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism 
" Reich, W., The Mass Psychology of Fascism (New York 1946); Gurvitch, G., Les cadres sociaux de 
la connaissance (Paris 1966); Theweleit, K., Male Fantasies, vol. II: Male bodies: psychoanalyzing 
the White Terror (Cambridge 1989) 
18 Lipset, S. M., Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics (London 1963); Lasswell, H. D., "The 
Psychology of Hitlerism ", Political Quarterly, 4 (1933), pp. 374 -84; Germani, G., 
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ambiguous implications. Either fascism is an ideological -political potential in every 
society, regardless of different social, economic and political conditions19; or it is a 
stage of political development, an extreme form of the authoritarian model, which 
many societies undergo in one way or another'. These are extremely intriguing 
assumptions, but they fail to account for the baffling appeal, popularity and 
destructiveness of fascism in the interwar period. 
Yet, in the face of the unpopularity of comparative analysis, there have 
been systematic attempts to provide the kind of comparison that Mason suggested. 
The Italian and German regimes have become the focus of some comparative 
approaches to fascism in the 1980s and 1990s. S. Payne's work21, R. A. H. 
Robinson's studies on European fascism72 and, more recently, De Grand's and R. 
Bessel's comparative analyses' have placed the discussion of a generic concept of 
"fascism" on a more sound theoretical platform. Bessel's effort, especially, divulges 
through its title the challenge and power of the suggested comparative approach: 
namely, that there is as much to learn about the nature of fascism from the 
similarities as from the differences in the ideology and policy of the "fascist 
regimes ". R. Griffin's authoritative study The Nature of Fascism (1994) has built 
confidently upon this dual significance of comparison. Griffin constructs a clear and 
elaborate "ideological minimum" for a fascist paradigm (a "palingenetic" form of 
extreme nationalism in the context of liberal crisis), and then tests its validity against 
the different representations of this minimum in the various fascist movements and 
regimes'. In spite of a debatable broadening of focus to extra -European and post - 
1945 phenomena, the author devotes most space to the Italian and German fascisms, 
Autoritarianismo, fascismo e classi sociali (Bologna 1975), and "Fascism and Social Class ", in 
Woolf (ed.)., The Nature of Fascism, pp. 65 -96 
'Reich, preface 
`0 Mannheim, K., Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (New York 
1966) 
21 Payne, S., Fascism. Comparison and Definition (Madison 1980); A History of Fascism, 1914 -1945 
(London 1997) 
22 Robinson, R. A. H., Fascism in Europe, 1919 -1945 (London 1981), and Fascism: The International 
Phenomenon (London 1995) 
23 De Grand, A. J., Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: The fascist' style of rule (London & New York 
1995); Bessel, R. (ed.), Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Comparisons and Contrasts (Cambridge 
1996) 
24 Griffin, Nature of Fascism, pp. 26 -55 
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thus acknowledging their primary relevance to any discussion of a generic concept of 
"fascism ". 
In the field of foreign policy, the limits of the comparative sample have 
somehow been determined by history itself in a de facto manner. Of all potentially 
"fascist" regimes only the Italian, German and Japanese systematically pursued 
expansionist policies. It was, however, the earlier convergence between the former 
two, and their closer political co- operation in promoting the goal of a new territorial 
map in Europe, that has focused the attention to the Italian and German cases. E. 
Wiskemann's work has underlined the significance of the German- Italian alliance for 
the implementation of the fascist "new order'''. In a similar vein, J. Petersen's study 
has examined the origins of the two regimes' politico- ideological convergence in 
1933 -36 and provides insight into the nature of the Axis alliance, while F. W. Deakin 
has focused on the significance of the alliance during the Second World War'. Yet, 
for these comparative -and many other singular - studies, Axis expansionism 
reflected the triumph of Nazi ideology and policies over a weaker Italian regime that 
was dragged to aggression and war against its alleged political intentions. In this 
respect, the work of M. Knox is unique in its analysis of the expansionist penchant of 
the Italian and German regimes". Knox has pinpointed the origins of this common 
propensity in comparable ideological traditions of indigenous nationalism, in the 
personal visions of the two leaders, as well as in the idiosyncratic circumstances of 
the interwar period in the two countries. He has also formulated a common 
theoretical framework which helps to incorporate expansionism into the internal 
logic of the two regimes. The political and ideological relevance of expansion is 
established here in two ways: first, horizontally, as a common denominator between 
the two regimes' Weltanschauungen; and second, vertically, combining the 
propensity for territorial expansion with the desire for conquest of the domestic 
'S Wiskemann, Rome -Berlin Axis (London 1966, 2nd), and Fascism in Italy (London & Basingstoke 
1970, 2nd) 
26 Petersen, J., Hitler und Mussolini. Die Entstehung der Achse Berlin -Rom 1933 -1936 (Tübingen 
1973); Deakin, F. W., The Brutal Friendship. Mussolini, Hitler and the Fall of Italian Fascism 
(London 1962) 
27 Knox, M., "Conquest, Domestic and Foreign, in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany ", Journal of 
Modern Histomy, 56 (1984), pp. 1 -57; Ibid., "Expansionist Zeal, Fighting Power, and Staying Power 




system. Knox's thesis, granting equal gravity to the ideological value and political 
functionality of expansion in the Italian and German cases, provides a strong defence 
for the value of a comparison between them. However, at the same time, it does not 
revolve around a solid definition of its generic concept of "fascism ". In this sense, it 
is somehow reminiscent of the traditional justification for such a comparison: 
namely, that we should examine together the expansionist policies of the two regimes 
simply because they seem comparable, served similar political functions or were 
pursued concurrently. 
This study aims to examine fascist expansionism in each regime on two 
levels: first, as ideology, both in its links with long -term traditions in the two 
societies since unification and in its relevance to specific "fascist" values; second, as 
a process of translating intentions into action through the influence of domestic and 
international factors. The unique expression of expansionism as both thought and 
action under the two regimes sets them apart from other quasi fascist cases, where 
expansion remained a utopian ideology or was practised outside the framework of a 
coherent ideological system. In this sense, comparison provides an opportunity to test 
two hypotheses - first, whether the two regimes' idiosyncratic propensity for 
territorial expansion and their expansionist policies were underpinned by specifically 
"fascist" ideas; and, second, whether expansionism can be regarded as a major 
feature of a generic fascist worldview. 
III: Ideology and action: a puzzling relation 
The dualism between ideology and action constitutes a pivotal element of 
the fascist systems, not only in the sphere of foreign policy, but in every aspect of 
fascist thought and policy. Yet, the nature of this dual relation in fascism has 
traditionally been an area of heated controversy and debate. Again, the origins of this 
controversy lay in a general lack of consensus about the role of ideology in the 
process of foreign policy -making. In spite of many attempts to present the ideology - 
action problem in fascist regimes as a special feature of "fascism ", this debate 
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remains part of a wider discussion on domestic and foreign policy- making. 
Perceiving fascist foreign policy as an extreme expression of this theoretical problem 
might satisfy intentions to mythify or demonise fascism as a completely unique 
phenomenon. It does not provide, however, a constructive methodological point of 
departure. The intricate relation of ideology and action is not the exclusive privilege 
of the study of fascist foreign policies; it is, in fact, not even limited to the theory of 
foreign policy in general. Instead, it remains a philosophical and political riddle in all 
systems and spheres of policy, domestic and foreign'. Fascism enters the debate as 
an aspect - however unique - of the wider problem, in the same way that fascism is in 
itself an aspect of our social, political and ideological history. 
Two different debates - the first about the programmatic or 
opportunistic /diversionary character of fascist foreign policies, the second about the 
continuities of fascist expansionist policies with previous aspirations - have 
dominated our perceptions of the fascist phenomenon. We may dismiss their crude 
polarisation and cut across their artificial barriers, but we can neither disregard it nor 
refrain from using their terminology as a point of reference. Aspects of the debates 
are discussed in the following chapters79. Fascist foreign policy - and expansionism 
in particular - have attracted extensive attention in the context of the debate. This 
popularity has provided a pluralism of interpretations, sharpened the research focus 
and enhanced our empirical knowledge of the subject. It has not, however, 
contributed to conceptual clarity or theoretical elaboration. Polarisation fuelled 
extremes on both sides of the debate. The result was a model, in which ideology and 
action are either linked in a linear way (i.e. cause -effect) or form two unrelated 
categories. The former thesis echoes the obsession of the "programmatic" approaches 
with ideology as the principal guide for action, despite the impact of domestic 
limitations and international developments30. The latter thesis reflects an attempt to 
deconstruct the cult of fascist ideology - in a way, however, that virtually divests 
action from a long -term relevance to deep- rooted beliefs and long -term aspirations. 
28 Thompson, J. B., Studies in the Theory of Ideology (Oxford 1984), pp. 173 -204 
zv See below, introductions to Chs. 2, 4, 5, 7 
30 See, amongst others, Jäckel, E., Hitlers Weltanschauung. Entwurf einer Herrschaft (Tübingen 
1969), translated in English as Hitler's Weltanschauung: A Blueprint for Power (Middletown 
Connecticut 1972); Trevor -Roper, H. R., "Hitlers Kriegsziele ", Vierte jahrshefte fair Zeitgeschichte, 
8 (1960), pp. 121 -33 
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At the same time, more moderate approaches appeared to have escaped the tyranny 
of the two extremes, but were often too eclectic to formulate an alternative theory 
about the ideology- action problem. 
The debate about the programmatic or not character of fascist foreign 
policies has performed an important historiographical role - along with similar 
controversies in other areas of research - in encouraging constructive exchanges on 
the role of ideology in foreign policy- making, but it seems to have almost exhausted 
its raison d' être. The elaboration and eclecticism in the arguments of the more 
recent studies reflect the theoretical poverty of the debate's initial polarisation. This 
does not mean that the basic theoretical issue that fuelled the debate (i.e. the 
ideology- action dualism) has lost its pertinence to the study of fascism - and of 
fascist expansionism, in particular. The calls to transgress the limited horizons of the 
debate show that a more constructive approach to the ideology- action problem is still 
needed and wanting. These calls simply betray an underlying belief that new answers 
lie in a more flexible conception of the role of ideology and action in fascist regimes. 
Testing the putative ideological character of fascist foreign policy on a day -to -day 
basis blurs awareness of the long -term purported significance and consistency of a 
set of pivotal expansionist aspirations. Conversely, rigid emphasis on the long -term 
dimension of fascist ideology may produce misleading conclusions about the 
importance of domestic and external forces which affected the foreign policy -making 
of the two regimes at specific historic conjunctures. 
The key to a more coherent and flexible approach to the ideology- action 
problem lies in a better understanding of the nature and function of ideology itself. 
On a general level, an ideological system consists of two equally important time 
dimensions. The first pertains to the past and present, and offers an analysis of what 
has happened and what is happening. In this way, it codifies past developments and 
assesses their utility or benefits. At the same time, it crystallises a value- system and a 
utopian vision which reflects a society with all those elements that have been deemed 
advantageous, and freed from past features that have been rejected in the previous 
analysis. The second dimension regards the future as a prescription: what is desirable 
to happen, again on the grounds of the previous analysis. The prescription is 
formulated with a view to achieving the "ideal" society, but is also located in the 
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present, in the sense that it offers certain solutions to current grievances and 
establishes the prerequisites for a long -term process of improvement31. The major 
difference between the first and the second function of an ideological system is 
simply the difference between norm and operation. While norm is rooted in theory, 
operation is a category of action. In this respect, an ideological system contains an 
analysis, a general plan for action and a utopia as the end -result, all in a cohesive 
unity. 
Having said that, ideology is definitely not a detailed scheme for action'. 
Its "catch -all" character, the vast chronological span of its two dimensions and its 
link with utopia, render it a long -term phenomenon, an ideal -type. It reflects an 
idiosyncratic interpretation of historic evolution and suggests a long -term pattern of 
intervention to it, in order to promote the objectives it has prescribed as beneficial. It 
is related to action, but not on a linear, day -to -day basis33. Ideology provides hints to 
regulate and guide short-term developments, but cannot predict or prescribe them, 
since these are not the results of calculated actions and intentions of a single agent, 
but rather the cumulative outcomes of the interaction and conflict between many 
agents and their incompatible prescriptions. This is why no single agent can hope to 
forge these developments alone. Predictions fail, actions fall short of expectations, 
plans are superseded by events and different agents are often not capable of 
promoting their objectives in favourable circumstances. In this sense, ideological 
systems per se can neither prescribe nor determine actions on a short -term basis. 
They generate options which allude to long -term objectives, but the ultimate choice 
for short-term actions and strategies is left to the agents' judgement34. Since these 
agents are not alone, either on the domestic or the international level, their decisions 
are both active and reactive: to produce conditions that favour the realisation of their 
objectives; and to respond to existing domestic and international developments. This 
is essentially what Marx implied when he concluded that "[mien make their own 
31 On this definition of ideology see Seliger, M., Ideology and Politics (London 1976), pp. 119ff; 
Smith, W. D., The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism (Oxford 1986), pp. 13ff; Duchacek, I., 
The Territorial Dimensions of Politics Within, Among and Across Nations (Boulder & London 
1986), pp. 30 -1 
3' Duchacek, p. 32 
" Thompson, J. B., Studies in the Theory of Ideology, pp. 79ff 
19 
Introduction 
history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under 
circumstances chosen by themselves but under circumstances directly encountered, 
given and transmitted from the past ''. 
These observations are extremely pertinent to the understanding of the 
ideology- action problem in the field of foreign policy. They remind us that the ability 
of a given agent to promote their ideological visions is determined not just by the 
strength of their ideological commitment to a set of general goals, but also by the 
agent's dominant or not position domestically and internationally. The "primacy -of- 
domestic- policy" thesis established the interconnection between internal and foreign 
affairs, as well as their complementary functions. At the same time, the study of 
international relations placed the foreign policies of individual states in a wider 
framework, by which their policies were greatly defined, expressed and constrained. 
This is why it is misguided to exclude any of these elements (domestic 
circumstances, international developments, ideological traditions, actions) from the 
examination of a regime's foreign policy. This is also why changes in the handling of 
foreign affairs reflect the constant fluidity of the context of foreign policy -making, 
but not necessarily a lack of ideological substance in the long term. Foreign policy 
remains one aspect - albeit pivotal - of a regime's ideology and practice. It has indeed 
its own internal logic and function, but serves goals complementary with domestic 
policy and is also influenced by a plethora of other factors. In this respect, it is both 
an autonomous system of thought and action, as well as part of a wider effort to 
translate an ideological vision into action and reality. It is autonomous because it 
involves a clash of interests and aspirations between major political units (i.e. 
nations, blocs, empires) in the international system, between groups and individuals 
sponsoring different ideals and views. Yet, foreign policy is only a part of an 
ideological system's prescriptions for future action. It might serve autonomous long- 
term objectives, but their functionality should eventually complement or assist 
domestic achievements (e.g. the welfare of the nation; the prestige or legitimacy of 
the regime). 
34 Cf. Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, pp. 125 -30; and, in a wider theoretico- philosophical context, 
Althusser, L., Essays in Self- Criticism (London 1976), pp. 119 -25 
Marx, K., Engels, F., Selected Writings, vol. 11: Marx and Engels: 1851 -53 (London 1979), p. 103 
20 
Introduction 
Fascism could not form an exception to this general model. To suggest that 
the Italian Fascist and the Nazi regimes dealt with the ideology- action problem in a 
radically different way could be meaningful only if fascism had evolved in a 
domestic and international vacuum. This was not the case, however. Fascist ideology 
was rooted in radical nationalist tradition, acquiring its radical character in opposition 
to existing ideologies (as a reaction to crisis) and in recasting nationalist themes3''. In 
many ways, as S. Payne has argued, it presupposed a reservoir of latent radicalism in 
autochthonous nationalist beliefs and a sense of collective frustration or 
humiliation37. It was a "nationalism plus" ideology'', not just rejecting current values 
(e.g. liberalism, socialism, conservatism) but also developing previous ideas and 
aspirations (e.g. elitism, imperial nostalgia) into a new synthesis, updated with more 
recent experiences (war, the postwar crisis, fear of communism- Bolshevism). The 
fascist leaderships were admitted to power on the basis of compromise, initially at 
least, depending on the expertise of traditional non -fascist figures and groups - in the 
armed forces, economy, administration, diplomacy etc. The struggle of the PNF 
( Partito Nazionale Fascista, National Fascist Party) and the NSDAP 
( Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, National Socialist German Workers' 
Party) for political supremacy reflected exactly the difficulties that the two fascist 
leaderships faced in attempting to pursue their special objectives. By the same token, 
the "fascistisation" of the two systems depended on the two leaderships' eventual 
success in overpowering domestic opposition, but was in itself a strategy to achieve a 
new political and social constellation that was still wanting. On the international 
level, the tone of foreign affairs was not set by the fascist regimes but by the powers 
that had guaranteed the Versailles settlement and still had a commanding role in 
sanctioning any changes to it (i.e. mainly Britain and France). Alone or in the context 
of the Axis alliance, the fascist regimes were still pursuing anti -systemic objectives 
in the inauspicious circumstances of appeasement and peaceful revisionism. Only in 
36 Griffin, Nature of Fascism, pp. 56 -63, 85 -94; Hamilton, A., The Appeal of Fascism. A Study of 
Intellectuals and Fascism 1919 -1945 (London 1971); Alatri, P., Le origini del fascismo (Rome 
1963); Mosse, G. L., Nazi Culture. Intellectual, Cultural and Social Life in the Third Reich (New 
York 1966), and The Crisis of German Ideology (London 1966); Stern, F., The Politics of Cultural 
Despair (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1961) 
37 Payne, History of Fascism, pp. 240 -56 
38 Birken, L., Hitler as Philosophe. Remnants of the Enlightenment in National Socialism (Westport, 
Connecticut & London 1995), esp. pp. 40 -1 
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the context of war were these impediments removed, but by that time the two 
regimes had to face a different set of obstacles - concerted opposition, limited 
resources, defeat and finally collapse. 
IV: The plan of the study 
The general theoretical direction of this study is to analyse expansionism 
in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany as a version of the ideology- action problem. Equal 
consideration is given to the elements that underpinned the ideology of expansionism 
in each regime, and to its practical expression as foreign policy. The thesis analyses 
fascism as a "nationalism plus" phenomenon, which blended radical elements of 
each country's nationalist tradition with a specific novel commitment to a fascist new 
order. In this sense, a conjunction of comparative analysis of fascism with a similar 
analysis of national history in the long durée is needed. The thesis examines the three 
levels in which fascist expansionism was expressed - expansion as ideology; 
expansion and foreign policy- making; expansion as a joint enterprise for a fascist 
new order. On the level of ideology, it examines the ideological traditions in the 
Italian and German post -unification societies and shows how fascist ideology 
achieved an ideological fusion of pre- existing radical traits in a new synthesis with an 
increased emphasis on action and a determination to unite reality with utopia 
(Chapter 1). It also studies the expansionist ideologies of the two fascist movements - 
regimes as coherent systems of thought, with a number of similar underlying features 
(historic living space, elitism, cult of violence, unity of thought and action) which 
explain the rigidity and dynamism of the expansionist arguments in Italian and 
German fascism (Chapter 2). In order to examine whether there is an "ideological 
minimum" of fascist expansionism in the two regimes' ideologies, the ideas and 
pronouncements of the two leaders are examined as official expressions of 
commonly held fascist values and beliefs. 
On the level of foreign policy -making, the thesis analyses the domestic 
framework of foreign -policy making. It lays emphasis on the leader- oriented 
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character of the two fascist systems, which led to the relegation of other powerful 
groups (traditional élites, fascist parties) to a functional status subject to the will of 
the leader. It assesses, however, the efforts of such groups to shape the foreign 
policies of each regime. Particular attention is paid to the ideological and political 
interaction between the two leaders and prominent fascist figures, highlighting the 
latters' attempts to influence, re- interpret or alter the regimes' official foreign 
policies as formulated by the leaders (Chapter 3). It also examines the practical forms 
of the two regimes' expansionist foreign policy (i.e. revisionism, colonialism, 
irredentism) and shows how ideology provided only a long -term framework for 
expansion. Lack of clear short- and medium -term strategies rendered the fascist 
foreign policies extremely flexible and opportunistic, alert to external opportunities 
and unbound by prior commitments (Chapter 4). 
On the level of interaction, the thesis emphasises the neglected 
importance of the exclusive relation between the two fascist regimes for the 
radicalisation of their expansionist policies in the second half of the 1930s. It 
examines the process of fascism's internationalisation and analyses how both rivalry 
and co- operation between the two fascist regimes contributed to the radicalisation of 
their expansionist objectives and policies (Chapter 5). 
War accentuated all the above tendencies and aspirations of the two 
fascist regimes. In 1940 -41 they embarked upon the realisation of their extreme 
expansionist visions in a final attempt to unite reality with utopia. Failure, however, 
to balance means with ends and to achieve an effective form of domestic and 
international co- ordination transformed an ideological campaign into desperate war - 
making, pushing fascism to its eventual collapse in 1943 -45 (Chapter 6). 
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CHAPTER 1 
Expansionism in post- unification Italy and Germany 
until the First World War: on the ideological and political 
origins of fascist expansionism 
I: Introduction 
Undoubtedly, the fascist episode has dominated the postwar debate about the 
course of modern Italian and German history. The domestic and international impact 
of fascist policies drew attention to the conditions which facilitated the appeal of 
fascism in the two countries, and to the factors which contributed to the radicalisation 
of its ideology and political practices. In the first two decades after the war the debate 
concentrated mainly on the various short-term circumstances of the interwar period: 
the impact of the First World War, the economic crises of the 1920s and early 1930s, 
the failure of the democratic systems, and the gradual destabilisation of the European 
state -system. In this sense, fascism was depicted as a violent, idiosyncratic response 
to the unique stimuli of the 1920s and 1930s, with little political relevance to the 
long -term developments in the post -unification history of the two states. The 
traumatic experience of the Second World War produced a psychological tendency to 
discredit fascism completely, to present it as an aberration due to short-term 
anomalies, and to place the whole fascist chapter in a historic parenthesis'. 
For the thesis that fascism marks a break with the past see for Italy: Procacci, G., "Appunti in tema 
di crisi dello stato liberale e di origini del fascismo ", Studi Storici, 6 (1965), pp. 221 -37; Vivarelli, 
R., Il dopoguerra in Italia e l'avvento del fascismo(1918- 1922), vol. 1: Dalla fine della guerra 
all'impresa di Fiume (Naples 1967). Cf. Tranfaglia, N., Dallo stato liberale al regime fascista 
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The idea that a certain degree of continuity existed between the fascist 
phenomenon and the pre -1918 history of the two societies was a rather uneasy 
concession to make, especially for Italian and German historians, in the immediate 
postwar period. Outside Italy and Germany, however, an increasing interest 
developed in the interpretation of fascism as the outcome of the ideological and 
social development of the two countries after their unifications. This tendency was 
stronger in the case of Germany, because the Reich was widely held to be responsible 
for the outbreak of the two world wars, but it was also amplified with reference to 
Italy after the crucial role of the Fascist regime in paving the way for the Axis and, 
eventually, for war. Consequently, the focus moved to the continuity of an aggressive 
expansionist ideological tradition, evident in Italy and Germany since the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century'. At the same time, the "primacy -of- domestic- policy" thesis 
directed attention to the development of long -term authoritarian structures in the two 
political systems, to the crisis of the Italian and German traditional élites, and to the 
dynamic mobilisation of a large section of Italian and German voters towards either 
socialism or radical nationalism'. 
This revisionist approach to the problem of how to historicise fascism 
reached its peak with the so- called "Fischer controversy'. The idea that Nazism 
might have simply exaggerated intentions and aspirations which had dominated 
(Milan 1973). For Germany see Hiden, J., Germany and Europe 1919 -1939 (London 1977), pp. 24- 
44 and 158 -163 
2 There is ample bibliography on the issue of continuity in German and Italian foreign policies. 
Amongst others, see Hillgruber, A., Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in der deutschen Aussenpolitik 
von Bismarck bis Hitler (Düsseldorf 1969); Smith, W. D., The Ideological Origins of Nazi 
Imperialism (Oxford 1986), esp. Chs. 4, 5, 9, 10; Nipperdey, T., "1933 and Continuity of German 
History", in Koch, H. W. (ed.), Aspects of the Third Reich (Houndmills & London 1985), pp. 489- 
508; Jarausch, K., "From Second to Third Reich. The Problem of Continuity in German Foreign 
Policy ", Central European History, 12 (1979), pp. 68 -82 
3 For the "primacy of domestic affairs" thesis see Kehr, E., Der Primat der Innenpolitik (Berlin 1965), 
pp. 152 -6. For a discussion see Mommsen, W. J., "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy 
before 1914 ", in Sheehan, J. J. (ed.), Imperial Germany (New York & London 1976), pp. 223 -68; 
Doyle, M. W., Empires (Ithaca & London 1986), pp. 320, 326f; Germani, G., "Fascism and Social 
Class ", in Woolf, S. J. (ed.), The Nature of Fascism (London 1968), pp. 65 -96 
° See Fischer, F., War of Illusions. German Policies from 1911 to 1914 (London 1975); ibid., 
Germany's Aims in the First World War (New York 1967); Weltmacht oder Niedergang. 
Deutschland irn Ersten Weltkrieg (Frankfurt 1965); and From Kaiserreich to Third Reich (London 
1979). For a discussion of the problems involved in the "Fischer controversy" see Moses, J. A., The 
Politics of Illusion. The Fischer Controversy in German Historiography (London 1975); Eley, G., 
From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past (Boston, London & Sydney 1986), 
pp. 2 -8; Mommsen, W. J., "The Debate on German War Aims ", Journal of Contemporary History, 1 
(1966), pp. 47 -72 
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German policies since Bismarck, had a tremendous impact on German 
historiography, giving rise to acrimonious debates such as the Fischer -Ritter 
exchange clearly demonstrated. In Italy, the notion of continuity between liberal and 
Fascist foreign policy has been an even more sensitive suggestion, given the 
ideological tendency of anti -Fascist tradition to present Fascism as an ephemeral 
aberration of national history. When the Australian historian R. J. B. Bosworth 
alluded to a clear line of continuity between liberal and Fascist expansionism, there 
was an angry reaction and vehement criticism from a series of Italian historians in 
defence of the singularity of Fascism'. At the same time, a new aspect of the fascist 
problem attracted considerable attention: what were the long -term similarities in 
post -unification Italian and German societies that rendered them, and them alone, so 
vulnerable to the fascist appeal'? Despite the differences in the level of economic 
development, as well as in the social and political structures of the two countries, the 
fact that they shared the experiences of late state -formation and belated 
modernisation may shed new light on their common destiny in the interwar years. 
The attempt to fit the parallel emergence of fascism in interwar Italy and Germany 
into a single pattern of historic evolution has produced similar controversies about 
the extent of the long -term similarities between the two countries. Taking into 
account the significant differences in the economic and social conditions between 
Italy and Germany, it seems that the "late-corners" theory has provided a better 
starting point for the understanding of the similar long -term propensity of the two 
systems for territorial expansion than the theories of uneven economic or political 
development'. Expansion was a means of both accelerating the pace of domestic 
development, enhancing the international prestige of the "late-corners", and breaking 
Bosworth, R. J. B, "Italian foreign policy and its historiography ", in Bosworth, R. J. B., Rizzo, G. 
(eds.), Altro polo. Intellectuals and their Ideas in contemporary Italy (Sydney 1983), pp. 52 -96; The 
Italian Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism 
(London & New York 1998). On the anti -fascist tradition in Italian historiography see Zapponi, N., 
"Fascism in Italian Historiography, 1986 -93: a Fading National Identity ", Journal of Contemporary 
History, 29 (1994), pp. 547 -68 
6 Griffin, R. D., The Nature of Fascism (London & New York 1994), pp. 221 -5 
For a discussion of this theory see Hiden, J., Farquharson, J., Explaining Hitler's Germany (Totowa, 
New Jersey 1983), pp. 158ff; and, generally, Kershaw, I., Weimar: Why Did German Democracy 
Fail? (London 1990); Baglieri, J., "Italian fascism and the crisis of liberal hegemony ", in Larsen, S. 
U., Hagtvet, B., Myklebust, J. P. (eds.), Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism 
(Bergen 1980), pp. 318 -36 
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free from the limitations (political, economic, geographical) that their belated arrival 
had placed upon them. 
There are, however, questions that the above theory cannot answer 
convincingly. The experience of national unification and state -formation might have 
resulted in common tendencies in the two countries, but it cannot account by itself 
for their whole post -unification fate, their striking obsession with the idea of 
territory, or the gradual radicalisation of the scope of their expansionist aspirations. 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the ideological and political origins of fascism 
expansionism by analysing territorial expansion as a long -term tendency and 
tradition in the post -unification history of the two countries. It illustrates that the 
emergence of a similar territorially expansionist culture in the modern Italian and 
German states is attributable not simply to their late arrival in the European system, 
but also to the specific pattern of their state -formation (territorial unification). This 
experience produced a long -term accentuation of the importance of territory for 
political, economic, but mainly for symbolic reasons. In the years prior to the First 
World War, the acquisition of territory became synonymous with national power and 
domestic prosperity. It provided a basis for the conceptualisation of the political, 
social and economic aspirations of diverse groups in the two societies, and became a 
crucial field of confrontation both domestically (among the élite groups; between 
élites and the mobilised middle and lower classes) and internationally (between 
countries). It accounts for the radicalisation of the expansionist policies of the two 
countries in the years immediately preceding the First World War and attempts to 
construct a long -term framework which sheds light on the emergence and scope of 
fascist expansionism in the interwar period. The second part of the chapter offers a 
brief analysis of the various pre -war expansionist arguments, and shows that the 
divisions and failures in Italian and German foreign policies before 1914 further 
accentuated the long -term expansionist tendencies of the two countries instead of 
discouraging them. The idea of a territorially complete national unification, the 
evocation of the imperial Italian and German pasts, the great -power aspirations, and 
the need of the two "late- comers" to assert themselves in the international system, 
constituted the long -term ideological and political basis, upon which the pre- and 
post -war significance of the territorial issue for Italy and Germany rested. 
27 
Ideological and political origins offascist expansionism 
II. National unification and boundaries: the symbolic significance of 
territory 
The patterns of state -formation followed by Italy and Germany in the second 
half of the nineteenth century present a number of crucial similarities. First, they 
rested upon an ideological and political liberal nationalist tradition which had 
pursued the goal of national unification as the platform for domestic development 
and international power. In Italy, the Mazzinian principle of self -determination in 
1848 had given rise to the vision of a "new" republican, democratic Italy as the 
inheritor of the glorious Roman empire, with an historic mission in the 
Mediterranean area'. In Germany, the Frankfurt parliament of 1848 had emphasised 
the urgency of national unification, in order to abolish the authoritarian structures of 
the German states, to provide an efficient basis for social and economic 
modernisation, and to create a German state as a great power in the political vacuum 
at the heart of Europe. 
The second similarity concerned the character of the process of state - 
formation. In both countries, this process was instigated by one state that had 
achieved political and economic power, as well as a certain diplomatic position in the 
European system. Prussia in Germany exploited its political prestige amongst the 
smaller German states and its great military potential to achieve its goals on its own, 
while Piedmont in Italy took advantage of the antagonisms among the European 
powers in order to offset its military incapacity, which had hampered its aspirations 
in 1848/9e. In order to provide legitimacy to their expansionist plans and to their 
struggle against foreign dominators, both states invoked the principle of self - 
determination and gradually put forward the ideal of national unification. 
s On the Mazzinian vision of a "new Italy" see Mack Smith, D., Mazzini (London 1994), Chs. 7 -8; 
Griffith, G. O., Mazzini: Prophet of Modern Europe (New York 1970). For the importance of the 
Mazzinian "myth" in Italy in the first half of the 20th century see, in this study, Ch. 2, Section II 
9 See Breuilly, J., The Formation of the First German Nation- State, 1800 -1871 (Basingstoke & 
London 1996), pp. 49 -57; Gall, L., Bismarck: The White Revolutionmy (London 1986), vol. 1; 
Riall, L., The Italian Risorgimento. State, Society, and National Unification (London & New York 
1994), pp. 63 -75 
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The third similarity was related to the self -centred ambitions of Piedmont and 
Prussia. The revisionist historiography of the Risorgimento and the Vereinigung have 
long ago exposed the differences between the liberal perceptions of national 
unification and the political aspirations involved in the efforts of the two states that 
eventually led to unification in 1861 and 1871 respectively. The establishment of a 
politically unified nation -state was indeed the outcome of their long struggle against 
foreign rulers, but it was not a sine qua non of their initial plans10. The goal of 
national unification only gradually became a more feasible and desired option, 
linking the ambitions of Piedmont and Prussia for increased power with the revolt of 
the other Italian and German states, in Italy against Austria in the north, the Bourbon 
rule in the south, and the Papacy, in Germany against the Habsburg empire and 
France. The result was the creation of two states which politically represented the 
two historic nations and satisfied the criteria of a real nation -state in terms of the 
predominantly Italian/German character of their populations. Yet, in both cases, the 
goal of national unification, i.e. the inclusion of all ethnically kin groups in the 
territory of the new states, was not realised. The invocation of the principle of 
nationality was not aimed at achieving national unification; it was rather the 
justification for state -formation under the tutelage of Prussia and Piedmont, and a 
means to grant legitimacy to their plans for extending their political power in their 
regions ". When this had been achieved, the two new states declared the process of 
unification completed. They also renounced or repressed any further immediate 
territorial ambitions, in spite of the continuing existence of Italian/German 
populations outside their frontiers. Symbolically, Italy and Germany were integrated 
in the European system not in opposition to, but in alliance with, a common enemy, 
the Habsburg empire. The conclusion of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria - 
Hungary, Italy) was the purported symbol of the end of the territorial struggle in 
central Europe. 
10 Breuilly, Formation, pp. 100 -13; Hughes, M., Nationalism and Society. Germany 1800 -1945 
(London 1988), pp. 135ff; Coppa, F. J., The Origins of the Italian Wars of Independence (London & 
New York 1992), pp. 69 -111; Blumberg, A. A., A Carefully Planned Accident: The Italian War of 
1859 (London 1990) 
" Breuilly, Formation, pp. 103 -9, 112 -3; Riall, Italian Risorgimento, pp. 109ff 
29 
Ideological and political origins offascist expansionism 
A fourth similarity concerned the inflated expectations that the process of 
unification created in the various groups of the two societies, and the problems of the 
post -unification period that thwarted these expectations. From the outset, the 
establishment of a "nation- state" was seen as the necessary precondition for domestic 
development and international ascendancy. For reasons not entirely linked to the 
event of unification itself, these hopes were soon disappointed. It is not our intention 
to provide an analysis of the factors that led to the economic depression in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, or to the slow pace of social and political reform 
which left the middle and lower classes feeling even more vulnerable than before''`. 
Such was, however, the symbolic significance of the "unification" myth that these 
problems were interpreted as complications of the incomplete process of state - 
formation. Attacks on the notion of territorial saturation grew stronger and further 
expansion was gradually accepted as the ultimate means for domestic well -being and 
international prestige. Economic development was linked to a theory of neo- 
mercantilism, reflecting the idea that growth and power could not be created but only 
achieved through expansion at the expense of other states13. Finally, the social 
pressures originating from overpopulation and emigration were again associated with 
lack of resources and territory, thus prescribing further territorial expansion14 
On the international level, the great -power ambitions of the two new states 
were inevitably conceptualised in the pre- existing pattern of territorial domination, in 
Europe and overseas. Nationalism entailed a perception of power that could only be 
measured in comparison with other states of high international standing. These states, 
'2 For the impact of the economic depression of the late 19th century see the classic study by 
Rosenberg, H., Grosse Depression and Bismarckzeit. Wirtschaftsablauf, Gesellschaft and Politik in 
Mitteleuropa (Berlin 1967); and the assessment of his work by Eley, From Unification to Nazism, 
pp. 22 -41. See also Saladino, S., "Italy ", in Rogger, H., Weber, E. (eds.), The European Right. A 
Historical Profile (London 1965), pp. 209ff 
" Lichtheim, G., Imperialism (London 1971), pp. 66 -8; Kitchen, M., The Political Economy of 
Germany 1815 -1914 (Montreal 1978), p. 180; Magdoff, H., "Imperialism without colonies ", in 
Owen, R., Sutcliffe, B. (eds.), Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London 1972), pp. 146ff; Offer, 
A., The First World War. An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford 1989), pp. 8 -9 
14 On the problem of emigration see Segrè, C., Fourth Shore: The Italian Colonization of Libya 
(Chicago & London 1974), pp. 6ff; Bosworth, R., Italy and the Approach of the First World War 
(New York 1983), p. 95; Walker, M., Germany and the Emigration, 1816 -1885 (Cambridge Mass. 
1964); Mola, A. A., 1882 -1912: fare gli italiani. Una società nuova in uno stato vecchio (Turin 
1973), pp. 35 -41; Foerster, R., The Italian Emigration of our Times (Cambridge Mass. 1919); Clark, 
M., Modern Italy, 1860 -1995 (London 1996), pp. 161 -7; Smith, W. D., pp. 21ff; Borchardt, K., 
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primarily Britain and France, had long ago developed a network of colonial 
possessions that offered them protected markets, raw materials, and prestige greater 
than Italy and Germany. This had been a time -consuming process - the two new 
states had to copy the old imperial states under great pressure of time and with 
severely limited political or geographical flexibility. In this respect, the "late- comer" 
theory offers valuable insight into the importance and the problems of expansion for 
the new Italian and German states in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. On 
the one hand, the late experience of state -formation in Italy and Germany meant that 
the two unified states had to abbreviate a whole process of social, political and 
economic development - that had taken centuries in the case of their main 
competitors, i.e. Britain and France - into a few decades. This would enable them to 
compete on equal terms with them for the attainment of their great -power aspirations. 
They had also to adhere to an already existing pattern of competition amongst states 
(economic, political), to a restrictive concept of the European balance -of- power, and 
to a geographically limited sphere of potential expansion. The pressure of time meant 
that they had to hasten for the few remaining territories (the best lands had already 
been appropriated by the British, French, but also Dutch, Portuguese and Spaniards) 
before even having resolved the problems of domestic economic development and 
decided on the priorities of expansion. On the other hand, they were aware that they 
had started from a territorially underprivileged position and with a growing domestic 
pressure for establishing a commanding role in the international system. Territory 
became a sine qua non for the political ascendancy of the new states and for the 
prestige of the domestic ruling forces against the growing challenges from both left 
and radical right's. 
The prestige factor gradually overshadowed the economic significance of 
expansion, in the sense that the remaining options were not necessarily the most 
economically or geographically beneficial ones for the states, but had to be exploited 
for reasons of international competition16. Political pressure for expansion meant that 
"Germany ", in Cipolla, C. (ed.), Fontana Economic History of Europe: vol. 4: The Emergence of 
Industrial Societies (Part I) (London & Glasgow 1973), p. 123 
15 Reichman, S., Golan, A., "Irredentism and Boundary Adjustments in Post -World War I Europe ", in 
Chazan, N. (ed.), Irredentism and International Politics (Boulder & London 1991), p. 66 
16 On the inability of the Italian and German states to increase trade with their colonies see, amongst 
others, Stoecker, H., "The German Empire in Africa before 1914: General Questions ", in Stoecker 
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economic and social needs had to be adapted afterwards to the - often limited - 
opportunities offered by the seized territories. At the same time, economic 
infiltration, both in European and overseas territories (informal imperialism), was 
often seen as something more than a goal in itself. It was also a form of political 
investment for future expansion in those areas, when circumstances would be 
favourable. Economic exploitation of colonies was often a very costly enterprise, 
with little support from industrial and economic interests in the metropolis, and 
became the subject of severe criticism". Criticism was, however, mainly directed 
against ineffectual or limited expansion, not against expansion as such. Failure in one 
field simply increased the appeal of the other forms of expansion. With the exception 
of the socialist left, territorial aggrandisement remained high on every other political 
agenda. The plethora of expansionist arguments that emerged after unification in 
Italy and Germany reflected a symbolic significance of territory which was more 
important than the political or economic considerations behind expansion. 
Thus, we arrive at a widely disregarded common element which underlay the 
idiosyncratic expansionist tendencies of the two states and remained a constant long- 
term factor in the ideology of Italian and German nationalism. The process of 
national unification had not taken place in a geographical or political vacuum. In 
both cases, it involved the incorporation of populations inhabiting territories under 
foreign rule. It rested upon political control of territories and this, in turn, 
presupposed territorial conflict. Ultimately, unification entailed the expansion of 
Piedmont and Prussia at the expense of international "enemies" and against the 
opposition of domestic antagonists. At the same time, because the concept of an 
Italian of German "nation" had predated state -formation, it was extremely difficult 
for the new states to claim a real "nation- state" status once they had opted for the 
"small" territorial solutions18. As has been shown, the principle of self -determination 
(ed.), German Imperialism in Africa (London 1986), pp. 188ff; Henderson, W. O., The German 
Colonial Empire, 1884 -1919 (London 1993), pp. 149 -51, Tables 2, 4; Segrè, Fourth Shore, pp. 
184f; Anderson, M. S., The Ascendancy of Europe. Aspects of European History, 1815 -1914 
(London 1972), pp. 215f 
" Fischer, Germany's Aims, pp. 14ff; Smith, W. D., pp. 32 -40, 52ff; Webster, R. A., Industrial 
Imperialism in Italy, 1908 -1915 (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1975), passim 
18 Roseman, M., "National Socialism and Modernisation ", in Bessel, R. (ed.), Fascist Italy and Nazi 
Germany. Comparisons and Contrasts (Cambridge 1996), pp. 220 -1; Eley, From Unification to 
Nazism, pp. 61 -84 
32 
Ideological and political origins offascist expansionism 
was only a minor consideration behind the policies of Cavour and Bismarck. This 
consideration was quickly cast aside with the subsequent renunciation of the goal of 
"complete" national unification (uniting all Italian irredenta; Grossdeutschland) by 
Cavour and Bismarck. In the 1870s the two states declared their territorial "satiation" 
in Europe, despite growing awareness that the ethnically incomplete unifications had 
increased the popularity of irredentism and had produced a stronger pressure for 
expansion outside the European system. In this way, however, they did nothing to 
allay a growing feeling that, although the "nation" was the basis of state -formation, 
the state had abdicated its responsibility to incorporate all populations and territories 
which formed part of this "nation ". Voices advocating expansion and an ethnically 
and territorially "complete" unification proliferated and became increasingly vocal19 
The pressures upon the governments for tangible manifestations of national prestige, 
and the need to combat the post -unification disillusionment in the two countries 
strengthened the link between domestic and foreign policies. Territorial concessions 
came to be seen as the ultimate political and economic solution to domestic 
grievances. The fact that these aspirations were temporarily diverted to colonial 
antagonism did not preclude a return to territorial conflicts in Europe, should more 
auspicious circumstances arise. After 1900, with the gradual disintegration of the 
European balance of power, these suppressed ambitions were once again on the 
agenda and eventually led to a war that was essentially a territorial struggle on the 
continent. 
In this sense, the key -element in the propensity for expansion which 
characterised the foreign policies of Italy and Germany lay in a combination of two 
factors. First, it was the political priority of the two states to establish their 
hegemonic position by antagonising the most advanced countries or by squeezing 
concessions out of them (i.e. Italy with the Treaty of London; Germany with the 
Algeçiras Treaty, and the agreements of 1909 and 1911 regarding Morocco)'. This 
presupposed that the "late-corners" had to "catch up" with the other powers (Britain 
19 Hughes, M., pp. 142ff; Chickering, R., We Men Who Feel Most German. A Cultural Study of the 
Pan -German League, 1886 -1914 (Boston 1984), pp. 76 -7; Frymann, D.(pseydonym for H. Class), 
Wenn ich Kaiser wäre. Politische Wahrheiten und Notwendigkeiten (Leipzig 1912); Fischer, War of 
Illusions, p. 245ff 
'0 Webster, pp. 191ff 
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and France, but also Austria and Russia) in the shortest possible time and often under 
quite unfavourable domestic and international circumstances. Second, it was the 
aggressive character of their state -formation, based on a struggle to gain territory 
from other states, which survived the period of unification and permeated the foreign 
policies of the new Italian and German states. Territory was identified with the very 
existence of the nation -state. Politically, this reflected a wider conviction that 
political control over territory guaranteed domestic stability, either as a form of social 
imperialism or as "space" providing resources to help solve economic and social 
problems. Psychologically, it symbolised a tendency to view the post -unification 
period as a continuation of the unification war, of the struggle against the same 
foreign foes who had for so long denied the national existence of Italy and Germany. 
It also signified the failure of the new "states" to overcome the predominantly ethnic 
definition of "nation" and foster the idea of a "complete" nation -state. National 
territory remained a vague concept which transformed irredentist arguments into an 
open -ended commitment to expansion. 
Ill. The radicalisation of the Liberal and Wilhelminian 
expansionist policies: the emergence of radical nationalist 
organisations 
This long -term symbolic significance of territory in post -unification Italian 
and German history lends considerable credence to the "latecomers" theory. 
However, explaining the radicalisation of the expansionist policies of the two 
countries in the years up to the First World War requires the examination of another 
crucial development - the emergence and mobilisation of radical nationalist 
organisations. The process through which the ideological developments on the 
radical nationalist right affected the conduct of foreign affairs in the two countries 
was a highly complex one. On an ideological level, the transformation of the 
nationalist movements in Italy and Germany into imperialist organisations, with 
beliefs in the transcendental power of the nation and a growing aggressive tone in 
their territorial programmes, largely predated the political emancipation of the two 
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movements. In Italy, the turning -point in the ideological transformation of the 
nationalist right was the foundation of the Italian Nationalist Association 
[Associazione Nazionalista Italiana, ANI] in 1906. The new organisation aimed to 
give political expression to the "new" nationalist ideology that had made its 
appearance after the traumatic defeat at Adowa in 189621, in an attempt to restore 
faith in the capacity of the new Italian state to acquire the prestige that its glorious 
past justified ". The AM became an umbrella organisation for the various nationalist 
groups, covering a wide spectrum from radical ideologies of imperialism to the 
liberal exponents of irredentism. It attempted to provide a synthesis of the different 
nationalist ideologies into a uniform programme for domestic rejuvenation and 
international ascendancy, and thus justify its political function as the main 
representative of a nationalist renaissance in contrast to the "old ", bankrupt official 
nationalism of the Italian state. In Germany, such an umbrella organisation did not 
theoretically exist, with a number of new groups emerging in the first decade of the 
twentieth century and a fairly even distribution of membership figures among them-3. 
However, the central role that the Pan-German League [Alldeutsche Verband] had 
occupied in the representation of the radical nationalist viewpoint since the 1890s 
rendered it a mirror of the ideological developments in the whole German radical 
nationalist movement'. The intensification of the aggressive character of the 
organisation under the leadership of Heinrich Class reflected the emergence of a new 
trend in German nationalism. This trend supported a confrontational foreign policy 
against the other European states, a revival of the imperial glories of the German 
21 For the defeat at Adowa see the detailed analysis in Del Boca, A., Gli italiani in Africa orientale 
(Rome & Bari 1976), pp. 579 -750 
`2 Adamson, W., "Avant -garde political rhetorics: pre -war culture in Florence as a source of post -war 
fascism ", Journal of European Ideas, 16 (1993), pp. 753 -7, and "The Language of Opposition in 
Early Twentieth -Century Italy: Rhetorical Continuities between Pre -war Florentine Avant -garde and 
Mussolini's Fascism ", Journal of Modern History, 64 (1992), pp. 22 -51; De Grand, A. J., The 
Italian Nationalist Association and the Rise of Fascism in Italy (Lincoln & London 1978), pp. 23ff; 
Gaeta, F., "L'Associazione Nazionalista Italian ", in Gentile, E. (ed.), L'Italia giolittiana. La storia 
e la critica (Rome & Bari 1977), pp. 253 -68 
23 For a list and short description of the other radical nationalist organisations in Wilhelminian 
Germany, see Eley, Reshaping the German Right, pp. 41 -206; Hughes, M., pp. 130 -40 
za Chickering, pp. 1 -14 (for different views). Cf. Kruck, A., Geschichte des alldeutschen Verbandes, 
1890 -1939 (Wiesbaden 1954) 
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nation and an extensive territorial agenda for expansion, mainly in Europe but also 
overseas25. 
Another major factor which encouraged the radicalisation of Italian and 
German foreign policies was the deterioration of international relations during the 
last decade before the war'. Colonial disputes had reached such levels of political 
confrontation and geographical diffusion that they affected the stability of the 
European system itself. This happened in two different ways. First, some colonial 
disputes were by their nature directly linked to the European balance of power. This 
was the case with Libya. The Italian campaign of 1912 was indeed a colonial war, 
but also a war against the Ottoman Empire, which had long before been considered 
politically indispensable for the equilibrium in the Balkans and east Mediterranean. 
The defeat of the Ottoman forces in Libya and the Aegean Sea entailed a colonial 
success for Italy, but at the same time exposed the crumbling political base of 
Ottoman rule in those areas. The huge political vacuum in south -eastern Europe had 
become apparent long before the campaign against Libya, since the Ottoman Empire 
had lost most of its European territories before 1912. The Italian victory, however, 
further encouraged many European states to seek a stronger politico- economic 
position in the region at the expense of the Empire". 
Second, colonial conflicts brought certain states together in new alliances and 
led to a rapid polarisation of the European system. Germany's aggressive behaviour, 
manifested in the two Moroccan crises, was perceived as a direct challenge both to 
French (who controlled the colony) and also to British interests in Africa and the 
Mediterranean. Contrary to the hope of German governments, the Tangier and 
Agadir incidents solidified a united front between the two western Powers. The 
formation of the Entente, with the later addition of Russia, meant that bilateral 
25 Chickering, pp. 74 -101; Smith, W. D., pp. 94 -111; Fricke, D. et al., Bürgerliche Parteien in 
Deutschland. Handbuch der Geschichte der bürgerlichen Parteien und anderen bürgerlichen 
Interessenorganisationen vom Vormärz bis zum Jahr 1945, vol. I (Berlin 1968), pp. 1 -26; 
Wertheimer, M. S., The Pan -German League, 1890 -1914 (New York 1924); Eley, Reshaping, pp. 
48 -58 
26 The importance of diplomatic developments and international relations as a cause of the First World 
War is underlined in Doyle, pp. 320 -3; Mansergh, N., The Coming of the First World War. A Study 
in European Balance of Power (London 1949). Cf. Taylor, A. J. P., Germany's First Bid for 
Colonies, 1884 -1885. A Move in Bismarck's European Policy (Hamden, Connecticut 1967), pp. 5ff 
27 Segrè, "Il colonialismo", pp.135f 
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differences were inevitably internationalised. Apart from solidarity amongst allies, 
challenges against the colonial or European frontiers of one state were translated into 
issues of wider European interest, involving whole coalitions of states. This 
multiplied the implications of single international rivalries and facilitated an 
increasingly confrontational reaction on the part of the European states in their 
international relations. 
The decline of the European balance of power in the last decade before the 
First World War played a crucial role in the radicalisation of the territorial policies of 
the late- comers. It encouraged the ideological extremes of the radical nationalist 
organisations, by confirming their major ideological postulate: that nations have to 
struggle for survival and living space against other nations. This struggle, according 
to them, was a natural necessity which kept nations alive and powerful'. It also 
created the political circumstances which made possible the expression of aggressive 
expansionist claims on the level of official foreign policy. This combination of 
domestic pressure for expansion and international opportunities for confrontation 
provided the argument for territorial expansion with an unprecedented popularity and 
political utility. 
However, international antagonisms in the decade before 1914 are 
historically important not only for their contribution to the atmosphere that led to the 
Great War. In the long term, they prompted transformations in the basic structures of 
the European system, the effects of which were felt in the interwar period. Their 
legacy was a long -term radicalisation of territorial politics, an accentuation of the 
importance of territory per se, an obsession with matching ethnic with territorial 
boundaries, and a new political pattern of confrontation between traditional powers 
and the two late- comers. National power became synonymous with aggressive 
expansion, and the collapse of international co- operation led to the eventual 
questioning of the whole political and territorial framework of the European state - 
system. This tendency survived the First World War and contributed to the outbreak 
of another war in a very short period of time, and this was not simply coincidental79. 
28 Alatri, p. 13; Malaparte, C., "Mussolini and National Syndicalism ", in Lyttelton, A (ed.), Italian 
Fascisms: From Pareto to Gentile (London 1973), pp. 225 -41 
29 For a discussion of these issues with regard to the interwar period, see, in this study, Ch. 4, Section 
III 
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IV: The radicalisation of expansionist arguments: irredentism, 
continental expansion versus colonial expansion, conquest versus 
economic infiltration 
The radicalisation of territorial politics in the years prior to the First World 
War dramatically affected the way in which expansion was conceptualised in Italian 
and German society. Although traditional arguments for territorial aggrandisement 
(irredentism, colonial expansion, economic infiltration, "living space ") continued to 
dominate the debate in the two countries, their content underwent a long -term 
transformation. The shift to confrontational policies was reflected in the 
radicalisation of previously moderate arguments (irredentism) and in the priority 
given to continental expansion and territorial conquest (as opposed to overseas 
expansion and informal imperialism). We shall now turn to these separate 
expansionist arguments and examine the process of their radicalisation, their 
contribution to the aggressive spirit which led to the First World War, and their 
legacy to the post -1918 expansionist ideologies in the two countries. 
Irredentism 
The historic origins of irredentism lie in the liberal nationalist ideology of the 
nineteenth century. The term signified the desire of an ethnically homogeneous, yet 
scattered, population to be incorporated in the same political unit, the nation- state, on 
the basis of national self -determination. Clearly, the dream of a complete unification 
of the Italian and German peoples presupposed a political vacuum in central and 
eastern Europe, namely the absence of strong states occupying territories and 
controlling peoples claimed by the "new" states. This was not the case, however. 
Powerful neighbouring states (France and the Habsburg empire, in the case of Italy; 
the same two plus Russia in the case of the German Reich) placed territorial 
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restrictions upon the plans of Cavour and Bismarck for a complete national 
unification. This led to a political compromise which had two characteristics. On the 
one hand, it allowed the establishment of the Italian and German states as nation - 
states, representing politically the Italian and German historic nations in the 
European system. On the other hand, the incomplete unifications prompted the 
formation of national irredenta outside the frontiers of the two states. In this sense, 
the post -unification irredentist claims of Italian and German nationalism reflected an 
attempt to resume the artificially interrupted process of national and territorial 
unification by non -aggressive, liberal means". 
In the last decades of the nineteenth century irredentism acquired a new 
popularity within the wider nationalist discourse of the two countries. In Italy, the 
Mazzinian vision of a unified Italian state, based on self -determination, survived in 
various nationalist organisations which emerged in the three last decades of the 
nineteenth century. The story of all these organisations (Pro - Italia Irredenta, 1877; 
Dante Alighieri, 1889; Trento e Trieste; Pro Patria and others31) followed a similar 
pattern until the turn of the century. Largely confined to intellectual circles, with a 
relatively small membership and a non -aggressive character, they advocated the 
ideological and ethical priority of irredentism over all other forms of territorial 
politics. Anti- Austrian sentiments - inheritance of the bitter Risorgimento struggle 
since 1848 - made the irredentist claims to Trento and Venezia Giulia politically 
more important than the claims to the south -eastern coast of France32. The early 
alignment, however, of the Italian state with the Triple Alliance rendered territorial 
expansion at the expense of the Habsburg Empire impossible33. Italian governments 
from 1876 onwards endeavoured to play down the importance of irredentist agitation 
in the country, while taking active steps to limit the influence of nationalist 
3° On the ideological importance of the "unification" theme for Italian and German expansionism, see, 
in this study, Ch. 2, Section IIc 
31 Bosworth, R. J. B., Italy, the Least of the Great Powers. Italian Foreign Policy Before the First 
World War (Cambridge 1979), pp. 45 -57; Mack Smith, Italy, pp. 141ff 
32 Sandonà, A., L'irredentismo nelle lotte politiche e nelle contese diplomatiche italo -austriache 
(Bologna 1932 -1938), II, pp. 151 -4 
33 Hence, the ephemeral popularity of the anti -French irredentist claims of the Italian nationalist 
organisations. See Thayer, J. A., Italy and the Great War. Politics and Culture, 1870 -1915 
(Madison & Milwaukee 1964), p. 145; Sandonà, I, pp. 124f 
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organisations, especially in the north- eastern provinces34. It has been argued that 
Manzini and, later, Crispi, turned to Africa as a substitute for the impracticality of 
irredentist claims'. Such an assertion, however, is anachronistic, since irredentist 
ideology did not occupy a prominent position on the expansionist agenda before the 
first decade of the twentieth century. Before that time, even irredentist organisations 
acknowledged the political necessity of the alliance with Austria36. In the same vein, 
official Italian foreign policy aimed to uphold the European balance of power, 
accepting the political necessity of a strong state at the heart of Europe (Habsburg 
Empire) at the expense of the principle of self -determination which underlay the 
formation of the Italian state37. 
Similarly, the formation of the Pan-German League in 1893 reflected - as its 
title suggests- the ideological popularity of the irredentist argument in post - 
unification Germany, but was initially confined to an aspiration not involving 
immediate political action. The right of all the German Volk to belong to the same 
state was a demand shared not only by nationalist organisations, but also by liberal 
and non -conservative circles of the German society38. This right, however, did not 
amount to a questioning of the European territorial map, especially since expansion 
could be pursued in other, less aggressive forms, in colonies or through economic 
infiltration in Europe. Until the first years of the twentieth century there was a 
flexibility in the ideologies of Lebensraum: economic or territorial, living -space 
could be claimed anywhere without subverting the overall territorial settlement. 
Thus, irredentism remained marginal to the territorial debate in Germany until the 
beginning of the twentieth century. 
Increasing European instability, in conjunction with nationalist mobilisation 
in the two countries during the decade before the war, transformed the context of 
irredentist ideology and provided it with a new political significance. In Italy, the 
34 Lowe, Marzari, pp. 50 -4, 96ff, 112; Thayer, pp. 125ff, 171; Sandonà, II, pp. 163ff; Seton -Watson, 
pp. 407 -8 
35 Segrè, "Il colonialismo"; Sandonà, II, pp. 151f 
36 Seton -Watson, pp. 397f; Alatri, pp. 13 -4. Note that, even in August 1914, the ANI initially 
supported negotiations with the Triple Alliance [De Grand, Nationalist Association, pp. 60ff] 
37 Lowe, Marzari, p. 112 
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"new" nationalist movement rejected the mediocrity of the post -unification Italian 
system and advocated instead an expansionist policy as part of a rejuvenating process 
and a completion of the Risorgimento. The policies of the Italian governments after 
the defeat at Adowa in 1896 remained focused on the task of domestic reform, 
renouncing irredentism as "sentimental rhetoric ", incompatible with the country's 
strategic interest in strengthening the Triple Alliance39. This dogma did not change 
significantly even after the nationalist agitation following the Bosnian crisis, when 
the Giolittian administration was severely criticised for playing down any Italian 
claim for territorial compensation40. The chasm, however, between the "old" and 
"new" Italy, Italia legale and Italia reale, was constantly growing41. The ideological 
synthesis in the framework of the Italian Nationalist Association provided the 
conceptual platform for incorporating the liberal irredentist argument into a wider 
programme of territorial aggrandisement. Especially after the annexation of Bosnia - 
Herzegovina, the imperialist wing of the ANI acknowledged the political utility of 
irredentism. A small liberal irredentist group, under the leadership of Bissolati and 
Sighele, joined the ANI, aiming to preserve its ideological autonomy in the context 
of this anti -Giolittian nationalist conglomeration'. 
By 1910, however, the incompatibility between the aggressive imperialist 
wing and the narrow "liberal" irredentism by Sighele and Bissolati (again anti - 
Austrian and anti -imperialist) prepared the ground for a final struggle for the soul of 
the ANI. The Libyan campaign marked a turning point in the fate of irredentist 
ideology in Italy. The Irredentist group within the association reacted against the 
38 See, for example, Max Weber's preference for a "complete unification" or for no unification at all, 
in Mommsen, W. J., Max Weber and German Politics 1890 -1920 (Chicago & London 1984), pp. 
68 -9 
39 Lowe, Marzari, pp. 96ff; Bosworth, Approach of First World War, p. 119 
4° Pastorelli, P., "Il principio di nazionalità nella politica estera italiana ", in Spadolini, G. (ed.), 
Nazione e nazionalità in Italia (Rome & Bari 1994), pp. 190 -1 
41 Adamson, "Avant- garde ", pp. 753 -7; Lotti, L., "L'età giolittiana ", in Spadolini (ed.), pp. 56ff. See, 
in general, Nöther, E. P., "The Intellectual Dimension of Italian Nationalism: An Overview ", 
History of European Ideas, 16 (1993), pp. 779 -84 
42 Initially, the Italian Nationalists had criticised the concept of irredentism. See De Grand, Nationalist 
Association, pp. 13f; Corradini, E., "Nazionalismo e sindicalismo", in Perfetti, F. (ed.), II 
nazionalismo italiano dalle origini alle fusione col fascismo (Bologna 1977), pp. 91ff; and "Classi 
proletarie: socialismo; nazioni proletarie: nazionalismo ", in Castellini, G. (ed.), Atti del Congresso 
di Firenze (Florence 1911), pp. 21ff]. The Congress of Florence (1910) did succeed in temporarily 
disguising the ideological rifts between the Irredentists and the imperialist wing of the emerging 
ANI [De Grand, Nationalist Association, pp. 23 -7] 
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broader imperialist campaign that treated the irredenta as part of a historic claim for 
the restoration of Italian rule in the Mediterranean. Yet, by the Congress of Rome in 
1912 the Irredentists had been completely marginalised, first ideologically, and then 
politically, following the withdrawal of Sighele from the Association'. 
Consequently, anti -Austrian irredentism survived in the new Italian nationalist 
ideology, but only after having made two irreversible concessions44. First, the 
programme of the ANI reduced it to one of several elements of territorial policy, 
thus facilitating the synthesis of colonial, imperialist and liberal expansionist goals. 
Second, by its absorption into the militant expansionist spirit of the ANI, irredentism 
assumed confrontational implications which facilitated its conceptualisation in terms 
of international territorial rivalries. This, in turn, made possible its adoption as 
official foreign policy of the Italian state in 1915, as part of an aggressive 
expansionist programme in contrast to the initial liberal inspiration of the concept'. 
Similar tendencies characterised the irredentist ideology of the German 
völkisch nationalist movement which revolved around the Pan -German League. The 
proposition that the unification of 1871, involving the concept of a Kleindeutschland, 
was territorially incomplete acquired a new political significance in the decade before 
the war'. Of course, the main current of German irredentism, namely the union with 
the German population of the Habsburg empire, was politically unrealistic in the 
context of the Triple Alliance. However, the deterioration of European international 
relations after 1905 provided three further stimuli to the development of a stronger 
irredentist element in German nationalist ideology. First, the limited gains from 
colonial expansion re- focused territorial policies on the European continent, thus 
providing ideological currency for the ideas of a central European union 
(Mitteleuropa), in economic or even annexationist terms47. Second, the collapse of 
Russian - German relations led to ruthless policies of russification of the German 
minorities of the Tsarist empire, thus provoking the interest of the German nationalist 
4a De Grand, Nationalist Association, pp. 34ff, where the radicalisation in the expansionist ideology of 
the ANI is also accounted for. 
44 Sandonà, III, pp. 151 -4 
45 Pastorelli, P., "Il principio di nazionalità", pp. 189 -92; Webster, pp. 334f; Mack Smith, Italy, pp. 
142f 
4e Chickering, p. 76; Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 263 -4 
47 Smith, W. D., pp. 109 -11 
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movement in the fate of Germandom outside the frontiers of the Bismarckian Reich. 
Third, the irresponsible, self -centred policies of the Habsburg empire infuriated 
German nationalists to the degree that they even wished for a quick war, in order to 
cause the collapse of the Dual Monarchy and thus redeem the German territories and 
populations of the Ostmark48. 
In the remaining years before the outbreak of the war, the idea that the 
existing German state was a Vorstaat, a transitional stage in the process of state - 
formation49, was coupled with the economic and defensive necessity of territorial 
expansion in central and eastern Europe. As in the case of Italy, the overlapping of 
irredentist claims with imperialist plans for the economic and political domination of 
vast areas of the continent provided a synthetic ideological platform for aggressive 
territorial expansionism. Irredentism was placed in the wider context of a 
Lebensraum policy, echoing the millenarian obsessions of the völkisch nationalist 
movement for the historic mission of Grossdeutschland. As in Italy, the radical 
nationalist organisations in Germany accomplished a remarkable ideological 
preparation for combining the claim for colonial expansion with irredentist 
objectives, in order to achieve both national development and international prestige. 
They plucked irredentism out of its liberal context and reintroduced it as a 
prerequisite for national power in competition to other European states. This meant 
that irredentism acquired a political role in international rivalries and was directed in 
an aggressive manner against the territorial integrity of those states still holding the 
irredenta within their frontiers. 
What expansion? Continental versus colonial expansion, formal versus 
informal imperialism 
Throughout the period between the 1880s and the First World War, 
ideological and political controversies emerged about the most beneficial type of 
expansion. These controversies involved official government policies, organisations 
48 Chickering, pp. 289 -90 
a9 Chickering, p. 76; Sheehan, J. J., "What is German History? Reflections on the role of the nation in 
German history and historiography ", Journal of Modern History, 53 (1981), pp. 1 -23 
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not affiliated to a political party, and public opinion in the two countries. The 
dilemma between continental and colonial expansion permeated the expansionist 
debate in Italy and Germany, and produced a rough polarisation which survived the 
First World War. This was understandable, since on a theoretical level the two 
expansionist arguments represented different perceptions of national prestige and 
different philosophies about how expansion could aid the goal of national 
development. The advocates of colonialism regarded overseas expansion as 
combining territorial expansion and economic growth without destabilising effects 
for the European balance of power. They also supported the idea of colonial 
possessions as a symbol of great -power status, thus enabling the "late- comers" to 
achieve equality of standing with the other European great powersi0. For them, 
European stability was a prerequisite for the fruitful advance of national goals and 
they hoped that colonial expansion would, in the long run, deliver more substantial 
politico- economic benefits than any expansion in the continent. 
On the other hand, the so- called "continentalists" supported the reverse 
argument: expansion in Europe and the political acceptance of the "late- comers" as 
equals by the major powers of the continent was the necessary precondition for a 
broad expansionist policy overseas''. According to the exponents of this position, the 
state should look for material resources, "elbowroom" and political prestige in 
Europe before embarking on a world policy. They did not advocate the undermining 
of the stability of the continental system, but believed that the real struggle amongst 
European nations would be eventually transferred from the colonies to the continent. 
It was, therefore, vital to guarantee their strong politico- economic position in Europe, 
to win a hegemonic role in European affairs, with the acquisition of colonies as a 
complementary objective. Furthermore, Europe and the Mediterranean had 
historically been the cradle of the Italian and German civilisations, the area where 
they had established their vast empires in the past and from where they had acquired 
their strength. In this sense, continental expansion possessed a historic and symbolic 
significance, reminiscent of the hegemonic role that the two nations had exercised in 
Europe and the Mediterranean in the past. 
Plehn, H., Deutsche Weltpolitik und kein Krieg (Berlin 1913) 
51 Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 259ff 
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This theoretical controversy was coupled with another controversy, this time 
about the character of expansion. There was tension between economic infiltration 
and territorial conquest, i.e. between economic and political control over territories'. 
Again, this controversy originated from different perceptions of how territory would 
benefit domestic well -being and national prestige. Economic infiltration promised the 
creation of an informal empire, in Africa, Asia and south/central Europe alike, which 
could provide immediate material solutions to domestic needs, and help the 
expanding industrial sectors against foreign competitors. More importantly, however, 
it could also enhance the political strength of the state without risking a costly 
military confrontation for territorial control. On the other hand, the advocates of 
annexation focused on three different aspects. First, they stressed the importance of 
territory as "space" for the problems of emigration and overpopulation53. Second, 
they asserted that Italy and Germany , as "late-corners", could not compete on equal 
terms with the other great European powers on the economic level, because they 
lacked the resources and economic network which only political control over 
territories could furnish. Third, they underlined the significance of territory in terms 
of national defence (in Europe) and living space, two elements that were considered 
by them as prerequisites for the survival and flourishing of the nation. 
On the theoretical level, these four different arguments produced a number of 
expansionist ideologies, each attempting to combine as many objectives as possible 
but with divergent priorities and prescriptions. In Italy, the extent of emigration 
throughout the period up to 1914 gave precedence to the migrationist argument, 
which prescribed the acquisition of territory for settlement and agricultural 
exploitations'. At the same time, a geopolitical argument, based on considerations of 
national defence, emphasised the importance of territorial expansion along both 
coasts of the Mediterranean. This was seen as particularly urgent, since the other 
powers (Britain, France, Germany) were gradually acquiring stronger positions in the 
region. Furthermore, international developments influenced the focus of Italian 
sz For a discussion of the two arguments see Wehler, "Bismarck's Imperialism ", pp. 185 -9 
53 Kitchen, pp. 180 -99; Segrè, Fourth Shore, pp. 8ff. Cf. similar references in the NSDAP Programme 
of 1920, in Feder, G., Das Programm der NSDAP und seine weltanschaunlichen Grundlagen 
(Munich 1932) 
sa On Crispi's conversion to Africanism see Segrè, Fourth Shore, pp. 6 -8, 17 -24. See also Lowe, 
Marzari, pp. 56 -7 
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expansionist aspirations. Considerations of prestige and the historic ties of Italy with 
the Balkan area placed emphasis on economic expansion in the region to fill the 
vacuum caused by the decline of the Ottoman empire. This "industrial imperialism ", 
which supported economic infiltration in the Balkans'', was linked to security 
considerations (control of the Adriatic) and was regarded as a prelude to political 
control in the event of an Ottoman collapse56. In a similar manner, the annexation of 
Bosnia -Herzegovina by the Habsburgs in 1908 re- focused the interest of Italian 
nationalism on the Adriatic region57, in the same way that the acquisition of Tunisia 
by France in 1883 and the two Moroccan crises had increased the Mediterranean 
tendencies in Italian expansionist ideology. 
In Germany, the chasm between colonial and continental expansionist 
ideologies had been significantly more deep- rooted and with a stronger symbolic 
dimension than in Italy. It had been a conflict between two incompatible visions: 
Germany as a continental great- power, on the one hand, and Germany as a world 
power, on the other. It had also been a clash between the concepts of a central/eastern 
European empire ( Mitteleuropa) and of a vast African network of colonies 
(Mittelafrika)58; between the traditional prestige of the army (linked to European 
expansion) and the emerging prestige of the navy (associated with Weltpolitik). 
Attempts were made to synthesise economic with political expansion'. For example, 
the exponents of the vague notion of Mitteleuropa never resolved how much 
economic infiltration or territorial annexation was required for its attainment60. At the 
same time, the advocates of each argument, while criticising the other ideologies for 
their priorities, never completely espoused one type of expansion. Emphasis on 
expansion and settlement in Europe did not exclude interest in similar prospects in 
55 For the definition of this term see Webster, pp. 3 -5 
56 For the moderate success of the Italian enterprises in expanding in the Balkan region see Webster, 
pp. 290ff; Bosworth, Approach of First World War, pp. 108 -16. For the difficulties in competing 
against other European giants see Zamagni, V., The Economic History of Italy, 1860 -1990 (Oxford 
1993), pp. 110ff 
57 Saladino, "Italy ", pp. 240ff 
58 Smith, W. D., pp. 140f 
59 Smith, W. D., Ch. 7 
60 For the concept and economic -territorial aspects of Mitteleuropa see Meyer, H. C., Mitteleuropa in 
German Thought and Action, 1815 -1945 (The Hague 1955); Stirk, P. (ed.), Mitteleuropa: History 
and Perspectives (Edinburgh 1994); Lichtheim, pp. 62 -7; Chickering, p. 268; Kaiser, D., "Germany 
and the Origins of the First World War ", Journal of Modern History, 55 (1983), pp. 456 -7 
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Africa. Similarly, economic infiltration in central Europe could be complemented 
with related plans in central and south Africa. Even in the clash between economic 
and territorial expansion it was often acknowledged that one form was more suitable 
than the other in certain areas or under specific circumstances". Again with reference 
to Mitteleuropa, the exponents of territorial conquest had initially to respect the need 
for continental stability and for the integrity of the Habsburg Empire. Thus, they 
could argue in favour of economic expansion as a temporary measure which could be 
translated into political control in more favourable future circumstances, given that 
the Dual Monarchy was another "sick man of Europe ". Everything came down to 
priorities, i.e. a question of which area or mode of expansion would be more 
beneficial in the long term for economic development and the great -power 
aspirations of the country'. 
These confrontations between different expansionist programmes were 
evident in the official foreign policies of the Italian and German states. They explain 
to a great extent the plurality of expansionist strategies, the oscillations of the 
governments and the divisions in the radical nationalist camp in the period up to the 
First World War. Domestic and international developments of the last decade before 
1914, however, had an impact upon the ideology and practice of expansionism in the 
two countries. Three major changes may be identified. First, the view that espoused 
colonial expansion as substitute for the territorial stalemate in Europe was gradually 
reversed. The strength of alliances and the prestige of each nation in the continental 
system became the primary factors which could guarantee power, security and the 
preconditions for expansion abroad. In Italy, this trend was manifested in two 
different developments. On the one hand, the focus of Italian colonialism shifted 
from the distant regions of south - eastern Africa to the Mediterranean area, towards 
the northern coast of Africa, the Aegean Sea and its islands. Strictly speaking, this 
was still expansion in colonial terms, an attempt to divert the pressure for territorial 
conquest away from the European system. Yet, it was also expansion in an area 
crucial for Italy's strategic position in Europe, indispensable for the control of the 
61 For an overview of the different opinions see Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 275ff 
62 See, for example, Bernhardi's priority to European expansion [von Bernhardi, esp. pp. 131 -57]. Cf. 
Weber's priority to colonial expansion in quest for "elbowroom" [Mayer, J. P., Max Weber and 
German Politics (London 1943)] 
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Adriatic and for winning relative advantage against Britain and France in the 
Mediterranean basin. On the other hand, after 1908 the domestic consensus for 
Italy's participation in the Triple Alliance suffered a severe blow. The renewal of the 
treaty in 1912 was not actually criticised by the radical nationalist groups (the sole 
exception were the Irredentists), but this consent reflected less of an unqualified 
support for the spirit of the Alliance, and more a grudging realisation that, at that 
time, there was no diplomatic alternative open to the Italian governmentó3. 
In Germany, a similar trend became predominant immediately before and 
after the second Moroccan crisis. The priority of continental expansion over 
colonialism had long been advocated by the radical nationalist organisationsó4. In the 
context of this logic, the Tangier crisis indeed had a colonial function, reflecting 
Germany's long -standing aspirations in the Congo basinó5. Yet, this was not the 
primary consideration which ignited the incident. The diplomatically isolated Reich 
attempted to stir up colonial antagonism in north -west Africa in order to break the 
British -French front and consolidate its political position in the European system 
against its main rivals. The crisis, however, had exactly the opposite effect. It 
increased tension between Germany and the other European states, and strengthened 
the continental, annexationist arguments as the prerequisite for national prestige, 
security and strength of the Reichó6. In the Moroccan crisis of 1911, the Navy proved 
incapable of securing the international interests of the nation. The Army, on the other 
hand, grasped the opportunity of this alleged failure in order to press for more funds 
and a primary role in foreign policy- making67. The clamour for a military 
confrontation increased, the Weltpolitik objectives subsided; and an aggressive form 
of continental foreign policy gained the upper handó8. 
63 See "Triplice Alleanza", in Levi, F., Levra, U., Tranfaglia, N. (eds.), Storia d'Italia (Florence 
1978),vol. 3, pp. 1318 -32 
6a Craig, Germany, pp. 328ff 
65 For the importance of the Congo basin for the realisation of the Mittelafrika vision see Stoecker, H., 
"The Quest for `German Central Africa', in Stoecker (ed.), German Imperialism in Africa, pp. 249- 
61; Henderson, pp. 93ff; Smith, W. D., pp. 68f 
66 Lichtheim, pp. 81f 
67 Craig, Germany, pp. 287f, 294ff; Fischer, From Kaiserreich, pp. 48f. On the importance of the War 
Council of 1912 for army expenditure see Mommsen, "Debate on German War Aims ", pp. 47ff; 
Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 161ff 
68 Chickering, pp. 267 -8; Fischer, From Kaiserreich, pp. 48f; Craig, Germany, pp. 318f; Eley, 
"Conservatives and Radical Nationalists ", pp. 100 -1 
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The second major change pertained to the shifting character of Italian and 
German expansionist policies. The previous balance between economic infiltration 
and annexationism was disturbed by the growing need for prestige and the 
difficulties related to economic expansion itself. The domestic crisis of the two 
systems in the years immediately preceding 1914 necessitated impressive victories 
which the subtlety of informal imperialism did not provide. This, in conjunction with 
the objective difficulties for the "late-corners" in catching up with the position of the 
other great powers in areas of economic confrontation, gradually discredited 
economic infiltration as an alternative to territorial conquest. Italy and Germany 
continued their efforts at informal expansion, the former mainly in the Balkans and 
Asia Minor, the latter in central and southern Europe as well as in northern Africaó9, 
but the symbolic significance of territory gradually gained currency. Arguments in 
favour of living space, for demographic, economic and defensive reasons prevailed in 
the expansionist discourse of the two countries. The decision of Giolitti to sanction 
the campaign for the acquisition of Libya provides evidence for this shift towards 
annexationism. Far from being a colonial enthusiast, but aware of the need to 
manifest Italy's power in a tangible manner, the architect of Liberal Italy succumbed 
to the growing emotive attraction of territorial expansion, regardless of the minimal 
tangible benefits promised by the venture. 
The example of the Libyan campaign highlights the third change in Italian 
and German expansionist politics in the period immediately before the First World 
War - the loss of the practical character of the expansionist objectives. Both the 
Libyan campaign and the Tangier crisis reflected an unconditional hunger for 
territory in strategic and prestige terms, in complete defiance of material 
considerations70. The ex post facto arguments for settlement prospects and economic 
opportunities in the areas claimed reflected less and less the genuine motives behind 
the decisions to expand. This was not simply the result of the "late- comers "' limited 
margins for expansion in a world almost completely occupied by the traditional great 
69 Webster, pp. 244 -332; Stoecker, pp. 195ff 
70 Webster, p. 203, and pp. 246 -7, for the limited possibilities for Libya's economic exploitation; 
Segrè, Fourth Shore, pp, 20 -32; Thayer, pp. 254f. For the views of contemporary analysts on 
Libya's limited benefits see Gregory, J. W., "Cyrenaica ", Geographical Journal, 47 (1916), pp. 
321 -45 
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powers. It was mainly the outcome of the growing impression that geopolitical 
advantage and prestige were the keys to power in a highly competitive international 
system. Understandably, economic infiltration could not satisfy this illusion; nor 
could the degree of usefulness of a territory for settlement or economic development 
overshadow the need for territorial expansion in any possible direction and at every 
opportunity. 
V: Conclusions 
In concluding, we need to ask a crucial question: how did the developments 
of pre -World War I Italian and German expansionism affect the formulation of 
fascist expansionist ideology and practice ? The answer may be categorised in three 
long -term tendencies initiated in the pre -1918 period which influenced interwar 
development of territorial politics in the two countries. First, the pattern of state - 
formation followed in Italy and Germany, belated and based on annexations to a 
central unit, guaranteed the long -term symbolic significance of territory for domestic 
prosperity, national prestige and great -power status. This tendency was further 
strengthened by the experience of the First World War and by the territorial 
redistribution following the conclusion of hostilities in 1918. Second, the shift in the 
Italian and German foreign policies to an aggressive expansionist agenda in the years 
immediately before the war transformed the context and style of the two countries' 
territorial politics. The traditional arguments (colonialism, living space, irredentism) 
acquired a series of confrontational implications, thus paving the way for the fierce 
territorial antagonism among the European states before and during the First World 
War. 
Third, the experience of war generated new opportunities and justifications 
for what each of the two countries regarded as legitimate territorial expansion. For 
Italy, the irredentist claims against the Dual Monarchy, although previously 
sacrificed for the sake of the stability of the Triple Alliance, appeared at the forefront 
of the Italian expansionist aspirations. This altered priorities to such an extent that the 
Italian state considered that any postwar territorial solution without substantial 
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frontier adjustments in the north (Brenner) and east (Dalmatia, Istria) would be 
incomplete, humiliating and unjust. Germany, on the other hand, entered the war 
with plans for eastward and westward expansion alike without having indisputably 
decided on geographical priorities. In contrast to the traditional Prussian policy, 
especially after 1815, of expansion in central and eastern Europe, Wilhelminian 
foreign policy never established clear geopolitical priorities, deeply divided between 
Weltpolitik and continental expansion. In this sense, the German First World War 
campaigns in the east re- established the priority to eastern expansion, but did so to an 
extent which went significantly beyond traditional Prussian ambitions and plans. The 
collapse of the Tsarist empire and the subsequent treaty of Brest -Litovsk established 
the eastern territories as Germany's living space par excellence and as a vast area of 
opportunity for German large -scale expansion. For both countries, war, the territorial 
aspirations invested in the campaign, the conquests and losses, all created new 
opportunities, new necessities and new priorities for the two late- comers' future 
expansion. This transformation affected postwar political decision -making but, most 
significantly, forged a new territorial utopia which fascism could effectively 
manipulate and radicalise as a leitmotif for future expansion. 
,. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Fascist ideology and expansion 
I: Introduction 
The concept of "fascist ideology" has become the focus of a heated 
controversy among researchers of fascism. The challenges to the validity of the 
concept have originated from the enigmatic nature of both its components: "fascism" 
and "ideology ". With regard to the former, there are a number of questions of 
definition. Is there any meaning in, and need for, a generic notion of "fascism "'? Are 
we entitled to use the term as a generic ideal -type for the analysis of two such 
disparate regimes and value -systems as Italian Fascism and German Nazism, or even 
such different countries historically, culturally and socio- economically? Could we 
derive a fascist "ideological minimum" which justifies the comparative use of the 
term for describing common fundamental characteristics of the two regimes? If we 
now add to these questions about fascism the problems involved in a working 
definition of ideology, then the questions about "fascist ideology" become even more 
perplexing. Does "fascism" as a value- system and worldview (Weltanschauung) 
qualify as ideology? Were the leader's views an accurate reflection of collective 
"fascist" values or did they evolve in contradiction to other fascists' views. If we 
trace a set of ideas, long -term objectives and implements for their attainment in the 
Mason, T., "Whatever Happened to `Fascism ', in Childers, T., Caplan, J. (eds.), Reevaluating the 
Third Reich (New York, London 1993), pp. 253 -62; Allardyce, G., "What Fascism is Not: Thoughts 
on the Deflation of a Concept ", American Historical Review, 84 (1979), pp. 367 -88; Wilford, R., 
"Fascism ", in Eccleshall, R., Geoghegan, V., Jay, R., Kenny, M., MacKenzie, I., Wilford, R. (eds.), 
Political Ideologies. An Introduction (London & New York 1994, 2nd ed.), pp. 185 -217. See also, 
in this study, Introduction. 
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practice of fascist regimes, how do we establish the relation between thought and 
action? Is "ideology" in fascism something more than ex post facto justification, in 
other words, does it have a normative value? And, finally, how negative, "anti ", 
"reactionary", "palingenetic" or positive, original and utopian is whatever we agree 
that is "fascist ideology "? 
The above questions are pertinent to the main objective of this chapter, 
namely the analysis of whether there was a generic "fascist" expansionist "ideology ", 
shared by the Italian and German fascist regimes. The relation between ideas and 
actions in the foreign policies of the two regimes has become a point of fierce debate 
ever since the end of the Second World War. R. De Felice's use of Mussolini's 
speeches and writings as literal reflections of his intentions has led to exaggerations 
and failed to distinguish between consistent themes and ad hoc inconsistent elements 
in the Duce's pronouncements. The same rigidity in treating Hitler's speeches and 
books pervades the most extreme "Hitler- centric" approaches to Nazism, which 
overstate his personal contribution to Nazi ideology'. Absolute emphasis on the 
personal obsessions of Mussolini and Hitler as the only source of fascist expansionist 
ideology has deprived fascism of its historical relevance to the post -unification 
structures and developments in Italy and Germany'. If we agree upon a certain 
ideological nature of fascist expansionist policies, then this "ideology" cannot be 
located exclusively in individuals, even individuals of such symbolic dimensions as 
2 Renzo de Felice, Mussolini, Part 2: 11 fascista, vol. 1 : Il conquista del potere, 1925 -29 (Turin 1966), 
pp. 464ff. For a criticism of his literal use of sources see Bosworth, R. J. B., The Italian 
Dictatorship. Problems and perspectives in the interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism (London 
1998), pp. 17 -25, 96 -8. For Germany see Jäckel, E., Hitlers Weltanschauung. Entwurf einer 
Herrschaft (Tübingen 1969); and Kershaw, I., The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of 
Interpretation (London 1989, 2nd edition), Ch. 5 
3 On the special role of Hitler in Nazi foreign policy see Bracher, K. D., 
"The Role of Hitler: 
Perspectives of Interpretation ", in Laqueur, W., Fascism: A Reader's Guide. 
Analyses, 
Interpretations, Bibliography (Harmondsworth 1979), pp. 193 -212; 
Hildebrand, K., "Hitlers Ort in 
der Geschichte der preussisch- deutschen Nationalstaates ", Historische 
Zeitschrift, 217 (1973), pp. 
584 -632; ibid., "Monokratie oder Polykratie'? Hitlers 
Herrschaft und das Dritte Reich ", in 
Hirschfeld, G., Kettenacker, L. (eds.), Der 'Führerstaat': Mythos 
und Realität (Stuttgart 1981), pp. 
73 -97; Jäckel, E., Hitler in Histo'y (Hanover & London 1987). 
The importance of Mussolini's role 
for the stability and dynamism of Italian fascism is discussed 
by Melograni, P., "The Cult of the 
Duce in Mussolini's Italy ", in Mosse, G. L. (ed.), International 
Fascism. New Thought and New 
Approaches (London & Beverley Hills 1979), pp. 
73 -90. For a more detailed reference to the 
problem of leadership in fascism see below, Chs. 4, 7 
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the Duce and the Führer4. The tendency to view fascism as a "demonic" repudiation 
or aberration of history might have served the instinctive need to castigate it morally 
but it has also obscured its relevance to the secular ideological and political traditions 
of post -unification Italian and German societies'. The tremendous appeal of fascist 
ideas to wider social audiences and strata may only partly be explained away by the 
charismatic nature of the two fascist leaders. What rendered fascism an intelligible 
system of thought was also the ability of Mussolini and Hitler to assimilate and 
systematise a series of pre -existing beliefs and values, effectively updating them with 
the experience of the First World War and thus linking past and present with a 
positive vision for the immediate future. On the other hand, the non -ideological, 
"opportunist" interpretation of fascist expansion has reduced the ideological 
declarations of the fascist leaders to the status of ad hoc justifications, devoid of any 
normative power. A. J. P. Taylor rejected Hitler's words as evidence of real 
intentions or tools for understanding his decisions. In a similar vein, G. Salvemini 
portrayed Mussolini as constantly improvising and superior to Hitler in the art of 
propaganda - a view shared by other subsequent historians of Italian Fascism'. In this 
way, however, the mythic, quasi -religious, millenarian aspects of fascism are reduced 
to the level of vulgar propaganda, deprived of any significance for understanding the 
dynamism of fascist expansion and the derivation of its large -scale goals. Both 
leaders emphasised the function of fascism as a new faith for the nations which 
promised a secularised utopia. Their pronouncements comprised a plethora of 
symbols and metaphors as part of an imagery of salvation and triumph for their 
nations. Although their discourse was not devoid of manipulative propaganda, it 
comprised a series of themes, interpretations and prescriptions which had been 
consistently employed from the period of the two movements' incubation until the 
final collapse in 1943 -45. In this sense, it is essential to investigate the impact of 
4 The notion that one person alone can be responsible for the production of an ideological system (and 
especially of fascist ideology) is adequately criticised by Griffin, R., The Nature of Fascism 
(London & New York 1994), pp. 16 -7; Mannheim, K., Ideology and Utopia (London 
1966), pp. 
189f 
5 Griffin, Nature of Fascism, pp. 29 -32; Eatwell, R., "Towards a New Model 
of Generic Fascism ", 
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 4 (1992), pp. 161 -94; Bosworth, The 
Italian Dictatorship, pp. 99ff 
6 Salvemini, G., Prelude to the Second World War (London 
1953), pp. 9ff; Vivarelli, R., "Benito 
Mussolini dal socialismo al fascismo", Rivista storica italiana, 
79 (1967), pp. 438 -58; Denis Mack 
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these ideological elements on the two regimes' foreign policies and determine to 
what extent they underpinned fascism's commitment to radical, large -scale 
expansionist goals or were manipulated in order to justify a blind policy of territorial 
aggrandisement. 
On a comparative level, the debate has been dominated by an emphasis on the 
unique elements of Nazi expansionist policies (i.e. terror, racism, especially anti - 
Semitism) which set apart the German from the Italian - and all the other potentially 
"fascist" - cases. There has also been a challenge to the idea that territorial 
expansionism should be regarded as a core element of fascist "ideology" and political 
practice. While Lebensraum- oriented expansion has been widely seen as central to 
the Nazi worldview7, Italian Fascism has been alleged to lack clear expansionist 
visions and the determination to pursue aggressive policies, leading to an eventual 
enslavement to the dynamism of Nazi territorial ambitions'. Hitler, Rosenberg, 
Himmler and even von Ribbentrop have been credited with a solid ideological 
background in their political practice9. This is something that has only occasionally 
been granted to Mussolini, or to independent- minded Fascists such as Gentile, Bottai, 
Balbo and Grandi. The Italian Fascist leadership has consistently been portrayed as 
unable to produce a systematic ideological ethos for their regime, as being simply 
determined to exploit the emotive power of expansion to consolidate its domestic 
Smith, Mussolini 's Romaa Empire (London & New York 1976), pp. 15 -6, and Mussolini (London 
1981) 
7 See, for example, Trevor -Roper, H., The Testament of Adolf Hitler. The Hitler- Bormann Documents, 
February -April 1945 (London 1961); Hildebrand, K., The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich 
(London 1972); "Hitlers `Programm' und seine Realisierung ", in Funke, M. (ed.), Hitler, 
Deutschland, und die Mächte. Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches (Düsseldorf 1977), 
pp. 63 -93; "Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in der deutschen Aussenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler ", 
in Hillgruber (ed.), Grossmachtpolitik und Militärismus im 20. Jahrhundert (Düsseldorf 1974), pp. 
212 -44; Hillgruber, A., Hitlers Strategie. Politik und Kriegihrung, 1940 -1941 (Frankfurt 1965) 
8 Salvemini, Prelude; Wiskemann, E., The Rome -Berlin Axis (London 1966). This problem is 
discussed in this study, Ch. 5 
9 A general discussion of the ideas that these, and other, figures of the Nazi regime held is provided by 
Smelser, R., Zitelmann, R (eds.), The Nazi Elite (Houndmills & London 1993); 
Fest, J., The Face of 
Third Reich (London 1970). Additionally, a number of biographies have focused on the special 
ideological beliefs of the Nazi leaders. See, for example, Heiber, H., Goebbels (New York 1972); 
Overy, R. J., Göring: The 'Iron Man' (London, Boston, Melbourne & 
Henley 1984); Padfield, P., 
Himmler: Reichsfahrer-SS (London & Basingstoke 1990); Segrè, 
C. G., Italo Balbo: A Fascist Life 
(Berkeley , Los Angeles & London 1987); Cordova, F. (ed.), 
Uomini e volti del fascismo (Rome 
1980) 
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position10. Thus, the idea of a generic fascist expansionist ideology has been 
undermined in two ways. First, the emphasis on the atypical manifestations of Nazi 
expansionist policies (terror, destruction, genocide) has extracted territorial 
expansion from the core of a fascist paradigm. Second, the excessive character of 
Nazi expansionist policies, in style, in dynamism, determination, and finally in 
effectiveness and brutality, have established territorial expansion as an ideological 
sine qua Icon only of the German regime, as its ultimate goal and reason that sets it 
apart from the Italian case ". In this sense, the Nazi raison d' être has been equated 
with "total" war, annihilation and genocide of an unprecedented character, and this 
has been regarded as a major reason for discarding any attempt to produce a concept 
of generic "fascist ideology ", or at least one including Nazi Germany. By contrast, 
our view of Italian Fascism has been dominated by a historiographical tendency to 
depict both the Italian Fascist regime (and the Italian people as a whole) as culturally 
opposed to the brutality and inhumanity which informed the policies of the Nazi 
regime and were dutifully never contradicted by the majority of the population'. 
The aim of this chapter is to examine whether an ideologically conditioned 
propensity for expansion was indeed a generic characteristic of fascism, derived from 
a common core of axioms in the ideologies of the two regimes. Clearly, the attempt 
to produce a generic framework for fascist expansionist ideology is impeded by the 
diversity of style, scope, methods and short-term goals in Italian and German 
expansionist policies. It is, therefore, essential to provide a re- definition of what we 
regard as the ideological "minimum" of fascist expansion13. The emphasis on 
atypical elements (the "demonising ", genocidal, anti- Semitic aspects of Nazi 
1) See, for example, Mack Smith, D., Mussolini (London 1981); Hibbert, C., Benito Mussolini 
(London 1975) 
" The alleged difference between the "traditional, imperialistic" expansion of the Italian regime and 
the "racialist" expansionist ideology of Nazism has been overemphasised as a generic difference 
between the two regimes by a number of authors. See, for example, Turner, H. A. "Fascism and 
Modernisation ", in Turner (ed.), Reappraisals of Fascism (New York 1975), pp. 117 -39; Kershaw, 
Nazi Dictatorship, p. 40; Mosse, G. L., "Towards a General Theory 
of Fascism ", in Mosse (ed.), 
International Fascism. New Thoughts and New Approaches (London & Beverly Hills 1979), pp. 
34f; Payne, S. G., Fascism. Comparison and Definition (Madison 1980), 
pp. 101ff; Perfetti, P. (ed.), 
Il dibattito sul fascismo (Rome 1984), pp. 12 -3 
12 For this debate see Bosworth, Italian Dictatorship, pp. 100 -5; 
Steinberg, J., All or Nothing. The Axis 
and the Holocaust, 1941 -42 (London 1990); Griffin, Nature of Fascism, 
pp. 231 -5 
Sternhell, Z, Neither Right nor Left. Fascist Ideology in 
France (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1986), 
pp. 18f. See also Griffin, Nature of Fascism, Ch. 1 
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expansionism, on the one hand; and the alleged opportunist, unsystematic character 
of Italian Fascist foreign policy on the other) has blurred the similarities in a set of 
ideas and long -term objectives shared by the two regimes. The expansionist 
tendencies of the two movements and regimes rested upon comparable perceptions of 
their place and role in national and European history. They were derived from a 
nucleus of crucial, somewhat neglected, ideological constants: a notion of political, 
national and racial elitism; a perception of violence as a rejuvenating and 
revolutionary force; a determination to unite ideas and utopias with uncompromising 
action; a belief in the historic role of fascism as the force to complete national 
unification and to introduce a new stage in human civilisation. This chapter 
investigates how each of the two regimes expressed these ideological denominators 
in the context of its distinct national historic, political and social experience. 
II. Fascist ideology and the analysis of the past: the "self - 
historicisation" of fascism 
Fascist ideology and the liberal past 
One of the most common criticisms against the validity of fascism as 
"ideology" has been its negative, reactionary, "anti -" character's. This charge, 
implying the lack of an original, autonomous and long -term perspective, has been 
based on the perception of fascism as an ideology of crisis, defined by its 
oppositional attitude to established beliefs rather than on a novel conceptual core. 
The "negative" character of fascism originated from the context of interwar crisis and 
polarisation which defined its negative, confrontational, myopic principles and 
" Linz, J. J., "Some notes towards a comparative study of 
fascism in sociological historical 
perspective ", in Laqueur, W. (ed.), Fascism: A Reader's 
Guide. Analyses, hrterpretations, 
Bibliography (Harmondsworth 1979); Griffin, Nature of Fascism, 
pp. 4 -8; Malaparte, C., 
"Mussolini and National Syndicalism ", in Lyttelton, A. 
(ed.), Italian Fascisms from Pareto to 
Gentile (London 1973), pp. 225 -41 (esp. 229 -31). For 
a treatment of fascist ideology as a "positive" 
phenomenon, see Gregor, A. J., The Ideology of Fascism. 
The Rationale of Totalitarianism (New 
York 1969); Mosse, "General Theory", pp. 1 -41. An 
interesting implication of this general trend 
was the perception of the PNF as an "anti- party", in its 
negation of all other existing political forms. 
See Gentile, E., Ideologia fascista, pp. 70f, and, for 
a contemporary definition of fascism as an anti - 
party, in Gioda, M., "L'anti- partito ", Popolo d'Italia, 
10 -2 -1919. Cf. the notion of "anti- state ", in 
Mussolini, B., "Stato, anti -stato e fascismo", Popolo 
d'Italia, 29.6.1922 
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credos. It was also condemned to limited originality, since the "space" for ideological 
novelty had long been occupied by other major ideological trends's. In this sense, the 
argument goes, fascism, whether in Italy or Germany, was required by external 
factors to offer a negative, or even nihilist, view of history, with its principles defined 
in opposition to established truths rather than in accordance with a new teleology. 
Postwar research on fascism has endeavoured to present it, whether 
generically or in its individual expressions, as a distinct phenomenon which does not 
fall under the "ideal types" of modern ideological and political phenomena. 
"Sondenveg "1 °, "revolution of nihilism' `. "anti- ideology ", are but a few of the 
neologisms that have been employed to criticise the alleged "trivialisation" of 
fascism. It goes against the grain to grant fascist ideology a positive character, not 
least because this long -term utopia presupposed destruction and use of violence as its 
major instruments. This assumption, however, should not reduce fascist 
expansionism to a mere "anti ", destructive phenomenon. For all its negations - and 
they were numerous' - fascism established its own unique teleological version of 
history as a process of re -birth and rejuvenation, and presented itself as an integral 
part of the post -unification history of the two countries'. As with any other 
ideological system, it offered a novel interpretation of the past (descriptive aspect) 
and provided a long -term normative platform for the future (prescriptive aspect), 
prioritising goals and justifying methods and practices''. The `'negative" experience 
of the recent past, both on the national and international levels, was incorporated in 
the fascist vision as the necessary stage of collapse before renaissance. In this sense, 
'5 Linz, J. J., "Political Space and Fascism as Late -Comer ". in Larsen, S. U., Hag vet, : _, Myklebust 
J. P. (eds.), Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen, Oslo, Tromso 
1980), pp. 153 -189, and "Some Notes ", pp. 14 -20; Grif iin.Naiure of Fascism. pp. 209ff 
15 For a criticism of the validity of this concept see Maier, C., The Ltnmasterable Fast_ History. 
Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge Mass. 1988), pp. 102 -8; Fuhle, 11.-i, 
"Deutscher Sonderweg. Kontroverse um eme vermeintliche Legende", Journal fir Geschichte. 4 
(1981), pp. 44ff; Roseman, M., "National Socialism and Modernisation ", in Bessel, 
R (ed.), Fascist 
Italy and Nazi Germany. Comparisons and Contrasts (Cambridge 1996), pp. 199f, 220f 
" Rauschning, H., The Revolution of Nihilism (New York 1939), passim 
Linz, "Some Notes ", pp. 29ff. Cf. Malaparte, C., Europa Vivente. 
Teoria storica del sindicalismo 
nazionale (Florence 1961), an excerpt of which is translated in Griffin, 
R (ed_). Fascism (Oxford 
New York 1995), pp. 48 -9 
19 Casucci, C., "Fascismo e storia", II Mulino, 9 (1960). pp. 
213 -42; Griffin. Nature of Fascism, Ch. 
On the interrelation between the descriptive and the 
normative aspects of ideology see mpson. 
J. B., Studies in the Theory of Ideology (Cambridge 1984), pp_ 
73-90: Smith, W. D.. The Ideological 
Origins of Nazi Imperialism (Oxford 1986), pp. 13 -20 . See also. 
in this studs", Introduction_ 
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the "anti -" and "re -" elements of fascist cosmology were dovetailed in a biological 
perception of history as a process of birth, triumph, collapse and re -birth. The decline 
of the old order, reaching its climax in the war and the interwar crisis, became the 
necessary historical platform, upon which the positive fascist vision for the future 
was constructed'. 
These "positive" aspects of fascist ideology were strengthened with the 
evolution of Fascism and Nazism from protest movements into organised political 
parties seeking power. The promise of short-term change had to be complemented 
with a design for long -term salvation from the national and international forces of 
"decay ". In order, however, to make this design intelligible and appealing to broader 
sections of public opinion, fascism had to devise a way to place itself in historical 
context. The self -historicisation of fascism rested upon a definition of its role with 
regard to three levels of "time ". The first was a micro -historic dimension, portraying 
fascism as the counter -current to recent national degeneration. This antithetical 
aspect of fascism defined its characteristics as a negation of the qualities of the "old 
order ". This negation was indispensable, so that the emerging fascist movements 
could justify their "rejuvenating" function. The second level was related to a macro - 
historic perception of national history, in an attempt to present fascism as an integral 
part of the nation's collective memories, traditions and aspirations. This task entailed 
its incorporation in the historic process initiated by unification (1859 -71 and 1866 -70 
respectively), and the linking of its short-term functions (the first level, above) to the 
unfulfilled long -term ambitions of the resurrected nation. The third level involved an 
extension of fascism's historic role to a universal ethical context. In portraying itself 
as a new stage of European civilisation, engaged in a fight against all forms of moral 
and political decadence, fascism emerged as a novel, "positive" utopia. Fascist 
ideology complemented the short-term negation of degeneration with an appealing 
eschatology for the nation (completion of unification) and the world (a new universal 
morality). 
We will deal with the ethical -universal aspect of fascist ideology later in the 
chapter. What is of immediate interest is to show how fascist expansionist ideology 
was located in the context of the short- and long -term developments of the post- 
21 Bubenden, F. (ed.), Gesammelte Briefe von Albert Leo Schlageter 
(Berlin 1934), pp. 70ff 
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unification national histories of Italy and Germany. This task involved, first of all, 
the invention of a symbolic watershed, a chronological point or period which pushed 
the old, decadent forces to a state of collapse and generated the rejuvenating 
dynamism of the fascist movements. In Italy, this turning point coincided with the 
period between the emergence of the intervento (1914) and what the Fascists 
perceived as the real collapse of liberalism in 1918 -202'. During that period, the 
ideological mentors of Italian fascism located the origins of the Fascist postwar 
raison d' être in three separate developments. The first, and the only positive one, 
was the formation of the intervento bloc as a national reaction to the inertia of the 
liberal "oligarchy '. Mussolini saw in the events of 1914 -15 the first political 
expression of the revolutionary qualities of "new" Italy: the vision of a great nation, 
both territorially and politically, redeemed in its internal life and ready to embark on 
a "permanent revolution "'4. This vision was not limited to the reconfiguration of the 
national spiritual forces prior to the war, but was solidified by the collective 
experience of the battlefield'. The eventual overturning of the liberal ideology of 
parecchio in May 1915 signified the triumph of the new era of imperialism, national 
grandeur and idealistic activism in its historic antithesis to the liberal vecchiaia'6. 
War in itself became the source of an apocalypse, a new secular religion of the 
nation, based on the revelation of its unique destiny which permeated Fascism's later 
ultra- nationalist millenarianism''. Prominent members of the intervento movement, 
among them Papini and Malaparte, saw the First World War as the symbolic 
beginning of a long struggle for the "new" Italy's domestic transformation and 
22 Mussolini, B., Scritti e Discorsi (Firenze 1934 -1939, henceforward cited as Scritti), II, pp. 47 -9 
( "Speculazioni e responsabilità ", Popolo d'Italia, 25 November 1919) 
" Gentile, E., Ideologia fascista, pp. 74f; Casucci, "Fascismo e storia ", pp. 225ff 
24 Susmel, E. Susmel, D. (eds.), Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini (Florence & Rome 1951 -78, 
henceforward cited as 00), VII, 197, 394, 418. See also Gentile, E., II mito dello stato nuovo (Bari 
1982), Ch. 6; De Grand, A. J., "Curzio Malaparte: The Illusion of Fascist Revolution ", Journal of 
Contemporary History, 7 (1972), pp. 73 -90 
`` Marinetti, F. T., "The War as the Catharsis of Italian society", translated and cited in Griffin, R., 
Fascism (Oxford & New York 1995), pp. 25 -6; Guerri, J. B., "Bottai: da intelettuale futurista a 
leader fascista ", in De Felice, R. (ed.), Futurismo, cultura e politica (Turin 
1986), pp. 223 -4. See 
also 00, X, 140 -1 
'600, VII, 78 -9 
27 Gentile, E., Il culto del littorio. La sacralizzazione della politica 
nell'Italia fascista (Rome & Bari 
1993), pp. 108ff 
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international ascendancy's. Even the traumatic Italian defeat at Caporetto in 1917 was 
depicted as an essential act of martyrdom on the way to spiritual catharsis29. This was 
the nadir in the decay of the "old" Italy, both militarily and spiritually, as well as the 
beginning of a truly "national" war. The experience of fighting to liberate Italian 
lands, to repel enemy forces and avenge the defeat united people of all regions and 
social strata in what Mussolini called in December 1917 "the brutal apprenticeship of 
the trenches'''. It also revealed to the soldiers their collective identity as defenders of 
the common cultural and historic ideal of a reborn Italy. The experience of war 
succeeded, according to Mussolini, where the Risorgimento had failed - in instilling a 
common sense of national pride to the Italian people, displacing the previous diverse 
regional identities by the ideal of "citizen- soldier" (cittadino -soldato) of the nation31. 
What followed Caporetto, he added, showed to the world that that Italians could 
wage a brave national war, that they were indeed the worthy inheritors of the historic 
Roman civilisation and that the process of "making the Italians" had entered its final, 
decisive stage'. The task of the Fascist "revolution ", as he stressed in numerous 
occasions during the 1920s, was to unite the nation under the authority of a new, all - 
encompassing state33. In Fascist Italy there would be no division between regions, 
between north and south; there would be only Italians united "at the heart of the 
fatherlandi34. 
28 Malaparte, Europa Vivente, pp. 93ff; Papini, G., "The War as a Source of National Renewal ", in 
Griffin (ed.), Fascism, pp. 23 -4 
29 
For the importance of war in general see Ciccardini, B., "Il fascismo come esame di coscienza delle 
generazioni ", Terza Generazione, 3 (1954), pp. 39 -44, reprinted in Casucci, C. (ed.), II fascismo: 
Antologia di scritti critici (Bologna 1982), pp. 489 -502 
30 00, X, 140ff ( "Trincerocrazia" in Popolo d'Italia, 15 December 1917); an excerpt is translated in 
Griffin (ed.), Fascism, pp. 28 -9 
J1 Mosse, G. L., "Two World Wars and the Myth of the War Experience ", Journal of Contemporary 
History, 21 (1986), pp.491 -514; Isnenghi, M., "Il mito di potenza ", in Del Boca, A., Legnani, M., 
Rossi, M. C. (eds.), 11 regime fascista. Storia e storiografia (Rome & Bari 1995), pp. 144f 
32 For the importance of Caporetto see Bosworth, R. J. B., Italy and the Wider World, 1860 -1960 
(London 1996), pp. 33ff; Hamilton, A., The Appeal of Fascism. A Study of Intellectuals and 
Fascism, 1919 -1945 (London 1971), pp. 16ff. For Mussolini's comments 
see Scritti, I, 320 -1 ( "La 
vittoria fatale ", speech in Bologna, 24 May 1918); II, 11ff ( "Discorso 
da ascoltare ", Popolo d'Italia, 
1 May 1919) 
33 00, XXI, 359 ( "Intransigenza assoluta ", speech to the Fascist Congress in Rome, 21 June 1925) 
34 00, XVII, 218 ( "Programma fascista ", 8 November 1921). Cf. XXIV, 9f (speech to the Assembly 
of the Regime, 10 March 1929); XXIV, 227 -8 (speech in Livorno, 
11 May 1930) 
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Linked to this positive development were the other two negative origins: the 
postwar peace settlement and the rapid decline of the Giolittian system after 1918'. 
The unsatisfactory territorial gains from the treaties of Versailles, Trianon and 
Rapallo provided the intervento movement with a new point to rally its disparate 
ideological and social forces. The so- called "minimalist" solution to Italy's territorial 
claims in the Adriatic (excluding Fiume and other parts not inhabited by ethnic 
Italian majorities) was regarded by the Fascist leadership as an artificial, arbitrary 
denial of the status that the country had achieved through her participation in the 
First World War'''. The resurrection of the Italian nation during, and because of, the 
war warranted the annexation of vast areas, established as historically and 
geographically Italian'. This claim was significantly more than naked imperialism, it 
was argued. It was the ultimate consecration of the Italian victory which emerged 
from the apocalyptic vision of a "new" Italy38. 
In this respect, the liberal system failed to acknowledge the historic 
significance of the intervento and the war experience. Mussolini saw the vindication 
of his intervento rhetoric in Giolitti's belated recognition that Italy's participation in 
the war had promoted long -term national interests39. Yet, for the Fascists the war was 
not over in 19180. Liberalism proved itself incapable of responding to the new 
realities, especially in its incompetent representation of the nation at the peace 
negotiations'. The myth of vittoria mutilata and the violent suppression of the 
dannun:ianismo in Fiume were further manipulated by the leadership of the Fasci to 
J5 For the importance of the Peace Treaties see, in this study, Ch. 4, Section II. For the collapse of the 
Giolittian system see Casucci, "Fascismo e storia ", pp. 238ff; Gentile, E., "From the Cultural Revolt 
of the Giolittian era to the Ideology of Fascism ", in Coppa, F. J. (ed.), Studies in Modern Italian 
History. From Risorgimento to the Republic (New York 1986), pp. 103 -19 
16 Scritti, II, 16 -7 ( "Annessione ", Popolo d'Italia, 24 April 1919), 52 ( "Navigare Necesse" in Popolo 
d 'Italia, 1 January 1920); Mack Smith, Guerre di Duce, pp. 18f; Forges Davanzati, E., "L'Italia fa 
da se ", Idea Nazionale, 23.4.1919 
37 Scritti, II, 111 ( "Ciò che rimane e ciò che verra", Popolo d'Italia, 13 November 1920); Copolla, F., 
La crisi italiana (Rome 1916), pp. 77 -91 
J8 On the nationalist and fascist conceptions of nazione see the two contributions of Agnelli, A., 
"L'idea di nazione all'inizio e nei momenti di crisi del secolo XX ", and Gentile, E., "La nazione del 
fascismo. Alle origini del declino dello Stato nazionale ", in Spadolini, 
G. (ed.), Nazione e 
Nazionalità in Italia (Rome & Bari 1994), pp. 15 -32 and 65 -124 respectively 
39 Scritti, II, 98 -9 ( "Discorso di Trieste ", 20 September 1920) 
40 Bottai, G., Pagine di critica fascista, edited by Pacces, F. M. (Florence 
1941), p. 9 
41 On the failure of liberalism after the First World War to respond 
to the feeling of aggrieved 
nationalism see Vivarelli, R., 11 fallimento del liberalismo (Bologna 
1981) 
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propagate the imagery of liberal collapse'-. Mussolini commented sarcastically that 
the liberal vecchiaia had failed to grasp that the war and the "immense Italian 
victory" had established the country as a power with a universal mission and an 
imperial destiny ". Against the defeatism and lack of ambition of Giolittism, on the 
one hand, and the corrupt internationalism of the socialists, on the other, Fascism 
developed its own ideological identity as a terza via between the decadent ideologies 
of the left and the right." or even as a "fourth way ", rejecting old- fashioned models of 
authoritarianism. 
In Germany, the "turning point" was partly in the experience of the Great War 
itself'", but mainly in the developments of the immediate postwar period: the 1918 
Revolution, the Versailles Treaty and the establishment of the Weimar Republic. As 
111 the case of Italy, the peace settlement became the focal point of nationalist 
criticism against the liberal system. However, the institution of the Republic was the 
epitome of what German radical nationalism opposed: it represented liberal 
incompetence, socialist subversion, class divisiveness and international conspiracy 
against the German Volk46. In the interviews with early Nazis of the Abel collection, 
anti -Weimar feeling was one of the major factors in the NSDAP members' decision 
to join the party in the 1920s. At the same time, after the experience of the 1918 
revolution and left -wing agitation in the interwar period, they combined their 
rejection of the Republic with a deep- seated hatred of socialists and an equally 
fundamental anti -Semitic prejudice. The overwhelming majority of the respondents 
tended to identify all these negative elements with the reality of the Weimar 
Republic, thus investing their political opposition to liberalism with nationalist and 
42 Scritti, II, 28 -9 ( "Dopo il voto ", Popolo d'Italia, 2 June 1919); 31 -7 (speech in Florence, 9 October 
1919); 55 -7 ( "Rinunciatori ", Popolo d'Italia, February 1920); 101 (speech in Trieste, 20 September 
1920) 
43 00, XI, 92 (May 1918); Scritti, II, 31 -7 (speech in Florence, 9 October 1919). See also Knox, M., 
"Conquest, Foreign and Domestic, in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany ", Journal of Modern History, 
56 (1984), pp. 16 -8 
44 Mosse, G. L., "Towards a General Theory of Fascism"; Bobbio, N., "L'ideologia del 
fascismo ", 
reprinted in Casucci (ed.), Antologia, pp. 598 -624 (esp. pp. 621 -4) 
45 The quotation from Moeller van den Bruck, A., Germany's 
Third Empire (New York 1971), pp. 
122f 
46 Hitler, A., Mein Kampf translated by R. Mannheim (London 
1972), Chs. 8 -10 
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irrational ideological beliefs in the purity and unity of the German Volk'. This 
criticism was further strengthened by the moderate attitude of Weimar politicians 
towards the prospect of treaty revisions, and reached its climax during the campaign 
against the Young Plan in 19298. The grievances of the German nation in 1918 -24, 
and then during the economic crisis of 1929 -33, were exploited in Nazi rhetoric to 
project a positive message of national endurance, in contrast to the decaying, 
contaminated Weimar system'. 
The "new" German nationalism of the 1920s succeeded in transforming the 
negative experience of the interwar period into a positive apocalypse, from which the 
nation's heroic destiny and its inevitable Neugeburt would emerge. At a time when 
the traditional nationalist forces (most notably the DNVP) were moving towards a 
positive, if somewhat uneasy commitment to the Republic, the forces of "new" 
Germany (i.e. the Nazi ideologues but also radical nationalist thinkers like Spengler, 
Jünger, Moeller van den Bruck and Jung) called for the "annihilation" of the Weimar 
experiment'0. The experience of war itself, the national grandeur it instilled into the 
Volk, the territorial dream it temporarily realised, all contributed, they claimed, to the 
generation of a new national conscience. This process was delayed by the conspiracy 
of 1918 (Revolution, "stab -in- the -back "), but could be resuscitated out of the ruins of 
the Republic". The legacy of the "new" nationalism was presented as antithetical to 
the old perceptions of "liberal" nationalism, and to the "jingoism" of the traditional 
politicians'. It was a political religion, based on the Lebensnotwendigkeit of the 
4' Merkl, P. H., Political Violence under the Swastika. 581 Early Nazis (Princeton, New Jersey 1975), 
pp. 382ff, 549ff 
48 Childers, T., The Nazi Voter. The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 1919 -1939 (Chapel 
Hill & London 1983), pp. 129 -38; Merkl, pp. 322ff; Feuchtwanger, E. J., From Weimar to Hitler. 
Germany, 1918 -1933 (Basingstoke & London 1983), pp. 205ff; Noakes, J. Pridham, G. (eds.), 
Nazism. A Documentary Reader, vol. I: The Rise to Power, 1919 -1933 (Exeter 1983), pp. 64 -5 
49 Baynes, N. H. (ed.), The Speeches of Adolf Hitler. April 1922 - August 1939 (London, New York & 
Toronto 1942), vol. I, pp. 584 -92 (speech in the opening of the House of German Art, 18 July 
1937); Mohler, A., Die Konservative Revolution in Deutschland (Darmstadt 1972), passim; Griffin, 
Nature of Fascism, pp. 92f; Hitler, Mein Karnpf, pp. 211ff. Cf. "Das Programm der NSDAP", 
translated and reprinted in Griffin, Fascism, pp. 121 -2 
5o See, for example, Moeller van den Bruck, Germany's Third Empire (New York 1971); Struve, W., 
Elites against Democracy. Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890- 
1933, (Princeton, New Jersey 1973), p. 378; Herf, G., Reactionary Modernism. Technology, Culture 
and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge 1984), Chs. 2 -6; Hamilton, pp. 
141f 
51 See, for example, Juenger, E., Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis (Berlin 1922) 
52 Baynes, II, p. 1218 -47 (speech to the Reichstag, 21 May 1935) 
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nation, the unique destiny of the German Volk and the generational conviction that a 
cycle of national history had been initiated by the war'. 
Fascism in post -unification national history: a syncretic ideology 
The second task of fascism's short-term historicisation involved a critical 
assessment of the policies and worldviews which dominated the post -unification 
history of the two countries. This assessment rested upon a clear separation between 
those elements which diverted the nation from its destiny, on the one hand, and those 
which contributed to the revelation of the nation's role of grandeur for the future. The 
fascists could justify an original and historically crucial role for their movements by 
making a sharp break with a past which, by 1919, had been widely held as 
responsible for the unfortunate course of national history. This served a dual 
function. It made fascism ideologically intelligible by presenting it as the synthesis, 
continuation and reinvigoration of constructive, but unexploited forces of post - 
unification history'. It also avoided the danger of a total rejection of the past as 
futile. Instead, fascist ideology presented the five or six decades after unification as a 
period of national "soul- searching ", as a necessary apprenticeship which, through 
both its ventures and failures, paved the way for the fascist rebirth'. 
The attempt to devise a history of "proto- fascism" and to distance it from the 
context of the overall criticism of the pre -1914 policies was indeed a complex 
process. In Italy, Mussolini attacked the pusillanimous and humiliating liberal 
policies concentrated on the key figures of the Giolittian system: Giolitti, above all, 
but also Orlando and Nitti for their mishandling of the territorial negotiations after 
the war and their inability to grasp the changing nature of nationalist feeling in the 
country5ó. However, the Duce replicated the rhetoric of the ANI ( Associazione 
57 On this issue see Juenger, Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis; Spengler, O., The Decline of the West 
(London 1926), pp. 40ff; Moeller van den Bruck, Third Empire 
54 Mosse, "General Theory", p. 36; Baynes, II, p. 1129 (speech in Weimar, 1 November 1933) 
ss See Hitler's speech, quoted in Boepple, E. (ed.), Adolf Hitlers Reden (Munich 1933), pp. 6 -21. For 
a general analysis of this theme see Griffin, Nature of Fascism, Ch. 4; Mohler, p. 82 
56 Scritti, II, 75 ( "Nefasto ", Popolo d'Italia, 9 May 1920) ,77 -81 ( "Restare a 
Valona", Popolo d'Italia, 
13 June 1920) ; Chiurgo, G. A., Storia della rivoluzione fascista, 1919 
-1922, vol. II: Anno 1920 
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Nazionalista Italiana, Italian Nationalist Association) in excluding Crispi from the 
context of his anti -liberal polemics. Crispi, as the man responsible for the most 
prestige- oriented imperialist policy in modern Italian history, the man charged with 
the cost of the most opprobrious failure of Italian expansionism (Adowa, 1896), was 
resurrected in Fascist propaganda as the "bearer" of the great -power conscience of 
modern Italy''. He was credited with the invention of a truly "Italian" - as opposed to 
the "Prussian" or "western" - style of imperialism's. Mussolini also praised his 
intuition in pushing Italy towards the Mediterranean and Africa. This policy reflected 
the nation's universal imperial destiny and was a necessity dictated by the country's 
underprivileged economic, commercial and demographic conditions'. 
The abandonment of Crispi's vision, however, by successive liberal 
politicians was not simply seen as a fatal miscalculation of Italy's real needs and 
objectives. According to Gentile, Crispi was the torch -bearer of the Risorgimento 
tradition, the only true heir to the Mazzinian dream of "new" Italy and the ultimate 
exponent of the "Roman myth "60. The romantic, spiritual ideal of a new universal 
empire, based on the legacy of the Eternal City, the traditions of Mazzini, Garibaldi 
and Gioberti, were the true guiding- principles behind Crispi's "cultural 
imperialism "61. Mussolini did not interpret these policies as imperialistic in the 
conventional sense of the word. They were inspired by an ideal of egalitarianism 
(Florence 1929), pp. 267ff; De Grand, A. J., The Italian Nationalist Association and the Rise of 
Fascism in Italy (Lincoln & London 1978), pp. 103 -5, 110. In the nationalist press see, for example, 
"Cinicesmo cieco ", Idea Nazionale, 17.9.1919; "La conferenza contro l'alleanza ", Idea Nazionale, 
2.5.1919. For an analysis of the traditional policies of Orlando see Bosworth, Italy and the Wider 
World, pp. 33f 
57 Scritti, II, 95 ( "Discorso di Trieste ", 20 September 1920) 
Se Scritti, IV, 13 -5 ( "Francesco Crispi ", speech in Rome, 12 January 1924); II, 199 -201 (address to the 
Fascist Congress of Rome, 9 November 1921). The portrayal of Italian imperialism as different 
from, and indeed superior to, both the "Prussian" and the "Anglo- Saxon" equivalents was a constant 
theme in the rhetoric of the PNF leadership. See also Gentile, E., Ideologia fascista, p. 397ff; Bottai, 
G., "Politica coloniale ardita ", Popolo d'Italia, 10 -5 -1919 
sv Scritti, IV, 151(speech in the Chamber of Deputies, 7 June 1924). On Mussolini's demographic 
ideas, and the dangers of `overpopulation" or "demographic decadence ", see 00, XXIII, 215f 
( "Regresso delle nascite, morte dei popoli ", speech in Bologna, 1 September 1928); Segrè, C. G., 
Fourth Shore. The Italian Colonization of Libya (Chicago & London 1974), pp. 3 -32 
60 Gentile, G., I Profeti del Risorgimento (Florence 1944, 3rd edition), and "Origini e dottrina del 
fascismo ", in Casucci (ed.), Antologia, pp. 37 -8; O'Sullivan, N., Fascism 
(London & Melbourne 
1983), pp. 164f; Hamilton, pp. 39 -43, 57 -9; Griffin, Nature of Fascism, pp. 68 -9. For the 
significance of the "myth of Rome" see later in this chapter. 
61 Gentile, E., Ideologia fascista, p. 396 
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among peoples under the spiritual and cultural domination of Rome'. They echoed 
Italy's moral and historic right to equality with the other great European nations, in 
political and territorial terms. In its opposition to Crispian policies after 1896, 
liberalism and Giolittism were presented as rejecting the long -term objectives and 
legacies of the Risorgimento. In this sense, they were historic aberrations, a 
parenthesis that was sealed off by the intervento movement and the final victory of 
Fascism in 1922'. 
On the other hand, the Fascists had been significantly more reluctant to 
acknowledge ideological debts to the "new" Italian nationalist movement which 
came to be identified with the ANI. Undoubtedly, the PNF had its own ideological 
mentors within its ranks: Mussolini himself, the revolutionary syndicalists`', the 
Futurists'', even D'Annunzio'. The ANI represented a kind of nationalism that was 
pro -monarchical, "dynastic" and highly "ideological" - both qualities unacceptable to 
Fascism's early republicanism, anti -intellectualism and activism". In contrast, the 
revolutionary aspects of syndicalism and squadrism tended to focus on the need for 
domestic transformation which was antithetical to most nationalists' social 
conservatism and old- fashioned nationalism. At the same time, the ANI was widely 
regarded by the revolutionary wing of the PNF as part of the same "old" nationalist 
tradition which Fascism opposed. Despite the respect for the father -figures of 
Corradini, Papini and Prezzolini, the new stars of the ANI, mainly Federzoni and 
Rocco, had been charged with a certain "restorationism" and ideological rigidity, 
62 00, XVI, 128 
63 Boccioni, U., Opere complete (Foligno 1927), pp. 8ff; Volpe, G., L'Italia in cammino (Milan 1931, 
3rd ed.), preface 
64 See, for example, Panunzio, S., "Stato e sindicalismo", Rivista Internationale di Filosofia del 
Diritto, 3 (1923), pp. 4 -9, translated and reprinted in Griffin, Fascism, pp. 46 -8. For an analysis of 
the ideology of revolutionary syndicalism in Italy see Sternhell, Z., The Birth of Fascist Ideology. 
From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution (Princeton 1994), pp. 131 -59 
65 On the political significance of the Futurist Movement see Zapponi, N., "Futurismo e fascismo ", 
and Gentile, E., "Il Futurismo e la politica dal nazionalismo modernista al fascismo (1909- 1920) ", 
in De Felice (ed.), Futurismo, pp. 161 -76 and 105 -60 respectively 
66 For the significance of Gabriele D'Annunzio in the development of fascist ideology in Italy see 
Griffin, Nature of Fascism, pp. 64f; Ledeen, M. A., The First Duce. D 'Annunzio at Fiume 
(Baltimore 1977); Mosse, G. L., "The poet and the exercise of political power: Gabriele 
D'Annunzio ", in Mosse (ed.), Masses and Man (New York 1980), pp. 35 -61 
67 Gentile, Ideologia fascista, pp. 218f; Missiroli, M., Una Battaglia Perduta (Milan 1924), pp. 301ff. 
For a criticism of the Fasci by the ANI see Pedrazzi, O., "I Fasci di combattimento. Un errore ", Idea 
Nazionale, 25.3.1919 
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alien to Fascism's revolutionary élan. Even when the PNF emerged as the strongest 
nationalist force in 1921, or even after the March on Rome, the prospect of a merging 
of the two poles of the Destra Nazionale was viewed with considerable scepticism, if 
not hostility, among extreme groups of the PNF68. Reservations about fusion were 
also expressed in the ANI camp, the spokesmen of which pointed to the ethical 
ambiguity and ideological poverty of Fascism69. Yet, in the sphere of foreign policy, 
the lack of a clear vision in early Fascist expansionist rhetoric facilitated the 
assimilation of many nationalist themes in the programme of the PNF. The two 
parties shared a number of novelties and experiences which set them apart from the 
"old" Italian nationalism: the cult of war, the belief in a new hierarchy based on 
individual merit, the vision of a strong, expansionist Italy, the idea of an Italian 
"mission" and, most of all, the struggle of intervento70. 
The eventual fusion of the ANI into the PNF in 1923 constituted the first 
successful attempt at a wide political synthesis in the nationalist camp. It also 
provided tangible evidence of the process of ideological fusion in the nationalist 
Right which had been initiated with the intervento and had by 1922 -23 entered its 
final, decisive stage". By that time, Mussolini had already made a spectacular U -turn 
towards "normalisation" (rejecting its previous anti -monarchism, anti -capitalism, 
anti -clericalism and anti- étatism') which enabled conservative figures like Federzoni 
and Rocco to be given strategic ministerial posts in the new Fascist cabinet. This 
transformation should not be attributed to what many historians have called the 
68 Gentile, E., Ideologia fascista, pp. 221f, 385 -6; De Grand, Nationalist Association, pp. 149ff 
69 See, for example, Ercole, F., "Contro un affretata fusione ", Idea Nazionale, 20.12.1921; D'Andrea, 
U., "Due nature, due compiti ", Idea Nazionale, 25.11.1921, both reprinted in Perfetti, F., Il 
nazionalismo italiano dalle origini alla fusione col fascismo (Bologna 1977), pp. 267 -82 
70 The ideological similarities of fascism with its nationalist predecessors are discussed in Griffin, 
Nature of Fascism, pp. 56 -60. See also Alatri, P., Le origini del fascismo (Rome 1963), pp. 5 -31; 
Gentile, E., Ideologia fascista, pp. 385ff; Mack Smith, D., Le guerre di Duce (Rome & Bari 1976), 
pp. 4 -5. Generally, on the ideological influence of the ANI upon fascism see Stemhell, "Fascist 
Ideology ", pp. 332 -8 
" Griffin, Nature of Fascism, pp. 65 -6 
'` The idea of fascist "normalisation" is discussed in Andreski, S., "Fascists as Moderates ", in Larsen, 
S. U., Hagtvet, B., Myklebust, J. P. (eds.), Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European 
Fascism (Bergen, Oslo, Tromso 1980), pp. 52 -5; Santarelli, C., Storia del movimento e del regime 
fascista (Rome 1967), pp. 288ff; Koch, H. W., "1933: The Legality of Hitler's Assumption of 
Power ", in Koch (ed.), Aspects of the Third Reich (Houndmills & London 1985), pp. 44 -5; Eatwell, 
R., Fascism: A History (London 1995), p. 46 
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"triumph of the nationalist mentality over Fascism "73. In the sphere of foreign policy, 
the PNF had long subscribed to the ideological myths of the ANI, but at the same 
time it imposed upon them an idiosyncratic emphasis on action - in contrast to the 
ANI's intellectualism and obsession with programmes. With the fusion of 1923, 
Fascism completed its re- writing of post -unification national history. Both politically 
and ideologically, it emerged as the culmination of all those suppressed energies of 
the past with a unique dual task: to rectify the recent mistakes, and to fulfil the long- 
term visions of the Risorgimento, of Crispi and the intervento';. 
A similarly selective treatment of the past characterised the attempts of Nazi 
ideologues to historicise their movement. The Dolchstoss rhetoric relieved the 
Second Reich of the main responsibility for the humiliating postwar settlement. Of 
course, it was an undeniable truth that Wilhelminian Germany had failed to win the 
First World War. The reasons for this lay not in the qualities of the German Volk 
(which was superior, destined to dominate and of the highest racial stock, as Hitler 
repeatedly stressed''), but in the political handling of foreign affairs by the 
Wilhelminian Honorationenpolitiker76. Hitler was not prepared to demolish the 
reputation of pre -1914 Germany. That task would entail a rejection of the 
significance of unification, and of the special role of Bismarck in achieving it. 
Nazism needed these two elements in order to construct its own myth of national 
reawakening". The Führer was eager, however, to put the blame on the policies of 
73 For an analysis of this argument see Alatri, pp. 10ff ; Griffin. Nature of Fascism, p. 68 
74 Rocco, A., "Genesi storica dei fascismo", in his Scritti e discorsi politici, vol. III (Milan 1938), pp. 
1118f; "Il valore dell'atto", Idea Nationale, 28.2.1923, reprinted in Perfetti, 11 nazionalismo, pp. 
282 -4 
75 Domarus, M., Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, 1932 -1945, vol. I: Triumph (Würzburg 1962), p. 
977 (speech to the German Press, Munich, 10 November 1938). See also pp. 194 (letter to Prälat, 
February 1933), 207 (speech in Berlin, February 1933), 609 (speech in Hamburg, March 1936), 743 
(speech in Berlin, November 1937) 
76 Eley, G., From Unification to Nazism. Reinterpreting the German Past (Boston, London & Sydney 
1986), pp. 226f, and Reshaping the German Right. Radical Nationalism and Political Change after 
Bismarck (New Haven & London 1980), pp. 19ff, 356ff; Mommsen, H., "The 
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in late 19th -early 20th century Germany ", in Mommsen, H. (ed.), 
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(Cambridge 1991), pp. 11 -27; Retallack, J. N., Notables of the right. The Conservative 
Party and 
political mobilization in Germany (Boston & London 1988) 
77 Andrews, H. D, "Hitler and Bismarck: A History", German Studies 
Review, 14 (1991), pp. 511 -32. 
For an assessment of Bismarck's role by Hitler see Domarus, 
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Bethmann Hollweg which had isolated Germany from the other Great Powers 
(Britain, France, Russia) and pushed the Reich into a two -front war with no overall 
strategy and no concrete territorial objectives'$. The war in itself was not the sole 
responsibility of the Second Reich. The conspiracy of the "plutocratic" nations of the 
west (Britain, France) against Germany's ascendancy had confined the Reich to a 
suffocating diplomatic encirclement which dictated a policy of self -defence. It was, 
therefore, a struggle for national survival and not crude imperialist aspirations which 
changed the "peace -loving" nature of the Second Reich79. The Wilhelminian 
politicians, however, had "done everything by halves "80 and thus failed to prepare the 
nation for the war, both militarily and psychologically. Their experiments with 
"alien" forms of internal organisation (liberalism, parliament, racial tolerance) had 
fatally undermined the strength of the Volksgemeinschaft and had led to a decline that 
became even more traumatic after 1918. 
The criticism of the Second Reich for its share of responsibility for the events 
of 1914 -18 was not peculiar to the NSDAP. Both the Wilhelminian völkisch 
nationalist organisations and the various radical nationalist groups and ideologues in 
the 1920s, pointed to Germany's domestic and international weaknessesS1. The need 
for radical change, "rejuvenation ", Neugeburt, had formed the focal point of the 
interwar nationalist rhetoric'. In the difficult years between 1920 and 1928, when the 
NSDAP was caught between putschism and diminishing electoral support, 
independent mentors of the "new" nationalism (Spengler, Jung, Jünger, Moeller van 
den Bruck, to name but a few33) carried out a magnificent ideological preparation for 
the forthcoming "salvation ". Even Hitler himself initially perceived his role as a 
78 See the speech translated in Baynes, II, p. 1493 (speech for the Parteitag at Nuremberg , 12 
September 1938); and another reference in Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1340f (broadcast to the German 
Volk, 3 September 1939), where he reassured his audience that this time the invasion of Poland and 
the war would lead to a German victory. 
79 Völkischer Beobachter (henceforward, V. B.), 3 -4 -1939 
80 Hitler, Mein Kampf pp. 215ff, and in general pp. 205 -57 
81 On the radical nationalist associations of the Wilhelminian period see Chickering, R., We Men Who 
Feel Most German. A Cultural Study of the Pan -German League, 1886 -1914 (Boston 1984), esp. 
pp. 278ff; Eley, Reshaping, pp. 41 -98; Griffin. Nature of Fascism, pp. 85 -94. For the Weimar period 
see the analysis of Struve, pp. 232 -414; Mohler, pp. 35ff 
82 See, for example, Rosenberg, A., Krise und Neubau Europas (Berlin 1934) 
83 See Griffin, Nature of Fascism, Ch. 4; Sontheimer, K., Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer 
Republic (Munich 1968); Smith, W. D., The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism (Oxford 1986), 
pp. 196 -230 
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"Drummer" (Trommler), a prophet for a future Führer84. In this respect, the Nazi 
movement and its ideology became the platform of a synthesis of völkisch ideals of 
national unity, rebirth and greatness with the added element of historic urgency 
which pervaded the atmosphere of crisis in the 1920s. Where the NSDAP differed 
from the other forces of the nationalist opposition, however, was in its complete self - 
exemption from the stigma of the liberal system. The Nazi leadership emerged from 
the ruins of 1918 as a truly "new" spiritual élite, a negation of the forces of national 
destruction (liberalism, socialism, Jews), and of the "old" institutionalised 
nationalisms'. In this respect, the Nazi self -historicisation involved an unqualified 
rejection of post -Bismarckian choices. As in the case of Italy, the disaster of war was 
viewed as a "god -sent gift", from which the apocalyptic vision of "new" Germany 
originated'. Hitler's theory of territorial expansion emerged from the experience of 
1917 -18, in an attempt to remedy those conditions which had led to encirclement, 
defeat and loss of territory87. Furthermore, the degree of suffering that the negative 
elements of the old system inflicted upon the Volk strengthened and justified 
Nazism's "anti" character as a precondition for a true national renaissance. 
Destruction and endurance in German history highlighted the "transcendental" 
necessity of the existence of the German Volk. This belief invested Nazism's task of 
rebirth with a historic obligation to the nation itself, consisting in rescuing and 
completing the dream of unification but also defending the superiority of the national 
culture against the forces of "corruption" and "collapse ". 
84 On this issue see Tyrell, A, Vom ' Trommler' zum 'Führer'. Der Wandel von Hitlers Selbverständnis 
zwischen 1919 and 1924 and die Entwicklung der NSDAP (Munich 1975); Can, W., Hitler. A Study 
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criticises the idea that Hitler had formulated a definite version of his later ideology by 1922 (see for 
example, Stoakes, G., "The Evolution of Hitler's Ideas on Foreign Policy, 1919 -1925 ", in Stachura, 
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The fascist myth of national unification: the "mission" of completing the 
creating the nation -state 
The connection made by the fascist ideologues to the process and goals of 
national unification formed the basis of what has been t-mted the "palingenetic 
nature of fascism ", i.e. the revival of old national myths of grandeur in an effort to 
regenerate a society in deep crisis88. Attacks on the concepts of "territorial saturation" 
and "pacifism" resonated with the belief that unification was incomplete, and this 
fatally undermined the process of domestic unity and national ascendancy. Proto- 
fascism rejected the complacency of the post- unification generations and advocated 
the completion of unification as the spiritual sine qua non of national regeneration. 
This was a message that, according to the radical nationalists, neither Italian liberal 
politicians nor the Honorationenpolitiker of the Wilhelminian -Weimar systems could 
comprehend. Their historic deviation from the true goals of unification remained a 
source of domestic and external weakness for the two countries and peoples, 
culminating in what was perceived as a disastrous postwar heritage. The triumph of 
fascism with the March on Rome of 1922 and the Machtergreifung of 1933 validated 
the perception of liberalism as a historic aberration in terminal decay. It also 
confirmed the historic role of the two regimes in returning the unification process to 
its ideological origins and in reinventing it, this time freed from the forces of 
corruption. 
In this sense, fascism married its revolutionary activism with the idealism of 
national utopia and the necessity to expand in order to complete the mystic union of 
the whole nation within the national territory. This was not a re- negotiation of the 
past, but a conscious effort to reset the clock of national development and restart 
unification from point zero". It also mirrored a psychological reluctance to accept 
past failures (i.e. the thwarted visions of Crispi and Bismarck) as historic facts. In 
88 For an analysis of this term see Griffin, Nature of Fascism, esp. pp. 32f, 74f, 217 
S9 Stephenson, J., The Nazi Organisation of Women (London 1981), Introduction 
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this respect, fascism may be seen as an alternative process of unification9', in contrast 
to the political reality of unification as experienced after 1861 (in Italy) and 1871 (in 
Germany). Fascist ideology contrasted the ideological core of the unificatory vision 
(one state for the whole nation, nationalisation of the people, common struggle for 
greatness) to the decadent experience of the post -unification period. The myth of 
national rebirth expressed the aspirations of new politicised forces (the middle and 
lower classes), which had emerged after unification and now claimed a special role in 
the process of national ascendancy91. Representatives of these social groups 
interpreted the problems of the unified state not as the ideological bankruptcy of 
unification as an ideal, but as the outcome of political inertia, pragmatism and 
compromise by political leaders. The gap between the vision and the reality of 
unification, it was argued, was one of a mismatch between ideas and actual 
developments, thus underscoring the ideological sterility of liberalism. It was, 
therefore, fascism's historic role to reunite the initial idealism of the Risorgimento 
and the Vereinigung with a determination to achieve their goals. Fascists perceived 
the raison d' étre of their movements as the ultimate culmination, not the negation, 
of the unificatory visions of the nineteenth century'. Liberalism, as the dominant 
force of the past century, attempted to give political expression to these visions, but 
had failed. Now, fascism, portrayed as the only meaningful political form of the 
twentieth century, would have its turn93. 
The fascist vision of national unification had two aspects of particular 
importance for fascism's territorial philosophy. The first pertained to the ideological 
90 This is the basic idea behind Salvatorelli's perception of fascism as "anti- Risorgimento ". See 
Salvatorelli, L., Na:ionalfascismo (Turin 1923); De Felice, R., Interpretations of Fascism 
(Cambridge Mass. & London 1977), p. 181; Hamilton, pp. 57 -9 
9j On the role of these social forces in the emergence of radical nationalist and authoritarian 
tendencies in the two countries see Blackbourn, D., Eley, G. (eds.), The Peculiarities of German 
History (Oxford 1984); Weisbrod, B., "The crisis of bourgeois society in Interwar Germany "; and 
Lyttelton, A., "The `crisis of bourgeois society' and the origins of fascism ", both in Bessel (ed.), pp. 
23 -39 and 12 -22 respectively 
92 This idea is expressed in De Marsanich, A., "Il punto fermo", Critica Fascista, 1 -9 -1924; Gentile, 
E., Ideologia fascista, Chs. 5 -7; 00, XIV, 71 ( "L'ora nostra", Popolo d'Italia, 3 February 1920). 
Also in Hitler's speech in the aftermath of the Anschluss, reported in V. B., 18 -3 -1938 (reprinted in 
Baynes, II, pp. 1425 -7) 
93 Scritti, III, 77 (published in Gerarchia, March 1923); 00, XXVI, 44 ( "Fra due civiltà", speech in 
Rome, 22 August 1933); Mussolini, B., "Political and Social Doctrine 
of Fascism ", in Oakeshott, M. 
(ed.), The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe (New York 1949), pp. 
164 -79; 
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legacy of the patriarchal figures of the struggle for unity. In Italy, the prophecies of 
Mazzini, Oriani and Gioberti for the nation's superior historic mission were adopted 
by Fascist ideology as a proof of the limited relevance of the modern Italian state to 
the dream of the Risorgimento94. The Risorgimento, according to Gentile, was not 
simply a static concept, an act that might or might not be accomplished. It was a 
permanent struggle for renaissance and grandeur, in which the conquest of Rome and 
Venice were landmarks but not termini95. The liberal attempt to present unification as 
completed reflected a conservative philosophy of history and showed its ideological 
irrelevance to the "revolutionary" and idealistic principles that inspired the 
Risorgimento". The failure to carry out the promises of 1848 -60 had its roots in the 
marginalisation of Mazzini and Garibaldi by a liberal "oligarchy" which held a 
pragmatic and limited vision of the "new" Italy. Mussolini was always at pains to 
criticise the notion that the Risorgimento had been a liberal accomplishment. For 
him, the Garibaldian revolutionary and universalist vision, on the one hand, and the 
Mazzinian idealism (represented as the heritage of Dante), on the other, had been the 
two foundations of the modern Italian state97. The liberals entered the game later and 
they usurped the ideological and political credit for unification, with the disastrous 
consequences of Giolittism and postwar humiliation. In his co- operation with 
Gentile, Mussolini saw the unity of ideals and actions which reflected the 
complementary roles of Mazzini and Garibaldi, against liberal introversion and lack 
of vision's. 
Scritti, II, 339ff ( "Discorso di Napoli ", 24 October 1922), reprinted in Santarelli (ed.), Scritti di 
Mussolini, pp. 219 -23 
9; See, for example, Gentile, G., Profeti del Risorgimento; Simonini, A., Il linguaggio di Mussolini 
(Milan 1978), pp. 96 -99; "Il monito di Oriani ", Popolo d'Italia, 14.3.1915, reprinted in Santarelli 
(ed.), Scritti di Mussolini, pp. 157 -60; and 00, XX, 244 -5 ( "Oriani ", speech in Cardello, 27 April 
1924) 
95 Gentile, G., Guerra e Fede (Rome 1927, 2nd edition), pp. 55ff 
96 Salomone, A. W., "The Risorgimento and the Political Myth of the `Revolution that Failed "', 
American Historical Review, 68 (1964), pp. 38 -53 
97 Scritti, IV, 63 -84 ( "Cinque anni dopo San Sepolcro ", commemorative 
speech, 24 March 1923); 
327 -8 (speech in Dalmine, 27 October 1924); 323 -5 (speech in Bergamo, 
27 October 1924) 
98 00, XIII, 296. On a general discussion of the connection between fascism and Risorgimento see 
Mack Smith, D., "The Prehistory of Fascism ", reprinted in Salomone, 
A. W. (ed.), Italy from 
Risorgimento to Fascism. An Inquiry into the Origins of the Totalitarian State 
(Newton Abbot 
1971), pp. 103 -23 
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Hitler, too, perceived his task as a continuation of Bismarck's artificially 
interrupted and distorted vision of national grandeur. This goal was significantly 
more difficult than the defence of Mazzini and Garibaldi by the Duce, since the 
architect of the German nation -state shared responsibility in the fate of post - 
unification Germany in the 1870s and 1880s99. Bismarck had been very reluctant 
either to pursue a policy of colonial expansion or to promote the territorial goal of 
Grossdeutschland (i.e. the completion of unification with the inclusion of Austria 
into the Reich10°). His dismissal in 1890, however, marked the end of an era and 
initiated the downward slide of the Second Reich. Hitler did not fail to criticise the 
shortcomings of Bismarckian Germany, but he was always respectful of the role and 
the vision of Bismarck himself'''. He was the "prophet ", the "precursor of Great - 
Germany", the man who realised the destiny of the German Volk and initiated the 
difficult process of its renaissance10'. The elements of "moral decay ", inherent in his 
Reich, finally managed to overpower him, leaving the task of forming a complete 
state and a mature nation unfinished10'. Yet, here lay the historic significance of the 
Nazi movement, which was to draw the Bismarckian effort to its logical conclusion. 
The Nazi regime was destined to fulfil the last stage of unification, namely to create 
one people and one Reich, as well as to unite the German state with its historic 
birthplace of central Europe which remained "unredeemed "10 ;. The negative 
experience of the past taught Hitler to avoid compromises and not to waste any 
valuable time. German unification was historically incomplete and this would 
eventually drag Germany into chaos, unless it was complemented immediately. Any 
hesitation would exacerbate the problems and lead to a repetition of the post - 
Bismarckian disaster " ". 
99 See Hitler's speech of 20 February 1938 to the Reichstag, quoted from the authorised English 
translation in Baynes, II, pp. 1376ff 
'0" Birken, p. 50 -1 
101 Andrews, pp. 511f 
102 Speech reported in the FranlOrter Zeitung (henceforward F. Z.), 15 -2 -1939 
103 Speech translated and quoted in Baynes, II, p. 1012f (speech to the Reichstag, 
21 March 1933). See 
also Birken, pp. 50 -1 
104 V. B., 21 -2 -1938, 27 -3 -1938; and speech reported in F. Z., 8 -4 -1938. 
See also Hitler, Mein Kampf 
pp. 351 -98, 599ff; Zweites Buch, pp. 115 -6 
Ios Baynes, II, p. 1377 (speech to the Reichstag, 20 February 1938) 
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The fascist myth of unification recast the traditional radical nationalist claim 
of uniting all ethnically kin populations and their territories with the fatherland. 
Having successfully amalgamated previous nationalist themes into their ideological 
system, the two fascist movements emerged in the 1920s as the torch -bearers of the 
struggle for the rebirth of their nations and for the promotion of the nationalist utopia 
of completing the process of unification. This notion provided the first tangible 
argument in defence of territorial expansion beyond the existing boundaries of the 
two countries. However, in contrast to conventional irredentist arguments, fascist 
ideology accentuated the radical nationalist claim for an open -ended process of 
expansion far beyond what could be justified in purely ethnic terms. The completion 
of unification had immense territorial and, above all, spiritual value but was regarded 
as the necessary sine qua non for greatness, the beginning - rather than the terminus - 
of national "palingenesis ". What transformed territorial expansion from a political 
option of limited scope into a historic necessity for fascist ideology was the emphasis 
on two further abstract principles. The first was the conception of history as a 
constant struggle in social Darwinist terms for the survival and triumph of the fittest. 
The second pertained to the self -perception of everything fascist (leadership, nation, 
culture) as an elite force, entrusted with a mission to legitimise the spreading of its 
values. To these two pivotal elements we shall turn now. 
Ill. Beyond national unification: justifying the right to expand 
Fascist expansionism, "constant struggle" and the ideology of "violence" 
If fascism's analysis of the past provided ideological support for the claim of 
Italy and Germany for international leadership, post -1918 political realities seemed to 
impede the realisation of this destiny. Both fascist leaders capitalised on this gap 
between the historic right of their nations to dominate and the artificial thwarting of 
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this destiny by internal and external foes in the recent past106. They based their appeal 
on the promise to rectify this historic aberration by exploiting the dynamism which 
the Italian and German nations de facto possessed, based on their alleged spiritual 
superiority and "widest range of capacities "107. Expansion, as Hitler repeatedly 
emphasised, was the historic right of the "talented" people to possess space 
equivalent to the quality of their activities, but the reality was diametrically different, 
with less talented people possessing "a greater and often unexplored extent of living 
space "103. Neither of the two leaders, however, made any secret of the difficulties that 
this promise entailed. The rise of the two "young" nations to prominence would 
continue to be subverted by the selfishness and greed of the `old ", "plutocratic" 
powers". History in itself, according to fascist ideology, was the outcome of a 
permanent struggle for survival and domination. In the long term, only the most 
competent would excel. Struggle, even in the form of violent confrontation, was both 
inevitable and desirable for the fulfilment of the fascist prophesies1'. 
This was the point where expansion ceased to be simply one option for 
foreign policy -making and became a necessity for the existence and the legitimate 
aspirations of the two nations. The belief that history was decided by constant 
struggle, and the conviction that fascist all -round excellence was destined to prevail, 
offered a new significance to the spreading of the fascist idea through force. In this 
sense, expansionism was not simply a political form of control and subordination of 
populations or a policy of ruthless exploitation (as in the case of British and French 
imperialism). It was rather the natural extension of a higher moral, cultural and 
biological order. The ethical -religious connotations are obvious. Fascism was 
106 Scritti, II, 52, 55; and, for the need to modify the Treaty, II, 114. For more details see, in this study, 
Ch. 4, Section II 
107 Baynes, I, p. 989ff (interview with Otto Strasser, 21 May 1930); and II, 1041 -2 (speech to the 
Reichstag, 17 May 1933), 1260 -3 (interview to Paris Soir, 27 January 1936); Scritti, II, 114 ( "Ciò 
the rimane e ciò the verra ", 13 November 1920) 
108 Domarus, Hitler, I, pp. 748ff (Hossbach Conference, 5 November 1937); II, p. 
1052 (speech to 
party members, 30 January 1939); Baynes, II, p. 1262 (interview to Paris Soir, 
27 January 1936) 
109 Scritti, I, 321 ( "La vittoria fatale ", speech in Bologna, 24 May 1918); Baynes, 
II, p. 1547 (speech 
in Weimar, 6 November 1938) 
110 Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 123; Weinberg (ed.)., Zweites Buch, pp. 
34, 46ff; Boepple, pp. 40 -1; 00, 
XVII, 282; XVIII, 235ff; XXI, 160ff. For an analysis of these ideas 
see Rich, I, pp. 8 -10 
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destined to expand as a force of salvation and rebirth '. The media for this new order 
were the two nations with the strongest universal cultural tradition. Italy and 
Germany, both separately and en bloc after 1936'2, were so powerful internally that 
they were designed to turn this dynamism outwards, in an expansion of values that 
was a natural and moral inevitability. 
The cult of violence in fascist ideology had two separate aspects13. The 
spiritual aspect of violence was perceived as a force of national renovation, as an 
imperative step in the re- education of the individual in order to "remake his content" 
and transform him into a genuine uomo fascista"4. Fascism, Mussolini argued, was 
the negation of liberalism, because the former "attacks" and progresses while the 
latter only "defended" and sank into inertia ''. Fascism's task was to mobilise the 
Italian people both for the works of peace and the ineluctable labours of war1ó. One 
of his favourite themes was the "morality" of violence and its spiritual importance as 
expression of human will. In a speech he gave at Udine just a month before the 
March on Rome, he stressed that violence was a legitimate instrument of the State, 
crucial for the spiritual preparation of the Italian people for their future glory"'. In 
the opening speech to the Fascist Congress of 1925 he went even further, claiming 
that violence was more moral than any form of compromise or negotiation'''. Force 
was lawful and preferable to inertia, so long as it was pervaded by a worthy objective 
and was not blind19. In December 1924, speaking about his regime's foreign policy 
" Hartmut, L., "The Germans as a Chosen People: Old Testament Themes in German Nationalism ", 
German Studies Review, 14.2 (1991), pp. 261 -73; Steding, C., Das Reich and die Krankheit 
Europas (Hamburg 1938). See also 00, XXIX, 403 -5 
"" See Hitler's references in the joint mission of the two fascist nations in Baynes, II, pp. 1520 -1 
(speech in Sportpalast Berlin, 26 September 1938) 
13 See the insightful analysis in Neocleous, pp. 1 -18; and also Galli, G., I partiti politici (Turin 1974), 
pp. 231ff 
"a Mussolini, B., "Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism" (1932), pp. 164 -79, also in 00, XXXIV, 
124ff 
15 Scritti, III, 60 ( "La nuova politica estera ", speech to the Chamber of Deputies, 16 February 1923) 
Scritti, I, 320 -1 ( "Vittoria fatale ", 19 May 1918) 
"' 00, XVIII, 413f /Scritti, II, 307 -22 (speech in Udine, 20 September 1922); Gregor, Ideology of 
Fascism, pp. 188 -9. On the spiritual force of violence see also Corradini, "The Principles of 
Nationalism ", pp. 145 -7 
"8 Scritti, V, 109 -18 (speech to the Fascist Congress at Rome, 22 
June 1925). Cf. V, 179 -81 
( "Elementi di Storia ", Gerarchia, October 1925) 
"`' Scritti, V, 173 -81 ( "Elementi di Storia ", October 1925); Gentile, 
E., Storia del Partito Fascista, 
1919 -1922. Movimento e militia (Rome & Bari 1989), pp. 470ff; 
Zapponi, N., "Fascism in Italian 
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in front of the Italian Deputies, he once again underscored the morality of violence 
and asked the Italian people to be prepared for an "armed peace '. Only through the 
spiritual strength of violence and will could the Italian people be transformed into a 
real nation of warriors, building upon the experience of the First World War '''. 
In Germany, on the other hand, war and violence were significantly more 
embedded virtues in the militarist framework of society'". Exponents of radical 
nationalist ideology saw in war the means to "transcend" decadent bourgeois 
morality and to continue the process of transformation that had been initiated with 
the First World War''3. The overwhelming majority of the respondents to the Abel 
interviews accepted the necessity of using violence, and almost half of them 
exercised it wholeheartedly as a moral means to promote the Nazi new domestic 
order'''. Nazism endorsed and systematised the notion of a Volk in a state of constant 
mobilisation, modelled along the example of the armed forces'''. The "military" 
structure of the Nazi organisations, the spirit of "comradeship" they inspired to their 
recruits and the opportunities they offered for activism were regarded by the Abel 
Nazis as the most important factors in their decision to join the NSDAP''6. Violence 
and war became the ultimate expressions of the will to dominate, as well as the 
devices that offered concrete, effective form to fascist political activism. All these 
amounted to a perception of violence and war as both a means and an end in itself - a 
Historiography, 1986 -93: a Fading National Identity", Journal of Contemporary History, 29 (1994), 
pp. 558 -9 
Scritti, IV, 381 -90 (speech to the Chamber of Deputies, 15 November 1924). Cf. the use of the 
same term in justification of the Italian non -belligerence in November 1939 in 00, XXIX, 327 (15 
November 1939) 
'`' Scritti, V, 179 ( "Elementi di Storia", October 1925). See also the analysis in Zapponi, pp. 559ff 
''` Knox, M., "Expansionist Zeal, Fighting Power, and Staying Power in the Italian and German 
Dictatorships" in Bessel (ed.), pp. 115 -23; Struve, pp. 424 -5 
123 Theweleit, K., Male Fantasies, vol. II: Male Bodies: psychoanalyzing the white terror (Cambridge 
1989), pp. xii- xviii, 345 -407. On the origins of the ideology of violence see Sorel, G., Réflexions stir 
la violence (Paris 1912) 
=4 Merkl, pp. 540ff 
125 Struve, pp. 385ff. In Ernst Juenger's work similar references are numerous. 
See for example, Der 
Arbeiter. Herrschaft und Gestalt (Hamburg 1932, 2nd ed.), pp. 90, 
161f; and "Die Totale 
Mobilmachung", in Juenger (ed.), Krieg und Krieger (Berlin 1930), p. 14; 
Herf, Ch. 4 
126 Merkl, pp. 616 -7 
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means for realising national destiny, and a goal in its ethical and educational value 
for the people'''. 
The external aspect of violence, i.e. its use against others and its destructive 
potential, was regarded by fascist ideology as less fortunate, but no less inevitable or 
legitimate. Mussolini saw confrontation as a historic necessity, since life itself was 
punctuated by antitheses and clashes. It was not a pleasant "sport" or an 
entertainment to exercise violence, he noted in 1924, but in the end fundamental 
conflicts could be resolved only through force and war''8. In this respect, the use of 
violence by an élite was moral and legitimate, not only in a natural sense (the 
strongest had to prevail), but also politically (in order to bring the necessary 
readjustments to the "new order ")19. This was an argument consistent with the 
squads' emphasis on violent action and their "dogmatic, violent negation of the 
present ", as Mussolini described it in the Doctrine of Fascism. Fascism, he 
continued, did not believe in pacifism and perpetual peace, as these derived from the 
renunciation of struggle and from cowardice in the face of sacrifice130. War was 
regarded as the "most ferocious necessity ", but it also possessed qualities which 
determined the "whole progress of humanity '131. The nation, he added in 1934, must 
be militarised and prepare for war by subjecting all other considerations and needs to 
military priorities13'. Similarly, Hitler repeatedly stressed his aversion to violence as 
such, but claimed that its use had been sanctioned by higher historic priorities. The 
right of the German Volk to transform its inner superiority into international 
supremacy was questioned by a plethora of Feinde. If Germany wished to become 
again a great power (and, as an élite, she had the obligation to do so), she had to fight 
against the desire of her enemies to annihilate her133. The Nazi "new world" would 
come to life only through struggle and destruction, the latter directed against the 
12' 00, XXI, 193f /Scritti, IV, 391 -402 ( "La politica interna al Senato ", 5 December 1924) 
128 Scritti, II, 53/00, XVI, 445 ( "Navigare necesse ", 1 January 1920); IV, 334f (speech in Cremona, 
29 October 1924) 
129 00, XXI, 193 ( "Politica interna ", 5 December 1924) 
130 Mussolini, B., "Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism ", in Oakeshott, M. (ed.), The 
Social and 
Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe (New York 1949), pp. 167f 
131 00, XXVI, 259ff (speech at Turin, 4 May 1934). Cf. Mussolini, "Political and Social Doctrine of 
Fascism ", pp. 168f. See also Simonini, pp. 138 -40 
132 00, XXVI, 308f ( "Dopo le grande manovre" speech, 24 August 1934) 
n Rich, pp. 3 -10 
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forces of national and universal decay. On this point, National Socialism went 
significantly further than Italian Fascism. Hitler did not simply perceive the birth of 
the "new" as originating from the defeat of the "old ". Nazi ideology glorified total 
destruction as a precondition for total victory, but also as a goal in itself which would 
ineluctably lead to renovation13;. 
Fascism and elitism: élite "leaders ", élite "nations ", élite "civilisations ", 
and fascism's "mission" of expansion 
It has been one of the most perplexing ideological paradoxes of fascism that it 
strove to stress its egalitarian, meritocratic and classless elements13' while at the same 
time not concealing its elitist character. Unfortunately, even the few systematic 
accounts of fascist elitism focus on National Socialist movement136. Moreover, these 
accounts have been dominated by the domestic aspects of fascism as "political" élite, 
and have widely disregarded the ramifications of elitism for both the national and 
international practices of the fascist regimes. It is crucial to understand that these 
elitist theories were at the root of serious tension between "élites" and "non -élites" 
which inevitably resulted in the dominance of the former over the latter. In this sense, 
the "triumph" of fascism reflected the dynamism of the fascist élites, as well as their 
self -assigned "mission" to dominate and lead those groups that had been excluded 
from the fascist definition of élite. 
Fascist elitism owed its ideological substance to the previous elitist theories of 
social transformation. People like Michels and especially Pareto had spoken of a 
pattern of constant circulation of elites in society and viewed the triumph of one elite 
13' Baynes, II, p. 1552 (speech in Munich for the anniversary of the 1923 Putsch, 8 November 1938). 
See also, for an analysis, Griffin, Nature of Fascism, pp. 106, 110 -2 
15 Struve, pp. 418ff; Linz, Some Notes ", pp. 36f; Schoenbaum, D., Hitler's Social Revolution. Class 
and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933 -1939 (New York & London 1980), Ch. 8. On the anti -class 
character of fascism see (for Italy) Gentile, E., Ideologia fascista, pp. 363f; Rocco, A., "La dottrina 
politica del fascismo", in Rocco, Scritti e discorsi politici, vol. III (Milan 1938), pp. 
1099ff; 
Rossoni, E., "Sindicalismo fascista", La Stirpe, 6 (1928), pp. 705 -7, reprinted 
in Casucci (ed.), 
Antologia, pp. 113 -7; Ferrari, F. L., Le régime fasciste italien (Paris 1928), pp. 
241ff; and (for 
Germany), Baynes, I, pp. 15 -16 (speech in Genoa Conference, 12 April 
1922), 430 -1 (speech to the 
Reichstag, December 1933); Hitler, Mein Kampf pp. 351 -98; Birken, 
pp. 65 -6 
136 On the paucity of literature regarding the elitist aspects of fascist 
ideology see Struve, p. 415, n. 1 
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group as evidence of its superior qualities. In this sense, Pareto argued, fascism 
represented a victory of a historic set of ideas and mentalities which were destined to 
prevail and become generic137. At the same time, elitism evolved out of fascism's 
interpretation of history in essentially social Darwinist terms. The two fascist 
movements introduced themselves as the reincarnation of the highest elements of the 
Risorgimento and the Vereinigung, the bearers of the task to fulfil the prophecies of 
national reawakening and excellence. On a more general level, the fascist movements 
had allegedly emerged as a political, ideological and ethical élite through their 
successful struggle against the "old" forces of national and universal decay13'. 
Perseverance in difficult times led to their eventual victory and thus justified their 
self -historicisation as the new dynamic force, destined to guide the nation towards a 
future utopia. 
There are two crucial implications from fascist elitist ideology. The first 
demonstrates that fascist elitism was not limited to the notion of an élite 
leadership139, but embraced two further levels: an élite of nations, and an élite of 
races or forms of civilisation. The second implication concerned the interrelation of 
the elitist fascist theories with the propensity for aggressive expansion. The social 
Danvinist production of the élites (as leaders, nations and races or cultures) gave 
them a sense of historic significance and a determination to continue their struggle 
for the attainment of their allegedly superior historic objectives. Fascists were 
ideologically conditioned to reject all forms of political introversion or inertia, and to 
seek to dominate all (domestic and international) who resisted their historic message. 
"' See Pareto, V., I aiatemi socialisti (Turin 1954); Finer, S. E., Vilftedo Pareto: Sociological 
Writings (London 1966), pp. 51 -71. A relevant excerpt is translated in Lyttelton (ed.), Italian 
Fascisms, pp. 71 -90. For an assessment of Pareto's influence on Mussolini's thought see Simonini, 
pp. 99 -104; Borkenau, F., Pareto (London 1936), pp. 18ff, 185ff; Wilford, "Fascism ", 
pp. 194 -6 
and Mosca, G., Teorica dei governi e governo parlamentare (Turin 1925). 
For an analysis of the 
Italian elitist theories see Gregor, Ideology of Fasciste, pp. 36 -46 
138 Baynes, II, p. 1377 (speech to the Reichstag, 20 February 1938); Hamilton, 
pp. 53 -4 
19 Strasser, 0., Aufbau des Sozialismus (Prague 1936), pp. 103 -4, translated and cited 
in Griffin, 
Fascism, pp. 114 -5; 00, VI, 80 -1 ( "Valore del socialismo", 8 February 1914). See also the relevant 
analysis in O'Sullivan, pp. 149 -60; Gentile, E., Ideologia fascista, 
p. 401f; Glaser, H., The Cultural 
Roots of National Socialism (London 1978), pp. 130 -5. For the role of leadership 
in the fascist 
systems see also below, Chs. 4, 7 
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Expansion, therefore, was the outward manifestation of fascism's transcendental 
power, of the fascist will to power and of the claim to ethical supremacy'40. 
Domestic conquest was the primary task of the fascist élite as the "leadership" 
of the nation. The two fascist movements shared a biological interpretation of 
hierarchy as the outcome of a permanent struggle between old and new forces. Elites 
performed their historic functions, but they were destined to decay or defeat by 
stronger and "younger" groups in a circulation of élites"'. The production of the 
fascist élites in Italy and Germany was vastly different from the old pattern of a de 
lure class -based aristocracy which was unassailable in its leadership position. 
Fascism was meritocratic in the sense that its leadership was open to the whole 
nation, regardless of old criteria of wealth or origin"'-. It was, however, highly elitist 
in its self -perception as a spiritual aristocracy which had been shaped during its 
struggle for power and its eventual victory13. The events of 1922 and 1933 not only 
legitimised the transcendental role of the historic fascist leadership, but also proved 
the superiority of its vision and morality. After the acquisition of power, these two 
lessons should be taught to the rest of the nation through a process of spiritual 
education which entailed the eradication of all opposition or deviation. Fascism had 
to be totalitarian, as a political choice and as an ideological necessity. Since deviation 
from the fascist paradigm meant negation of its special value and destiny, opposition 
or compromise were inconceivable'. 
The establishment of the fascist leadership as the spiritual aristocracy of the 
nation inevitably created a gap between the élite and non -élite elements within the 
10 Birken, pp. 81 -7 
141 Gentile, E.. Ideologia fascista, 197ff; Struve, pp. 344 -52, 384ff 
"' See, for example, Hitler's references on the non -class, "open" character of Nazism, in Baynes, I, 
620 -1 (speech in Berlin, 1 May 1937); and Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 392ff. Also, Jung, E. J., Die 
Herrschaft der Mindenvertigen. Ihr Ze fall und ihre Ablösung durch ein neues Reich (Berlin 1927), 
pp. 329ff. See also Schoenbaum, Chs. 8 -9 
143 Struve, pp. 349 -52; von Kotze, H., Krausnick, H. (eds.), "Es spricht Hitler ". Sieben exemplarische 
Hitler -Reden (Gütersloh 1966), p. 141 (speech in Berlin, 28 May 1925) 
14 For this notion see Spirito, U., "Il concetto di libertà e i diritti dell'opposizione ", Critica 
Fascista, 
15 -6 -1924; and Struve, pp. 437 -8; Gregor, Ideology of Fascism, pp. 231 -9. For a general 
analysis of 
the connection between totalitarianism and fascism see Bracher, K. D., 
Totalitarianismus und 
Faschismus. Eine wissenschaftliche und politische Begriffskontroverse (Munich 
& Vienna 1980). It 
is important to note that we use the term here not in its original sense (proposed 
by Arendt), but in 
the sense of the "total" character of control that fascism aimed to exercise 
in domestic life. On this 
matter see Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, pp. 31ff; and Carocci, G., 
Storia d'Italia dall'unità ad oggi 
(Milan 1975), pp. 265 -71 
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national community. Notwithstanding the "open ", meritocratic character of the two 
movements, the fascist regimes gradually imposed a new hierarchical structure. The 
privilege of moral and political authority was the monopoly of the enlightened fascist 
"minority" and this was potentially the source of an inferiority complex for the 
majority excluded from the élite group. Mussolini described the Fascist leadership as 
"few but the greatest force of the nation ", while Hitler justified the principle of 
authoritative leadership as legitimate if based on genuine spiritual values14'. To allay 
these sentiments of discrimination, fascist ideology introduced the idea that the 
whole "fascist" nation was de facto an élite among the community of nations. This 
transfer of elitist sentiment to the level of the nation performed two important 
functions. First, it established an egalitarian concept of nation, based on a community 
of people who share the same qualities and pursued common objectives for the 
benefit of the collectivity16. Second, it translated the notion of historic hierarchy to 
the international system by asserting the superiority of the new élite of "young 
nations ", i.e. the Italian and German nations1'7. The two nations had historically 
manifested their ability to produce the highest forms of universal civilisation14'. The 
alleged Roman and Christian origins of the modern Italian state, and the heritage of 
the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation19 attested to the long -standing 
spiritual superiority of the two peoples. This belief was strengthened by the 
grievances of the post -unification period. In spite of international "conspiracies" and 
the tyranny of the decadent "old" nations150, Italy and Germany displayed an 
admirable determination to survive and a will to excel, which attested to their 
145 00, XI, 87 /Scritti, II, 253 (speech to the Chamber, 17 February 1922); Baynes, I, p. 623 (speech in 
the Nuremberg Party Rally, 12 September 1938); Jung, pp. 344; Domarus, Hitler, I, p. 716 
(Proclamation, 7 September 1937). See also Struve, pp. 408 -9, 429ff, for a discussion of the relation 
between leader and people. 
146 Griffin, Nature of Fascism, p. 37; Hitler, Mein Kampf pp. 258 -99 
"7 V.B., 14 -9 -1938; and Mussolini's speech on 28 -9 -1937, first published in Popolo d'Italia, 29 -9- 
1937, translated and cited in Delzell, C. F. (ed.), Mediterranean Fascism, 1919 -1945 (New York, 
Evanston & London 1970), pp. 202 -5 
148 Scritti, II, 214 (speech to the Chamber of Deputies, 26 November 1921); Papini, G., Italia 
mia 
(Florence 1941), passim; and Hitler's speech to students in Berlin, published 
in F.Z., 8 -2 -1934, 
quoted in Speer, A., Inside the Third Reich (London 1970), pp. 14 -6 
19 For the imperial traditions of the two countries see [Italy] Mack Smith, Guerre 
di Duce, pp. 15f; 
00, XIX, 266; and [Germany] Baynes, II, pp. 1002 -3 (speech to the Reichstag, 20 February 1938); 
Domarus, Hitler, I, 765 -6 (speech in Berlin, 27 November 1937); Jung, 
pp. 75ff 
150 See Mussolini's criticism of Britain and France in 00, XIII, 147ff 
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transcendental power as precursors of a new historic era. The victory of Fascism 
terminated the cycle of national decay and brought the two nations back onto their 
destiny. L. Federzoni described the establishment of Fascism in Italy as the 
culmination of a historic process which had started with the Risorgimento and 
consolidated with the experience of the First World War'''. In a similar way, Hitler 
described the role of the Nazi regime as the decisive start in a long process of 
"liberating Germany" from the past " -. The nations of Italy and Germany, according 
to the words of Hitler, "stand young not on new territory, but on historic soili1'. 
Their classification as élite nations stemmed not simply from the power of destiny, 
but from the ability of fascism to provide allegedly tangible evidence of this historic 
superiority. Both leaders placed particular emphasis on the demographic vitality of 
the population. Mussolini's persistent efforts to promote a combination of food- and 
birth -increase policies in the second half of the 1920s aimed to ensure a demographic 
boom, which was regarded a necessary evidence of the nation's renewed vitality 
under Fascism. Women were seen as the bearers of a new generation of warriors and 
should, therefore, be confined to their domestic functions as wives and mothers in 
order to contribute best to this national goal'' ;. Italy, he argued in 1923, should avoid 
the fate of France, whose demographic decadence was regarded as evidence of 
political and spiritual decline '''. The same example was used by Hitler in Mein 
Kampf as an example of what Germany should avoid in order to reclaim her 
international position and historic significance. In 1937 he celebrated what he called 
15' Federzoni, L., "Nuove ipocrisie legalitaria", in Griffm (ed.), Fascism, pp. 40 -1 [speech delivered in 
the Chamber, June 1922] 
15' Baynes, I, pp. 617 -8 (speech in Munich, 24 February 1935) 
153 Baynes, II, p. 1498 (speech in Parteitag, Nuremberg 12 September 1938) 
'54 De Grazia, V., The Culture of Consent. Mass Organisation of Leisure in Fascist Italy (Cambridge 
1981), pp. 220ff; Simonini, pp. 118 -20 
'55 On the demographic propaganda of the Fascist regime see Mussolini, B., "Il numero come forza", 
Gerarchia, 9 September 1928, reprinted in Santarelli (ed.), Scritti di Mussolini, pp. 248 -51; "Ai 
combettenti della Battaglia del grano", in Scritti, V, 143 -4 [speech delivered at Rome, 11 October 
1925]. For the failure of these policies to result in a demographic boom see Caldwell, L., 
"Reproducers of the Nation: Women and the Family in Fascist Policy ", in Forgacs, D. (ed.), 
Rethinking Italian Fascism. Capitalism, Populism and Culture (London 1986), pp. 110 -41; 
Willson, 
P. R., "Women in Fascist Italy ", in Bessel (ed.), pp. 84ff. For the comments regarding France see 
00, XVIII, 396f (June 1923) 
85 
Fascist ideology and territorial expansion 
"fifteen years ... of strong life" after a period of painful decay, evident in the strength, 
progress and numerical expansion of the German Volk' . 
Civilisations and races as "élites ": racialism, anti -Semitism and fascist 
ideology 
The third level of the fascist élite ideology again rested upon the perception of 
the fascist nation as a superior force. This time, however, the implications of this 
transcendental privilege were extended much further, presenting fascism as an élite 
force of civilisation in a historic, universal sense. It is paradoxical that fascism, 
initially portrayed by its own ideologues as a national force vehemently hostile to 
any notion of internationalism, ended up with a teleological vision which reflected 
notions of universal domination and historic endism'57. The universal tendencies of 
fascism had their origins in the elitist theory of the fascist nation, but were politically 
indispensable in the context of the historic antithesis between socialism and 
fascism'''. Bolshevism represented a lethal menace both to individual nations and to 
the whole existence of "European" civilisation. Fascism represented, therefore, a dual 
defence. First, it should safeguard the élite character of the nation against the 
international forces of corruption. Second, it had to defend the European culture, 
156 Domarus, I, pp. 759 -60 (speech in Augsburg, 21 November 1937); Baynes, II, pp. 1220 (speech to 
the Reichstag, 21 May 1935). Again, however, the demographic boom remained a myth. See 
Stephenson, J., "Reichsbund der Kinderreichen: The League of Large Families in the Population 
Policy of Nazi Germany ", European Studies Review, 9 (1979), pp. 351 -75; Knodel, J. E., The 
Decline of Fertility in Germany, 1871 -1939 (Princeton 1974) 
157 See a series of aggressive comments made by Hitler against the notion of internationalism in 
Baynes, I, pp. 256, 259 (speech in Berlin, 2 March 1933); II, 1047 ( "Friedensrede" speech to the 
Reichstag. 17 May 1933). Note, however, the ambiguities of the fascist discourse in this respect, 
discussed in Megaro, G., Mussolini in the Making (London 1938), pp. 318ff; Sacconi, S., "A 
proposito di un libro di Ernst Nolte. Il volto pecoliare del fascismo", reprinted in Casucci (ed.), 
Antologia, pp. 680 -3 
158 The importance of bolshevism in the production of the fascist Weltanschauung has been widely 
accepted. See Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 437 -61; Göring, H., Aufbau einer Nation (Berlin 1934), 
passim; and Schiavi, A., Esilio e morte di Filippo Turati (Rome 1956), pp. 122ff. See also various 
analyses of this issue in Nolte, E., Three Faces of Fascism. Action Française, Italian Fascism, 
National Socialism (London 1965), pp. 360ff, 384ff, 404ff; Neocleous, M., Fascism (London 1997), 
pp. 38 -58; Del Noce, A., "Appunti per una definizione storica del fascismo", in Pavetto, 
R. (ed.), Il 
problema storico del fascismo (Florence 1970), pp. 133ff; Glaser, pp. 121 -5; Linz, "Some Notes ", p. 
26. However, compare Bracher's assertion that fascism's emphasis on anti -communism 
was 
"merely propagandistic" in his The Age of Ideologies. A History of Political Thought in the 
Twentieth Century (London 1982), pp. 98 -9 
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which both Italian and German fascist ideologies perceived as the historic 
achievement of their respective nations'''. 
This universal "mission" of fascism portrayed the fascist nations as the élite, 
or the most superior form, of civilisation. Before the 1936 -8 period, each of the two 
regimes had attempted to monopolise this title for itself and its respective nation. The 
dual heritage of Rome and Catholicism formed the basis of Fascism's claim to 
universality and cultural superiority. Nazi ideology, on the other hand, presented the 
Teutonic past and the legacy of the Holy Roman Empire as evidence of Germany's 
destiny to dominate and defend Europe'''. After the rapprochement between Italy and 
Germany, the two fascist leaderships presented the historic task of the struggle 
against bolshevism as a joint undertaking1''. Fascism was destined to prevail, both by 
dominating this civilisation and by defeating the other "corrupted" or "barbaric" 
forms of culture. Its success and rejuvenating dynamism had their foundations in the 
superior qualities of the two nations which formed the fascist bloc. They had now re- 
emerged after a cycle of decay, reborn under fascism, to assume their historic 
responsibilities. In inaugurating a new stage in civilisation, fascism had not only the 
moral right, but also the obligation to expand, i.e. to become universal and thus to 
spread its superior political, ideological, social and ethical message to humanity. 
However, in the execution of their universal project, the two regimes 
exhibited considerable differences which merit attention. A fundamental difference 
between the two fascist ideologies was the way in which the concept of nation was 
defined. Italian Fascism, as well as its nationalist precursors, stood for a voluntarist 
idea of nation -formation''. The nazione comprised all those individuals who shared 
an Italian cultural ideal, those who placed their allegiance to the Italian state and 
1S9 Both Hitler and Mussolini made numerous references to the anti -Bolshevik character of their 
regimes and their Axis alliance. See, for example, Baynes, II, pp. 1234 -5 (speech to the Reichstag, 
21 May 1935), 1252ff (speech in the Parteitag, Nuremberg , 11 September 1935), 1331 (speech in 
the Harvest Thanksgiving Festival, 4 October 1936); Scritti, II, 7 -14 ( "Posizioni e obiettivi" and 
" "Discorso da Ascoltare", in Popolo d'Italia, March 1919 and May 1919 respectively); Delzell, pp. 
202 -5. 
160 These aspects of fascist ideology are analysed later in this chapter, Section IV 
161 Baynes, II, pp. 1115 (speech in Berlin, 24 October 1933), 1352 (speech to representatives of the 
Italian Balilla, 16 June 1937); 00, XXVIII, 248 -53 ( "Discorso di Torino ", Popolo d'Italia, 
15.5.1939); see for the report and repercussions of the speech in DDI, 8th, V, 29/83 
162 "Irredentismo ", in Levi, Levra, Tranfaglia (eds.), Storia d'Italia, (Florence 1978), vol. II, pp. 573- 
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tradition above any other loyalty, religious or ethnic163. In this sense, the nation was 
not a biological or historic reality, but the result of a continuing process of cultural 
education and integration'. Undoubtedly, there was an extremist minority in the 
Italian Fascist movement which advocated a semi -biological, unalterable inherent 
national identity. Their ideas, however, did not gain wide currency, even in such 
fertile ground as the anti -Semitic or anti -Slav groups within the Fascist party165. Even 
in the early years of the movement, only occasionally did unruly squads target Slav 
groups in north Italy, and such actions remained isolated incidents of uncontrolled 
minorities rather than systematic regime policies of discrimination166. By contrast, 
Nazi ideology was monolithic in its acceptance of the biological origins of national 
identity. An individual was either German by blood or could never become so, even 
if they chose to adopt the cultural elements of Deutschturn b7. This was the 
ideological principle behind Hitler's rejection of the policies of Germanisation in 
conquered areas1óx. The scientific ethos of German post -unification society penetrated 
the irrational nucleus of nationalist mythology, thus providing it with what appeared 
to many as unquestionable empirical credibility. 
The above different definition of "nation" also explains why the two regimes 
diverged in the definition of their racial doctrines. In Italian Fascist ideology the 
distinction between race as a cultural product and race as a biological condition was 
never clear169. As defender of European civilisation and the white race, the Italian 
nation was superior to the other European "races" (stirpe) because of its higher 
161 Vincent, A., Modern Political Ideologies (Oxford 1992), pp. 158ff; Mussolini, B., "The Political 
and Social Doctrine of Fascism ", in Oakeshot (ed.), pp. 164 -79 
164 See G. Gentile's criticism on the static notion of the nation as something existing and objective, in 
Guerra e Fede, pp. 55f; and Gentile, E.. Ideologia fascista, pp. 350ff 
16s De Felice, R., Storia degli ebrei sotto il fascisnto (Turin 1972), pp. 64 -78 
166 Segrè, C. G., Italo Balbo. A Fascist Life (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London 1987), pp. 48 -9 
167 Hitler, Mein Kampf pp. 258 -99. See also Maser, W., Hitler's Mein Kampf. An Analysis (London 
1970), pp. 176 -8; Ley, R., Neuadel als Blut und Boden (Munich 1930), passim; and Vincent, p. 158 
168 Hitler had repeatedly stated his rejection of Germanisation policies. See, for example, the relevant 
references quoted in Baynes, II, pp. 1144 -7 (conversation with Lipski, 15 November 1933); Hitler, 
Mein Kampf pp. 353ff; Zweites Buch, pp. 111ff. And, for a case -study, see the analysis of the 
occupation policies in Poland in Noakes, J., Pridham, G. (eds.), Nazism. A Documentary Reader, 
vol. III: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination (1939 -1945) (Exeter 1988), pp. 922 -96. 
Nevertheless, the SS had schemes for the re- Germanisation of those populations (Polish, Rumanian, 
Russian) who, although considered by the Nazi regime as "ethnically German ", did not speak 
German anymore. See Schechtman, J., European Population Transfers, 1939 -1945 (New York 
1946), pp. 255 -363 
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cultural idea and history1'. Until 1935, however, Mussolini was highly critical of 
Hitler's biological racism, stressing that race was meaningless due to the common 
biological origins of all white peoples1''. As he stated in the 1932 Doctrine of 
Fascism, the nation "was not a race, nor a geographically individualised region, but 
stock (schiatta) historically perpetuating itself X1'. Against this ideological backdrop, 
it is difficult to comprehend the introduction of anti -Semitic policies by the PNF after 
1936. From an ideological point of view, the "Manifesto of the Race" and the anti - 
Semitic legislation do not stand up to any serious criticism13. The Italian Jews were a 
small and integrated group in the national community, with a high representation in 
the PNF hierarchy, as Balbo kept repeating to his Capo at the Grand Council in 
1938 -3917'. The shift in the policy towards them reflected a change in Mussolini's 
definition of race: from now on, Jews were de facto a biological category. Although 
there is no evidence that the Nazi leadership had exercised pressure for the 
introduction of the racial laws, Mussolini adopted an anti -Semitic legislation which 
bore little relevance to the original ideology of Italian Fascism. Not surprisingly, the 
legislation found an unqualified supporter in J. Evola, A. Sofici and R. Farinacci, 
who had always made their anti -Semitic beliefs clear. Surprisingly, even Bottai - by 
no means ideologically anti -Semitic - backed the legislation, although his support 
169 Neocleous, M., Fascism (London 1997), Ch. 2 
10 Scritti, II, 96 (speech in Trieste, 20 September 1920) 
11 Scritti, IV, 350 (speech to the Chamber of Deputies, 12 September 1924); Missiroli, M., "Razza e 
cultura ", Circoli, 7- 8.1939, pp. 981 ff, quoted in Gregor, Ideology of Fascism, p. 267; Mack Smith, 
Guerre di Duce, pp. 59ff; Michaelis, M., Mussolini and the Jews. German- Italian Relations and the 
Jewish Question in Italy 1922 -1945 (Oxford, 1978), pp. 59ff, 83f. See also Aloisi, P., Journal, 25 
juillet 1932 -14 join 1936 (Paris 1957), p. 138 
17' Mussolini, "Doctrine of Fascism ", pp. 169f 
173 For the Manifesto of the Race see De Felice, Storia degli ebrei, pp. 541 -2; Gregor, Ideology of 
Fascism, pp. 381 -9 (for the text), 265 -82 (for an assessment); Michaelis, pp. 152ff. For a general 
background of Mussolini's turn to anti -Semitism see Preti, L., Impero fascista, africani ed ebrei 
(Milan 1968), pp. 87 -113, an excerpt of which is translated and cited in Sarti, R., The Ax Within. 
Italian Fascism in Action (London 1974), 197ff - the following references come from the translated 
part. See also the general criticism against Mussolini's anti- Semitic policies as a symptom of the 
decline of his regime (Michaelis, pp. 183f, 411fí); Gregor, Ideology of Fascism, pp. 241 -82. 
Bernardini, G., "The Origins and Development of Racial Anti -Semitism in Fascist Italy ", Journal of 
Modern History, 49 (1977), pp. 431 -53. 
174 De Grand, Italian Nationalist Association, pp. 34 -6. For Balbo's arguments see Michaelis, M., "Il 
Maresciallo dell'aria Italo Balbo e la politica mussoliniana ", Storia Contemporanea, 14 (1983), pp. 
3 51 ff 
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was more a sign of loyalty to Mussolini and did not endorse its violent side- effects1'. 
Yet a sizeable minority of leading Fascist figures, including Balbo, Federzoni and 
Acerbo, did speak out against the rationale of the laws, questioning their utility, their 
relevance to Fascist ideology, and asking for wide exemptions.1ó Yet, the cultural 
nature of the PNF's elitism did not rule out the partial integration of Jews into Italian 
society, through renouncing their religion and culture. The legislation, rigid in 
doctrine, was loosely and selectively implemented, falling short of the extremes of 
Nazi anti -Semitic policies '''. Especially in the periphery of the Italian Impero, 
implementation of the legislation depended heavily upon the views of the local 
Fascist administration. The example of Libya is indicative. Balbo - as Governor of 
the colony - remained reluctant to abide by the regime's official anti -Semitic line. 
Mussolini continued to criticise his lack of enthusiasm and to press for a more 
systematic application of the racial laws, but he did not take active steps to curb his 
Governor's liberal interpretation of the legislation. As a result, the Jewish community 
in Libya remained relatively insulated from the implications of the anti -Semitic 
legislation until Balbo's death in June 194018. 
Italian racism did reflect a biological basis in the treatment of the Ethiopian 
peoples. The importance of the racial legislation in Ethiopia after 1936 went far 
beyond the rise of anti -Semitism in Italy. In many ways, the experience of managing 
a proper, extensive colonial empire after the formal occupation of Ethiopia in 1936 
may be seen as the reason behind the inception of all racist legislation by the Italian 
Fascist regime"9. Its logic, however, was reminiscent of the conventional "white 
man's burden" colonial justification rather than of any rigid eliminationist doctrine - 
the black race was both culturally and biologically inferior to the "Aryan" race; 
therefore, its subjugation to white rule was legitimate and its separation from the 
white peoples essential. Here, cultural re- education would have had limited effect, 
15 De Grand, A. J., Bottai e la cultura fascista (Rome & Bari 1978), pp. 260 -85. For the different 
shades in Italian fascism, between a still voluntarist notion of identity to the extremism of people 
like Guido Cogni and Julius Evola, see Preti in Sarti (ed.), Ax Within, pp. 201ff; Gregor, pp. 241 -82 
16 Segrè, Balbo, pp. 345 -53 
"' Zuccotti, S., The Italians and the Holocaust. Persecution, Rescue, Survival (New York 1987); 
Steinberg, J., All or Nothing. The Axis and the Holocaust, 1941 -43 (London 1990), passim, esp. 
220 -41; Michaelis, pp. 183ff; Preti in Sarti (ed.), Ax Within, p. 204 
"8 De Felice, R., Storia degli ebrei sotto il fascismo (Turin 1972), pp. 263ff; Segrè, Balbo, pp. 349ff 
19 Goglia, L., "Note sul razzismo coloniale fascista ", Storia Contemporanea, 19 (1988), pp. 
1223 -66 
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because the black peoples were incapable of adopting the "superior" moral and 
cultural qualities of European civilisation18'. Some integration was again possible, 
but this could not rectify the biological shortcomings of the black race'''. Fascism's 
universal task was to civilise the inferior races and to defend the purity of western 
civilisation from racial miscegenation, which could harm the intellectual qualities of 
the white race; but not the eradicate them altogether"'-. 
German racism, by contrast, was significantly more rigid, in the sense that it 
regarded culture as a reflection of the biological characteristics of a nation or a race. 
The Germanic Kultur was superior, because the Nordic race was by nature the élite 
of all other races, as well as the élite of white peoples13. The problem lay with those 
of the "inferior" races who were feeding from, and poisoning, the blood of the 
German Volk'. Since their biological faults rendered any attempt at integration both 
unfeasible and dangerous, they had to be eradicated for the sake of Germany and 
western civilisation. Therefore, Nazi racial elitism was directed against Jewish, Slav 
and Latin peoples (sometimes not excluding even Italians), against black peoples and 
Indians '' as detrimental to the sanity of the German race. 
What transformed the Jews from one possible target to the most hunted victim 
of Nazi racism had indeed a lot to do with the Nazi Weltanschauung. According to 
Hitler's thought, the Jews lacked a national and cultural identity, a common history 
and their own place (Boden) in the world. They were also equated in his worldview 
180 Preti in Sarti (ed), pp. 190f; Robertson, E. M., "Race as a Factor in Mussolini's Policy in Africa 
and Europe ", Journal of Contemporary History, 23 (1988), pp. 31 -58 
181 See the plan to grant a "special" kind of Italian citizenship to the people of the northern provinces 
of Libya (in return for their acceptance of their subordinate status), in Preti in Sarti (ed.) , pp. 195ff 
182 00, XVI, 158f; XIX, 266. For the cultural origins of this belief (back to the nationalism of the 
1900s and D'Annunzio), see Hayes, P. M., Fascism (London 1973), p. 20f 
183 For this narrow definition of the Aryan race see Hitler, A., Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen, edited by 
Jäckel, E., Kuhn, A. (Stuttgart 1980), pp. 620ff; Hitler, Führung und Gefolgschaft (Berlin 1934), 
quoted in Struve, p. 421; Spengler, 0., Decline of the West, and Jahre der Entscheidung (Berlin 
1933), excerpt of which is translated and cited in Griffin, Fascism, pp. 112 -4; Domarus, Hitler, I, 
pp. 74 -6 (speech to the Industry Club at Düsseldorf, 27 January 1932); Günther, H. F. K., Kleine 
Rassenkunde des deutschen Volkes (Munich 1929), pp. 9 -25. For the idea that the German Kultur 
(as anything Germanic) is superior to other equivalent notions of other nations and races, see Herf, 
Ch. 8 
1" On this issue see Glaser, pp. 151 -3 
185 Baynes, II, pp. 988 -9 (interview with 0. Strasser, 21 May 1930) 
91 
Fascist ideology and territorial expansion 
with the internationalist conspiratorial project of world communism'''. A. Rosenberg, 
the chief Nazi ideologue of anti -Semitism, had since 1918 spoken of the "Jewish 
menace" for Germany and the whole Europe, advocating a systematic policy of 
exclusion and expulsion. His major works, Myth of the Twentieth Century and Pest in 
Russia, reflected a systematic attempt to lend scientific validity to an irrational 
prejudice and thus bring it to the forefront of popular nationalist feeling. At the same 
time, H. Himmler's idea of a racially re- organised and purified German society 
contained the seeds of an eliminationist, mystical attitude to anti -Semitism which 
was reproduced in the SS organisations and was allowed significant latitude in the 
last years of the Nazi regime"'. However, Nazism was not the only source of the 
anti -Semitic eliminationist ideology which led to the persecution and annihilation of 
the European Jews in the 1930s and 1940s. Other factors, which had been assimilated 
- rather than produced - by Nazism facilitated the radicalisation of anti- Semitic 
tendencies within the German society. The survival or revival of atavistic notions of 
"purity" and "wholeness ", the discarding of the philosophy of the Enlightenment, the 
belief in the ideal of a "blood community" and the rejection of cultural concepts of 
nationhood, were long -lasting legacies of German radical nationalism since 
unification. By the turn of the century, the Jewish "threat" had been invested with 
more far -reaching qualities: the Jews were morally, politically, culturally, racially, 
even economically "deviant ". Anti- Semitic hatred was still abstract and divorced 
from action (i.e. physical elimination), but it had become so central to the "cognitive 
model" of German nationalism that became an unquestionable element of social 
attitudes, passed on uncritically from one generation to the other's. 
186 Hitler, Zweites Buch, pp. 153 -4, 219ff; Mein Kampf Ch. 14. For the identification of bolshevism 
with the Jews see numerous references in Baynes - for example, I, pp. 733 (interview with United 
Press, 27 November 1935); II, 1380 (speech to the Reichstag, 20 February 1938), 1471 
(Proclamation at the Parteitag, Nuremberg 6 September 1938). Similar comments were made 
during the Second World War - see, for example, in Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 2000 (speech in Berlin, 
16 March 1943), 2204 (Proclamation to the German People, 24 February 1945). See also later in 
this chapter, Section IV 
18' Cecil, R., The Myth of the Master Race. Alfred Rosenberg and Nazi Ideology (London 1972), pp. 
162 -86; Manvell, R., Fraenkel, H., Heinrich Himmler (London 1965); Ackermann, J., Himmler als 
Ideologe (Göttingen 1970); "Heinrich Himmler: Reichsführer - SS ", in Smelser, R., Zitelmann R. 
(eds.), The Nazi Elite (Houndmills & London 1993), pp. 100ff 
188 Glaser, pp. 220 -30; Pulzer, P. G. J., Jews and the German State. The political history of a minority 
(Oxford 1992); Goldhagen, W., Hitler's Willing Executioners. Ordinary Germans and the 
Holocaust (London 1996), pp. 27 -79; Knox, "Conquest ", p. 30. On the origins of the ideology of 
anti -Semitism in Germany see the classic studies of Stern, F., The Politics of Cultural Despair 
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This again was not an exclusively German phenomenon. In the first half of 
the twentieth century, a number of other European societies often ran amok with anti - 
Semitic obsessions, originating from a resurgence of extreme nationalist sentiment1ß9. 
Yet, where German society had already begun to diverge was in its combined belief 
in the élite character of Germandom and in the "racial " -biological source of its 
superiority. The institutionalisation of the Jewry as the scapegoat for every social, 
economic and political setback was strengthened by the widespread phobia towards 
communism and bolshevism, which were regarded as a Jewish scheme for 
international domination. The 1918 revolution and the subsequent left -wing agitation 
throughout the period of the Weimar Republic bolstered popular beliefs in the 
alleged international conspiracy of the Jews against the German nation. At the same 
time, the atmosphere of crisis in interwar Germany was furthered compounded by the 
two economic crises and the threat of a communist revolution which, unlike in Italy, 
had not abated by the time of the seizure of power190. The publication of the 
fabricated Protocols of the Elders of Zion in the early 1920s acted as a confirmation 
of the suspicions about Jewish intentions which were rife in sections of German 
society. Nazi anti -Semitic ideology appealed to all these irrational fears and 
presented the Jewish "threat" as a lethal challenge to the "mission" of the German 
nation. The Abel interviews highlights that strong anti- Semitic beliefs were reflected 
in the discourse of half the respondents. However, a significant additional number 
came to an endorsement of anti -Semitism through resentment for defeat, the 1918 
revolution and the Weimar Republic, which they were ready to accept as indications 
of a international Bolshevik- Jewish conspiracy191. The Nazi regime subsequently 
radicalised these perceptions by investing them with grotesque pseudo -scientific 
metaphors - Jews were described as a "malignant poison ", "bacillus infecting the life 
of peoples ", "the race -tuberculosis of nations ", "pest ", "bacteria invading the body of 
(Berkeley 1961); and Mosse, G. L., The Crisis of German Ideology (London 1966). Cf. Rocco, 
Scritti, p. 1101 
189 Mosse, G. L., Towards the Final Solution (London 1978); Lyttelton, A., "The `crisis of bourgeois 
society' and the origins of fascism ", pp. 12 -3 
19° Griffin, Nature of Fascism, pp. 226 -8 
191 Merkl, pp. 169, 487ff, 522 
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the Volk" and "rotten'''. The morbid biological account of national life as a "closed" 
organism rendered all alien influences or interventions to its reproduction parasitic 
and contagious. Only complete eradication could guarantee the health of the 
Volksgemeinschaft and of the whole European civilisation. In this sense, defence of 
the nation was not enough. Expansion through force and destruction for the removal 
of the cultural and biological threat was perceived as a historic necessity consigned to 
the German nation. Nazi Germany as an elite nation, race and Kultur had the historic 
duty to salvage Europe from cultural and racial annihilation193. 
IV: Choosing targets: fascist expansionism and the notion of 
living space 
So far we have concentrated our analysis on the generic ideological factors in 
the fascist worldview which produced and explained the general propensity of the 
Italian and German regimes for territorial expansion. However, fascist ideology also 
needed a conceptual formula which could fuse the abstract tendency to territorial 
expansion with a more concrete and intelligible set of expansionist goals. In this 
respect too fascist ideology continued its function of annexing pre -existing themes 
192 In sequence: Baynes, II, p. 1338 -9 (speech to the Reichstag, 30 January 1937), 1601 (speech in the 
Wilhelmshafen Townhall, 1 April 1939); Domarus, Hitler, II, p. 2005 (talks with Horthy, 10 April 
1943), 2083 (radio address, 30 January 1944); Hitler, Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen, pp. 88 -90. See 
also Eckart, D., Ein Vermächtnis (Munich 1928), pp. 214 -9, translated in Mosse, G. L., Nazi 
Culture. Intellectual, Cultural and Social Life in the Third Reich (London 1966), pp. 75 -8. For the 
biological idea of the community as an organism in Nazi ideology see Weindling, P., 
"Understanding Nazi Racism: Precursors and Perpetrators ", in Burleigh, M. (ed.), Confronting the 
Nazi Past. New Debates on Modern German History (London 1996), pp. 66 -83 
193 Baynes, I, 668 (interview with the United Press, 27 November 1935); 707 (speech in 1937 
Nuremberg Party Rally, 10 September 1937). See also, for an analysis of these ideas, Goldhagen, 
pp. 80 -128 
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and currents into its mythical core of elitism and violent activism'. Hence, the idea 
of space was gradually put forward as the pivotal object of fascist expansion and the 
ultimate measure of fascism's success in revitalising the national community and in 
promoting its historic universal mission. 
The notion of spatial expansion comprised two different levels of justification 
and legitimisation. The first, abstract level focused on space as agriculturally usable 
land suitable for migration and resettlement of the excess population of the 
metropolis. It was related to demographic factors and underscored the need to find an 
effective relation between territory and population through expansion in 
underdeveloped, thinly -populated areas. It was also put forward as a technique to 
bring about a fairer re- distribution of natural resources in the world among the 
alleged demographically strong and culturally prominent nations. The second, 
historic -ideological level of justification of spatial expansion centred on the notion of 
space as a specific geographical entity, determined by the historic ties of a nation 
with its adjacent territories. This was an essentially irredentist argument, but not in 
its limited ethnic sense or its traditional emphasis on populations. It was rather an 
argument which used the historic precedent of a nation's control over a given 
territory in order to justify its right to "redeem" it at a much later stage in history, 
even in defiance of the principle of popular self -determination. This fascist notion of 
historic irredentism was directly derived from the ideological concept of elitism. It 
linked the acquisition of these territories with the fascist universal project and 
justified the subjugation of the populations inhabiting them to the professedly more 
"advanced" fascist nations as a natural necessity. 
The production of an ideology of spatial expansion in these terms by the two 
fascist movements was a long process of digesting and absorbing diverse ideological 
currents into a new synthesis. The idea of space per se was by no means a fascist 
conceptual innovation. It had previously informed the expansionist programmes of 
various nationalist movements in the two countries which lingered from the 
nineteenth to the twentieth century and continued to be influential until the First 
World War. However, the fascist notion of space went significantly further than its 
194 Mosse, G. L., "Towards a General Theory of Fascism ", in Mosse (ed.), International Fascism. New 
Thoughts and New Approaches (London & Beverly Hills 1979), pp.1 -41; Eatwell, "Towards a New 
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ideological predecessors. It was transformed into an ultimate ideological symbolism 
of fascist expansion, bridging the traditional nationalist goal of completing national 
unification with the fascist millenarian aspirations for a new international order195. In 
this sense, it is important to monitor how the notion of space was shaped in Italian 
and German fascist ideologies, acknowledging debts to previous nationalist 
movements and thinkers but also highlighting how it became the symbolic 
manifestation of all fundamental priorities and principles which informed the 
worldviews of the two regimes. 
Italy: the idea of spazio vitale and the Mediterranean project 
The idea of space in demographic and historic terms was introduced in Italian 
nationalism by the "new" radical generation of nationalist thinkers who made their 
appearance felt in the first decade of the twentieth century. The need for space as 
agricultural land for Italy's excess population and as solution to the problem of 
emigration had been a crucial element of legitimisation for Italy's colonial policies 
since the 1880s, giving rise to the ideology of migrationist colonialism in parts of 
Africa196. However, the new radical nationalist ideology of the novecento movements 
linked the objective demographic and economic rationale of spatial expansion with a 
metaphysical notion of historic greatness and imperial destiny. The influence of 
leading figures of the Italian Nationalist Association (ANI) - most notably, Enrico 
Corradini - on Mussolini's expansionist ideas has been acknowledged by a plethora 
of works on the intellectual basis of Fascist ideology197. Corradini's conception of 
Italy as a "proletarian nation" was the first synthesis of the abstract and the historic 
aspects of space ideology. Italy as a young nation, he argued, had been entitled to a 
Model of Generic Fascism ", pp. 189 -91 
195 Wilford, "Fascism ", pp. 185ff; Eatwell, R., "Fascism ", in Eatwell, R., Wright, A. (eds.), 
Contemporary Political Ideologies (London 1993), pp. 169 -91 
196 For more details see, in this study, Ch. 1, Section Vb 
197 Adamson, W., "Avant -garde political rhetorics: pre -war culture in Florence as a source of post -war 
fascism ", Journal of European Ideas, 16 (1993), pp. 753 -7; Bosworth, R. J. B., Italy, the Least of 
the Great Powers. Italian Foreign Policy Before the First World War (Cambridge 1979), pp. 95- 
126; Sternhell, "Fascist Ideology ", pp. 339f; Noether, E. P., "The Intellectual Dimension of Italian 
Nationalism: An Overview ", and Cunsolo, R. S., "Italian Nationalism in Historical Perspective ", 
History of European Ideas, 16 (1993), pp. 779 -84 and 759 -66 respectively; De Grand, Italian 
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very limited share of the world's resources by the established "plutocratic" great 
powers. This reality was unacceptable not simply for economic and demographic 
reasons but also as an insult to Italy's past grandeur and historic significance. In this 
sense, the legacy of the Roman empire redirected the modern Italian people to the 
Mediterranean basin in search of both living space and a new period of national 
greatness1''. 
However, there were limits to the appeal of Corradini's ideas in pre -1914 
Italian society. For a start, in spite of the ANI's consolidation after 1908, the 
movement continued to be regarded as an intellectual, elitist organisation, divorced 
from action and with limited impact upon popular nationalist perceptions19'. 
Furthermore, Corradini's influence on the ideological profile of the ANI had already 
started to wane by 1910 -12, when the more conservative attitude to foreign policy 
epitomised by Federzoni and Rocco gained the upper hand in the organisation. The 
ideas of imperialist nationalism and Africanism which inspired Corradini's vision of 
spatial expansion became less relevant to the nationalist war agenda of Adriatic 
expansion which underpinned the opposition of the ANI to liberal policies during and 
after the First World War'00. Finally, Corradini's emphasis on the primacy of a 
foreign policy conceived in imperialist, palingenetic terms was not shared by a large 
section of the radical nationalist movement. Prominent figures of the novecento, such 
as Papini and Malaparte, continued to view foreign policy and expansion as a means 
subjected to the goal of a revolutionary social transformation, rejecting the 
traditionalist Roman inspiration of Corradini's project'01. 
Nationalist Association, passim; Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, pp. 58, 76; Neocleous, p. 22; 
Eatwell, Fascism, pp. 26; Knox, "Conquest ", pp. 17 -8 
198 See "The Nationalist Blueprint for a New Italy ", programmatic declaration of the Italian 
Nationalist Association, translated and reprinted in Griffin (ed.), Fascism, pp. 37 -8; "Nationalism 
and the Syndicates ", in Lyttelton (ed.), Italian Fascisms, pp. 159 -63. See also, De Grand, Italian 
Nationalist Association, pp. 11ff; Saladino, S., "Italy ", in Rogger, H., Weber, E. (eds.), The 
European Right. A Historical Profile (London 1965), pp. 21 Off; Sternhell, Birth of Fascist Ideology, 
pp. 163 -4 
199 De Grand, Italian Nationalist Association, Chs. 1 -3; Gaeta, F., "L'Associazione Nazionalista 
Italiana", in Gentile, E. (ed.), L'Italia giolittiana. La storia e la critica (Rome & Bari 1977), pp. 
253 -68 
200 De Grand, Italian Nationalist Association, Ch. 3; Adamson, "avant- garde ", pp. 755 -7 
201 See, for example, Malaparte, C., "Fascism's European Mission ", in Griffin (ed.), Fascism, pp. 48- 
9; "Mussolini and National Syndicalism ", in Lyttelton (ed.), Italian Fascisms, pp. 225 -41 (esp. pp. 
235ff). For an analysis of this internal antithesis see Sternhell, Z., The Birth of Fascist Ideology. 
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In this sense, Mussolini's revival of the principle of space in the post -1918 
period, albeit not conceptually novel, was politically significant in that it popularised 
a previously elitist concept and transformed it into the fulcrum of a radical mass 
ideology of expansion. After 1919 he underlined the importance of acquiring more 
living space as a demographic necessity for the expanding Italian people. In the 
Second Declaration of San Sepolcro he contrasted Italy's meagre territory and natural 
resources with the vast lands of the British empire, calling for a forward policy of 
expansion in order to rectify this dangerous disproportion between "plutocratic" and 
"proletarian" nations'''. A year later, in a major speech delivered at Trieste, he 
justified the demographic reasons behind the Fascist demand for expansion, calling 
for a more equitable ratio of territory to people for postwar Italy703 Although after 
the acquisition of power he sponsored an ambitious, if ineffective policy of 
increasing agriculturally usable land (through land reclamation) and production 
(through the "battle of grain "), he believed that neither the exploitation of the 
existing territory alone nor the control of births were effective solutions to the 
demographic and food problem of postwar Italy70 ;. Spatial expansion was the right 
and the proof of a demographically and culturally flourishing people, as he explained 
in September 1928. In the same speech, titled "the Number as Force ", he described 
any population decrease as a prelude to the decay and cultural annihilation of a 
nation's. Expansion, therefore, for demographic- economic reasons was an open - 
ended process, intending to accommodate the existing excess population and to 
From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution (Princeton 1994), esp. pp. 163 -75; Hamilton, pp. 
51 ff; Saladino, "Italy ", pp. 236ff 
202 For the Declarations of San Sepolcro see 00, XII, pp. 311 -4 (23 March 1919); excerpts are 
reprinted in Santarelli, E. (ed.), Scritti politici, pp. 184 -90; translated in Baron Bernardo Quaranta di 
San Severino (ed.), Mussolini as Revealed in his Political Speeches (November 1914 - August 1923) 
(London & Toronto 1923), pp. 78ff; and excerpts in Griffin (ed.), Fascism, pp. 34 -5 
203 Scritti, II, 95 -109 (Discorso di Trieste, 20 September 1920), also in Santarelli (ed.), pp. 193ff 
204 See relevant comments in 00, XVIII, 396ff; Scritti, VI, 37 -77 (Discorso dell'Ascensione, 
delivered at the Chamber of Deputies, 26 May 1927); and "Discorso di Roma ", reprinted in 
Santarelli (ed.), pp. 254 -64. For Mussolini's demographic policy see Knox, "Conquest ", pp. 18 -20; 
"Il fascismo e la politica estera italiana ", in Bosworth, R. J. B., Romano, S. (eds.), La politica estera 
italiana (1860 -1985) (Bologna 1991), pp. 295f; and, for a self - justification, 00, XXXIV, pp. 124ff 
( "Doctrine of Fascism ", June 1932), translated in Mussolini, B., "Political and Social Doctrine of 
Fascism ", in Oakeshott, M. (ed.), The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe (New 
York 1949), pp. 164 -79 
205 00, XXIII, 216ff, reprinted in Santarelli (ed.), pp. 246 -54 (9 September 1928); excerpts translated 
in Griffin (ed.), Fascism, pp. 58 -60. Cf. similar comments in 00, XXII, 364ff (speech in Rome, 26 
May 1927) 
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provide the necessary space for the - hopefully - expanding population of a 
regenerated Italy206 
At the meeting at San Sepolcro in May 1919 Mussolini also spoke of the 
need to expand in order to give Italy a "place in the world" amongst the great 
powers'0'. In contrast to the ANI's pessimism about the prospects of the Latin 
peoples in their competition with the Nordic and Slavic races, the Duce professed his 
faith in Italy's future by prescribing the acquisition of living space as the necessary 
precondition for domestic recovery and international ascendancy'''. War, he claimed, 
had transformed the "new" Italy into an "imperial power ". It had highlighted the 
historic quality of the Italian people and revealed its glorious destiny to conquer and 
dominate'. The significance of acquiring new territory was not simply economic but 
also symbolic. Apart from completing the process of unification which had been 
initiated with the Risorgimento, spatial expansion would build upon Italy's gains 
after the war and consolidate her position among the great powers by using territorial 
aggrandisement as the currency of great power status'10. The state should strive to 
expand its territory, he argued in 1929, for the welfare of its thriving population and 
for the everlasting glory of the whole nation in its struggle for greatness' ". 
To this abstract notion of spazio vitale, which appeared to justify 
interminable expansion without specific objects, Mussolini gradually added a more 
concrete historic and geopolitical focus. The June 1919 Programme of the Fasci di 
Combattimento made vague references to a "foreign policy calculated to improve 
Italy's position" and to safeguard her vital strategic interests' ". However, by that 
time Mussolini had already started developing the idea of a Mediterranean mare 
nostrum, extending from the Adriatic to the north African lands, as historically 
belonging to Italy. Again at San Sepolcro he explained that Italy's claim to great- 
206 Scritti, II, 7 -10 ( "Posizioni e obbietivi ", Popolo d'Italia, 28 March 1919) 
207 00, XII, 313 -4 (San Sepolcro, 23 March 1919) 
208 For ANI's ideas on this matter see De Grand, Italian National Association, pp. 10ff. For 
Mussolini's relevant arguments see the analysis in Knox, "Conquest ", pp. 17 -8 
209 00, XII, 77ff (speech in Bologna, 20 December 1918); 312 -3 (San Sepolcro) 
210 00, XVI, 106ff ( "Per essere liberi ", published in Popolo d'Italia, 8 January 1921); Scritti, II, 133- 
5 ( "Legionari di Ronchi ", Popolo d'Italia, 5 January 1921) 
211 00, XXIV, 5ff (speech to the Assembly of the Fascist regime, 10 March 1929) 
212 Reprinted in Delzell (ed.), pp. 12 -3; De Felice, R., Mussolini il rivoluzionario (Turin 1965), pp. 
744f 
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power status was derived from history. The Mediterranean basin was her historic 
living space, he argued, threatening to oust the British and limit the influence of 
France in the region if they attempted to impede Italy's rightful expansion in the 
region'1'. The June 1919 Programme of the Fasci expressly stated Fascism's 
opposition to the "plutocratic powers" in the region which threatened Italy's interests 
and impeded the will of the Italian people to dominate the region''. The heritage of 
the Roman past directed the forces of the new Italy to its historic birthplace, the "sea 
of Rome ", in order to commence the third Italian universal civilisation'''. Emphasis 
on the official Italian claims to Dalmatia at Versailles was justifiable only as a means 
to ensure the country's land frontiers first and a prelude to expansion in the whole 
Mediterranean region, including both European and colonial lands'1'. The heritage of 
the first (Roman empire) and the second (Papacy) civilisation of Rome rendered 
modern Italy universal par excellence, with a mission to "spread our gospel to other 
lands where Italians always lived '' '. By 1922 the fusion of the abstract notion of 
spazio vitale with the historic irredentist notion of mare nostrum had been essentially 
completed. In his last major speech before the March to Rome in October 1922, the 
Duce spoke of the Fascist myth of the nation as a positive utopia, combining the 
significance of territory with the spiritual and historic qualities of the Italian people. 
"It is not simply a matter of size ", he added with reference to territorial expansion, 
but of the totality of national forces derived from the glorious Italian history and the 
spiritually rejuvenated "new" Italian nation'''. Less than a year later, this time from 
his responsible position as Prime Minister, he justified the violent occupation of the 
island of Corfu by blaming the Greek government for not appreciating that "Corfu 
2213 00, XIII, 143 (speech in Milan, 22 May 1919); Knox, "Conquest ", pp. 19 -20 
214 Published in Popolo d 'Italia, 6 June 1919 
215 00, XV, 217 (speech in Trieste, 9 September 1920); Scritti, V, 183 -91 (speech in Rome for the 
anniversary of the Italian victory in the First World War, 4 November 1925). For the "cult of Rome" 
in the Fascist regime see Gentile, Culto del littorio, pp. 146 -54 
216 See his speech in Florence (9 October 1919), in Bernardo Quaranta di San Severino (ed.), pp. 107ff 
217 Domarus, M., Mussolini und Hitler. Zwei Wege - Gleiches Ende (Würzburg 1977), p. 65 (speech in 
Milan, 5 May 1921) 
218 00, XVIII, 453 -8/ Scritti, II, 339 -48/ Santarelli (ed.), pp. 220ff ( "Discorso di Napoli ", 24 October 
1922) 
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had been Venetian for four hundred years" before becoming part of the modem 
Greek state'. 
As for the geopolitical dimension in Mussolini's vision of Mediterranean 
expansion, it originated from the growing awareness of the multiple external 
obstacles to Italy's territorial ambitions in the region. It was not just the British and 
the French who forestalled Italy's access to her historic spazio vitale. Other, lesser 
powers, according to Mussolini, had been allowed to enjoy privileges which had 
been denied to Italy in the past and especially after the peace settlement. Spain 
controlled one major exit point from the Mediterranean and had direct access to the 
vast resources of the Atlantic ocean70. At the same time, the new state of Yugoslavia, 
in itself a creation of the Peace Treaties, pursued a policy of expansionist greed 
against vital Italian interests in the Adriatic sea, impeding the realisation of Italy's 
historic claims over Dalmatia and jeopardising her strategic position in an area 
crucial to her national defence'''. In this respect, expansion in the Mediterranean was 
also a prerequisite for the country's rise to international prominence as it would 
ensure favourable strategic conditions for Italy's struggle against the other 
contenders for her historic living space. This geopolitical notion, crystallised in 
Mussolini's thinking before the March on Rome, was subsequently enriched with the 
idea of Italy's geographic "imprisonment" in the Mediterranean and the necessity of 
securing access to the oceans'. The product of this ideological fusion was a concept 
of spazio vitale which dictated expansion into crucial control points of the wider 
Mediterranean and Red Sea areas, in order to alter the balance of power in the region 
and establish Italy's strategic advantage. Such arguments became more pronounced 
in Mussolini's more radical expansionist discourse in the 1930s and especially from 
1935 onwards'''. In his major programmatic speech at Milan in November 1936 he 
justified Italy's vast aspirations in the Mediterranean basin as "a struggle for life and 
death ", in contrast to Britain's interest in the region as simply a sea -route to the 
219 Domarus, Mussolini and Hitler, pp. 115f (5 September 1923) 
220 00, XVI, 300ff (speech in Milan, 3 May 1921) 
221 Scritti, II, 55 -7 ( "Alle Alpi Giulie ", Popolo d'Italia, 22 February 1920); II, 113 ( "Ciò che rimane e 
ciò che verrà ", Popolo d'Italia, 13 November 1920) 
222 For Mussolini's earliest programmatic declarations of this kind see his speech in Florence (19 June 
1923) in Bernardo Quaranta di San Severino (ed.), pp, 328ff 
223 See in more detail, in this study, Ch. 4, Section IV 
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Indian Ocean. Italy, he added, was an island surrounded by the Mediterranean with 
no other exit to the world. If her world -power ambitions were to be taken seriously, 
control of her land and maritime spazio vitale was the geopolitical and historic key to 
greatness " ;. 
The doctrine of Italy's right to expand in the Mediterranean was further 
strengthened by Mussolini's notion of a spiritual and cultural hierarchy of races 
(stirpe). His references to "thinly populated areas" surrounding the Mediterranean 
did not simply amount to a demographic justification for Italy's claim to a fairer 
share of territory in proportion to her population'. In a permanent struggle between 
cultures, Italian civilisation possessed a historic heritage which rendered her the de 
facto spiritually dominant force in the Mediterranean. Prior to the March on Rome 
Mussolini had made ample use of the myth of Rome as a metaphor of Fascist Italy's 
historic universal legacy-2'. In his Trieste speech in September 1920 he described 
Rome's universal task as "yet unfulfilled ", alluding to Fascism's responsibility as the 
true heir to Italy's glorious past '''. In February 1921 he spoke of Rome as the 
historically dominating force in European culture, while a year later he went as far as 
equating Fascism with the Roman past, thus legitimising modern Italy's right to 
expand in the Mediterranean'''. The African lands were underdeveloped because the 
peoples inhabiting them lacked the demographic and cultural momentum to exploit 
their resources and prosper, both in numbers and political power 229. The tendency to 
imperial expansion was a "natural law" for the strongest peoples, as he noted in the 
Doctrine of Fascism published in 1932; it was the expression of the vitality of one 
people and the acceptance of inferiority on part of the subjugated populations in the 
224 Reprinted in Santarelli (ed.), pp. 297 -301, excerpts translated in Delzell (ed.), pp. 201 -2. Cf. Scritti, 
III, 98 ( "The problem of emigration ", speech in Milan, 2 April 1923), where Mussolini used the 
same phrase ( "matter of life or death ") 
225 00, XVI, 106 ( "Per essere liberi ", Popolo d'Italia, 8 January 1921) 
226 See the analysis in Simonini, pp. 96 -9 
227 Scritti, II, 101 ff (Discorso di Trieste, 20 September 1920); Bernardo Quaranta 
(ed.), pp. 108ff 
228 00, XVI, 159ff (Discorso di Torino, 6 February 1921); XVIII, 161ff ( "Past and 
d'Italia, 21 April 1922) 
79 Ludwig, E., Colloqui con Mussolini (Milan 1950), pp. 58 -64 
di San Severino 
Future ", Popolo 
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conquered areas'3°. At the same time, even in Europe there was a fierce struggle 
between the various "racial masses ", as he termed them, for domination. Racist 
undertones were evident in Mussolini's discourse long before the official shift of the 
regime towards apartheid and anti -Semitic policies from 1936 onwards. As early as 
in September 1920, speaking to the people of Trieste, he described the Slav peoples 
as "inferior" and "barbaric ", unworthy of their territory but extremely dangerous in 
their continued demographic and territorial expansion in central and south Europe231. 
Seven years later, he demanded that the Italian population reach at least the sixty 
million level in the near future through the intensified emphasis of the regime on 
marriages and births. According to his argument, this was a historic imperative in 
order to compete with the rising tide of Slav and non -white peoples in Europe and in 
the colonial empires'3'. The demographic and spiritual regeneration of the Italian 
people was the conditio sine qua non for greatness and for fulfilling the historic 
mission of dominating the Mediterranean mare nostrum. With the introduction of 
racial legislation, first in the Impero and then in the Italian mainland too, Mussolini's 
notion of "race hierarchy" acquired even more rigid qualities. In October 1938 he 
justified the racial policies of his regime as a historic necessity, arguing that only in 
this way could the Italian "racial mass" be protected and dominate the struggle for 
the shaping of future Europe. Italy's historic and geopolitical spazio vitale in the 
wider Mediterranean region had to be either reclaimed from other countries and 
populations or asserted in fierce competition with other powers733. In this sense, it 
became a metaphor for superiority and vitality, blending the abstract Fascist ideas of 
elitism, violent activism and historic mission with a specific historic and geopolitical 
focus of expansion. 
230 Mussolini, "Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism ", pp. 164ff; Scritti, II, 149 -50 ( "Dopo il natale 
di sangue ", second speech in Trieste, 6 February 1921); 00, XXVIII, 30 (speech in Lucania, 27 
August 1936) 
231 Scritti, II, 95 -100, Santarelli, pp. 196 -7 (Discorso di Trieste, 20 September 1920) 
232 Scritti, VI, 43ff (Discorso dell'Ascensione, 26 May 1927). Cf. his speech in Trieste (6 February 
1932), in Bernardo Quaranta di San Severino (ed.), pp. 121ff 
233 00, XXIX, 185 -95 (speech to the PNF General Council, 15 September 1938), also in Santarelli 
(ed.), pp. 301ff 
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Germany: the quest for Lebensraum in the east 
The idea of living space (Lebensraum) has been widely acknowledged as 
the most consistent ideological current in Hitler's expansionist vision. The 
conquest of Lebensraum in the east for agricultural settlement has been described 
by a number of historians as the unalterable basic tenet underpinning his foreign 
policy ideas since the early 19205234. By the time Hitler wrote Mein Kampf the 
idea of spatial expansion for the acquisition of living space had already been 
equated in his mind with the notion of Drang nach Osten. As a continental 
power, Germany could only acquire sufficient Lebensraum at the expense of the 
Soviet Union, in order to nourish her growing population, expand her natural 
resources and strengthen her ability for self -defences. He annexed an economic 
argument to his analysis - neither colonies nor foreign trade could enhance the 
country's natural resources and improve living conditions for the German people. 
Only further spatial expansion could provide a just and lasting solution to the 
problem13'. Fate, he added, was assisting Germany's necessity for eastern 
expansion by handing Russia to bolshevism and thus weakening the spiritual 
power of the country and its leadership'''. 
As it emerged from Mein Kampf and later from his Second Book, Hitler's 
Lebensraum ideology coalesced a plethora of pre- existing German radical 
nationalist currents and personal preoccupations into a new and outwardly 
coherent synthesis. The romantic idea of Blut and Boden, namely the mystical 
union between blood and soil, had traditionally been a constant theme of völkisch 
nationalism and gained significance in the post -1918 period238. During the 
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Wilhelminian period various ideologies of living space made their appearance, 
emphasising the agricultural benefits of spatial expansion, the need for economic 
autarky and the possibility of resettling excess population in the conquered 
areas'''. The ideal of Pan -Germanism, as expressed by the Alldeutscher Verband, 
presupposed the conquest of the "historic living space" of the German Volk in 
eastern and central Europe''0. At the same time, cultural and racial justifications 
for the expansion of the German nation in Europe abounded in pre -1918 radical 
nationalism, albeit with far less popular appeal than during the Nazi period. The 
Alldeutscher Verband spoke openly of the biological and cultural "inferiority" of 
the Slav races, while after 1908 anti -Semitic references became more widespread 
in the organisations' declarations. The geopolitical notion of Lebensraum, as 
systematised by Friedrich Ratzel by the 1890s, justified expansion in social 
Darwinist terms, in the context of an eternal struggle between cultures and 
peoples'''. Even such a highly- respected liberal figure as Max Weber advocated 
the need "to win the greatest elbowroom" so long as free territory and economic 
regions still existed. Although Weber's idea differed from the völkisch notion of 
aggressive Lebensraum expansion, it did accept the inevitable struggle between 
peoples for a "space in the sun" and saw expansion, both in spatial and economic 
terms, as the vital element in Germany's international ascendancy'. 
However, there was a significant qualitative difference in the pre -Nazi 
ideologies of Lebensraum and Hitler's concept of "living space ". As we have 
already seen, until the 1920s Lebensraum formed only part of the legitimisation 
of Germany's expansionist ambitions, caught in the political dilemma between 
continental and overseas expansion (Weltpolitik). It had also absorbed different 
ideological undercurrents - such as migrationist elements, social Darwinism, 
historic justifications and racist connotations - but lacked a systematic integration 
of these diverse ideas into a coherent argument which could project spatial 
168. For original references to the concept see various excerpts in Griffin, R., Fascism (Oxford & 
New York 1995), Part II, A, i -ii; B, ii (esp. p. 147) 
239 Smith, W. D, Chs. 5, 7 
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expansion as an all- embracing solution to Germany's domestic and international 
problems. In this sense, Hitler's contribution to the notion of Lebensraum was 
twofold. First, he amalgamated and radicalised pre- existing ideological, 
economic, historic, racist and geopolitical principles into a congruous system of 
thought which prescribed eastern expansion as the fundamental answer to 
Germany's grievances and the door to world power. Second, like Mussolini, he 
popularised the previously marginal and vague idea of living space by placing it 
in the forefront of the political programme of the Nazi mass movement. 
Having said that, the production of the elaborate ideology of spatial 
expansion found in Mein Kampf and later in his Second Book' followed a long 
process of integration and systematisation in the early 1920s'ß. The DAP 
Programme of 1920, to which Hitler's contribution should not be exaggerated, 
restated the conventional irredentist argument of uniting "all Germans" and 
added only vague references to "land and territory", including colonies, as 
solution to the country's space problem''. The absence of any allusion to eastern 
expansion originated from Hitler's initial obsession with the Versailles treaty, as 
a result of which he regarded - apart from France - "England [sic] and America" 
as the "absolute opponents" of the Reich' -36. There are various indications that in 
the 1919 -1921 period he was not averse to the idea of an alliance with Russia'' 
against the main powers guaranteeing the Versailles settlement. The demographic 
aspect of Lebensraum permeated his references to spatial expansion in 1920 -21, 
underscoring the unfavourable ratio of population to land in the post -Versailles 
Germany, but the prescription of spatial expansion lacked a concrete geographic 
243 
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character''. In contrast, Hitler had already developed the two central ideological 
themes of his worldview - anti -Semitism and anti -bolshevism. The myth of an 
"international Jewish conspiracy" underpinned his earlier anti -Semitic comments 
in 1920 and induced him to speak of a fundamental historic struggle between 
nationalism and internationalism (epitomised by the Jews), in which Germany 
would lead the fight against the latter'49. At the same time, bolshevism was also 
accused of internationalist and expansionist ambitions, allegedly promoting the 
ideal of a vast Russian empire in eastern and central Europe. By 1920 Hitler had 
fused the two concepts into one single enemy (bolshevism was perceived as the 
vehicle for Jewish international domination) and for that reason excluded the 
possibility of an alliance between Germany and a Bolshevik Russia. He did not, 
however, rule out a collapse of the Bolshevik regime which would pave the way 
for a rapprochement''0. 
The identification of Russia with bolshevism and the Jews in Hitler's 
mind was completed in 1922. By that time, the end of the Civil War in Russia 
had consolidated the Bolsheviks in power and had caused massive destruction to 
the country and its population. The "ruined civilisation" of Russia, he said in July 
1922, had been the result of the Jews' destructive influence and their absolute 
lack of constructive abilities'''. This was also an indication of the fate that 
awaited any other European country if it succumbed to communism - a theme he 
constantly reiterated in the 1930s and especially after the Spanish Civil War'''. 
Bolshevism, he argued in February 1925, was the new religion spreading from 
the east towards Europe like a "world pest ", aided by its spiritual supporter, 
namely Jewry'''. This convergence of his central racial prejudice (anti -Semitism) 
and his fundamental ideological antithesis (anti -communism) upon Russia re- 
248 Kuhn & Jäckel, Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen, pp. 207ff (October 1920) 
249 Baynes, I, pp. 21 ff; Phelps, p. 308 (speech to party organisation in Munich, 27 July 1920) 
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orientated his foreign policy programme against the Soviet Union with the 
cumulative vehemence of a metaphysical struggle. The elitist self -perception of 
National Socialism and Nazi Germany as the vanguard of the historic struggle 
against bolshevism and international Jewry for the protection of European 
civilisation established Russia as the symbolic alliance of all enemy forces to the 
German universal mission. 
To this racial -ideological nucleus of anti -Russian sentiment Hitler added 
a historic dimension which linked the Teutonic and imperial past of the German 
"race" with its need for living space. In Mein Kampf he reiterated that the central 
tenet of the National Socialist foreign policy was the "securing of land and soil 
rightfully belonging to the German Volk '''. The historic living space of the 
German people lay not in the west or in the colonies, as the Wilhelminian 
Weltpolitik had erroneously assumed, but in the east, linking the route of the 
Teutonic knights with the triumph of Brest -Litovsk in 1917255. Again, racial 
considerations shaped his perception and analysis of German history. He argued 
that the creation of the vast Russian empire could not have been the work of the 
"inferior race" of the Slays; it was rather the achievement of "Germanic 
organisers and rulers" who formed the basis of Muscovite Russia and established 
themselves as the intellectual and political elite of Russia throughout the 
centuries''. After, however, the 1917 Revolution, "a brutal dictatorship of 
foreign [Jewish] rule" had seized control of the country, destroying the 
constructive work of the Germanic race'''. In attacking the Soviet state, therefore, 
Germany not only defended the west against the "poison" of bolshevism, but also 
marched again over the traces of history to rescue her past achievements and 
make constructive use of the space and resources which inferior and incompetent 
Deutschen Arbeiter- Partei (Munich 1925), pp. 7 -8. For an interesting analysis see Can, W., . A 
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races had reduced to ruins'. Nazi foreign policy would pick up the thread left by 
the Holy Roman Empire and the Germanic crusaders, spr--,adinig towards the east 
and establishing what Hitler described as the "Germanic empire of the 
nation 
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If the integrative and figurative function of the ideology of living space was 
common in the two fascist regimes' expansionist policies, differences in the nature 
and importance of the various justifications should be neither discounted nor over- 
emphasised. The rigidity of the concept of race in Hitler's Weltanschauung cannot be 
compared either with Mussolini's endorsement of racism after 1936 or with Italian 
Fascism's emphasis on a hierarchy of cultures. Conversely, the element of historic 
irredentism was much more prominent in Mussolini's universalist project (based on 
the heritage of ancient and medieval Rome) than in the Hitlerite ideological- racial- 
historic notion of eastward expansion. The idea of mare nostrum and the claim to 
world power were much more akin to a nationalist utopia, if significantly more far - 
reaching in scope and radical in methods. Hitler's vision, by contrast, performed a 
significantly wider function of synthesis in the context of a much more fragmented 
nationalist agenda. It reconfigured the geographic priorities of German expansionism 
and purged it from remnants of previous currents (Wilhelminian policy, border 
policy, Weltpolitik)'6'. It is important, however, to note that the Nazi ideology of 
living space owed its dynamism and appeal to the cumulative effect of all its 
constituent elements. Anti -Semitism alone cannot adequately explain Hitler's vision 
of eastern expansion - as Röhm put it, "the problem was the Jews, not the eastern 
Jews "'G3; nor can exclusive emphasis on anti -bolshevism or the legacy of Brest - 
Litovsk. Similarly, Mussolini's active pursuit of a Mediterranean empire cannot be 
understood as the sole consequence of the importance of historic irredentism in 
fascist ideology. Geopolitical and defence considerations played an important part in 
his decision -making, in the same way that his social Darwinist perception of history 
created the ideological momentum for active spatial expansion at the expense of 
other nations. Any attempt to over -determine the two regimes' ideology of living 
space as the primary outcome of a single factor discards the metaphorical and 
composite character of living space in fascist ideology, as the point where elitism, 
and Society, 12 (1983), pp. 76 -82; Birken, L., Hitler as Philosophe. Remnants of the Enlightenment 
in National Socialism (Westport Connecticut & London 1995), Ch. 5 
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263 Quoted in Rhodes, J. M., The Hitler Movement (Stanford 1980), pp. 43ff 
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constant struggle, demography, national security and world -power ambitions 
intersected. 
V. Expansionist ideology in practice: the unity of thought and action in 
fascism 
If the above visions of large -scale spatial expansion were derived from 
ideological convictions and aspirations which were not exclusive to fascist ideology, 
their prioritisation by the two fascist regimes owed its dynamism to a specifically 
fascist resolve to take them at face value and promote them in their totality through a 
constant activism'. In the worldviews of the Italian and German fascist movements, 
action was not simply the vehicle for the implementation of ideas and programmes. It 
was also an ideological goal in itself, the political externalisation of national virility, 
of the will to power and prominence. Like violence, which may be seen as an 
indispensable part of fascist activism, action was the necessary precondition for the 
spiritual mobilisation of the nation and the transition to the fascist "new order ". It 
was a lasting legacy of fascism's revolutionary origins and a powerful weapon 
against normalisation and stagnation'6'. However, it was also a source of experience, 
processed by the fascist worldview to produce a more accurate account of national 
needs and intérests. Expansion as action was indeed prescribed by fascist ideology, 
but it was clearly the expression of ideas as well as a generator of new options which 
produced ideas. The experience of the First World War fostered the fascist belief in 
the power of activism to reveal the inner qualities of the nation and a leitmotif for its 
future'. The consequent unity of thought and action in the fascist worldview was a 
reflection of the equal significance given to both elements as complementing each 
other in serving the long -term aspirations of the nation. It was also a sign of 
fascism's determination not simply to mediate between the real and the utopian, but 
264 See the analysis of the "fascist activist style of politics" in O'Sullivan, pp. 113 -30; Gentile, E., 
Ideologia fascista, p. 229 -30 
265 De Felice, R., Interpretations of Fascism (Cambridge Mass. & London 1977), pp. 11 ff; Perfetti, F., 
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to use the latter in toto as the sole guiding principle for policy- making, unrestrained 
by other ideological beliefs and geared to uniting reality with vision. 
In Italy, the short incubation period of the Fascist movement before 1922 
resulted in a scarcity of policy statements on the part of its historic leadership267. 
Mussolini did not perceive this as a disadvantage for his party: his only programme 
was to govern and make Italy great again, both domestically and internationally268. 
He was also very emphatic in his rejection of the traditional notion of ideology as 
divorced from action'G9. Ideas, he said, had not saved Italy from decay70. The only 
remedy was a people with a will to power, with the strength to fight and exploit the 
superior inner qualities of the nation'''. Only the strength of will could "open the 
doors of power" and find solutions to every problem'''. In the Doctrine of Fascism 
Mussolini and Gentile described Fascism as both a faith and a doctrine in the 
making, an ideal with an evolving content realised through action and the laws of the 
omnipotent Fascist state73. Words and ideas were good and essential, he noted in 
1925, but action was even more crucial'. At the same time, Fascism, as a renovative 
force and a terza via, was a movement which did not slavishly copy existing 
programmes and ideas of the past. Instead, it was a historic force that would produce 
a doctrine as a result of its activities"'. Since old ideals had failed to restore the 
prestige of the Italian nation, Fascism would follow its own path, rejecting the 
limitations of existing principles and forging its ideological character according to 
the results of its activism. According to Pelizzi, Fascism based its historic success on 
267 On the vague character of the Italian fascist ideology see Gregor, Ideology of Fascism, pp. 10 -26 
2`$ Scritti, II, 159 (speech in Bologna, 3 April 1921); 307 -22 ( "Discorso di Udine ", 20 September 
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275 Rossi, C., "La critica alle critiche del fascismo ", Gerarchia, 4.1922; Lyttelton (ed.), Italian 
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the conjunction between pure idealism and uncompromising action276. The latter 
element guaranteed the revolutionary character of the movement, eliminating the 
option of political compromise which had kept utopia divorced from reality for so 
long. Even if Fascist ideas were not particularly original in themselves, the 
determination of Fascism to pursue them in an absolute manner was indeed 
innovative'". 
For Mussolini, the priority of serving the interests of the nation overshadowed 
all other ideological aspects of Fascist foreign policy. Since short-term interests were 
constantly changing in a very fluid international system, the Duce declared his 
determination to cut across ideological and political principles in order to achieve the 
most effective service to Italy'78. In his conduct of foreign affairs he had always 
endeavoured to exorcise two main enemies: normality and any restriction on his 
freedom of action. Normality was the negation of the revolutionary spirit of 
transcendence, something inconceivable as long as the "old order" was still alive and 
resisting. As for freedom of action, he fought stubbornly, even after the outbreak of 
the Second World War, to retain his regime's political autonomy, to keep all his 
options open and to avoid hasty commitments. He often declared his willingness "to 
swim against the stream "279, following an equivocal policy towards allies and 
enemies, ideologies and principles. Ideals possessed an ultimate value only with 
reference to the achievement of long -term visions. In the short term, political 
flexibility and uncompromising action were not regarded by the Fascist leadership as 
weakness, but rather as a sine qua non in the revolutionary fight against predictability 
and stagnation'80. Since 1918 Mussolini had made clear his determination not to be 
impeded by "forbidden" goals or means but to bring the vision of a world -power 
Italy to its logical, consummate conclusion281. 
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Hitler and the Nazi leadership did not go to such lengths in their deification 
of short-term activism. Unlike his Italian counterpart, the Führer had a long time at 
his disposal to study the experience of the past and reach a number of conclusions 
about how to achieve his goals more effectively than his predecessors. In his 
speeches, he presented the policies of his regime as stemming from a fairly concrete 
programme of priorities, which he had formulated before the assumption of power''. 
The unity between thought and action was the logical outcome of the ideologically 
conditioned emphasis on action as an expression of fascism's superior qualities and 
dynamism. Hitler held a general idea of his long -term aspirations (expansion in the 
east, a racially reconstructed Europe). He also formulated some guidelines for the 
achievement of his vision: for example, his instinctive perception of Britain and Italy 
as indispensable allies'R3. Having said that, the Führer did not possess a blueprint for 
short -term action. In the conduct of foreign affairs, Hitler was very short on the detail 
of how he would achieve his grand long -term goals. He combined his belief in 
activism with a confidence in his political intuition, perceiving himself as a 
"prophet" and gambler'" with a strength originating from the transcendental belief in 
his visions and the importance of action. He was systematic enough in his domestic 
preparation (i.e. rearmament, introduction of conscription), and lucky enough in his 
timing to reap benefits which fostered confidence in his own instinct and judgement. 
Like Mussolini, Hitler declared his determination to fight for the salvation of his 
nation in defiance of any ideological principle78'. Only action could provide the 
necessary expression of the ideological superiority of the regime and the nation. The 
inner qualities of the Volk would be revealed and become meaningful only through 
their externalisation. He also emphasised that the distinction between feasible and 
unfeasible national goals was nonsensical. In 1942 he spoke to his Minister of 
Munitions Speer about his aversion to the word "impossible ". For him, the will to 
succeed, to act and provide solutions was the only formula for eventual success'''. In 
282 See, for example, Hitler's speech on 10 -2 -1939, quoted in Michalka, W. (ed.), Das Dritte Reich, 
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this sense, the unity of ideas and action in Nazism becomes comparable to the Italian 
case in its dialectic nature. Action was the sharp edge of the fascist worldview and 
functioned as a force bridging the gap between reality and vision. It was the political 
and ethical vehicle for transforming the inauspicious present into a new reality that 
could realise the long -term aspects of the fascist "new order ". 
VI: Conclusions 
In this chapter we formulated a common "minimum" for the ideologies of the 
Italian and German fascist regimes which underpinned their inclination towards 
territorial expansion. This minimum projected expansion as a necessity for, and a 
right of, the two countries in three different, yet complementary ways. Expansion 
was a national necessity, pursuing the vision of a complete national unification and 
aspiring to create a homogeneous state which would encompass all ethnically kin 
peoples and their territories. It was a natural necessity in the context of the eternal 
struggle among nations, promising a fairer ratio of people to land by incorporating 
other areas, suitable for agricultural exploitation and resettlement, into the national 
territory. Finally, and by far most importantly, it was a historic necessity, derived 
from the alleged superiority of the two peoples and their destiny as creators and 
defenders of European civilisation. Beyond this nucleus of comparable ideological 
attributes each regime formulated its expansionist ideology and programme in 
accordance with national traditions and interests, fusing pre- existing ideological 
trends and the different experience of the First World War into a new synthesis with 
a significantly more pronounced propensity for activism. 
In this sense, the ideology of the two regimes combined a generic, abstract 
penchant for expansion with a more specific vision, scope and method for territorial 
aggrandisement. The abstract, generic justification prescribed a notion of expansion 
which was open- ended, dynamic and constant, without concrete short-term foci or 
binding priorities. What gave each regime's expansionist ideology a programmatic 
long -term character was to be found in a second level of justification, which 
comprised historic, ideological and geopolitical arguments. Predictably, at this point 
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the two regimes diverged. The Italian regime pursued a Mediterranean policy of 
expansion, while the German regime opted for a massive programme of Lebensraum 
acquisition in the east, in tandem with a crusade against bolshevism and the Jews. 
The significantly more brutal and destructive tendencies of Nazism fed from the 
biological rigidity of the concept of Volksgemeinschaft, from the objectification of 
irrational beliefs through science, from a fundamentalist vision of cultural and 
biological uniformity. Such beliefs had more shallow roots in Italian society which, 
according to Mussolini's own admission, was the most individualistic in the world 
and resisted rigid definitions of its character and duties'87. All the above similarities 
and divergences were reflected in each regime's definition of living space, which 
became a pivotal tenet not simply of fascist expansionism but of fascist ideology 
itself. The idea of living space developed into a figurative and composite expression 
of both generic fascist ideas and distinct national aspirations. It was an essentially 
tautological concept, being at the same time the prize for fascism's obsession with 
activism and the means for attaining concrete historic, geopolitical and ideological 
ambitions. In this respect, the historiographical distinction between "expansion 
without object" and "programmatic expansion" is methodologically erroneous as it 
disregards the above dual character of space in fascist ideology 'sa 
Both leaders repeated the themes of constant struggle, elitism and living 
space with a consistency throughout the life span of their regimes which should not 
be dismissed a priori as mere propaganda or bluff. They also declared their 
determination to unite utopia with reality by matching deeds with words and results 
with aspirations. Their position as charismatic leaders of the two movements 
established them as the living incarnation and ultimate expression of the fascist 
worldview. The transition of the movements to organised parties and finally to power 
necessitated the systematisation and clarification of those initial ideas which had 
informed the activities and aspirations of the two movements. The task of the two 
leaders was indeed formidable. They had to rally the disparate forces within their 
parties to a political programme of action which would combine and harmonise 
287 Scritti, II, 104 -5 (speech in Trieste, 20 September 1920) 
288 This is discussed in Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, Ch. 6; Vigezzi, B., Politica estera e opinione 
pubblica in Italia dall 'unità ai giorni nostri. Orientamenti degli studi e prospettiva della ricerca 
(Milan 1991), pp. 98ff 
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different views about the priorities and goals of fascism. Once in power, they had to 
translate fascist values into action and convince their fellow travellers that their 
decisions expressed the spirit of fascist ideology accurately and effectively. They 
also had to link expansionist policies with the wider fascist desire for a radical 
transformation of human life in all its expressions. The above ideological 
"minimum" represented a consensus within the two movements as to the long -term 
priorities and character of foreign policy- making. However, different views amongst 
fascist leading figures about the best way to achieve these goals persisted and 
remained in a dialectical relation with the leaders' own interpretations. At the same 
time, once in power, the two leaders became aware of the immense gap between what 
they perceived as "ideal" conditions for accomplishing their visions and the existing 
internal and international situation. These remarks bring us back to something 
mentioned earlier: that ideology produces predispositions, tendencies, options and 
priorities, but does not determine policy- making. Action is also defined by domestic 
circumstances and limitations, by the struggle of domestic institutions and 
individuals to shape policy according to their own perceptions, by the interaction 
between states. Fascism did not become an ideological and political fait accompli 
because it did not expand in a vacuum. Rather, its nature and policies were shaped in 
constant interaction with, and in opposition to, other strong forces, domestic and 
international. The following chapters explore the impact of these opposing factors 
upon fascist policies and analyse the complex process through which fascist ideals 
struggled, but never managed, to attain their unity with action in reality. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Towards a "fascist state ": fascist leaders, traditional 
groups, fascist parties and foreign policy decision -making 
I: Introduction 
The appointment of Mussolini and Hitler as heads of coalition governments in 
1922 and 1933 respectively constituted a decisive development in the process of 
fusion in the Italian and German Right. In the previous chapter we examined how 
such an osmosis took place on the ideological level, allowing fascism to emerge as 
an effective synthesis of traditional aspirations and a new sense of radicalism and 
activism. This process led to a gradual convergence between old and new Right upon 
a set of short-term goals for both domestic and foreign policy. In Italy this had been 
manifested in the rallying dynamism of the intervento movement of 1914 -15, but was 
strengthened through the inclusion of Fascists in the electoral lists of 1921. In 
Germany, the campaign against the Young Plan in 1929 produced a coalition 
between Hugenberg and Hitler which appeared to originate from agreement on a 
single issue (reparations- revisionism) but initiated a debate about the political role of 
Hitler and the NSDAP in the German Right. Although the implications of these 
developments did not become immediately apparent, a process of political fusion 
was set in motion which gradually legitimised Nazism as an alternative solution to 
the political crisis'. 
Eley, G., "Conservatives and Radical Nationalists in Germany: the production of fascist potentials, 
1912 -1928 ", in Blinkhom, M. (ed.), Fascists and Conservatives. The Radical Right and the 
Establishment in the twentieth centiny Europe (London 1990), pp. 50 -70 
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In this respect, the endorsement of the "fascist solution" in 1922 and 1933 by 
the élite groups in the two societies, albeit neither predetermined nor inevitable2, was 
the conclusion of a calculated political rationale. The aim was to transform the 
political representation of the Right by harnessing the powerful appeal of fascism and 
injecting its dynamism into the existing institutional framework of the state. This 
decision, however, instigated a new phase in the process of fusion, which this time 
involved the balance between traditional ruling groups and the fascist élites in the 
decision -making process. Agreement on a common agenda of short-term goals meant 
that the utilisation of Mussolini and Hitler was intended to remain confined within 
the framework of a "caesarist" regime, in which the autonomy of the traditional 
groups would be enhanced and legitimised by the charisma of the two fascist 
leaders3. Institutional rearrangements were not ruled out, but the emphatic separation 
of the two leaders from their more "extreme" parties was aimed to reduce the ability 
of the former to intervene in the institutional debate with radical proposals and 
initiatives. Such a calculation did seem logical, given that the number of fascist 
representatives in the two cabinets was initially very small (four in Italy; three in 
Germany), and the two Heads of State (the King Vittorio Emmanuelle III; President 
Hindenburg) possessed the constitutional prerogative to dispense with the fascist 
leaders at any time. However, by admitting the fascist leaders to power, the élite 
groups in Italy and Germany allowed fascism a significantly larger stake in the 
institutional debate over the form of decision- making. Despite converging on 
ideological and political objectives, fascist and non -fascist élites held fundamentally 
different views on how to achieve these goals - in other words, on how the state 
should be reorganised and what roles should be allocated to the different partners. 
The historiographical debate about the character of the state which eventually 
emerged from this institutional fusion has produced bitter controversies. The extent 
Lyttelton, A., The Seizure of Power. Fascism in Italy 1919 -1929 (London 1987, 2nd ed.); Bracher, 
K. D., The German Dictatorship (London 1970); Allen, W. S., "The Nazi Rise to Power: A 
Comprehensive Catastrophe ", in Maier, C. S., Hoffmann, S., Gould, A. (ed.), The Rise of the Nazi 
Regime. Historical Reassessments (Boulder & London, 1986), pp. 9 -18 
3 For Germany see Hildebrand, K., The Third Reich (London 1984), pp. 144 -7; Hiden, J., 
Farquharson, J., Explaining Hitler's Germany (Totowa, New Jersey 1983), pp. 157 -8. For Italy see 
Mack Smith, D., Italy and its Monarchy (New Haven & London 1989), pp. 253 -4; Gallo, pp. 165 -6 
' Koch, H. W., "1933: The Legality of Hitler's Assumption of Power ", in Koch (ed.), Aspects of the 
Third Reich (Houndmills & London 1985), pp. 53 -4 
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to which the development and structure of the two fascist systems reflected the 
intentions of the fascist leaders or resulted from the uncontrolled dynamism of the 
struggle between fascist and non -fascist élites or between fascist leaderships and 
fascist parties, remains open to discussion. Similar questions have been raised with 
regard to the actual political power of the two fascist leaders in the decision -making 
process, their capacity to shape or influence developments, their ability to contain the 
radicalism of the party. It is difficult to give definitive answers to these questions for 
the whole fascist period, given that fascist consolidation was not a one -way, 
calculated process with a foregone conclusion. Instead, the institutional form of the 
"fascist" system was the outcome of three major factors. The first was the struggle 
between the new fascist élites and the traditional political, economic, military and 
bureaucratic groups. The second was the complex relationship between the fascist 
leaders and the fascist parties. The third was the clash between the diachronic 
features of the Italian and German domestic systems, and the desire of the fascist 
élites to implement new patterns of organisation that had little relevance to the 
existing ones. Each of the two regimes responded differently to the challenge of 
constructing a fascist state, giving dissimilar solutions to the above three problems. 
In this sense, instead of speaking of the establishment of a "fascist" state in Italy and 
Germany', it would be more accurate to talk of a compromise between fascist 
concepts of "state" and the resistance of traditional, long -term features of the two 
systems. 
The importance of this institutional debate was central to the foreign policy 
decision -making process. Apart from whatever intentions and "programmes" the two 
fascist leaderships possessed, the implementation of a foreign policy plan depended 
heavily on both the acquiescence of the political, military and economic groups and 
on the capacity of the material infrastructure to produce optimal conditions for the 
attainment of the pursued goals. At the same time, the political tension between the 
fascist leaderships and their parties was anything but minimised after the inclusion of 
5 Ungari, P., "Ideologie giuridiche e strategie istituzionali del fascismo ", in Aquarone, A., Vernassa, 
M., (eds.), Il regime fascista (Bologna 1974), pp. 45 -56; Neumann, F., Behemoth. The Structure and 
Practice of National Socialism (New York 1963), pp. 467ff; Caplan, J., Government without 
Administration. State and Civil Service in Weimar and Nazi Germany (Oxford 1988), pp. 321 -81 
(esp. pp. 331 -2), and "National Socialism and the Theory of the State ", in Childers, T., Caplan, J. 
(eds.), Reevaluating the Third Reich (New York & London 1993), pp. 98 -102 
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the former and the exclusion of the latter from power -sharing. This was of great 
importance, since the parties sponsored more radical approaches to both domestic 
and foreign policy issues, perceiving themselves as institutional alternatives to the 
existing states. 
This chapter aims to examine the progress of this twofold institutional 
struggle from the period of the Machtübernahme until the outbreak of the Second 
World War6. It assesses the changing influence of the various traditional élite groups 
(military, political, diplomatic), of the fascist leaderships and the fascist parties in the 
foreign policy decision -making process. It focuses on key- decisions of the two 
regimes and highlights the role of each of the above agents in the formulation of 
foreign policy. The chapter first discusses how the "minimum consensus" that the 
traditional élites granted to the fascist experiment lay down the foundations for a 
leader -oriented system but also initiated a fierce institutional battle between these 
élites, the fascist leaderships and their parties. The ensuing consolidation of fascist 
power is analysed on two levels - first, with regard to the declining influence of the 
traditional groups and, second, with regard to the marginalisation of the fascist party 
as originator of foreign policy. The analysis highlights the central role of the two 
fascist leaders in the decision -making process, a role which was established through 
the relegation of traditional élites to a functional position in the decision -making 
process, and the curbing of the policy -making capacity of the fascist parties. 
However, the fascist systems that were developed in Italy and Germany were not 
simply the products of what the two leaderships might have perceived as the optimal 
state. Instead, they bore the marks of an institutional struggle between an 
authoritarian concept of state (based on the logic of "minimum consensus" and the 
idea of a "caesarist" state held by the traditional groups) and totalitarianism (as 
sponsored by the fascist parties) which pressed for a revolutionary transformation of 
state structures and a clear break with past foreign policy programmes'. The leader- 
6 Kettenacker, L., "Social and Psychological Aspects of the Führer's Role ", in Koch (ed.), pp. 98 -132 
Pombeni, P., "La forma partito del fascismo e del nazismo", in Bracher, K. D., Valiani, L. (eds.), 
Fascismo e nazionalsocialismo (Bologna 1986), pp. 219 -64; Demagogia e tirannide. Uno studio 
sulla forma partito del fascismo (Bologna 1984), pp. 237 -90. As in the previous chapter, the term is 
used to denote the aspirations for "total" control and integration of social life under the auspices of 
a hyper -party organisation with power of collective decision -making (as opposed to the 
authoritarian, leader -based model with the party as ancillary organisation). 
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oriented character of the two systems was further enhanced as each of the above 
groups sought a mandate and legitimacy from the leader in defending its autonomy 
against intrusions from the others. Yet, the institutional tension was never resolved in 
a decisive and definite way. In this sense, the consolidation of the two leaders' 
position in the fascist systems was not the inevitable consequence of any fascist 
theory of state or the outcome of the personal intentions of the leaders, but the end - 
result of a long -term structural struggle in the essentially polycratic framework of 
decision -making. 
II. The concept of "minimum consensus" 
The concept of "minimum consensus ", i.e. the support on the part of military, 
economic and political leading circles for certain domestic and international 
measures pronounced by the two fascist leaderships, in practice deprived the fascist 
acquisition of power in 1922 and 1933 of its revolutionary pretensions. Acquisition 
of power represented the successful revolution of the fascist movements, but also a 
revolution that took place in relative harmony with the interests and aspirations of the 
main actors of the anciens regimes8. This idiosyncratic blending of revolution with 
consent produced a complex dualism at the heart of the fascist regimes9. On the one 
hand, the fascist revolution aspired to a dramatic break with the previous domestic 
and foreign policies, both in style and in objectives. On the other hand, however, the 
conditions which facilitated the legal seizure of power resulted in a complicated form 
of power -sharing between fascist leaderships and traditional élite groups. This meant 
that fascism possessed limited institutional freedom to proceed unilaterally with the 
implementation of its own concept of state or its wide expansionist plans10. In Italy, 
s Mommsen, H., "National Socialism: Continuity and Change ", in Laqueur, W. (ed.), Fascism: A 
Reader's Guide. Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography (Harmondsworth 1979), pp. 151 -192 (here 
pp. 166f); Kettenacker, L., "The German View ", in Douglas, R. (ed.), 1939. A Retrospect Forty 
Years After (London 1983), pp. 25 -6; Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power, pp. 15 -41 
9 Payne, S. G., Fascism. Comparison and Definition (Madison 1980), p. 75; Kogan, N., "Fascism as a 
Political System ", in Woolf (ed.), Nature of Fascism, pp. 11 -18 
10 On the background of the fascist seizure of power and the problems it presented for the new fascist 
leaderships, see, for Germany, Carr, Hitler, pp. 28ff. And, for Italy, Lyttelton, Seizure, pp. 77 -93; 
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Mussolini had to accept the institutional tutelage of the Crown, co- existence with the 
traditional military and diplomatic bureaucracies whose primary loyalty was to the 
House of Savoy, and the limitation of the party's influence upon the state 
machinery". In Germany, Hitler faced similar political challenges: the dominant 
constitutional role of President Hindenburg under Article 48 of the Weimar 
Constitution', the latter's insistence on keeping the military and diplomatic 
functions of the state under his supervisioni3, and the need to restrain the 
revolutionary or subversive activities of the Nazi party when these were directed 
against the institutional authority of the state`'. 
This situation presented the fascist leaderships in Italy and Germany with a 
similar problem: how to show moderation towards the traditional élites while 
appeasing the craving of the fascist parties for a more central political function and 
influence on policy -making. From the viewpoint of the various traditional élite 
groups the party constituted the unacceptable face of fascism. For them, the appeal of 
Repaci, A., La marcia su Roma (Rome 1963), 2 vols.; Vivarelli, R., Il dopoguerra in Italia e 
l'avvento del fascismo (1918 -1922) (Naples 1967), 2 vols.; Lyttelton, "Italian Fascism ", in Laqueur 
(ed.), Fascism, pp. 88 -99 
" On a general survey of the limitations to Mussolini's power see Knox, M., "Conquest, Foreign and 
Domestic, in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany ", Journal of Modern History, 56 (1984), pp. 1 -57. See 
also Germino, D., The Italian Fascist Party in Power. A Study of Totalitarian Rule (Minneapolis 
1959), pp. 10fí; Aquarone, A., L' orgarizzazione dello Stato Totalitario (Turin 1965), pp. 291ff; 
Brooker, P., The Faces of Fraternalism. Na:! Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan (Oxford 
1991), pp. 153ff; Tannenbaum, E. R., Fascism in Italy: Society and Culture 1922 -1945 (London 
1973), pp. 72f; Gentile, G., "The Problem of the Party in Italian Fascism ", Journal of Contemporary 
History, 19 (1984), pp. 251 -74; Thompson, D., State Control in Fascist Italy. Culture and 
Conformity 1925 -43 (Manchester & New York 1991), pp. 79 -82 
12 On Article 48 see Boldt, H., "Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution. Its historical and political 
implications ", in Nicholls, A., Matthias, E. (eds.), German Democracy and the Triumph of Hitler 
(London 1971), pp. 79 -98. See also Heiber, H., Die Republik von Weimar (Munich 1966), pp. 225f; 
Koch, H. W., A Constitutional History of Germany in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries 
(London & New York 1984), pp. 266 -70 
11 Seraphin, H. G., Das Politische Tagesbuch Alfred Rosenbergs 1934/5 und 1939/40 (Göttingen/ 
Berlin/ Frankfurt 1956), p. 20. On Hitler's mistrust of the Foreign Office and the conservative 
diplomats related to Hindenburg see Carr, W., Arms, Autarky and Aggression. A Study in German 
Foreign Policy 1933 -1939 (London 1972), pp. 27f. On Hindenburg's support for von Neurath from 
1932 onwards see Heineman, J. L., Hitler's First Foreign Minister. Constantin Freiherr von 
Neurath, Diplomat and Statesman (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1979), pp. 44ff 
14 On the history of the Nazi party see Orlow, D., The History of the Nazi Party 1933 -1945 (Newton 
Abbot 1969- 1973), 2 vols.; Kater, M., The Nazi Party. A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 
1919 -45 (Oxford 1983); Unger, A. L., The Totalitarian Party. Party and People in Nazi Germany 
and Soviet Russia (London 1974). On the issue of party-state relations see Noakes, J., Pridham G., 
Nazism 1919 -1945 , vol. II: State, Economy, and Society 1933 -1939 (Exeter 1984), pp. 233 -58; 
Broszat, M., The Hitler State. The Foundation and Development of the Internal Structure of the 
Third Reich (London & New York 1981), pp. 199ff; Brooker, pp. 93ff 
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the "fascist solution" adopted in 1922 and 1933 resulted exactly from the clear 
separation of the fascist parties from their leaders, who were regarded by the 
dominant groups as a moderating force within the two movements''. The two 
leaders' ability to exercise full control over their parties was unquestioned, and their 
mirage of moderation could very easily be interpreted as the prelude to a long -term 
trend towards political normalisation which could in turn be imposed upon the more 
radical fascist movements. In Italy, the Confindustria (Confederazione Generale 
dell 'Industria Italiana, General Confederation of Italian Industry) had made clear in 
1922 that the appointment of Mussolini would not be opposed by industrial 
interests16. Nationalist pro -monarchical figures of the Italian Nationalist Association 
did their best to persuade the King that the Duce was the only available solution, and 
one that would not upset the position of the traditional élite groups if combined with 
the political isolation of the PNF. The leadership of the armed forces, represented by 
General Diaz, made it clear that martial law was much less desirable than a Mussolini 
coalition cabinet17. Fear of civil war or uncontrolled Fascist violence neutralised the 
last traces of opposition to the "fascist solution ". On a regional level, local political 
and military authorities openly defied orders from the central government to suppress 
Fascist mobilisation18. Even liberal politicians, including Giolitti, attempted to lure 
Mussolini into a wider liberal- Fascist cabinet19 
15 Andreski, S., "Fascists as Moderates ", in Larsen, S. U., Hagtvet, B., Myklebust, J. P. (eds.), Who 
Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen, Oslo, Tromso 1980), pp. 52 -5; Faye, 
pp. 407ff. See also the analysis of Faye's arguments in Thompson, J. B., Studies in the Theory of 
Ideology, pp. 211 -27 
16 Zamagni, V., The Economic History of Italy, 1860 -1990 (Oxford 1993), pp. 241f; Sarti, Industrial 
Leadership, pp. 33 -7. On the subsidies to the PNF from industrialists see Procacci, G., "Appunti in 
tema di crisi dello stato liberale e di origini del fascismo ", Studi Storici, 6 (1965), pp. 221 -37; Sarti, 
Industrial Leadership, pp. 36f; De Felice, R., Mussolini il fascista, vol. 1: La conquista del potere 
(1921 -25) (Turin 1966), pp. 327ff. See also the distrust of leading figures of the Confindustria 
towards fascism, in Melograni, P., "Confindustria e fascismo tra il 1919 e 1925 ", II Nuovo 
Osservatore, 6 (1965), pp. 834 -73; ibid., Gli industriali e Mussolini: Rapporti tra Confindustria e 
fascismo dal 1919 al 1929 (Milan 1972), pp. 9ff. Note, however, the declaration of support for the 
"fascist solution" [Clough, S., The Economic History of Italy (New York & London 1964), p. 216] 
17 Rochat, G., L'esercito italiano de Vittorio Veneto a Mussolini (1919 -1925) (Bari 1967), pp. 397- 
408; Clark, p. 221; Lyttelton, Seizure, pp. 91 -3; Eatwell, R., Fascism: A History (London 1995), pp. 
46 -7 
18 Lyttelton, Seizure, pp. 39 -41; De Grand, "Bolshevik and Fascist Attacks ", pp. 141 -3 
19 Mack Smith, Italy and its Monarchy, pp. 247 -8 
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In Germany, a long list of industrialists provided much needed financial 
support to the NSDAP, albeit not on a very large scale. This did not mean that they 
were committed to the Nazi solution, as at the same time they were subsidising other 
right -wing parties20, but it signified an acceptance of the political utility of Hitler and 
his entourage21. If many conservative Reichswehr figures were appalled by the 
plebeian Führer, a younger generation of military officials around von Schleicher did 
not hesitate to gamble with the Nazi leadership22 . Others went even further: the then 
Army Commander in East Prussia von Blomberg had already revealed his preference 
for the Führer compared to any other realistic alternative23. For their part, a number 
of conservative politicians, including the Foreign Minister von Neurath, preferred to 
see Hitler as Chancellor of a coalition government than a repetition of the von 
Schleicher or von Papen scenarios24. Personal antipathy between the von Schleicher 
and von Papen groups was running high, thus ruling out a repetition of either of the 
two short-lived 1932 cabinets25. Even more important, however, von Papen was so 
eager to succeed in forming a government without Schleicher that he surrendered to 
Hitler's demand for the position of Chancellor26. 
If now leaders and members of the two parties celebrated the seizure of 
power as the first step towards the fascist "revolution" and the "fascistisation" of the 
state, the "minimum consensus" programme was intended to remove this very 
possibility while strengthening the crumbling legitimacy of the state. Mussolini's and 
20 Geary, "Industrial Elite ", pp. 88ff; Turner, "Big Business and the Rise of Hitler ", pp. 95f; ibid., 
German Big Business, pp. 142ff, 253 -71 
11 Turner, Faschismus und Kapitalismus, pp. 92f; Manvell, Fraenkel, Hundred Days, pp. 215 -7 
22 Broszat, Collapse, pp. 146f; Carsten, F. L., The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918 -1933 (Oxford 1966), 
pp. 296ff, 364ff 
`3 Rosinski, H., The German Army (New York 1966), Chs. 5 -6; Carsten, pp. 389 -90 
24 Heineman, J. L., Hitler's First Foreign Minister. Constantin Freiherr von Neurath, Diplomat and 
Statesman (Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1979), pp. 63f; Schöllgen, G., A Conservative against Hitler. 
Ulrich von Hassell: Diplomat in Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, 
1881 -1944 (Basingstoke & London 1991), pp. 44 -6; Eley, G., "Conservatives and Radical 
Nationalists in Germany: the production of fascist potentials, 1912 -1928 ", in Blinkhom, M. (ed.), 
Fascists and Conservatives (London 1990), pp. 50 -70 
25 Abraham, D., "The Collapse of Weimar ", in Maier, C. S., Hoffmann, S. Gould, A. (eds.), The Rise 
of the Nazi Regime. Historical Reassessments (London 1986), pp. 6 -8; Heineman, pp. 60f; 
Vogelsang, Reichswehr, p. 386. Even the armed forces were no longer favourably disposed to von 
Schleicher [Geyer, "Etudes ", pp. 113ff] 
26 On von Papen's intrigues during January 1933 see Bracher, pp. 624ff; Wheeler- Bennett, 
Hindenburg, pp. 432ff 
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Hitler's charismatic leadership would form the basis of an authoritarian caesarist 
regime which would transform decision -making procedures and strengthen the 
jurisdiction of each traditional group in its own sphere of responsibility. The new 
state would fulfil a long -standing claim of conservative forces, namely to remove the 
burden of political accountability to democratic institutions and public approval. 
Experienced politicians, such as Sonnino and von Neurath, welcomed the gradual 
removal of liberal forms of accountability after the fascist acquisition of power27. 
Internal reform of the state along authoritarian lines was based on the principle that 
the traditional groups would use their institutional autonomy to reassert their total 
responsibility for political and practical decisions in their respective fields28. In other 
words, policy would originate with the relevant expert groups and would be 
sanctioned by the charismatic leader as a symbol of plebiscitary approval. 
This form of institutional fusion was, of course, compatible neither with the 
fascist leaders' ambitions for absolute power nor with the two fascist parties' plans 
for conquering the state and organising society in a totalitarian pattern. 
Consequently, from the first days of the Mussolini and Hitler cabinets the 
foundations of a fierce political and institutional struggle were laid down. What was 
essentially at stake was the balance of power among the three contenders within the 
state and their respective share of influence on the decision -making process. What 
was not apparent to the traditional ruling groups when the "fascist solution" was 
decided was that the appointment of Mussolini and Hitler increased, rather than 
curtailed, the influence of fascism upon the institutional debate over reform of 
27 For Sonnino's call for a "return to the Statuto" see Sonnino, S., Diario, 1866 -1912 (Bari 1972), vol. 
1, p. 356; Sarti, R., "Italian Fascism: radical politics and conservative goals ", in Blinkhorn, M. (ed.), 
Fascists and Conservatives. The radical right and the establishment in the twentieth century Europe 
(London 1990), pp. 19f. For Neurath's aversion to the parliamentary system see Rauschning, H., 
Men of Chaos (New York 1942), p. 172 
'8 Weisbrod, B., "The crisis of bourgeois society in Interwar Germany ", in Bessel, R. (ed.), Fascist 
Italy and Nazi Germany. Comparisons and Contrasts(Cambridge 1996), pp. 27ff; Blackbourn, D., 
"The German Bourgeoisie ", in Blackbourn, D., Evans, R. J. (eds.). The German Bourgeoisie: essays 
on the social history of the German middle class from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth 
century (London 1993, 2nd ed.), pp. 1 -45; Kettenacker, L., "Social and Psychological Aspects of the 
Führer's Rule", in Koch (ed.), pp. 96 -132 (here pp. 107 -8); Geiger, T., Die soziale Schichtung des 
deutschen Volkes. Soziographischer Versuch auf statistischer Grundlage (Stuttgart 1932), pp. 77f; 
Geyer, "Traditional Elites and National Socialism Leadership ", in Maier, C. S., Hoffmann, S. 
Gould, A. (eds.), The Rise of the Nazi Regime. Historical Reassessments (London 1986), p. 61. For 
Italy see Aquarone, Stato Totalitario, p. 106; Clough, p. 216 
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government. It produced a polycratic system in which rival conceptions of state and 
policy -making were bound to clash with totally unpredictable consequences. 
With hindsight, the arrogant confidence of the traditional groups in the 
safeguards of "minimum consensus" against fascist consolidation seems absurdly 
misplaced. The failure to control fascism was manifested in the declining influence 
of the traditional élites on the decision -making process: from total responsibility to 
co- decision, loss of political influence and, finally, relegation to a functional role 
with insignificant powers of intervention. However, this trend was expressed 
differently in each country. The initial institutional form of the state, the different 
traditional standing of the diverse groups, their varying ability to resist 
"fascistisation" and, not least, different perceptions about the party's function in a 
fascist system greatly affected the form of fascist consolidation in each country. Even 
Mussolini and Hitler appeared to hold diverse views about the optimal mechanism of 
decision -making, influenced by long -term features of the state they inherited in 1922 
and 1933 respectively. It is, therefore, essential to examine the process of 
institutional rearrangement in each country separately, first with regard to the role of 
the various non -fascist élite groups and, second, with regard to the function of the 
PNF and the NSDAP in the fascist systems. 
Ill. Foreign policy decision -making, fascist leaderships and 
traditional élites: the emergence of a leader- oriented system 
Italy: an authoritative, etatist model 
Long -term features of the system and Mussolini's early foreign policy (1922 -1924) 
In Italy, the foundation of the modem Italian state reproduced the main 
constitutional framework of the Kingdom of Sardinia, preserving the predominance 
of Piedmontese bureaucracies in the post -unification institutions. The House of 
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Savoy retained its constitutional prerogatives, namely the supreme command of the 
armed forces and a special relation with the traditional diplomatic group. Such 
institutional links perpetuated a tradition of primary allegiance of diplomatic and 
military élites to the Crown. The links, however, became increasingly weaker as 
liberal reforms of the state promoted the bureaucratisation of these groups and 
curtailed the political influence of the King upon policy- making. The initial 
intervening power of the Crown in key -appointments gradually waned, as did the 
monopoly of influential positions by the Piedmontese élite. Especially during the 
Giolittian period, the dynastic loyalty of diplomats and military officials became a 
feature of formal, rather than political, significance29. This resulted in a slight erosion 
of the aristocratic character of these groups as their transformation into "national" 
institutions dictated their opening to other groups within the Italian society. Although 
the influx of members from different social (bourgeoisie) and geographic (central and 
south Italy) groups was not dramatic, it did re- proportion the share of the 
Piedmontese aristocracy and its political influence3o 
The institutional links, however, between the monarchy and the diplomatic - 
military élites were never severed, insulating them from bureaucratic reform which 
took place after the turn of the century in the context of a general effort to modernise 
the Italian system31. This had a debilitating effect upon the effectiveness of the armed 
forces which was painfully manifested in their performance in the First World War. 
Although the trauma of the defeat at Caporetto instigated a process of limited internal 
reform and change of leadership in the armed forces, there was no attempt to reassess 
the structure of the armed forces or to enhance their wounded prestige32. Their 
weakening link with the House of Savoy and loss of their aristocratic character 
affected their social standing negatively33. Unlike the armies of most other European 
29 Orsini, F. G., "La diplomazia ", in Del Boca, A., Legnani, M., Rossi, M. C. (eds.), Il regime fascista. 
Storia e storiografia (Rome & Bari 1995), pp. 278 -9; Serra, E., "La burocrazia della politica estera 
italiana ", in Bosworth, R. J. B., Romano, S. (eds.), La politica estera italiana (1860 -1985) (Bologna 
1991), pp. 68 -72 
30 Bosworth, pp. 29ff; Orsini, pp. 282 -5 
31 Serra, "Burocrazia ", pp. 78 -81 
32 Rochat, G., L' esercito italiano da Vittorio Veneto a Mussolini (1919 -1925) (Bari 1967), pp. 67 -119 
33 For the low social status of the army in Italy see Whittam, J., The Politics of the Italian Army, 186/- 
1918 (London 1977). See also Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World, Ch. 3 
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powers, the Regio Esercito was not regarded as a channel to an attractive professional 
career. It remained a minor actor in foreign policy decision -making, geared to 
peacetime functions of guaranteeing public order and security34. It was deprived of 
major political influence on key- decisions of Liberal Italy, including the Libyan 
campaign of 1912 and the decision to enter the war in 191535. After the end of 
hostilities, pressure for fundamental reforms was stubbornly resisted by traditional 
hierarchies within the armed forces, on the basis of their institutional autonomy from 
public scrutiny36 
Italian diplomacy, on the other hand, retained a similar institutional dualism (a 
state bureaucracy with traditional links to the Crown) but was more firmly integrated 
into the foreign policy decision -making mechanism of the state. Although the 
Foreign Ministry was less immune to attempts at administrative reform, the 
composition of its officials and its traditional structure were not seriously altered 
until the end of the First World War, in spite of changes introduced after the fall of 
Crispi in 1896 and, later, during the Giolittian period37. Again, the relation of the 
diplomatic corps with the monarchy became more formal and symbolic, but public 
perceptions of diplomacy as an elitist body, bound to the traditional foreign policy 
objectives of the House of Savoy, became more widespread. After the war, the 
handling of peace negotiations exposed Italian diplomacy to criticism from both the 
moderate left and the "new" nationalist right. Reformist socialists, like L. Bissolati, 
renounced previous territorial claims (hence, their castigation as rinunciatori) in 
favour of lasting peace and international reconciliation, and criticised Italian 
governments for their expansionist, confrontational foreign policy38. The latter, 
including the ANI ( Associazione Nazionalista Italiana, Italian Nationalist 
Association), D'Annunzio and gradually Mussolini, demanded a more ambitious 
Rochat, G., "L' esercito e fascismo ", in Quazza, G. (ed.), Fascismo e società italiana (Turin 1973), 
pp. 89 -123 
35 Bosworth, R. J. B., Italy and the Approach of the First World War (London 1983), pp. 42ff 
36 Rochat, Massobrio, pp. 202ff; Rochat, G., "Mussolini e le forze armate ", in Aquarone, A., 
Vemassa, M. (eds.), II regime fascista (Bologna 1974), pp. 113 -7; Rochat, Esercito italiano da 
Vittorio Veneto a Mussolini , pp. 67 -119; 397 -408; Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World, pp. 69f 
37 Serra, E., La diplomazia in Italia (Milan 1984), pp. 28 -40 
38 Saladino, S., "Italy ", in Rogger, H., Weber, E. (eds.), The European Right. A Historical Profile 
(London 1965), pp. 209 -58 
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foreign policy along the lines of a great power rhetoric, and unleashed their 
frustration after 1918 at the handling of the peace negotiations and especially the loss 
of Fiume. For them, the moderate gains at Versailles revealed the ineffective, 
antiquated character of Italian diplomacy and underlined the need for modernisation, 
i.e. becoming more accessible to new social groups in Italian society. This call was 
mainly intended to strengthen the representation of the "new ", radical trend of 
nationalism at the expense of the aristocratic, elitist tradition of the diplomatic 
corps39. However, they also attacked the rinunciatori of the left: the first punitive 
expedition of the Fasci against socialists (January 1919) targeted Bissolati and his 
supporters for their alleged "betrayal" of national interests'. 
Thus, in the aftermath of the First World War, the impression that Italian 
diplomacy had been humiliated at Versailles resulted in its declining social prestige. 
This could only partly be rectified through the influx of new nationalist- minded 
candidates and through limited institutional reform. The new organisational pattern 
introduced by Count Carlo Sforza in 1920 effected internal changes in the structures 
of diplomacy but retained the separation of diplomacy from the state by 
strengthening the power of the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Ministry41. This 
position was regarded by traditional diplomats as an institutional safeguard, ensuring 
their distance from the state and special allegiance to the Crown. The dualism 
between state and monarchy was not altered in the institutional make -up of the 
Foreign Ministry, and the appointment of Mussolini was not interpreted as a 
challenge to this special status. 
The Duce's approach to government has been characterised as etatist, namely 
aiming to strengthen the legitimacy of the state and the role of its various 
institutions42. This was a pivotal expectation from the "minimum consensus" 
39 Orsini, p. 284; Serra, Diplomazia in Italia, pp. 39 -41 
40 Hamilton, pp. 11, 32 
41 Serra, "Burocrazia", pp. 81 -2 
42 Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, p. 37; Sarti, R., "Italian Fascism: radical politics and conservative 
goals ", in Blinkhorn, M. (ed.), Fascists and Conservatives. The radical right and the establishment 
in the twentieth century Europe (London 1990), pp. 14 -30; Organski, A. F. K., The Forms of 
Political Development (New York 1965), pp. 170 -7; Payne, pp. 101ff; Vincent, A., Modern 
Political Ideologies (Oxford 1992), p. 156; Pombeni, P., "La forma partito del fascismo e del 
nazismo ", in Bracher, K. D., Valiani, L. (eds.), Fascismo e nazionalsocialismo (Bologna 1986), pp. 
245 -6 
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programme but was also sponsored and systematised by the moderate nationalist 
wing of the PNF. Alfredo Rocco and Luigi Federzoni, who occupied key -positions 
(Ministers of Justice and Interior, respectively) in the fascist cabinets, promoted a 
model of "integral" state which promised increased power and prestige for the Capo 
ciel Governo by reducing the role of the Crown to a formal constitutional 
supervision43. Faced with the problematic dualism between monarchy and state, 
Mussolini endorsed the etatist project not because of any firm ideological belief in 
the centrality of the state but as a means to provide a point of positive integration for 
the whole Italian population and to consolidate his personal power -base against both 
the King and the traditional élites. This implication was missed or ignored by the 
diplomatic and military leaderships who welcomed this etatism as a way to foster 
their influence on the decision -making process while retaining their independence 
through their privileged relation with the monarchy. In this sense, agreement between 
the Fascist leadership and the traditional hierarchies upon the concept of a "strong 
state" ensured co- operation in the short-term, but stemmed from radically different 
perceptions of authoritarianism which were bound to clash in the longer term44 
Although Mussolini manifested his ambition to supervise foreign policy 
developments by keeping the portfolio for himself, an impression of continuity in the 
decision -making process was upheld after the March on Rome45. With the exception 
of Sforza and Frassati, the overwhelming majority of high -ranking diplomats 
remained in their positions, in anticipation of a quick return of Giolitti to the 
government46. Salvatore Contarini maintained his neuralgic post as Permanent 
Secretary to the Foreign Ministry, acting as an institutional check upon Mussolini's 
possible intrusions in the diplomatic jurisdiction. In the armed forces, the promotion 
43 Aquarone, Stato Totalitario, pp. 68 -110 (esp. 75ff); De Felice, R., Mussolini il fascista, vol. II: 
L'organizzazione dello Stato Fascista, 1925 -1929 (Turin 1968), pp. 166ff; Thompson, D., State 
control in Fascist Italy. Culture and conformity, 1925 -43 (Manchester & New York 1991), pp. 62- 
70; Morgan, P., Italian Fascism, 1919 -1945 (Basingstoke & London 1995), Ch. 3 
44 Griffin, R., The Nature of Fascism (London & New York 1994), pp. 74 -6; Lyttelton, Seizure of 
Power, pp. 121 ff 
45 Santoro, C. M., La politica estera di una inedia potenza. L 'Italia dall'Unità ad oggi (Bologna 
1991), pp. 157 -60; Knox, M., "Il fascismo e la politica estera italiana ", in Bosworth, R. J. B., 
Romano, S. (eds.), La politica estera italiana (1860 -1985) (Bologna 1991), pp. 287f; Rochat, G., Il 
Colonialismo italiano (Turin 1973), pp. 219 -24 
46 Di Nolfo, pp. 45 -6; DDI, 7th, I, 2 -4/14 (29 October - 1 November, reports about the resignations of 
Sforza, Frassati, and the decision of the other diplomats to stay in their positions) 
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of General Diaz and Admiral di Revel to the Ministries of War and Navy 
respectively served both as a vote of confidence for the new regime and as a 
guarantee of the exclusive jurisdiction of the military élites in their internal affairs47. 
For the first time such high- ranking officials were elevated to ministerial status, 
indicating their intention to keep Fascism at arm's length from both military policy 
and absolute power. In return for their support to the Fascist leadership throughout 
the 1920s, all liberal plans for structural reform in the armed forces were thwarted, 
leaving the military hierarchies in command of the administration of the Regio 
Esercito and the Regia Marina48. 
The first real test, however, was only a few months away from the March on 
Rome. In August 1923 Mussolini ordered the violent occupation of Corfu in 
retaliation to the murder of the Italian General Tellini, who presided over a League of 
Nations committee for the delimitation of the Greek -Albanian border49. The 
subsequent crisis was a tangible manifestation of the new activist style of foreign 
policy which Fascist participation in government had injected into the decision - 
making process'°. Mussolini succeeded in catching the diplomatic élite off -guard: 
many senior diplomats, including Contarini, were away from Rome at the day that 
the Duce ordered the occupation of Corfu'. Subsequently, Contarini, Salandra (as 
the Italian representative in Geneva) and Romano Avezzana (as ambassador in 
France) played a crucial role in diffusing the crisis, restraining Mussolini's excessive 
demands and saving Italy's prestige in international affairs52. Yet, the Fascist leader 
had manifested his determination to act independently from the advice of his political 
experts - even at the height of the crisis, he repeatedly rejected the moderating 
47 Rochat, G., "Il fascismo e la preparazione militare al conflitto mondiale ", in Del Boca, A., Legnani, 
M., Rossi, M. G. (eds.), II regime fascista. Storia e storiografia (Rome & Bari 1995), pp. 156 -7 
48 Rochat, Massobrio, pp. 196ff, 208ff; Rochat, Esercito italiano da Vittorio Veneto a Mussolini, pp. 
408ff; Whittam, J., "The Italian General Staff and the Coming of the Second World War ", in 
Preston, A. (ed.), General Staffs and Diplomacy Before the Second World War (Totowa, New Jersey 
1978), pp. 85ff 
49 For an account of the events surrounding the Corfu crisis see Barros, J., The Corfu Incident of 1923 
(Princeton 1966). See also the relevant documents in DBFP, 1st, XXIV, Ch. 4 
5° Bosworth, R. J. B., The Italian Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of 
Mussolini and Fascism (London 1998), pp. 93 -4 
51 Di Nolfo, pp. 90f; Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World, pp. 41 -2 
52 Cassels, pp. 91ff; Di Nolfo, pp. 79ff; Salandra, A., Memorie politiche, 1916 -1926 (Milan 1951), pp. 
101 -6 
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counsel of Romano Avezzana to accept a diplomatic compromise53. In contrast to the 
initial by- passing of the diplomatic élite in August 1923, the Navy leadership had 
been actively involved since July in the preparation of a plan for the occupation of 
Corfu in response to expected "provocative acts" by Greece54. The Minister of Navy, 
di Revel, endorsed the plan in order to underline the navy's crucial role for national 
security and for the country's great -power aspirations in the Mediterranean. He also 
seized the opportunity offered by the occupation of Corfu to claim priority for the 
Regia Marina in the allocation of resources and funds for rearmament". 
The "decade of good behaviour" (1925 -1935) 
The ensuing period until the Ethiopian war has misleadingly been described 
as the "decade of good behaviour "56. The term is justifiable only on the level of 
appearance as, after the Corfu incident, the Fascist regime did not officially commit 
any act of aggression in foreign policy, seemingly accepting its responsibility to 
contribute to European peace and stability. Although Mussolini manipulated 
institutional gaps to successfully establish his right to co- decide with the traditional 
diplomatic and military groups, the latter retained a primary responsibility for the 
handling of foreign affairs. The Palazzo Chigi averted the possibility of a 
choreographic celebration in Rhodes after the Treaty of Lausanne reaffirmed Italy's 
right to possess the Dodecanese Islands57. Furthermore, Italy's participation in the 
negotiations for the Locarno Treaty was effectively promoted by the Palazzo Chigi, 
53 Cassels, pp. 112 -23; DDI, 7th, II, 325/327. Cf. the anxiety of the diplomats in Rome in case 
Mussolini again changed his mind and rejected the compromise solution (DDI, 7th, II, 380) 
54 Di Nolfo, pp. 85 -6 
55 Bernardi, G., 11 disarmo navale fi-a le due guerre mondiali (1919 -1939) (Rome 1975), pp. 215f; 
Mack Smith, D., Mussolini's Roman Empire (London 1982), p. 5 
56 The so- called "decade of good behaviour" thesis is supported by Pastorelli, L., "La storiografia 
italiana del dopoguerra sulla politica estera ", Storia e Politica, 10 (1971), pp. 603ff; Halperin, S. 
W., Mussolini and Italian Fascism (Princeton 1964). For a discussion and criticism of this thesis see 
Cassels, pp. 394f. De Felice locates the change in Mussolinian foreign policy between 1929 and 
1930 [ "Alcune osservazioni sulla politica estera mussoliniana ", in ibid. (ed.), L' Italia fra Tedeschi e 
Alleati. La politica estera fascista e la seconda guerra mondiale (Bologna 1973), pp. 57 -74, here p. 
60]. See also Vigezzi, Politica estera e opinione pubblica, pp. 43 -5 
57 Guariglia, p. 27; Lowe, C. J., Marzari F., Italian Foreign Policy 1870 -1940 (London R. Boston 
1975), pp. 186 -91; Cassels, pp. 37 -45. See Guariglia's objections to Mussolini's idea in DDI, 7th, I, 
523 
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in spite of Mussolini's reservations58. Even the signing of the Kellogg -Briand pact 
was accepted by Mussolini, notwithstanding his subsequent mockery of the pact's 
main principle of renouncing violence in international relations59. The traditional 
strategy of Italian foreign policy appeared to have been restored after the Corfu crisis 
- cooperation with the western Powers, negotiations for colonial concessions in 
Africa, friendly relations with Yugoslavia, stability in Europe through multilateral 
arrangements. 
However, the term "good behaviour" grossly understates the gradual 
consolidation of Mussolini's personal role in foreign policy decision -making within a 
framework of co- decision with the diplomatic and military hierarchies. It has been 
established that the Duce's plans for an invasion of Turkey were not resisted by 
either the Palazzo Chigi or the Ministry of War. The first plan was studied by the 
army leadership at the beginning of 1924 with discouraging conclusions, but the 
Matteotti crisis re- focused the attention of the Fascist regime on domestic policy and 
the plan was droppedó0. The second plan was organised in 1926 but was subsequently 
abandoned when Turkey responded to rumours of invasion with partial 
mobilisations6t. At the same time, Mussolini received the political backing of the 
Palazzo Chigi for a more energetic policy in the Balkans. The signing of pacts with 
Rumania, Turkey, Greece and the revisionist Hungary in the second half of the 1920s 
underlined a priority shared by both Mussolini and the traditional diplomats for 
Italian infiltration in the Balkan- Adriatic region, both in political and economic 
terms62. 
58 Di Nolfo, pp. 99 -138; DDI, 7th, IV, 126/129. Note Mussolini's dissatisfaction with the Locarno 
Pacts in Cassels, pp. 279f 
59 00, XXII, 385 ( "Discorse dell'Ascensione ", Chamber of Deputies, 26 May 1927); Bosworth, Italy 
and the Wider World, p. 45 
60 Cassels, pp. 226 -30 
6' DDI, 7th, III, 604; 4, 298. For the importance of the Matteoti crisis for the Italian Fascist regime see 
Lyttelton, A., "Fascism in Italy: The Second Wave ", in Mosse, G. L (ed.), International Fascism 
(London 1979), pp. 50ff; ibid., Seizure. pp. 237 -268; Gallo, M., Mussolini's Italy. Twenty Years of 
the Fascist Era (London 1973), pp. 181 -92; Rossini, G. (ed.), Il delitto Matteotti tra il Viminale e 
1 'Aventino. Dagli atti del processo De Bono davanti all Alta Cate di Giustizia (Bologna 1966). 
62 Knox, pp. 301ff; DDI, 7th, V, 123/333; Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, pp. 18 -9; 
Jankovic, B. M., The Balkans in International Relations (Basingstoke & London 1988), pp. 157ff; 
Albrecht -Carrié, R., Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini (New York 1950), pp. 196ff 
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The handling of the Italian policy towards Yugoslavia and Albania revealed 
the declining grip of the diplomatic hierarchy over Mussolini. The traditional attitude 
of rapprochement with Belgrade, initiated by Sforza and endorsed by Contarini, 
clashed with the Duce's intention to isolate Yugoslavia (which he perceived as the 
most dangerous obstacle to his plans for penetration in the Balkans63) through the 
conclusion of pacts with the other Balkan states. Until 1926, Contarini managed to 
blend the two opposing principles. He promoted a friendly policy towards 
Yugoslavia during 1924 but also supported Mussolini's plans for the pénétration 
pacifique of Albania, culminating in the Treaty of 19256. For him, however, Albania 
was a secondary asset and not an antidote to Yugoslavia, and he hastened to remove 
the military implications of the Italo- Albanian alliance from the text of the treaty65 
This was his last major success in restraining Mussolini - Contarini resigned in 
March 1926, allowing Mussolini a significantly larger share of political freedom and 
enabling him to rehearse a more aggressive anti -Yugoslav policy after 1926, even to 
the point of contemplating a military campaign in 192766. 
The departure of Contarini had both personal and institutional implications 
for foreign policy decision -making. His resignation terminated an anomalous 
situation, in which Contarini - representing traditional diplomatic interests- was 
bracketed by Mussolini - Foreign Minister - and Dino Grandi - one of the 
quadrumvires and Under -Secretary since 192567. Contarini's successor, Bordonaro, 
lacked the political will of his predecessor, thus allowing Grandi larger institutional 
space for action. With the departure of Bordonaro for London, the position of 
Secretary General remained deliberately vacant, a development which eliminated a 
symbolic "diaphragm" of the Foreign Ministry's independence from state 
63 See, for example, his comments in Scritti, II, 55 -7 ( "Alle Alpi Giulie ", Popolo d'Italia, 22 February 
1920); II, 121 -2 ( "Fiume ", in Popolo d'Italia, 2 December 1920). See also, Mack Smith, 
Mussolini's Roman Empire, pp. 4 -5, 18 -21, for an analysis 
6a Di Nolfo, Ch. 4; Knox, p. 301 
65 Lessona, A., Memorie (Florence 1958), pp. 108ff 
66 Cassels, pp. 315 -52; Lowe, Marzari, pp. 208 -9, 216 -7, 227; Knox, "Fascismo e la politica estera 
italiana ", pp. 302 -5 
67 Cassels, pp. 283 -7; Lowe, Marzari, pp. 209 -10; De Felice, Mussolini il fascista, vol. I: La conquista 
del potere, 1932 -1925 (Turin 1966), pp. 559 -63; Santarelli, E., Storia del movimento e del regime 
fascista, vol. I (Rome 1967), pp. 447 -8 
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intervention and was greatly resented by traditional diplomats68. At the same time, 
the pace of administrative reform accelerated. The appointment of Grandi as Under - 
Secretary in 1925 constituted an attempt to expand Fascism both in mentality and the 
personnel within the Pallazo Chigi69. Since 1927, membership of the PNF became a 
prerequisite for retaining or acquiring influential diplomatic posts70. This was a direct 
assault on the bureaucratic, non -partisan character of Italian diplomacy but was 
unsuccessfully resisted by the diplomats. Meanwhile, the departure of older officials 
served the regime's plan to further erode the elitist, conservative composition of the 
diplomatic corps. The law of 1927 prompted the influx of new personnel in the 
Foreign Ministry a year later, the majority of whom either came directly from Fascist 
organisations or were more sympathetic to the philosophy of the regime. The so- 
called ventottisti formed the first generation of new officials in the process of 
constructing a "Fascist" ruling class71. 
The promotion of Grandi to the position of Foreign Minister in 1929 
accentuated the impression of "fascistisation" in the Palazzo Chigi and increased 
fears that the influence of the traditional diplomatic élites would be curtailed. This 
was not the case, however, in the short term. The intrusion of the ventottisti was 
mainly confined to the lower echelons of bureaucracy, while key -positions - such as 
the General Directors and major Ambassadors- remained firmly in the hands of 
experienced diplomats like Guariglia, Lojacono and di Rosso. The ability of the 
traditional diplomatic élite to adapt to the changing administrative structures without 
compromising their political priorities resulted in the gradual absorption of this new 
generation of officials to the spirit of responsible diplomacy. Membership of the PNF 
remained a formal concession to the party's totalitarian pretensions, devoid of any 
political consequence. As for Grandi himself, in many ways he was an unlikely 
candidate for the "fascistisation" of Italian diplomacy and foreign policy. A 
68 Orsini, pp. 290 -2 
69 Guariglia, pp. 53 -4; DDI, 7th, V, 255 
70 Aquarone, Stato Totalitario, pp. 70ff; Melis, G., "La burocrazia ", in Del Boca, A., Legnani, M., 
Rossi, M. G. (eds.), Il regime fascista. Storia e storiografia (Rome & Bari 1995), pp. 244 -76 
71 Aquarone, A., L' organizzazione dello Stato Totalitario (Turin 1965), pp. 101ff; Hughes, S., "The 
Early Diplomacy of Italian Fascism: 1922 -1932 ", in Craig, G., Gilbert, F. A. (eds.), The Diplomats 
/9/9 -1939 (Princeton, NJ 1953), pp. 210 -33; Gilbert, F., "Ciano and his Ambassadors" in Craig, G., 
Gilbert, F. (eds.), The Diplomats (Princeton, New Jersey 1953), pp. 516 -7; Orsini, pp. 292f 
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representative of the moderate, etatist wing of the PNF and an opponent of the notion 
of an omnipotent hyper -party, he remained sensitive to Mussolini's demands for 
great -power diplomacy and was by no means averse to an activist foreign policy 
which would include the option of going to war72. Yet he also showed an increasing 
reliance upon the professional expertise of the traditional diplomats, as well as a 
sense of realism which eventually clashed with Mussolini's more adventurous 
foreign policy initiatives73. His policy of peso determinante (determinant weight) 
aimed to coalesce the Duce's vision of Italy as the arbiter of the European system 
with the diplomats' cautious style and focus on stability74. After 1930, Grandi 
became increasingly alarmed at the rise of the NSDAP in Germany and sought a 
reorientation of Italian foreign policy, promoting an understanding with France, in 
accordance with the priorities of the conservative diplomats75. He also displayed a 
determination to make Italy play an active role in the League of Nations, especially 
regarding the issue of disarmament, which caused repeated frictions between the 
Minister and the Capo del Governo76. Grandi's constructive approach to the Hoover 
plan for a proportional reduction of armaments was strongly criticised by Mussolini 
and contributed to his dismissal in July 193277. According to the Duce, Grandi had 
"gone to bed" with the western democracies, making Italy a prisoner of the League of 
Nations7x. 
72 On Grandi's ideas on foreign policy see Nello, P., Un fedele disubbidiente. Dino Grandi dal 
palazzo Chigi al 25 luglio (Bologna 1993) 
73 See, for example, Guariglia, 63f, 81f; Orsini, 306 -7; Gilbert, pp. 513 -4 
74 See Grandi's own analysis of his vision in Nello (ed.), Dino Grandi, pp. 300ff (speech to the Grand 
Council, 2 October 1930). For an assessment see De Felice, R., "Alcune osservazioni sulla politica 
estera mussoliniana ", in ibid. (ed.), L' Italia fra Tedeschi e Alleati. La politica estera fascista e la 
seconda guerra mondiale (Bologna 1973), pp. 57 -74; Mussolini il duce, I, pp. 367ff 
75 See the analysis in Knox, M., "The fascist regime, its foreign policy and its wars ", in Finney, P., 
(ed.), The Origins of the First World War (London & New York), pp. 160 -1; De Felice, Mussolini il 
duce, I, pp. 411 -3; Santarelli, E., Storia del movimento e del regime fascista, II, pp. 84 -6 
76 See, for example, his speech to the Chamber of Deputies, in Nello, P. (ed.), Dino Grandi: la 
politica estera dell'Italia dal 1929 al 1932 (Rome 1985), pp. 451 -71 (14 March 1931). See also 
Guariglia, pp. 176 -8; Orsini, pp. 310 -1; Knox, pp. 312ff; Moscati, R., Torre, A. et al. (eds.), La 
politica estera italiana (Turin 1963), pp. 112ff 
77 For Grandi's attitude to the Hoover plan see Nello (ed.), Dino Grandi, pp. 513 -9 (speech at the 
London Conference, 20 July 1931). For Mussolini's reactions and Grandi's dismissal see Aloisi, P. 
Journal 25 Juin -I4 Juillet 1936 (Paris 1957), pp. 5ff; Di Nolfo, p. 304; Guariglia, pp. 176ff 
78 Cantalupo, R., Fu la Spagna. Ambasciata presso Franco, febbraio- aprile 1937 (Milan 1948), pp. 
42ff 
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By the time of Grandi's departure for the Embassy in London the Foreign 
Ministry had successfully digested the wave of the ventottisti and retained its 
influence on the shaping of foreign policy. However, a more subtle and potentially 
erosive procedure had already been set in motion - Mussolini's personal, parallel 
diplomacy. This practice was a projection of the Duce's authoritarianism and 
preference for personal rule in the field of foreign affairs. In 1925 Contarini painfully 
realised his superior's liking for secret diplomacy when he was informed of the 
activities of a personal emissary of Mussolini, Lessona, in the conclusion of the Italo- 
Albanian pact of 1925, unbeknownst even to the most senior officials of the Palazzo 
Chigi79. Secret meetings between Mussolini's emissaries and German radical 
nationalists were mainly handled by the Duce himself, by- passing both his diplomats 
in Rome and the Italian Embassy in Berlin, with the Ambassador De Bosdari, who 
resigned in protest in 1926, repeatedly complaining about his marginalisation80. 
Plans for an Italian -German cooperation in a war against France were constantly on 
top of Mussolini's secret agenda81. At the same time that Grandi followed a 
rapprochement with the Quai D ' Orsay where Ethiopia was for the first time 
mentioned as possible compensation for Italian friendship by Laval, Mussolini not 
only rejected his minister's efforts in this direction but also continued to contradict 
Grandi's official policy towards Yugoslavia and the disarmament negotiations82. The 
secret backing of Macedonian and Croat terrorist- separatist organisations in 
Yugoslavia contradicted the efforts for a détente with BelgradeS3. Grandi himself was 
definitely aware of such dealings, but he was increasingly kept uninformed about the 
revisionist initiatives of his leader in Yugoslavia, Hungary and Germany84. In a 
79 Lessona, A., Memorie, (Florence 1958), pp. 108ff ; Di Nolfo, pp. 183 -5 
80 Schieder, W., "Fascismo e nazionalsocialismo nei primi anni Trenta" in Del Boca, A., Legnani, M., 
Rossi, M. G. (eds.), II regime fascista. Storia e storiografia (Rome & Bari 1995), pp. 45 -56; 
Schubert, G., Anfange Nationalsozialistischer Aussenpolitik (Cologne 1961), pp. 150 -67; Cassels, 
pp. 165ff (and DDI, 7th, III, 85, for De Bosdari's complaints). 
8' Cassels, pp. 153 -9 
8' For Grandi's talks with Laval in 1931 see De Felice, Mussolini il duce, I, pp. 392 -402; Lowe, 
Marzari, Ch. 10; Di Nolfo, Chs, 5, 7. See also Mussolini's defiant comments 
83 For the secret negotiations between the fascist regime and the Ustasi, see Sadkovich, J. J., Italian 
Support for Croat Separatism, 1927 -1937 (New York 1987); Robertson, E. M., Mussolini as 
Empire -Builder (London 1977), pp. 23 -7, 35; Aloisi, pp. 42, 49; DDI, 7th, VI, 131/ 514/ 518 -9; 
Knox, pp. 307 -8 
84 Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, 22f 
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similar vein, while Grandi was discussing with Briand the prospects of a 
disarmament pact, Mussolini commented sarcastically that "words are nice things, 
but guns, ...ships, aircrafts and cannons are even nicer "85. In this sense, 
paradoxically, the dismissal of Grandi was a blow to the traditional diplomats' 
control over foreign policy. At the same time, the formal abolition of the position of 
Secretary General in 1932 was only a symbolic reflection of the loss of the Foreign 
Ministry's institutional independence and the beginning of its relegation, first, to a 
consultative and, finally, to a purely functional status86. 
In the armed forces, the progress of "fascistisation" was equally unimpressive 
until 1935, but the cooperation with Mussolini proved less problematic87. The army's 
support for the regime during the Matteoti crisis88 was of crucial importance and 
ensured the continuation of the military élites' primary jurisdiction in their internal 
affairs. In 1925 such a traditional figure as Pietro Badoglio was appointed Chief of 
General Staff and proved instrumental in providing support for the regime's plans 
against Turkey in 1926 and against Yugoslavia throughout the late 1920s and early 
1930sß9. The Regio Esercito's operational plan (defensive against France, offensive 
in the Balkans) endorsed Mussolini's anti -French and anti -Yugoslav orientation. 
Indoctrination and internal organisations were mainly left to the military élites with 
only some superficial attempts at "fascistisation "90. Mussolini's only notable 
initiative concerned his eventual rejection in 1927 of an initial plan for the creation of 
a powerful General Staff under Badoglio91. This decision thwarted any attempt to 
centralise military control, co- ordinate resources and promote a more powerful role 
of the military leadership in the shaping of foreign policy92. The implications of this 
rejection were not felt immediately, but this decision would weaken the armed 
85 00, XXIV, 235ff (speech in Florence, 17 August 1930); Di Nolfo, 282ff 
8" Orsini, pp. 311 -2; Serra, "La burocrazia ", pp. 82 -3 
87 Rochat, Massobrio, pp. 208f; Rochat, "Preparazione militare al conflitto mondiale ", pp. 158 -9 
88 Whittam, J., "The Italian General Staff and the Coming of the Second World War ", pp. 86 -7; 
Lyttelton, "Second Wave ", pp. 52ff; 
89 Knox, pp. 302 -3 
9° Rochat, Massobrio, pp. 219 -20; "Mussolini e le forze armate ", in Aquarone, A., Vernassa, A. (eds.), 
Il regime fascista (Bologna 1974), pp. 113 -26; Thompson, pp. 87 -9 
91 Rochat, Massobrio, pp. 211 -2; "Preparazione militare al conflitto mondiale ", pp. 158f 
92 See, in this study, Ch.6, Section VIa 
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forces' influence upon, and resistance to, future aggressive decisions of the regime93. 
If in 1932 Badoglio could successfully counter the plan for an invasion of Ethiopia 
by invoking logistical problems, a similar attitude would soon prove to be ineffective 
to arrest Mussolini's growing expansionist ambitions. 
The Ethiopian campaign (1935 -36) 
The background to the decision to attack Ethiopia serves as an all -round case - 
study for the realisation of the gradual changes in foreign policy decision -making. 
After Grandi's departure, the pattern Mussolini (Foreign Minister) - Suvich (Under - 
Secretary) accentuated tendencies that were introduced after 192994. Suvich, a fervent 
exponent of an anti -German line in foreign policy, repeatedly echoed similar 
complaints to those of Grandi before 1932 - monopoly of important decisions by the 
Duce, lack of information about diplomatic initiatives, less and less consultation in 
the shaping of foreign policy95 . The resistance of the traditional diplomats to 
Mussolini's growing inclination towards an alliance with Germany was epitomised in 
Suvich's numerous memoranda in the first months of 1936. The Under -Secretary 
described sacrificing the independence of Austria as a "colossal error" of judgement 
and did not fail to point out to his Capo that Italian foreign policy suffered from lack 
of direction, upholding Locarno on the one hand, and encouraging Germany's 
revisionism on the other96. Yet, the traditional diplomats' disagreements were 
neutralised by the Duce's dependence on parallel diplomacy. This was a tendency 
that was reciprocated by Hitler's eagerness to by -pass the equally unenthusiastic 
leadership of the Wilhelmstrasse in his dealings with the Italian regime for a "fascist" 
alliance. Goering became the link of the Nazi leadership with the PNF through direct 
93 Knox, M., Mussolini Unleashed, 1939 -1941. Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War 
(Cambridge, 1982), Ch. 1; Rochat, "Mussolini e le forze armate ", pp. 120 -2 
94 Orsini, pp. 316ff 
95 Suvich, F., Memorie 1932 -1936 (Milan 1984), pp. 4ff 
96 See DDI, 8th, III, 194 (memorandum 7.2.1936)/ /533 (memorandum 26.3.1936) respectively 
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contact with Balbo and the Head of the party's Foreign Affairs Office Renzetti97. 
After 1936, with the consolidation of the Axis alliance, he was assigned by Hitler 
special responsibility for the handling of the German- Italian affairs98. At the same 
time, the natural retirement of the old guard of Italian diplomacy in the early 1930s 
facilitated a deep personnel change in the Foreign Ministry. A second massive influx 
of new officials, coupled with radical changes in most embassies and directories of 
the Ministry in 1932, irreversibly eroded the continuity of Italian diplomacy99. The 
Palazzo Chigi again digested this second major reorganisation and salvaged its 
traditional spirit of a semi -autonomous bureaucracy. Yet, the absence of strong 
personalities, willing to retain their professional independence from the regime's 
demands, and Mussolini's growing tendency to conduct a personal diplomacy, 
pushed the Italian Foreign Ministry a further step down in terms of political 
influence. 
The unilateral introduction of conscription in Germany offered some 
ephemeral breathing space to traditional diplomats. Mussolini was forced to 
contemplate an agreement with France and to contribute to the creation of the Stresa 
Front against Germany's aggression in the spring of 1935100 Even regarding the 
thoughts for a campaign against Ethiopia, the impression of British and French 
support or disinteressement for a war in Africa was a source of some consolation101. 
The Ethiopian plan presented for the diplomats a much lesser evil to Mussolini's 
tendency to meddle with European stability - it entailed the abandonment of the 
Croat plan102, opened the way for a cooperation with France against Germany, and 
97 Segrè, C. G., Italo Balbo. A Fascist Life (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1987), pp. 353 -9; Robertson, 
Mussolini as Empire -Builder, pp. 56f; Overy, R. J., Goering. The 'Iron Man' (London 1984), pp. 
32 -3 
98 Weinberg, G. L., Hitler's Foreign Policy, Vol. II: Starting World War II (Chicago & London 1980), 
pp. 268ff 
99 Orsini, pp. 313f; Serra, "Burocrazia ", pp. 83 -4 
loo Quartararo, R., Roma tra Londra e Berlino. La politica estera fascista dal 1930 al 1940 (Rome 
1980), pp. 117ff; Gilbert, pp. 527f; Lowe, Marzari, pp. 259ff. See also, in this study, Ch. 4, Section 
IVa 
101 DDI, 7th, X, 423; De Felice, R., "Alcune osservazioni sulla politica estera mussoliniana ", in ibid. 
(ed.), L' Italia fra Tedeschi e Alleati. La politica estera fascista e la seconda guerra mondiale 
(Bologna 1973), pp. 67f; Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World, pp. 47ff 
102Knox, "Fascismo e la politica estera italiana ", pp. 317ff; Pelagalli, S., "Il generale Pietro Gàzzera al 
ministero della guerra (1928- 1933) ", Storia Contemporanea, 20 (1989), pp. 1040 -50 
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deflected Mussolini's activism to the politica periferica103. The Duce could also 
count on some support from the armed forces and even from the Crown for a limited 
operation against Ethiopia, which was widely regarded as a legitimate target of 
Italian expansionism, especially after the trauma of Adowa in 1896104 
Yet, this initial atmosphere of consensus was quickly shattered. In the 
summer of 1935, opposition by the western powers became evident, highlighting the 
potentially destabilising effect of the plan for the European system and the Stresa 
front in particular105. Eventually, the Palazzo Chigi bowed to the inevitable, but at 
least played a role in delaying the action and in averting a total rift with Britain and 
France. The complexity and delicacy of the ensuing situation did convince Mussolini 
to consult his diplomatic experts, especially in legitimising the aggressive action in 
the League of Nations and in minimising the extent of sanctions106 However, the 
initiative now rested with the Duce. Even at the height of the Ethiopian crisis, when 
Mussolini announced his decision to accept a "satellite" status for Austria in January 
1936, the exhortations of Suvich to reconsider this volte-face proved fruitless107 
From now on, the Foreign Ministry would have to fight hard to retain some 
consultative authority in the face of Mussolini's personal foreign policy. 
For the armed forces, the period of preparation for the Ethiopian campaign 
was a crude awakening to the regime's tightening grip on military issues. Mussolini's 
decision to hand responsibility for the campaign to the more "Fascist" Ministry of 
Colonies headed by De Bono108, forced Badoglio and the military leadership to 
hasten their contribution to the planning process109. However, the overruling of the 
initial decision for a limited campaign in favour of a full -scale war involving more 
than 300,000 men raised voices of protest in the armed forces about the logistical 
103 Robertson, Empire -Builder, pp. 93 -113; De Felice, R., Gli anni del consenso, pp. 399f 
104 Mack Smith, Monarchy, p. 271; Rochat, Massobrio, pp. 247f 
105 Guariglia, pp. 220ff; De Felice, Il Duce, pp. 526ff; "Alcune osservazioni ", pp. 67f; Thompson, G. 
H., Front -Line Diplomat (London 1959), pp. 96ff 
106 Suvich, Memorie, 275ff. For the diplomatic background to the decision to impose sanctions on 
Italy see Lowe, Marzari, pp. 283 -90 
107 Orsini, pp. 317ff 
108 Rochat, G., Militari e politici nella preparazione niella campagna d 'Etiopia (Milan 1971), pp. 
110ff; Rochat, Massobrio, pp. 247f 
109 Rochat, Massobrio, 247f 
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impossibility of such action. Repeated memoranda by Badoglio, asking for more 
time and resources1O underlined the growing gap between Mussolini's expansionist 
aspirations and the more limited objectives of the military leadership '''. A further 
blow was the appointment of De Bono - and not Badoglio - in command of the 
operation which started in October 1935112. De Bono's subsequent failure to deliver a 
swift military breakthrough in Ethiopia was a god -sent gift for the military 
leadership, paving the way to his substitution by Badoglio and the successful 
occupation of Addis Abeba in May 193613. Yet, the prestige for the victory was not 
reaped by the armed forces. Instead, the Impero was presented by the regime as a 
"Fascist" achievement. Mussolini carefully orchestrated a celebration for Badoglio's 
return to Rome which deliberately fell short of a "national hero's" reception. 
Everybody stepped in to claim a share of the glory - the Crown participated actively 
both in the build -up to victory and to the celebrations for the declaration of the 
Impero, and even the Catholic Church sanctioned the campaign as a mission 
civil isatrice11 4. Yet, it was the cult of the Duce that received the lion's share of the 
popularity boost, even for the attainment of such a traditional goal of Italian foreign 
policy'' . It was a meaningful reminder of Mussolini's power that the King had to 
share the title of the First Marshal of the Empire with the Duce, in spite of Victor 
Emmanuel's token role as head of the armed forces' 16. 
'lo Rochat, Militari, 324ff; Robertson, Empire- Builder, pp. 98ff; Rochat, G., 11 Colonialismo italiano 
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Towards war. 1936 -39 
The ensuing three years (1936 -39) reaffirmed the signs of a proceeding 
mussolinismo in the Italian Fascist system. The appointment of Count Galleazzo 
Ciano as Foreign Minister again had both an institutional and a personal 
significance 17. Since Ciano had pioneered a strongly pro - German approach to 
foreign policy and had criticised Suvich for not exploiting the German card during 
the Ethiopian campaign118, his promotion reflected Mussolini's victory over the 
policy of equidistance, sponsored by the traditional diplomats in the Palazzo Chigi. 
The dismissal of Suvich was accompanied by a third wave of new personnel in the 
Foreign Ministry. This time, an already weakened conservative diplomatic élite was 
outnumbered and capitulated to the new influx119. At the same time, Ciano's pro - 
German attitude clashed with the traditional lines of diplomacy, thus enhancing the 
gap between the leadership and the experienced officials of the Foreign Ministry. 
Administrative reforms after 1936 emphasised the shift of political weight from the 
traditional diplomatic hierarchies to the Gabinetto of the Ministry 120, a change which 
reflected the growing political character of foreign policy -making and the 
marginalisation of professional expertise. 
However, Ciano himself had more far- reaching plans for the Foreign 
Ministry. Although largely unpopular amongst party leading figures and despised by 
the older generation of Fascist gerarchi, he was the most prominent figure of a new 
generation of Fascists that epitomised the growing self -confidence of the regime. 
More importantly, Ciano, who had risen to political prominence as Minister of 
Popular Culture, was very sensitive to the propagandistic dimensions and functions 
storiografia (Rome & Bari 1995), pp. 132f. For a more detailed discussion of the Ethiopian 
campaign from a diplomatic point of view see, in this study, Ch. 4, IVa 
117 Guerri, G. B., Galeazzo Ciano. Una vita, 1903/1944 (Milan 1979), pp. 160ff; Morgan, pp. 148ff; 
Santarelli, E., II, pp. 226 -8 
18 For Ciano's comments see Bottai, Diario, 7.1/9.3.1936; Guariglia, pp. 328 -9. For Ciano's general 
attitude towards the diplomats see Orsini, 319 -28 
119 Serra, Diplomazia, pp. 43 -4 
120 Serra, "Burocrazia ", pp. 83 -6; Donosti, M., Mussolini e l'Europa (Rome 1945), pp. 12ff; Gilbert, 
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of foreign policy. In this sense, his approach to the handling of foreign affairs was 
fundamentally more populist than the cautious, professional techniques of traditional 
diplomacy121. His appointment to the Palazzo Chigi signified Mussolini's 
determination to accelerate the process of "fascistisation ", after the less satisfactory 
experiments with Grandi and Suvich, and to inject an air of unconventionality in 
policy -making that was alien to the perceptions of the conservative diplomatic élites. 
As Foreign Minister, Ciano entertained a close personal relation with the Duce, a 
relation that enabled him to play a more active role in the shaping of Fascist foreign 
policy and to be kept informed of Mussolini's plans and oscillations. This type of 
close communication had hampered the two previous patterns in the Palazzo Chigi 
since 1929 and provided the basis for a more effective integration of the Foreign 
Ministry into the "Fascist" state'22. 
At the same time, Ciano was widely regarded - and definitely regarded 
himself - as a strong candidate to succeed Mussolini, in spite of reactions from senior 
Fascists (most notably De Bono, Farinacci and De Vecchi) at the Grand Council 
meeting of 21 March 1939, when a list of possible candidates was discussed'23. His 
privileged relation with the Duce and the latter's unconditional support enhanced his 
political legitimacy and enabled him to create a personal authoritarian rule in the 
Ministry. In many ways, the Palazzo Chigi under Ciano was a miniature of the 
authoritarian character of the regime itself. The Foreign Minister could claim the 
exclusive right of interpreting Mussolini's intentions, consulting his favourite 
diplomats whenever he deemed it necessary and marginalising those officials who 
were less compliant at his own discretion. In this sense, the gap between Minister and 
diplomats was systematically widened, removing the latters' political role as group 
and reducing them to a purely functional status. Mussolini's tendency to conduct an 
independent foreign policy found a perfect institutional medium in Ciano's personal 
diplomacy until the summer of 1939, where for the first time the identity between the 
121 Vigezzi, B., "Mussolini, Ciano, la diplomazia italiana e la percezione della `politica dei potenza' 
al' inizio della seconda guerra mondiale ", in di Nolfo, E., Rainero, R. H., Vigezzi, B. (eds.), L' 
Italia e la politica di potenza in Europa (1938 -1940) (Milan, 1986), pp. 3 -18; Gilbert, pp. 515 -7 
122 Guerri, Galeazzo Ciano, Ch. 6. Cf. Ciano's nostalgic comments about his relationship with the 
Duce in Ciano 's Diaries, 8.2.1943 
123 Orsini, pp. 324 -5. For the Grand Council meeting see Segrè, Balbo, pp. 367 -8 
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two men was shattered with regard to the policy towards Germany. By that time, 
however, Ciano's identification with the Capo del Governo had deprived him of his 
political influence over the Duce. His strong opposition to Mussolini's pro -German 
policy failed to form an alternative concept of foreign policy which could seriously 
challenge the Duce's omnipotence in the handling of foreign affairs124. 
As for the armed forces, the presence of Badoglio as Chief of the General 
Staff until December 1940 kept up appearances of continuity in the military 
leadership. However, Mussolini's increasing capacity to control new appointments 
throughout the 1930s had, by 1936, promoted a new generation of officials (Pariani, 
Roatta, Valle, Graziani) in the three arms125. This group of officials appeared more 
accommodating to the regime's demands and less willing to resist the propagandistic 
use of the armed forces by Mussolini. While the old Badoglian group maintained the 
traditional line of avoiding a conflict with Britain, the new Chief of the Army Staff 
Pariani drafted an operational plan in December 1937, based on the assumption of a 
German- Italian alliance against the western powers126. Success in Ethiopia nurtured a 
misplaced optimism about the armed forces' capabilities that even the setbacks in 
Spain could not overshadow. While Badoglio and, later in 1940 -1, Graziani voiced 
their concerns about the over -ambitious plans for military action, Mussolini was in a 
position to overrule the military experts and use the armed forces as a functional 
device of his foreign policy. 
The Spanish Civil War exposed all the above developments. Unlike Ethiopia, 
Spain did not fare in any plan or traditional ambition of Italian foreign policy, except 
as a possible option in Mussolini's vision of Mediterranean domination127. On 
logistical grounds, the military leadership opposed participation, pressing instead for 
some time of peace to recover from the Ethiopian campaign and to improve the 
fighting capability of the armed forces128. Ciano, however, ignored the cautious 
124 Gilbert, pp. 531 -5; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 46 -7. See also, in this study, Ch. 6, Sections II 
and III 
125 Rochat, Massobrio, 220ff 
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counsel of traditional diplomats and sponsored the idea of active military 
involvement with an enthusiasm that boosted Mussolini's Mediterranean 
ambitions129. Once decision for limited participation had been made, everybody 
stepped in to prove themselves worthy of their leader's trust. The issue was discussed 
summarily in the Grand Council and elicited unanimous approval. General Roatta, 
head of the SIM ( Servizio Informazioni Militare, intelligence service) played an 
important role in stepping up the pace of Italian intervention after December 1936 
and organised the operations in Guadalajara and the air -raids on Spanish cities13o As 
for Ciano, he showed a determination to make the Spanish Civil War a success not 
only for Italy's military intervention but also for a "fascist" co- ordination. In his visit 
to Germany in October 1936, he pressed for closer cooperation between Italy and 
Germany, both in military and diplomatic terms131. The joint premature recognition 
of the Burgos government by the two regimes defied both military problems (defeat 
at Guadalajara, slow progress of Nationalist forces) and diplomatic advice, indicating 
the triumph of the Mussolini -Ciano line of activist foreign policy132. 
The final stage in the relegation of military and diplomatic groups to a 
functional role with no serious political influence came with the consolidation of the 
Axis alliance. This marked a clear departure from traditional concepts of cooperation 
with the Britain- France or "equidistance" between western powers and Germany, and 
its warlike implications alarmed the military leadership and many traditional 
diplomats133. Yet, this opposition did not lead to a last -ditch attempt to reverse this 
far -reaching reorientation of Italian foreign policy. Collective decision -making had 
been substituted by the intuitive personal diplomacy of Mussolini and Ciano, who 
alone negotiated the military alliance with Germany, who alone closed the doors to 
British overtures in January 1939, who alone concluded the Pact of Steel in May 
129 Cantalupo, pp. 65ff; Guerri, Galeazzo Ciano, pp. 225 -74; Rochat, Massobrio, pp. 256 -9; Santarelli, 
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cited as Ciano's Diaries) 
130 Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, pp. 101 -2; Rochat, Massobrio, pp. 256 -7 
131 Weinberg, G. L., The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany. Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933- 
1936 (Chicago 1970), p. 294f; Ciano, Diplomatic Papers, 52ff; Gilbert, pp. 520 -2 
Guerri, Galeazzo Ciano, pp. 234 -8 
133 Guerri, Galeazzo Ciano, Ch. 8; Santarelli, E., II, pp. 248 -65; 
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1939, while deliberately keeping ambassadors and diplomats uninformed134 The 
King found out about this pact after it had been signed135, but the fact that, although 
he did not formally ratify it, this was no prerequisite for the pact's validity shows the 
Crown's weak margins of resistance and its waning institutional power of 
intervention. The Cavallero Memorandum, which Mussolini submitted to Hitler only 
days after the signing of the Pact of Steel, offered some assurances to the military 
leadership that the conflict might not be imminent. In it, the Duce insisted on the 
need for careful preparation for a future war after a respite of at least three years. Yet, 
even these additional caveats did not suffice to alleviate the unpopularity of the 
alliance amongst high -ranking military officials136. No effort was made by the 
leadership of the Regio Esercito to promote joint military or political talks in the 
context of the Axis137. Even when Ciano reverted to an anti -German line after his 
meeting with von Ribbentrop and Hitler in August 1939, no concerted action could 
be taken by diplomatic and military élites to ensure a permanent neutrality. In spite 
of private objections to the Axis alliance by prominent Fascist figures, such as Bottai 
and Grandi138, there was no expressed opposition in the Grand Council or in the 
Council of Ministers meetings at the end of May139. Only Ciano spoke directly to a 
wavering Mussolini on a number of occasions during the autumn and winter of 1939, 
but even his special relation to the Duce did not suffice to avert Italy's entry into the 
war in the long run10. 
134 Toscano, M., Le origini diplomatiche del patto d'acciaio (Florence 1956), pp. 308ff; Mack Smith, 
Mussolini's Roman Empire, pp. 163 -5; Quartararo, Roma tra Londra e Berlino, pp. 460ff; Santoro, 
Politica estera di una media potenza, pp. 170 -1 
135 Mack Smith, Monarchy, pp. 279 -80 
136 For the Cavallero Memorandum see DDI, 8th, XXII, pp. 49 -51 (text); Quartararo, pp. 468ff; 
Candeloro, G., Storia dell'Italia moderna, vol. 9: Il fascismo e le sue guerre (Milan 1998, 8th ed.), 
pp. 482 -3. For the unpopularity of the Axis see Mussolini's own admission in Bottai, Diario, 8 
October 1938; and the analysis in Colarizi, S., "L' opinione pubblica italiana di fronte all' intervento 
in guerra ", in Di Nolfo, A., Rainero, R. H., Vigezzi, B. (eds.), L' Italia e la politica di potenza in 
Europa (1938 -1940) (Milan 1986), pp. 296ff; Gilbert, pp. 533 -4 
137 Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, p. 168 
138 See Mack Smith, Mussolini 's Roman Empire, pp. 129 -30. See also Grandi's comments quoted in 
Quartararo, pp. 468, 489. For prominent Fascists' attitudes to the alliance with Germany see, in this 
study, Ch. 5, Section IIc 
139 Bottai, Diario, 31.5.1939 
tao See, in this study, Ch. 6, Sections II and III 
148 
Foreign policy decision -making: towards a "fascist" state 
Germany: a "parallel" state 
Long -term features of the German system and Hitler's "divide- and -rule" technique (1933 -5) 
In Germany, the traditional framework of foreign policy decision -making 
presented a number of significant differences to the Italian model. First of all, the 
particular form of state that was entrusted to the Nazi executive in January 1933 had 
been regarded as a "liberal" experiment, and one stigmatised by the events of 
1918'4'. The obvious lack of legitimacy, which had plagued the Weimar Republic 
from the moment of its foundation but reached a terminal point in the 1930 -33 
period, convinced the various traditional élite groups that the widespread need for 
change could not be promoted through some sort of identification with the present 
state142, as was the case in Italy. Instead, the search for a new institutional 
arrangement entailed a clear break with the Weimar experience and a move towards 
an authoritarian solution with "caesarist" features, in which the autonomy and 
primacy of the traditional élite groups would be reinstated and enhanced. 
In the field of foreign policy making, the Weimar Republic attempted but 
failed to integrate the military, diplomatic and economic aspects of decision -making 
into a co- ordinated mechanism of state policy. Increasingly after 1930 the collapse of 
liberal institutions allowed the groups involved in these areas of decision -making a 
much wider margin for manoeuvre and resulted in the strengthening of their direct 
political links to President Hindenburg. This reverted the system to a situation 
"' Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, II, pp. 220 -1; Bessel, R., "The Formation and Dissolution of a 
German National Electorate: From Kaiserreich to Third Reich ", in Jones, L. E., Retallack, J. (eds.), 
Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany (Cambridge 1992), pp. 399 -418 
(here pp. 410f); and Matthias, E., "The Influence of the Versailles Treaty on the Internal 
Development of the Weimar Republic ", in Nicholls, A., Matthias, E. (eds.), German Democracy 
and the Triumph of Hitler (London 1971), pp. 13 -28; Weinberg, G. L., Germany, Hitler, and World 
War II. Essays on Modern German and World History (Cambridge 1995), p. 32 
142 For the importance of the element of "change" in the National Socialist appeal to the masses see 
Griffin, Nature of Fascism, pp. 98f; Sternhell, Z., "Fascist Ideology ", in Laqueur (ed.), Fascism, pp. 
356f. See also Kershaw, Hitler -Myth, pp. 64f, especially the disillusionment of NSDAP voters in 
1934 with the regime's failure to justify the promise of "change ". 
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reminiscent of the pre -1918 period, in which the élite groups drew their legitimacy 
from their identification with the Head of State (then the Hohenzollern, now the 
"hero" of the First World War, Field- Marshal Hindenburg)143. The presidential 
dictatorship of the post -1930 period recreated an institutional gap between high 
politics and the parliamentary-party system, a gap which the traditional military and 
diplomatic élites hastened to exploit in order to safeguard their primary role and 
autonomy in an authoritarian system. 
The second major difference in Germany was the de facto traditional 
institutional strength and prestige of the armed forces and the diplomatic corps'. 
Unlike in Italy, the Reichswehr was regarded as a pillar of the German state. The 
militarist structures of the Prussian system survived to a great extent in the 
Bismarckian and Wilhelminian states, embodied in the role of the Emperor as both 
the head of state and supreme Commander of the armed forces'45 In the Weimar 
years this link did seem to fade out, given the pluralism of the system and the 
emphasis on the power of the Reichstag as the main pillar of the system. After the 
failed experiments of General von Seeckt with active revisionism in alliance with the 
Soviet Union in the early 1920s, the new Defence Minister, Groener, promoted a new 
concept of military policy, based on the principles of disarmament, peaceful 
revisionism and cooperation with the western Powers146. In this sense, he attempted 
to integrate the armed forces into the Republican political framework, aligning 
military to diplomatic policy and subjecting the autonomy of the Reichswehr to the 
control of the state147. This was a novel arrangement for the traditionally militaristic 
spirit of the German armed forces and was greatly resented by the majority of 
conservative officers, who kept flirting with ideas of war against Poland and France, 
rejecting in principle the "inaction" of Weimar foreign policy. Groener's dogma 
1A3 Vogelsang, T., "Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930- 1933 ", Vierteljahrshefte 
fill- Zeitgeschichte, 2 (1954), pp. 436f 
144 Griffin, Nature of Fascism, pp. 225 -35 
las Müller, K. -J., "Structure and Nature ", pp. 139 -42; Messerschmidt, M., Militär und Politik in der 
Bismarckzeit und im wilhelminischen Deutschland (Darmstadt 1975) 
lab Carsten, pp. 245ff; Geyer, M., Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit? Die Reichswehr und die Krise der 
Machtpolitik 1924 -1936 (Wiesbaden 1980), pp. 80ff, 200ff; Deist, W., Messerschmidt, M., 
Volkmann, H. -E., Wette, W., "Causes and Preconditions of German Aggression ", in Deist, W. (ed.), 
The German Military in the Age of Total War (Leamington Spa 1985), pp. 336 -53, esp. pp. 339 -40 
147 Deist, W., The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament (London & Basingstoke 1981), pp. 13ff 
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could be upheld so long as the Republic enjoyed a minimum of political stability and 
an agreement of disarmament in the Geneva negotiations appeared a plausible 
prospect148. When both these conditions were thwarted by the early 1930s, the 
Reichswehr leadership distanced itself from the Republic's concept of revisionism 
and reverted to a more aggressive agenda based on the unilateral repudiation of the 
Versailles Treaty and emphasis on speedy rearmament149. In spite of its vastly 
reduced fighting power after 1918, the Reichswehr leadership retained its privileged 
political position in the foreign policy decision -making process and the power to 
influence decisions, not only in its immediate jurisdiction but also in general political 
and economic issues. The anomalous situation of the post -1930 period offered 
opportunities to people like von Schleicher to express their political ambitions with 
the consent of the Presidency, thus enabling the Reichswehr leadership to play a 
decisive role both in the 1930 -3 period, and in the compromise that brought Hitler to 
power in January 1933150 
With regard to the diplomatic élite of the Wilhelmstrasse, the Weimar 
Republic was more of an interlude which did not affect the continuity of the Foreign 
Office's structures and attitudes. The Wilheltstrasse bureaucracy drew its legitimacy 
not from any special constitutional link to the Head of State, as in Italy, but from its 
permanent character as a professional, non -partisan élite possessing an indisputable 
and unique expertise in foreign policy -making. This identification with the 
permanent structure of the German state insulated the Foreign Office from the 
disgrace of the Versailles Treaty which was almost exclusively debited to the 
Weimar politicians. Throughout the years of the Republic, the Wilhelmstrasse 
retained its traditional approach to foreign policy as a matter of professional, rather 
148 Geyer, M., "The Dynamics of Military Revisionism in the Interwar Years. Military Policy between 
Rearmament and Diplomacy ", in Deist, W., (ed.), The German Military in the Age of Total War 
(Leamington Spa 1985), pp. 100 -51, here pp. 111 -3 
149 von Strandmann, H. P., "Imperialism and Revisionism in Interwar Germany ", in Mommsen, W. J., 
Osterhammel, J. (eds.), Imperialism and After. Continuities and Discontinuities (London, Boston & 
Sydney 1986), pp. 93f; Geyer, "Etudes ", pp. 109ff; "Dynamics of Military Revisionism ", pp. 107- 
13; 
15° For the role of the Reichswehr leadership in the 1930 -3 events see Carsten, pp. 338ff, and, 
especially for Schleicher, pp. 364ff; Hayes, P., "Kurt von Schleicher and Weimar Politics ", Journal 
of Modern History, 52 (1980), pp. 35 -65; Koch, "Legality ", pp. 48ff; Overy, R. J., "Hitler's War 
Plans and the German Economy ", in Boyce, R., Robertson, E. M., (eds.), Paths to War. New Essays 
on the Origins of the Second World War (London 1989), pp. 97 -8 
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than public, jurisdiction. It also preserved its aristocratic composition in spite of the 
influx of new personnel in the early 1920s, mainly of bourgeois background. By the 
late 1920s the Wilhelmstrasse had successfully digested the newcomers, with the 
higher echelons of the Foreign Office remaining firmly in the hands of traditional 
officials151. The early attempts of the Republic to democratise the structures of 
German diplomacy had been abandoned in the face of more pressing problems for 
the very survival of the Republic. Although the diplomatic élite appeared to work 
together with Stresemann and Groener for a deal regarding disarmament, the 
commitment of the diplomats to the Republic's concept of peaceful revision was both 
half -hearted and ephemeral'52. Long before Hitler came to power, the Wilhelmstrasse 
leadership, including the conservative Foreign Minister von Neurath, resented the 
burden of political accountability and the relative loss of political autonomy that this 
entailed153. Instead, they were drawn to the platform of "minimum consensus ", based 
on rearmament, use of military threat to achieve a unilateral revision of the Versailles 
Treaty, and an authoritarian system which could restore their primary influence upon 
foreign policy decision -making. 
The third major difference between Germany and Italy in the interwar period 
stemmed from the dissimilar stage of economic development experienced by each 
country. In spite of a plethora of surviving non -modern aspects in the German state, 
the Weimar Republic was an advanced capitalist society. This meant that, albeit not a 
great power in military terms after 1918, Germany was still a potential great power in 
the political and economic sense of the word. In this sense, the economic capacity of 
the system for supporting rearmament was significantly higher than in Italy, thus 
151 Seabury, P., The Wilhehnstrasse. A study of German diplomats under the Nazi regime (Berkeley 
1954), pp. 18 -21 
152 Laffan, M., "Weimar and Versailles: German Foreign Policy, 1919 -33 ", in Laffan, M. (ed.), The 
Burden of German History, 1919 -45. Essays for the Goethe Institute (London 1989), pp. 81 -102; 
Eley, G., "Conservatives and Radical Nationalists in Germany: the production of fascist potentials, 
1912 -1928 ", in Blinkhorn, M. (ed.), Fascists and Conservatives. The Radical Right and the 
Establishment in the twentieth century Europe (London 1990), pp. 50 -70; von Strandmann, 
"Imperialism and Revisionism ", pp. 90ff; 
153 Heineman, J. L., Hitler's First Foreign Minister. Constantin Freiherr von Neurath, Diplomat and 
Statesman ( Berkeley, Los Angeles & London 1979), pp. 59ff; Noakes, J., "German Conservatives 
and the Third Reich: an Ambiguous Relationship ", in Blinkhorn, M. (ed.), Fascists and 
Conservatives. The Radical Right and the Establishment in the twentieth century Europe (London 
1990), pp. 71 -97; Seabury, pp. 21 -4. Also see von Neurath's relevant comment quoted in 
Rauschning, Men of Chaos, p. 172 
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underlining the importance of industrial élites in the foreign policy decision -making 
process. The support of heavy industry for an authoritarian system after 1930 
contributed significantly to the endorsement of the "fascist solution ". Apart from 
subsidising to an extent the NSDAP before 1933, sectors of the industrial élite played 
a much more crucial political role in the events leading to the Machtübernahme, 
through their rejection of the policies of Brüning and Schleicher, their acquiescence 
I n the participation of the NSDAP in the government and their importance for the 
success of the rearmament programme sponsored by the Reichswehr and guaranteed 
by Hitler'54. Unlike in Italy, where foreign policy was traditionally based on great 
power diplomacy, prestige and a moderate use of the threat of force, the return of 
German foreign policy to concepts of unilateral revisionism did not rule out the 
actual use of force and thus established industry as a pivotal factor in rebuilding the 
country's military strength. 
All these different factors dictated a fundamentally different approach to 
establishing a fascist state in Germany. For the Nazi leadership, an etatist model was 
neither available nor desirable as an option. For a start, the charismatic nature of 
Hitler's style of leadership, with its instinctive, mythical basis and its unsystematic 
approach to policy -making, could hardly be accommodated into the highly 
bureaucratised, rational structures of state administration'$'. This discrepancy 
became obvious from the first moment with the lapse of the Reich cabinet, but 
reached a terminal point by 1938, when access to Hitler became totally unreliable, in 
defiance of any form of government protocol and procedure156. Furthermore, Hitler's 
'54 Geary, D., "The Industrial Elite and the Nazis in the Weimar Republic ", in Stachura, P. D. (ed.), 
The Nazi Machtergreifing (London 1983), pp. 88ff; Turner, H. A. Jr., "Big Business and the Rise of 
Hitler ", in ibid. (ed.), Nazism and the Third Reich (New York 1972), pp. 94ff; Stegmann, D., "Zum 
Verhältnis von Grossindustrie and Nationalsozialismus, 1930 -33 ", Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 13 
(1972), pp. 399 -482; Mason, "Primacy ", pp. 170f 
'55 Nyomarkay, J., Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party (Minneapolis 1967), pp. 9ff; 
Kershaw, Hitler -Myth, pp. 11 -148; Noakes, J., Pridham, G. (eds.), Nazism 1919 -1945. A 
Documentary Reader, vol. II: State, Economy and Society, 1933 -1939 (Exeter 1984), pp. 204f; 
Caplan, J., Government without Administration. State and Civil Service in Weimar and Nazi 
Germany (Oxford 1988); Diehl- Thiele, P., Partei und Staat ini Dritten Reich. Untersuchung zum 
Verhältnis von NSDAP und allgemeiner innerer Staatsverwaltung, 1933 -1945 (Munich 1971), pp. 
21 -4 
156 Heineman, pp. 72ff; Bracher, K. D., Nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung und Reichskonkordat: 
zum Frage des geschichtlichen Zusammenhangs und der politischen Verknüpfung von 
Reichskonkordat und Nationalsozialistischer Revolution (Wiesbaden 1956), pp. 910ff; Orlow, 
History of the Nazi Party, vol. II: 1933 -1945 (Newton Abbot 1973), pp. 193f 
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conception of the state as an ancillary - and not pivotal, as in Italy- institution of the 
Nazi system ruled out an identification between the state and the Nazi movement157. 
His distrust of the elitist, pragmatic mentality of the state bureaucracies led him into 
a different state model, combining the totalitarian representation of the Volk by the 
party, the centrality of the armed forces for promoting national interest, and the 
charismatic authority of the leader as the only source of legitimacy in the system158. 
In this sense, the consolidation of Nazi power entailed an institutional challenge to 
the autonomy and legitimacy of the state apparatus, but not the conquest of the state 
itself. It was rather operating on the basis of a "parallel state ", using duplication of 
state functions by party agencies as a political laboratory for the production of new 
institutions to replace the existing state. 
This "divide and rule" has been an item of heated historiographical dispute, 
as it is not entirely clear whether it was pursued intentionally by Hitler or resulted 
from administrative chaos and incompetence159. In the field of diplomacy, the Nazi 
leadership accepted Hindenburg's condition of keeping Neurath as Foreign Minister 
and respecting the institutional autonomy of the Wilhelmstrasse. From the first 
moment, however, Hitler actively encouraged the creation of party agencies which 
claimed expertise in certain fields of foreign policy. The Aussenpolitisches Amt was 
established to institutionalise Rosenberg's aspirations to become the guru of Nazi 
foreign policy160. In a similar fashion, Ribbentrop's Dienststelle gave expression to 
its founder's alternative concepts of foreign policy -making and became the vehicle 
for the consolidation of his personal influence over Hitler and the handling of foreign 
157 On Hitler's ideas about the state see Hitler, A., Mein Kampf (London 1972), pp. 402 -10; Noakes, 
Pridham (eds.). Nazism, II, pp. 201ff. For the Nazi theory of state see Diehl -Thiele, Ch. 1; 
Bendersky, J. W., Carl Schmitt. Theorist for the Reich (Princeton 1983) 
158 Noakes, "German Conservatives and the Third Reich ", pp. 75, 86 -7; Deist, The Wehrmacht and 
German Rearmament, pp. 26f 
150 For the best discussion of the various historiographical approaches to the role of Hitler see 
Kershaw, I., The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation (London 1989, 2nd 
edition), Ch. 4. See also Bracher, K. D., "The Role of Hitler: Perspectives of Interpretation ", in 
Laqueur, W., Fascism. A Reader's Guide. Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography (Harmondsworth 
1979), pp. 193 -212 
lao Hauner, M., "The Professionals and the Amateurs in National Socialist Foreign Policy: Revolution 
and Subversion in the Islamic and Indian World ", in Hirschfeld, G., Kettenacker, L. (eds.), Der 
' Führerstaat'. Mythos und Realität (Stuttgart 1981), pp. 316ff; Jacobsen, H. -A., 
Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik 1933 -1945 (Frankfurt 1968), pp. 90 -160; Carr, W., "National 
Socialism: Foreign Policy and Wehrmacht ", in Laqueur, W., Fascism: A Reader's Guide. Analyses, 
Interpretations, Bibliography (Harmondsworth 1979), pp. 122 -4 
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affairs'61. The creation of the Auslandsorganisation (AO) created a parallel channel 
of communication between party officials and Nazi organisations or sympathisers 
abroad, providing an alternative source of information about international political 
developments162. Finally, Hitler developed a preference similar to Mussolini's for 
personal diplomacy, using von Papen for Austria, Goering for dealings with Italy, 
Spain (economic issues) and the Nazi Party in Danzig, and later Ribbentrop for secret 
negotiations with London and the Sudeten Party in Czechoslovakia163 
The operation of this multiple parallel mechanism reflects a deliberate 
strategy to undermine the authority of the Wilhelmstrasse, and this is attested to by 
Hitler's increasing reliance on the activities and advice of these agencies and special 
envoys at the expense of the diplomatic bureaucracy. Yet, the planning of this 
parallel mechanism was far from rational or successful. Rosenberg's disastrous trip 
to London in May 1933 reduced the influence of the APA to insignificant levels and 
led to a drastic cut in its funding by the party budget164 Ribbentrop's initiatives as 
Ambassador in Britain caused frequent disappointment both to the Nazi leadership 
and to himself for the failure to impress upon the British the need for a German - 
British alliance1G5. At the same time, expansion of the agencies did not entail 
effective political control over their activities. The July 1934 coup in Vienna was an 
eloquent indication of the Nazi leadership's inability to co- ordinate the secret 
initiatives of party organisations and ironically led to a temporary reliance on the 
professional advice of Neurath in the face of the party's lack of competence in 
161 Michalka, W., "Joachim von Ribbentrop: From Wine Merchant to Foreign Minister ", in Smelser, 
R., Zitelmann, R (eds.), The Nazi Elite (Houndmills & London 1993), pp. 165 -72; Jacobsen, 
Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, pp. 120ff; Broszat, M., The Hitler State. The Foundation and 
Development of the internal Structure of the Third Reich (London & New York 1981), pp. 296ff 
16' Seabury, pp. 67f 
163 Carr, Hitler, pp. 30f, 51ff; Craig, G. A., "The German Foreign Office from Neurath to 
Ribbentrop ", in Gilbert, F., Craig, G. A. (eds.), The Diplomats (Princeton, New Jersey 1953), pp. 
427f; Broszat, Hitler State, pp. 278f; Heinemann, pp. 102 -3, 119 -20. For Goering's missions to Italy 
see Weinberg, Diplomatic Revolution, pp. 90f, 130ff; for his relations with Franco's regime see 
Leitz, C., Economic Relations between Nazi Germany and Franco's Spain, 1936 -1945 (Oxford 
1996), pp. 59ff; and for von Papen, ibid., pp. 195f, 236 -7, 266 -71 
164 Seabury, pp. 35ff 
165 Michalka, W., Ribbentrop und die deutsche Weltpolitik 1933 -1940. Aussenpolitische Konzeptionen 
und Entscheidungsprozesse im Dritten Reich (Munich 1980), pp. 249ff; Noakes, Pridham (eds.), 
Nazism, III: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination (Exeter 1988), pp. 692 -6 
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foreign affairs166. The anarchic expansion of party activities caused a dual 
jurisdictional battle - between the party and the Wilhelmstrasse, and between the 
various party stars and agencies themselves. Rosenberg was happy to side even with 
Neurath against the prospect of Ribbentrop's appointment as State Secretary to the 
Foreign Ministry, while Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry kept antagonising 
Ribbentrop's Foreign Office over control of the flow of information from and to 
foreign countries167. Hitler permitted the mushrooming of agencies but avoided 
unequivocal commitments to any particular one, because he was distrustful of any 
form of bureaucratisation of his charismatic power. In the end, his dealings regarding 
policy -making remained confined to the level of personal relations, but his allegiance 
to Rosenberg initially, then to Neurath, Ribbentrop and finally to Himmler did not 
reflect an endorsement of the institutions each of them headed. The result was an 
institutional chaos, with agencies and bureaucracies competing to provide the best 
interpretation of Hitler's vague intentions. Such an uncoordinated polycratic system 
did strengthen the Fuehrer's institutional role as supreme arbiter but did very little to 
formulate an alternative Nazi foreign policy mechanism which could carry out 
policies effectively168. 
With regard to the armed forces, their centrality in the Nazi concept of state 
dictated a very different approach. The crucial significance of rearmament for Nazi 
expansionist plans, and the acknowledgement that technical expertise and 
infrastructure were exclusive privileges of the armed forces, led to a close 
cooperation and consensus between the Nazi Party and the Reichswehr leaderships 
which lasted until 1937169. Agreement on a more active revisionism eliminated 
frictions and left a large political space to the Reichswehr leaders to formulate 
military policy, reaping the benefits of the regime's priority of funding for 
rearmament. There were only two potential challenges to the primary authority of the 
armed forces. The first, the SA, became a bone of contention in early 1934, but 
166 For the July coup see Bracher, K. D., Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung. Studien zur 
Errichtung des totalitären Herrschaftssystems in Deutschland 1933/34 (Cologne 1960), pp. 939ff 
167 Heinemann, pp. 130 -1; Kordt, E., Nicht aus den Akten (Stuttgart 1956), pp. 230f 
168 Bracher, K. D., "Stufen totalitärer Machtergreifung ", Vierte jahrshefte fair Zeitgeschichte, 4 (1956), 
pp. 30 -42; and, for an overall assessment, Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, pp. 80 -1; Griffin, Nature of 
Fascism, pp. 107 -10 
169 Geyer, M., "Traditional Elites ", pp. 61 ff; 
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Hitler's growing irritation with Röhm's "revolutionary" rhetoric made the SA purge 
of June 1934 a less painful concession to Reichswehr demands for exclusive 
responsibility in military issues170. The second challenge, the SS, represented a less 
obvious danger initially, officially confined to the role of safeguarding domestic 
order. The Reichswehr's voluntary opt out from domestic affairs in 1933 rendered 
such a cohabitation feasible, but the implicit ambitions of the SS to become an élite 
military force of Nazi Germany were initially missed out by the traditional military 
leadership, allowing the SS space to flourish and eventually contest the authority of 
the army when the latter had lost most of its political authority171. 
In many ways, the foreign policy initiatives of the Nazi regime between 1934 
and 1936 were anticipated by this military planning. The introduction of conscription 
in 1935 was regarded by the military leadership as a sine qua non for attaining the 
division figures set for the expansion of the army in 1933 and 1934172. Also, the 
remilitarisation of the Rhineland was implicitly presupposed in Blomberg's plans for 
an effective defence policy against France. There was agreement between the Nazi 
and the Reichswehr leaderships that these two steps should be prioritised and taken 
when the situation permitted it. However, identity of goals did not mean identity of 
strategies or planning. Even at this early stage, views about the timing of these 
actions diverged. Hitler had initially planned the introduction of conscription for the 
autumn of 1935, a mere six months earlier than the Reichswehr leadership's 
estimates of the optimal date from a military point of view173. Similarly, the sudden 
decision to remilitarise the Rhineland in March 1936 was the result of Hitler's astute 
10 Bracher, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifi ng, pp. 928ff; Geyer, "Dynamics of Military 
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opportunism, when he sensed that the Ethiopian crisis would impede the western 
Powers from actively opposing his unilateral violation of the Versailles Treaty. In 
fact, Hitler had no fixed thoughts regarding the timing of his major foreign policy 
initiatives - in the case of the Rhineland, he had not envisaged a favourable situation 
for remilitarisation before 1937 but seized opportunities offered by unforeseen 
international developments to promote a crucial goal of German revisionism much 
earlier and in the defiant, uncompromising style of a great power174. However, the 
failure of the armed forces' leadership to curtail the increasing autonomy of the 
Führer in deciding when and how to implement commonly agreed policies 
undermined its political role in the foreign policy decision -making process in the 
long term. 
The challenge to the political influence of the Wilhelmstrasse upon foreign 
policy decision -making was less subtle and more corrosive, originating from the Nazi 
leadership's deep- seated antipathy towards the diplomatic corps175. Hitler maintained 
a pattern of smooth cooperation with Neurath personally and allowed him ample 
political space to deal with the pressing issues of German foreign policy, especially 
the negotiations for disarmament at Geneva176. In spite of his previous efforts to 
achieve equality of status for Germany and a disarmament agreement amongst the 
Great Powers, Neurath endorsed Blomberg's argument in favour of withdrawal and 
played a crucial role in preparing Germany's simultaneous withdrawal from the 
League of Nations177. However, this initial reliance on the professional expertise of 
Neurath did not entail an overall respect for the political autonomy of the 
Wilhelmstrasse in general. In Hitler's non -bureaucratic style of policy -making there 
was space for Neurath, partly because the latter was a personal choice of Hindenburg 
and partly because the Führer could rely on Neurath's accommodating attitude in the 
face of the lack of a reliable party candidate for the effective handling of foreign 
14 Michalka, W., (ed.), Das Dritte Reich, vol. I: Volksgemeinschaft und Grossmachtpolitik (Munich 
1985), pp. 224ff (an excerpt of which is translated in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, p. 725) 
175 Seabury, pp. 30 -1. See also Goering's unflattering comments in ibid., pp. 25 -6; and Rosenberg's 
lack of respect for the bureaucrats of the Foreign Office in Seraphin, H. G., Das Politische 
Tagesbuch Alfred Rosenbergs 1934/5 und 1939/40 (Göttingen, Berlin & Frankfurt 1956), p. 20 
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affairs' 78. In the same way that the armed forces aspired to use Hitler as a 
legitimising factor for their unilateral initiatives on rearmament and revisionism, 
Hitler himself acknowledged Neurath's potential to reassure international public 
opinion about Germany's increasing activism in foreign affairs. Indeed, Neurath met 
these expectations during both the conscription and the Rhineland crises, providing 
accurate predictions about the reluctance or inability of the western powers to react 
and minimising the negative impact of German defiance of international 
agreements' . 
The assault, however, on the political autonomy of the Foreign Office by the 
Nazi leadership started soon afterwards and it did not spare Neurath. Even before 
Hindenburg's death there were alarming indications of Hitler's tendency to ignore 
not only the reports of the diplomats but even the counsel of his Foreign Minister. In 
January 1934 he concluded a Non -Aggression Pact with Poland, a move which 
appalled Neurath and caused shock to the traditional diplomats as it seemed to thwart 
the utmost goal of German revisionism, i.e. the return of the Polish Corridor to the 
Reichts0. The July 1934 coup in Vienna was another alarming indication of the 
uncontrolled meddling of Nazi groups in foreign policy decision -making. Although 
Neurath was under the impression that he had committed Hitler to a peaceful course 
of action towards Austria, plans for a military coup against Dollfuss were secretly 
promoted by the Austrian National Socialist party with the agreement of the Führer. 
The Foreign Office was aware of the subversive activities of party members in 
Austria but Neurath seemed to have overestimated both the firmness of Hitler's 
conversion to a peaceful solution of the Austria problem and his capacity to control a 
chaotic party mechanism in Germany and abroad181 
1" Wollstein, G., Von Weimarer Revisionismus zu Hitler. Das deutsche Reich und die Grossmächte in 
der Anfangsphäse der nationalsozialistische Herrschaft in Deutschland (Bonn, Bad Godesberg 
1973), pp. 96ff 
18 Craig, "German Foreign Office ", pp. 406 -9, 425 
19 Heinemann, pp. 110ff. For Neurath's diplomatic reports and advice during the period of the 
conscription crisis and the remilitarisation of the Rhineland see, amongst others, DGFP, C, 4, 574 
(Memorandum, 22 February 1936) 
180 The significance of the pact is discussed in more detail in Ch. 4, Section IIb 
181 Heinemann, pp. 103f; Weinberg, Diplomatic Revolution, pp. 194 -6. That the Foreign Office was 
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The introduction of conscription resulted from another sudden decision made 
by Hitler, in the company not of Blomberg or Neurath, but of Ribbentrop, and was 
then announced to the Defence and Foreign Ministers as a fait accompli. As with the 
case of Blomberg, Neurath's reservations concerned the timing and the danger of 
negative repercussions, but he accepted the inevitable and worked conscientiously to 
minimise the damage to German relations with the western powers. However, he also 
awoke to the realisation that his initial underestimation of Ribbentrop's potential was 
imprudent182. Neurath had shown a certain willingness to establish constructive 
relations with the Nazi élites - in 1933 he informed the Wilhelmstrasse officials that 
they could join the party if they so wished. Yet, on a personal basis, Ribbentrop's 
consolidation through the establishment of his Dienststelle (summer 1934) and his 
increasing tendency to assume responsibilities without informing the Foreign Office 
was a step too far183. From 1935 onwards, Neurath used his privilege of having 
regular access to Hitler in order, first, to oppose Ribbentrop's ambitions to replace 
Bülow as State Secretary to the Foreign Ministry and, second, to make Ribbentrop's 
actions contingent upon the prior approval of the Wilhelmstrasse. He was fighting a 
losing battle, though. Ribbentrop's successful conclusion of the British -German 
Naval Agreement in the summer of 1935 enhanced his political leverage in the eyes 
of Hitler184. At the same time, Neurath's allies in the Foreign Office were becoming 
more scarce, not because of any extensive nazification of German diplomatic and 
administrative personnel (the Wilhelmstrasse was still regarded by the party as a 
"nest of conspirators" with only limited National Socialist representation amongst its 
ranks), but due to a natural combination of retirement and death. Filling the vacancies 
proved a formidable task for Neurath, because from 1935 Hitler had made personnel 
appointments subject to the approval of the Politische Organisation of the party185. 
Neurath, however, could still claim victories. The decision to remilitarise the 
Rhineland unilaterally contradicted the Foreign Minister's previous policy of a 
182 Heinemann, pp. 134ff 
183 Seabury, pp. 46ff; Craig, "German Foreign Office ", pp. 422f; Broszat, Hitler State, pp. 296f 
184 Weinberg, G. L., "Hitler and England, 1933 -1945: Pretense and Reality ", German Studies Review, 
8 (1995), pp. 299 -309; Deist, Wehrmacht and German Rearmament, pp. 76ff. For the negotiations 
and the text of the agreement see DGFP, C, 4, 132/240 
185 Carr, Arms, Autarky and Aggression, pp. 27 -9; Orlow, II, pp. 178f; Heinemann, pp. 138 -42 
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negotiated solution, but at least Neurath was present at the conference at which the 
decision was after some discussion taken186. Again, he did not ultimately oppose the 
move, convinced that no danger of military reaction existed at the time of the 
Ethiopian crisis' 87. He was definitely happy to be the Foreign Minister who had freed 
Germany from all the onerous restrictions of the Versailles Treaty. A few months 
later, the death of Bülow refuelled the bitter struggle between Neurath and 
Ribbentrop, as the latter restated his claim for the post of the State Secretary. Neurath 
was still in a position to carry the day with Hitler and avert the prospect of 
Ribbentrop's appointment even by threatening to resign188. His eventual choice, his 
son -in -law von Mackensen, came as a relief to the traditional diplomats but also 
underlined the scarcity of Neurath's available choices for filling the vacant places 
and the increasing influence of factors outside the Wilhelmstrasse upon the personnel 
policy of the Foreign Office. 
Growing autonomy and self-confident (1936 -37) 
Thus we arrive at the Spanish Civil War. The background to Germany's 
involvement exposed the extent to which gradual, subtle changes in the foreign 
policy decision -making process in the previous three years had resulted in a 
cumulative strengthening of Hitler's personal power at the expense of the traditional 
élite groups. The crucial role of the NSDAP's Auslandsorganisation (AO) in dealing 
with both diplomatic and military issues of Germany's intervention has been 
established by the historiography on the Spanish Civil War189, as has Goering's 
personal influence and pressure to intervene in order to benefit from Spain's rich raw 
186 Kettenacker, L., in Douglas, R. (ed.), 1939. A Retrospect Forty Years After (London 1983), p. 28; 
Heineman, pp. 90f; Brüning, H., Memoiren 1918 -1934, vol. I (Munich 1972), p. 203; Craig, 
Germany, pp. 678ff; Parker, R. A. C., "The First Capitulation: France and the Rhineland Crisis of 
1936 ", World Politics, 4 (1951), pp. 355 -73; Schuker, S. A, "France and the remilitarisation of the 
Rhineland, 1936 ", in Finney, P. (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War (London & New York 
1997), pp. 222 -44 
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material resources190. From the beginning, Neurath vehemently opposed any degree 
of involvement in the war or co- ordination with Italy for joint diplomatic -military 
action, while Ribbentrop pressed Hitler to accept Franco's and the AO's suggestions 
for a large -scale military intervention191. In this chaos of conflicting jurisdictions and 
policies, the role of Hitler as the ultimate initiator of policy was de facto 
acknowledged. Access to him became the most crucial and effective method of 
influencing policy -making. The AO envoys succeeded in explaining their case in 
favour of military involvement at a meeting with Hitler at Bayreuth, with both 
Goering and Goebbels endorsing the expediency of this course of action192. 
Obviously, this meant that the Foreign Office had lost not just its political primacy in 
foreign affairs but also the privilege of co- decision. In this sense, Neurath's relative 
success in curtailing the extent of German involvement in Spain and in minimising 
the reaction to the bombing of the battleship "Leipzig" later in 1936 (against the 
initial wishes of the Nazi leadership for large -scale military retaliation) should be 
placed into perspective193. In this case, Neurath had failed to initiate or pursue a 
policy compatible with the objectives of German traditional diplomacy. He was 
excluded from consultations and only managed to intervene belatedly to alter 
practicalities, not the framework of the policy itself. His success owed almost 
everything to his personal relationship to Hitler and the considerable access to him 
which he still enjoyed; it did not reflect acceptance of any procedural obligation on 
Hitler's part to consult or inform the Foreign Office. So long as Neurath had Hitler's 
ear, the Foreign Office could exercise some influence on foreign policy decision - 
making through him. If Neurath's access was curtailed by Hitler himself, then the 
whole German diplomatic service would be automatically cut off from decision - 
making. 
190 Leitz, pp. 92ff; Schieder, W., "Spanischer Bürgerkrieg und Vierjahresplan. Zur Struktur der 
nationalsozialistischen Aussenpolitik ", in Michalka, W. (ed.), Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik 
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The events until the so- called Hossbach conference (November 1937) 
confirmed the precarious position of both diplomatic and military élites, and their 
gradual relegation to a near -functional institutional status. For the armed forces' 
leadership, the gathering pace of Nazi aggression and independence in foreign 
policy -making was a cause for alarm but did not result in any serious discussion of 
the long -term implications of the increasing rearmament programme. The 
Wehrmacht leadership was so absorbed in the practicalities of meeting increased 
targets of mobilisation in a shorter time -scale that they paid little attention to the 
goals that such a formidable military machine could serve194. There was still a high 
degree of agreement on the priorities of German foreign policy: Austria and 
Czechoslovakia were obvious targets, both in irredentist terms and for their 
importance in solving the labour and raw materials problems of German 
rearmament195. Yet, the implications of the offensive nature of military planning, 
entailing a higher risk of confrontation with Britain, were not taken at face value by 
the military leadership until the end of 1937. War as an option was not rejected 
altogether but General Beck, Chief Commander of the Army Staff, understood it in a 
fundamentally different way - only against France, possibly over Czechoslovakia 
which was a legitimate target of German expansion, but not before 1943, when the 
targets of the August 1936 programme of rearmament would have been attained' 96. 
If the armed forces' leadership could still entertain an illusion of control over 
decision -making, the Foreign Office had by 1937 given up most of its hopes. Hitler's 
tendency to bypass the Wilhelmstrasse increased, as did his reliance on the advice 
mainly of Ribbentrop and Goering. By implication, Neurath's access to the Nazi 
leadership was gradually curtailed, leading to the marginalisation of the institutional 
194 Deist, Wehrmacht and German Rearmament, pp. 40ff; Geyer, "Dynamics of Military 
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position of the whole Wilhelmstrasse. The German -Austrian Gentlemen's Agreement 
was signed without even consulting the Foreign Office, while Ribbentrop elicited 
Hitler's permission to negotiate a tripartite agreement with Italy and Japan without 
the prior knowledge and against the wishes of Neurath who dreaded the anti -British 
implications of such a pact197. The prospect of concluding such a pact, and the 
consolidation of the Axis alliance, convinced not only Neurath but also other 
prominent non -Nazi figures of the government - such as the Minister of Economics, 
Schacht, who resigned in the autumn of 1937198 - that the aggressive tone of Nazi 
foreign policy marked a qualitative departure from traditional principles and entailed 
a high risk of conflict with the western powers. The fatalism with which the Foreign 
Minister viewed these developments, his frequent resignations and decreasing 
willingness to intervene as he had done in the past, were symptomatic of an 
awareness that political influence had eluded the Wilhelmstrasse199. The Foreign 
Office might have succeeded in insulating its ranks from the intrusion of undesired 
figures (Ribbentrop, for example) until 1938, but the parasitic Nazi system allowed 
ample political space to Ribbentrop, Goering and Goebbels to use their direct access 
to Hitler in order to eclipse the political role of the traditional diplomatic group in the 
decision -making process. 
In this sense, the Hossbach conference had a limited importance as an overall 
programmatic statement, but was a catalyst in reflecting deep changes in the way 
foreign policy decisions were taken in the Nazi system, and in alluding to even more 
radical intentions for the near future. The prioritisation of Austria and 
Czechoslovakia as targets of Nazi expansion were not a real shock to the participants 
(Neurath, Blomberg, Fritsch, Raeder, Goering), because the former was regarded as a 
legitimate objective of German irredentism and the latter had fared prominently in 
the military planning of the Wehrmacht for German defence. Also, there was a 
reassuring commitment to a significantly later date - optimal conditions for actions 
197 Heinemann, pp. 153ff; Craig, "German Foreign Office ", pp. 431 -3. For the negotiations and the 
agreement see DGFP, C, 5, 554 (Neurath to Hitler, 25 September 1936) 
198 On Schacht's failure to persuade Hitler and on his eventual resignation see various contributions in 
Forstmeier, F., Volkmann, H. -E. (eds.), Wirtschaft und Rüstung am Vorabend des Zweiten 
Weltkrieges (Düsseldorf 1975) 
199 Rauschning, Men of Chaos, pp. 70ff; Seabury, pp. 35ff, 40f 
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were expected in 1943. The difference lay in the choice of means and strategy. 
Instead of an evolutionary approach to Anschluss and a defensive plan against a 
possible attack by France and/or Czechoslovakia, Hitler's exposition was based on an 
offensive action and on exploiting a "favourable situation which would not occur 
again" in terms of Germany's military advantage. The strategic prerequisites for this 
favourable solution were fairly absurd: civil war in France or a French -British -Italian 
war in the Mediterranean as a result of tension in Spain. However, the other 
importance of Hitler's account at the Hossbach conference regarded his inclusion of 
Britain in the camp of Germany's possible enemies, along with France. Here, the 
influence of Ribbentrop's anti -British rhetoric upon Hitler's medium -term strategy 
becomes evident; in particular the allusions to a parallel action by Japan in the Far 
East and by Italy in the Mediterranean against British colonies echoed Ribbentrop's 
ongoing efforts for a tripartite alliance against the interests of the British empire2oo 
The increased danger of a conflict with Britain alarmed the traditional 
military and diplomatic leaderships. Both Blomberg and Fritsch expressed strong 
reservations during the conference, while Neurath was mobilised after the discussion 
to seek the cooperation of the military in arresting Hitler's aggressive intentions2o1 
However, the extent of reaction by the traditional military and diplomatic élites after 
the Hossbach conference can only partly be explained by these programmatic 
divergences. What mainly raised the stakes of opposition was the realisation that 
foreign policy decisions, even of such grave importance, were now taken by Hitler 
without even prior consultation with the Wehrmacht leadership or the diplomats 
about the practical aspects or the feasibility of his plans. Neurath had been more 
accustomed to this sort of marginalisation since 1936; but Fritsch, for example, who 
had struggled to check the influence of the Nazi party over the army, awoke to the 
realisation that rearmament and offensive military planning had reduced policy 
options to either war in the near future or peace by actively opposing Hitler's 
?°° For the text of the Hossbach Memorandum see DGFP, D, 1, 19. See also the document reprinted in 
Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp., 680 -7. For an analysis see Meinck, G., Hitler und die 
deutsche Aufrüstung (Wiesbaden 1959). See also, in this study, Ch. 4, Section IV 
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to 1940 ", in Koch. H. W. (ed.), Aspects of the Third Reich (London 1985), pp. 151ff; and his "The 
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(eds.), The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement (London 1983), pp. 65 -75 
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strategy202. The defiant manner in which the Führer drafted and announced his plans, 
"rejecting the idea of discussion before the wider circle of the Reich cabinet ", 
amounted to a de facto relegation of the military and diplomatic leaderships to the 
function of simply executing his programme. This places the function of the 
Hossbach conference in a different perspective. Hitler did not intend the discussion to 
be interactive - his intentions regarding Austria and Czechoslovakia were fixed and 
co- decision was not part of his style of leadership. Instead, he used the occasion to 
test the participants' willingness to accept their institutional subordination to his 
primary, exclusive jurisdiction and to act as a- political functionaries of a leader - 
oriented system203 
In this sense, the dismissal of Fritsch, Blomberg and Neurath early in 1938 
reflected Hitler's realisation that traditional figures had become a liability for Nazi 
foreign policy204. It also showed a peak of self -confidence for his instinctive 
leadership and his trust in the new generation of officials who were chosen to replace 
the old military and diplomatic guard. Ribbentrop had long before been a Foreign 
Minister -in- waiting. His exclusive responsibility for the secret German-Czech 
negotiations in 1936 -37 and for the conclusion of the tripartite agreement with Italy 
and Japan were major initiatives without any involvement of the Foreign Office. In 
the armed forces, Hitler demonstrated his determination to control even the military 
planning of the Wehrmacht by taking over Blomberg's post as Commander -in -Chief 
of the Armed Forces. At the same time, Brauchitsch, the new Commander -in -Chief 
of the Army, and Keitel, head of the newly established Wehrmacht High Command 
(OKW), were more sympathetic to Hitler's aggressive policy and in any case 
represented a new technocratic, non -political attitude to policy -making that 
202 Hossbach, F., Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, 1934 -1938 (Wolfenbüttel & Hannover 1949), pp. 
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facilitated the Führer's plans to separate the political from the functional aspects of 
military and foreign policy2o5 
The triumph of the Nazi leadership: a different system of foreign policy decision -making 
(1938 -39) 
The Anschluss in March 1938 was the first major achievement of the new 
Nazi style of foreign policy, but it does not offer the best example of how this new 
decision -making mechanism would operate. The reason was that the dramatic events 
leading to the incorporation of Austria into the Reich were precipitated by 
Schuschnigg's arbitrary decision to break his agreement with Hitler and call a 
plebiscite. The crisis caught the Nazi leadership unawares to the extent that the new 
Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, was in London throughout the time of the 
Anschluss2°6. The successful handling of the crisis was the result of Goering's 
autonomous role in dealing with Seyss- Inquart in Vienna and, ironically, of 
Neurath's professional advice and weight. Neurath offered his services to Hitler in 
the absence of the Foreign Minister and, although he did not succeed in committing 
him to a non -invasion policy, he correctly predicted that no serious international 
repercussions should be expected207. 
It was the Czech crisis of the summer and autumn of 1938 that illustrated the 
new division of labour between political, diplomatic and military groups in the Nazi 
system. Hitler's "unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in 
the near future" was translated into a military plan by the new Wehrmacht 
leadership208. The only remaining bastion of the old military guard, General Beck, 
Chief of the General Staff since 1933, resorted to a last -ditch attempt to change the 
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course of German foreign policy by fighting against party involvement in the 
decision -making process209. Since the Hossbach conference General Beck had 
endeavoured to bring traditional military figures (Fritsch, Blomberg) into a political 
movement that could express the strong opposition of prominent political, diplomatic 
and military circles to the prospect of Germany's involvement in a major war210 
Notwithstanding the purge of the military leadership, Beck continued to fight against 
the warlike implications of the Führer's new aggressive policy. During the Czech 
crisis, his reservations were shared not only by conservative figures like Neurath, 
Schwerin von Krosigk and Weizsäcker, but also by Goering and Hitler's adjutant 
Wiedemann211. Interestingly, even Beck's vehement criticism excluded the person of 
Hitler, whose right to primary authority in the decision -making process was not 
questioned2I2. The main targets were party appointees and members, both in the 
armed forces and the Foreign Office, who had surrounded the Führer and alienated 
him from his professional experts. Hitler, however, could afford to discard Beck's 
protests now that he had the backing of the new military leadership for the execution 
of his plans. The resignation of Beck in the midst of the Sudeten crisis underlined the 
complete failure of the traditional élites to reinstate a degree of control over the 
foreign policy decision -making process213. 
At the same time, Ribbentrop seized the opportunity offered by the Czech 
crisis for diplomatic activity in order to reassert his authority after his exclusion 
during the Anschluss. He played a significant role in reinforcing Hitler's aggressive 
intentions towards Czechoslovakia. He, like his leader, seems to have believed that 
Britain and France would not risk a major confrontation for the sake of 
209 On Beck's opposition see Müller, Beck, pp. 555f; Heer und Hitler, pp. 301 -331, 650ff; "Structure 
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213 Müller, Heer und Hitler, pp. 317 -33; "Structure and Nature of the National Conservative 
Opposition ", pp. 169 -78; Hoffmann, P., Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat. Der Kampf der 
Opposition gegen Hitler (Munich 1979), Ch. 4 
168 
Foreign policy decision- making: towards a 'fascist" state 
Czechoslovakia214, but he was prepared to follow an "unwavering attitude" that could 
lead to a "major war with the western powers "215. Ribbentrop had since 1936 been 
convinced that a German- British conflict would be inevitable, because "Britain does 
not want a powerful Germany ", and he pressed for an uncompromising line against 
the efforts of Halifax, Henderson and, later, Chamberlain to promote a peaceful 
solution216. Many conservative diplomats, including the State Secretary to the 
Foreign Ministry von Weizsäcker, had strong reservations about Ribbentrop's 
aggressive foreign policy ideas and reckless style but were not willing to express 
their opposition or to act against the wishes of their chief217. In some ways, they had 
been content with the appointment of Ribbentrop to the position of Foreign Minister 
as his high profile with Hitler was expected to result in an improvement of the 
Wilhelntstrasse's status in the decision -making process after the last years of 
inactivity and marginalisation. Initially, Ribbentrop had chosen to rely on the 
existing professional personnel of the Foreign Office in his struggle against Goebbels 
and Goering over jurisdictional issues218. When von Mackensen resigned, 
Ribbentrop's proposed the conservative Ernst von Weizsäcker for the post of State 
Secretary - an unlikely choice by the star of Nazi diplomacy for an allegedly 
fascistised Foreign Office219. Gradually from 1939 onwards, however, he 
marginalised the traditional groups by transferring personnel from his Dienststelle to 
key positions of the Foreign Office (like Martin Luther and Paul Karl Schmidt)22 
°. 
He also initiated a process of administrative reform within the Office with two clear 
Michalka, W. (ed.), (ed.), Das Dritte Reich, vol. I: Volksgemeinschaft und Grossmachtpolitik 
(Munich 1985), pp. 245f 
2j' Seabury, pp. 93 -4 
216 Ribbentrop's 1936 comments may be found in Michalka (ed.), Das Dritte Reich, I, pp. 246; 
Ribbentrop, pp. 249ff. For his subsequent policy initiatives towards Britain see Michalka, "Conflicts 
within the German Leadership on the Objectives and Tactics of German Foreign Policy, 1933- 
1939", in Mommsen, W. J., Kettenacker (eds.), The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of 
Appeasement (London 1983), pp. 53f; "Joachim von Ribbentrop ", pp. 167f; "From Anti -Comintern 
Pact to the Euro- Asiatic Bloc: Ribbentrop's Alternative Concept to Hitler's Foreign Policy 
Programme ", in Koch, H. W. (ed.), Aspects of the Third Reich (Houndmills & London 1985), pp. 
267 -84 
217 For von Weizsäcker's opposition see DGFP, D, 1, 86 (Memorandum, 20 December 1937); Hill, L. 
(ed.), Die Weizsäcker -Papiere, 1933 -1950 (Frankfurt 1974), pp. 130ff; and Michalka, "Structure 
and Nature of the National Conservative Opposition ", pp. 160 -70, for an analysis. 
218 Seabury, pp. 58ff 
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aims. The first was to create new bodies with enhanced responsibilities (like the 
Agency for News Analysis) in order to strengthen the Wilhelmstrasse position in its 
jurisdictional battle with the Ministry of Propaganda. The second was to instigate a 
process of creating a Ribbentrop Foreign Office within the Foreign Office, in other 
words a small diplomatic élite comprising Ribbentrop's closest allies which would 
operate as the power -base of Ribbentrop's personal diplomacy during the war 
7,1 
years . 
The period from the Munich Agreement to the invasion of Poland offers 
ample confirmation of this decision -making pattern. The armed forces' leadership 
dutifully provided military plans to execute Hitler's plans regarding the liquidation of 
the rump state of Czechoslovakia in March 1939222. Brauchitsch committed himself 
to a speedier indoctrination of the Wehrmacht, something that even Blomberg had 
been very careful about223. With the resignation of Beck there was nobody in the 
forces to express the traditional army aspiration for co- decision- making in military 
planning. The Wehrmacht had reached formidable levels of fighting power, 
mobilisation and technological excellence - but it had also been reduced to a 
technocratic agency assigned to making political directives by the Nazi leadership 
practically feasible. The revision of the whole rearmament programme in 1938 with 
the so- called Schnellplan reflected a much earlier target for military preparedness, 
brought forward to 1939 -40 as opposed to the 1943 -45 date used at the Hossbach 
conference224. At the same time, the introduction of the Z -Plan for naval rearmament 
highlighted a deep change in the strategic assumptions of the Nazi leadership - war 
against Britain was becoming increasingly more probable, despite Hitler's desire to 
220 Seabury, pp. 60 -1, 71 -7 
221 Broszat, Hitler State, pp. 297 -9 
222 DGFP, D, 4, 202 (Report of a conversation between Hitler and Tiso, 13 March 1939) 
123 Weinberg, Hitler, Germany and World War II, pp. 139 -41; Müller, Heer und Hitler, pp. 263ff; 
Berghahn, V. R., "NSDAP und 'Geistige Führung' der Wehrmacht, 1939 -1943 ", Vierteljahrshefte 
fir Zeitgeschichte, 17 (1969), pp. 17 -71 
224 For the importance and the effectiveness of the Schnellplan see Murray, W., The Change in the 
European Balance of Power, 1938 -1939. The Path to Ruin (Princeton 1984), pp. 24 -5; Hancock, E., 
The National Socialist Leadership and Total War, 1941 -5 (New York 1991), pp. 16f 
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avoid it and his hopes that it could be averted even after the invasion of Poland225. 
For his part, Ribbentrop played a crucial role in producing a dramatic volte-face in 
European diplomacy that proved a catalyst for the decision to launch war in 
September 1939. The conclusion of the German- Soviet Non -Aggression Pact in 
August 1939 attained the strategic prerequisite for Hitler's aim to avoid a two -front 
war226. Germany embarked on war with a foreign policy- making mechanism that 
confirmed the triumph of the autocratic, leader- oriented tendencies of the Nazi 
system. Power emanated from, and rested in, Hitler and those who were given the 
privilege of having access to him, providing plausible strategies for implementing 
their leader's ideas. The removal of decision -making responsibility from those 
involved in the execution of policy was by now complete. 
IV. Fascist parties and leaderships: totalitarianism versus 
authoritarianism 
Against the backdrop of authoritarianism, epitomised in the cult of the Duce 
and in the Fiihrer-prinzip, the fascist parties represented an alternative source of 
power which was both instrumental for fascist consolidation and problematic for a 
leader -oriented regime. The PNF and the NSDAP sponsored a totalitarian 
conception of domestic life, a system in which the party would replace the state as 
the highest form of representing the nation and would thus raise claim to the totality 
and exclusivity of such a representation227. In the first years of their existence, the 
two parties maintained an identity between movement and leader, in the sense that 
the position of the latter depended upon the collective will of the party membership. 
225 Deist, Wehrmacht and German Rearmament, pp. 60ff; Dülffer, J., Weimar, Hitler und die Marine. 
Reichspolitik und Flottenbau, 1920 bis 1939 (Düsseldorf 1973), pp. 501ff. See also a collection of 
relevant documents in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 728 -30 
226 For a detailed analysis of these issues see, in this study, Ch. 6, Section II 
227 Pombeni, "La forma partito", pp. 219 -64. For the conception of party as a crucial device of 
"totalitarian" regimes see Friedrich, C. J., "The Unique Character of Totalitarian Society", in 
Friedrich, C. J. (ed.), Totalitarianism (Cambridge Mass. 1954), pp. 47 -60 
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Mussolini's resignation in 1920 after criticisms for his role in the Pacification Pact 
with the Socialists underlined the PNF's relative autonomy from its leadership which 
was not as yet regarded as permanent and unquestionable228. In Germany, until the 
late 1920s, Hitler's leadership was still an item of criticism, especially by the so- 
called "left- wing" revolutionary members of the NSDAP who saw the growing 
authoritarian tendencies of the Führer as a negation of the collective character of the 
party229. The crisis came to a head in 1930, with Otto Strasser openly criticising 
Hitler for using the leadership principle to ban intra -party debate on ideological 
issues230. 
The gap between leader and party increased in the last years before the 
acquisition of power. Mussolini's and Hitler's success in claiming to represent the 
whole parties and their ability to centralise authority over their supporters seemed to 
confirm the authoritarian model of leadership at the expense of the initial egalitarian 
and collective character of the movements. Even then, however, party officials 
aspired to a high degree of power -sharing with the leadership in a future fascist 
system, something that was an anathema to the traditional élites who had acquiesced 
in the "fascist experiment" on the explicit understanding that this would involve the 
separation of the parties from the allegedly responsible leaders231. Thus, with their 
appointment as head of coalition governments, Mussolini and Hitler faced a complex 
dilemma - how not to thwart their parties' totalitarian aspirations and reward the 
support of the old fighters without jeopardising their own positions of authority or 
18 The identification of fascism with Mussolini is advocated by Finer, H., Mussolini 's Italy (Hamden, 
Connecticut 1964, 2nd ed.), p. 161. This identification dates back to 1921, in the aftermath of the 
crisis related to the Pacification Pact with the Socialists [Gentile, E., Storia del Partito Fascista, 
/919 -1922: Movimento e milizia (Rome & Bari 1989), pp. 247ff]. The problems that arose from the 
plans for a Pacification Pact with the Socialists are discussed in Gentile, Storia del Partito Fascista, 
pp. 257ff; Giurati, G., La parabola di Mussolini nelle memorie di un gerarca, ed. by E. Gentile 
(Rome & Bari 1981), pp. 92f. 
229 Carr, Hitler, pp. 15 -27; Mommsen, H., "National Socialism: Continuity and Change ", in Laqueur, 
W. (ed.), Fascism: A Reader's Guide. Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography (London 1979), pp. 
158f; Plewinid, M., Hitler. Der völkische Publizist Dietrich Eckart (Bremen 1970), pp. 85f 
230 Strasser, O., Hitler and I (London 1940), pp. 108ff 
23) Andreski, S., "Fascists as Moderates ", in Larsen, S. U., Hagtvet, B., Myklebust, J. P. (eds.), Who 
Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen, Oslo, Tromso 1980), pp. 52 -5; Faye, 
J. P., Langages totalitaires. Critique de la raison / l ' economie narrative (Paris 1972), pp. 407fî See 
also the analysis of Faye's arguments in Thompson, J. B., Studies in the Theory of Ideology, pp. 
211 -27 
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offending the sensibilities of the traditional élites whose consent was pivotal for 
retaining power. 
Italy: mussolinismo and the de- politicisation of the PNF 
The complexity of the problem of how to deal with the party was different in 
each country. In Italy, the short period of Fascist incubation did not allow sufficient 
time for the crystallisation of the PNF's definite ideological character or the 
centralisation of Mussolini's power232. After the March on Rome, the party suffered 
from multiple political confusion and incompatible expectations. Moderates, such as 
Grandi, and many members of the ANI favoured the total integration of the party into 
the state structure and dismissed radical calls for an "anti- state" function of the 
party'''. The National Syndicalists, headed by Rossoni, rejected etatism, sponsoring 
instead plans for a radical reorganisation of Italian society on the basis of syndicalist 
corporatism 234. Extremists, such as Farinacci and Malaparte, were against the idea of 
a strong state and advocated a totalitarian rule of the party through dictatorship and 
removal of all institutional limitations on Fascist power235. Farinacci, in particular, 
described the party as the only authentic expression of the spirit of fascism, a 
reminder of its agrarian, provincial roots and of the dynamics of squadrismo236. Most 
members of the old guard were also extremely critical of newcomers to the PNF, 
232 Germino, D. L., The Italian Fascist Party in Power. A Study in Totalitarian Rule (New York 
1971), pp. 133 -9; Sarti, "Italian Fascism ", pp. 14 -30 
233 See Gentile, E., Le origini dell 'ideologia fascista, 1918 -1925 (Roma & Bari 1975), Ch. 5; 
Germino, pp. 19f; Payne, S., A History of Fascism, 1914 -1945 (Madison 1995), pp. 111 -2 
734 On the ideology of national syndicalism see Gentile, Ideologia fascista, pp. 76 -90; Sarti, "Italian 
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235 For review of the different groups within the PNF see Payne, History of Fascism, pp. 110 -3; 
Germino, pp. 83 -104. See also in general De Felice, R., Mussolini il fascista, vol. I: La conquista del 
potere, 1921 -1925 (Turin 1966). See also Gentile, E., Le origini dell'ideologia fascista, /918 -1925 
(Roma & Bari 1975), passim, where an interesting attempt at self -classification (Volt, "Le cinque 
anime del fascismo ", Critica Fascista, 15 February 1925), is reprinted (pp. 454 -8). 
236 Farinacci, R., Un periodo aureo del Partito Nazionale Fascista (Foligno 1927), pp. 155 -60. For an 
analysis of Farinacci's views see Gentile, Ideologia fascista, pp. 263 -76; Hamilton, pp. 54 -6 
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whose motives they distrusted, advocating instead their expulsion and the blocking of 
further "opportunistic" inflows of new members'-37. Tensions surfaced very early, 
especially in the field of appointments, where the so- called "Fascists of the first 
hour" felt they had been sidelined in favour of sympathetic traditional figures or 
"newcomers ", i.e. members who joined the PNF after the March on Rome238. 
However, the tension reached a critical point during the Matteotti crisis which lasted 
for more than six months. The mobilisation of the extremists, their pressure on 
Mussolini for a "second wave" of fascistisation during the Matteoti crisis, and the 
threat from local Fascist organisations not to obey the Duce if he did not assume 
dictatorial powers and separate the party from the state, contributed to the decision to 
establish the dictatorship in January 1925239. 
The appointment of Farinacci as Party Secretary signalled a victory for the 
intransigents, but it was an ephemeral one. The dictatorship had strengthened the 
authoritarian, leader -oriented character of the Fascist system without in reality 
rewarding the party as an institution of the Fascist regime with increased political 
influence in the decision -making process240. Faced with a clash between Farinacci 
and the Ministry of the Interior Federzoni over the status of the militia, the Duce did 
not hesitate to dismiss the former, endorse the etatist approach of the latter and 
minimise the role of the squadri241. In the same vein, the institutionalisation of the 
Grand Council as the highest organ of the state (law of 9 December 1928) 
highlighted the intention to bring the party under the control of the state242. 
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Meaningfully, with the law of 24 December 1925, Mussolini as Head of the 
government was recognised as the sole repository of the Crown's power243. After 
Farinacci, the position of Party Secretary was offered to less independent members of 
the PNF ( Turati, Giurati) who assumed the responsibility to monitor the activities of 
the party gerarchi and ras, thus further distancing Mussolini from party structures 
and opponents'. However, it was during the eight years in which A. Starace was 
Party Secretary (1931 -1939) that the de- politicisation of the PNF reached its peak. 
Bottai described staracismo as a negation of Fascism's interest in the content of 
politics, as opposed to style and presentation. As he argued in an article published in 
Critica Fascista, the party sacrificed its spiritual intensity for the sake of superficial 
appearance'''. For him, under Starace the party accepted its "expulsion from politics" 
and its subordination to the necessities of mussolinismo''6. In a similar vein, Grandi 
attributed the phenomenal unpopularity of the party to Starace's reforms and lack of 
political substance'. With the decree of January 1927, the party was officially 
subordinated to the state as organ for the indoctrination and organisation of the 
population248. This meant the death warrant of alternative non -etatist conceptions of a 
Fascist system - Farinacci's idea of a strong party against state control or Rossoni's 
vision of mass syndicalist organisations249. The party secretary was not admitted into 
the Council of Ministers until 1937, but even this belated participation did not 
reverse the loss of authority by the PNF. When in 1930 Turati attempted to establish 
himself as de facto deputy of Mussolini, by claiming the position of Under -Secretary 
to the Interior Ministry (with Mussolini as Minister) as complementary to his role as 
Party secretary, he was immediately dismissed''°. As for Farinacci's concept of an 
233 Aquarone, Stato Totalitario, pp. 395 -6; translated in Clough et al. (eds.), History of Modern Italy, 
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élite party organisation, inaccessible to opportunist newcomers through a 
membership ban, it materialised only temporarily in 1925 -26. Then, membership was 
reopened and in 1932 the idea of compulsory participation to the PNF (in order to 
include all civil servants of the "Fascist" state) led to a dramatic increase in the 
party's membership figures. Further influx of members took place in 1936 and in 
1940, transforming the party into a mass organisation of the state's centralised 
authority over society251. With the amendments to the Party Statute of 1932 the 
Grand Council ceased to be a party organ and was recognised as the highest state 
organ, while the PNF Secretary became exclusively dependent upon, and accountable 
to the Duce, who was responsible for selecting and replacing the holder of the post. 
The depoliticisation of the PNF, through its subordination to the political will 
of the state and the neutralisation of dissident trends within its ranks, reflected 
Mussolini's ambitions to establish a truly authoritarian model of government. In 
justifying his policy towards the party, Mussolini stressed in December 1936 that 
political decision -making did not concern the party as an institution; instead, "the 
party should always concentrate solely on the political education of the people '''. 
The party was allowed to perform totalitarian functions on a societal level (youth, 
leisure, press, education) but only once it had been deprived of its collective right to 
political co- decision253. Even after the PNF's crucial role in promoting the racial 
legislation against Jews, Arabs and Africans, the party remained the semi -effective 
"nervous system" of the Duce's political will254. Its growing unpopularity with the 
Italian population hampered the main task of "militarising" the nation and 
transforming Fascism into a catholic secular religion for the whole nation'". This 
251 Lyttelton, Seizure of Power, pp. 271 -95; Gentile, "The Problem of the Party", pp. 263ff; De Grand, 
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failure rendered the Duce's authoritarian position even more crucial for the 
preservation of social unity and gradually reduced his reliance on collective party 
approval in defining and implementing his radical plans for a "new state" and a "new 
man "256. In this sense, mussolinismo was reconciled with the totalitarian aspirations 
of the party, but only once the former had hijacked the political influence of the 
latter. Ex post facto attempts to present the monopolisation of Fascism by Mussolini 
as predetermined by Fascist political ideology have been taken at face value by 
exponents of the "totalitarian power" of the party, like D. Germino and E. Gentile257. 
Such a totalitarianism, however, subjected to authoritarian rule and etatism, was the 
utter antithesis of the system that syndicalists, squadristi and many gerarchi had 
cherished in the early years of the Fascist movement258. Many old fighters continued 
to criticise the alteration of Fascism's character and disapproved of the 
marginalisation of old members in favour of conservative nationalists, such as Rocco 
and Federzoni, ex- liberal intellectuals, like Gentile, or ambitious younger members, 
such as Ciano259. Bottai kept deploring the pro -German shift in Italian policy, 
regarding it as a contradiction to the spirit and intellectual traditions of Italian 
Fascism, although he publicly supported the regime's policy of rapprochement with 
Nazi Germany260. After the war, he castigated Mussolini's efforts to monopolise 
Fascism in the 1930s, presenting the emergence of mussolinismo as a de facto 
negation of the collective, evolving spirit of Fascism'61. Marinetti accepted his 
election to the Italian Academy in spite of his aversion to "intellectual" institutions, 
but could not hide his disillusionment with the regime's lack of progress towards a 
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domestic transformation of Italian society. As for Balbo, always the strongest voice 
of criticism in the Grand Council, he kept criticising Mussolini's distance from the 
party members and institutions, deploring the change in his Capo's attitude towards 
the old fighters and underlining the danger that, in his isolation, Mussolini appeared 
to have lost his political astuteness'''. In the end, of course, loyalty to the Duce 
would dictate an acceptance of his political decisions. In all these cases, however, 
reservations about the regime's developments entailed an implicit criticism of the 
Duce's personal, authoritarian rule. 
The subordination and de- politicisation of the party becomes even more 
evident in the field of foreign affairs. The Council of Ministers, a body supposed to 
maintain the collective character of government decision -making, gradually came to 
be dominated by Mussolini's long monologues, losing any real consultative or co- 
decision function. One of its most prominent Fascist members, Bottai, noted with 
pessimism in July 1940 that the institution was in a state of "plain decadence ", with 
its allegedly collective character overshadowed by the authoritarian tendency of 
mussolinismo and the Duce's insistence on monopolising responsibility for every 
single political issue763. Similar feelings were expressed privately even by Ciano, 
who often found the monopolisation of the meetings by Mussolini and the lack of 
debate "deeply humiliating '44.The Fascist Grand Council was not consulted in the 
formulation of the plan to attack Ethiopia, a fact that infuriated both Balbo and 
Federzoni'6'. Mussolini and Ciano also kept the Council uninformed about 
preliminary preparations for the invasion of Albania in the first half of 1938266. In a 
number of occasions, Mussolini used the frequent meetings of the Council to 
legitimise faits accomplis. The Anschluss was presented as the desired choice of 
Italian policy, while participation in the Spanish Civil War had already been agreed 
before the members of the Council applauded Mussolini's determination to promote 
262 Segrè, Balbo, pp. 271 -5, pp. 372 -3; Michaelis, M., "Il Maresciallo dell'aria Italo Balbo e la politica 
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the alleged interests of international fascism267. Individually, however, a number of 
leading Fascist figures expressed doubts about the advisability of Italy's involvement 
in Spain. Balbo reacted angrily, criticising Mussolini's awkward handling of 
sensitive foreign policy issues268. If the Council was supposed to be the institutional 
expression of the party's right to influence decision -making, the Duce showed that he 
would not be influenced by any form of criticism. At the Council meeting of 21 
March 1939, Balbo was even less tactful - he accused Mussolini of "licking Hitler's 
boots" and reminded the other participants that there was still the possibility of 
opting for Britain against Nazi aggression269. When the news about the signing of the 
Pact of Steel reached Rome in May 1939, not only Bottai but also Federzoni and 
Grandi could not hide their frustration'70. Bottai, on the other hand, offered a more 
elaborate implicit criticism through the pages of Critica Fascista. He accepted the 
internationalisation of Fascism as a logical extension of its internal vitality and 
spiritual advantage (compared to the democratic and communist regimes), but 
warned that such an internationalisation should be promoted very carefully, in order 
to avoid associating it with opportunistic imitators"'. 
Mussolini allowed discussion and tolerated verbal dissidence (as can be seen 
by his relatively calm reaction to Balbo's extreme comments of March 1939'7', but 
was unmoved by other concepts of foreign policy -making, even if these came from 
prominent Fascist gerarchi. He had manifested his determination to control foreign 
affairs by retaining the portfolio of the Foreign Minister until 1928 and in the 1932- 
36 period. His two other choices for the post, Grandi and Ciano, were intended to 
promote the "fascistisation" of the style of Italian diplomacy but not to enhance the 
political influence of the party as an institution in the shaping of foreign policy. 
267 DGFP, D, 1, 399 (Plessen to Foreign Ministry, 25 March 1938). For the manner in which the news 
of the Anschluss were presented to the Italian public opinion see Ciano's Diaries, 1937 -8, 
12.3.1938; Lowe, C. J., Marzari F., Italian Foreign Policy 1870 -1940 (London & Boston 1975), pp. 
303ff 
268 Michaelis, "II Maresciallo dell'aria ", pp. 334 -5 
269 Bottai, Diario, 14.2.1939; Ciano 's Diaries, 21.3.1939; Segrè, Balbo, pp. 357 -8 
270 Segrè, Balbo, pp. 358 -62; Grandi, Il mio paese, Ch. 41; Quartararo, R., Roma tra Londra e Berlino. 
La politica estera fascista dal 1930 al 1940 (Rome 1980), pp. 468ff 
271 Bottai, vent'anni, pp. 55 -62; De Grand, Bottai, Ch. VII 
272 His reaction is documented by Ciano, who protested violently to the comments - see Ciano 's 
Diaries, 21.3.1939 
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Grandi, as a moderate and opponent of a strong party, was a de facto reluctant 
agent'". Ciano, on the other hand, used the increased role of the Gabinetto to 
promote compliant party colleagues, such as Anfuso, who would dutifully support 
his foreign policy agenda and transform the Foreign Ministry into a docile institution 
for his personal elevation''. As we saw earlier, both under Grandi and especially 
Ciano, the political power of Fascist elements in the Palazzo Chigi increased rapidly 
at the expense of the traditional diplomatic groups. Yet, the promotion of selected 
personnel from the PNF was made on the basis of personal allegiance to the Duce 
and his appointees as Foreign Ministers. Even the political autonomy of the Foreign 
Ministers was circumscribed by their detachment from the party's control, by their 
subordination to the will of the state and by Mussolini's ultimate right to dismiss 
them at any time. In this sense, the promotion of party members to state positions 
(Grandi, Bottai, Balbo, De Bono, Ciano) did entail an increase in their personal 
political power, but this power was not transferred cumulatively to the party, whose 
influence upon the leader- oriented decision -making process of the regime waned. In 
spite of the existence of ideological currents which either contradicted Mussolini's 
political decisions or aimed to alter them, the party as institution and collective 
expression of Fascist values conspicuously failed to sponsor a political agenda 
autonomous from Mussolini's will and thus lost its institutional capacity to 
effectively influence the decision -making process'''. In the end, all these leading 
figures of Fascism found it impossible to push their individual disagreements 
Mussolini's political decisions to extremes. The cult of the leader, the notion of 
loyalty to the Capo and the belief that he incarnated Fascist values, provided the 
strongest force of integration within the Fascist regime, overcoming even the strong 
opposition by the majority of Fascist gerarchi to the alliance with Germany and the 
anti -Semitic legislation. In spite of differences of opinion, they still viewed their 
allegiance to the Duce as a moral task to serve Fascism. In this sense, the motion of 
24/25 July 1943 was consistent with the overall philosophy of the Italian Fascist state 
in that opposition to the Duce's will could be intelligible only as a vote of no- 
273 See, in this chapter, Section IIIa 
274 Gilbert, "Ciano and his Ambassadors ", pp. 517 -8; Donosti, Mussolini e l'Europa, pp. 12ff 
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confidence in his overall political position and function as Capo del Governo / leader 
of Fascism and not in individual policies he sponsored'7'. 
Germany: Hitler's authoritarianism and the NSDAP's quest for a political 
role in the Nazi system 
In Germany, a similar institutional tension between the totalitarian aspirations 
of the NSDAP and the authoritarian concept of rule epitomised in Hitler's leadership 
surfaced long before the Machtiibernahme. The much longer period of incubation 
offered the NSDAP significantly wider time margins to crystallise its ideological 
character and its internal structures of power. By 1930, Hitler had successfully 
established his position as the indisputable leader of the movement by eliminating 
the opposition from the more "left- wing" group of the party 277. He had also asserted 
his authoritarian and charismatic concept of rule at the expense of party collective 
decision -making. Plans to establish a party Senate as the highest ideological organ of 
the NSDAP were tacitly dropped by Hitler. The Führer- also thwarted or revoked the 
systematic reforms of G. Strasser in 1928 -32, which intended to streamline the whole 
party organisation; a similar fate awaited Ley's plans from 1933 onwards to 
centralise and rationalise administrative control over the party organisation278. By the 
time of the acquisition of power, the Fiihrer possessed an ideological and political 
monopoly over the NSDAP, avoiding any form of collective representation of party 
interests on the leadership level or any accumulation of permanent power by either 
275 Gentile, E., 1I culto del littorio, pp. 269ff 
276 For the motion see Clough et al. (eds.), History of Modern Italy, pp. 514 -5. For an analysis see 
Schröder, J., "La caduta di Mussolini e la contromisure tedesche nell' Italia centrale fino alla 
formazione della Repubblica Sociale Italiana", in De Felice, R. (ed.), L' Italia fra Tedeschi e Alleati 
(Bologna 1973), pp. 138ff; Eatwell, Fascism, pp. 80 -2 
277 Stachura, P. D., "Der `Fall Strasser': Gregor Strasser, Hitler and National Socialism ", in ibid. (ed.), 
The Shaping of the Nazi State (London 1978), pp. 88 -130; and his Gregor Strasser and the Rise of 
the Nazi Party (Newton Abbot 1969), pp. 22 -66; Kissenkoetter, U., Gregor Strasser und die NSDAP 
(Stuttgart 1978), pp. 22 -7; Nyomarkay, pp. 90ff; Tyrell, A., "Gottfried Feder and the NSDAP ", in 
Stachura (ed.), Shaping of the Nazi State, pp. 48 -87 
278 For the Senate see Struve, pp. 436 -8; Broszat, Hitler State, pp. 207f; Mommsen, H., "National 
Socialism: Continuity and Change ", pp. 154 -5. Hitler declared his desire to establish a Senate in 
August 1933 [Domarus, Hitler, I, p. 292 - speech to Reichs- and Gau- leiters, 6 August 1933] but 
nothing came out of these declarations. For Strasser's efforts see Stachura, "Der `Fall Strasser -, pp. 
90ff; and, for Ley's plans, Orlow, Nazi Party, II, 85ff, 152f, 183ff 
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individuals or agencies. At the same time, however, the long duration of the 
Kampfzeit had transformed the NSDAP into an effective institution of mass support 
for Hitler and a much more sophisticated hierarchical organisation than the PNF279. 
By 1933, the Nazi party had developed a fairly elaborate division of expertise 
amongst its ranks - Rosenberg in foreign affairs, Hess and Ley in organisational 
issues, Goering in technical and economic issues, Röhm as the leader of an 
alternative military organisation for the armed forces of Nazi Germany280. The 
strengthening of the political power of certain individuals and groups within the party 
did not pose an institutional challenge to Hitler's power, as he was seen as the sole 
originator of policy'8'. It did, however, create an élite within the NSDAP with 
competences and ambitions which could justify the party's right to co- decide policy 
issues. 
Such hopes were frustrated very quickly, not only because the "minimum 
consensus" programme foiled a direct Nazi assault on the state, but also because 
Hitler was aware of the need to keep up appearances during the difficult period of 
consolidation. In 1933 -34, the SA and Röhm, who aspired to absorb the Reichswehr 
into their ranks and sponsored the idea of a "constant revolution" presented Hitler 
with the last major case of ideological opposition from his party282. The purge of 
June 1934 was, therefore, significant in two different ways. First, it underlined 
Hitler's determination to safeguard the authoritarian basis of his power against any 
possible contender, be that from the state or the party. Second, it showed that the 
Führer was serious about his declarations, on 13 July 1934, that the "revolution was 
over ", in the sense that the main component of the Nazi system - the Führer's 
charismatic rule - had been established and would not be institutionally 
challenged283. With the Law for Ensuring the Unity of Party and State (December 
279 Brooker, pp. 154 -6; Knox, "Conquest, Domestic and Foreign ", pp. 29 -30 
280 Orlow, Nazi Party, II, pp. 56 -60, 94ff 
;ß1 Nyomarkay, Chs. 3 -5 
282 Broszat, Hitler State, Ch. 6; Carr, "National Socialism: Foreign Policy and Wehrmacht ", pp. 166 -9 
283 On Hitler's declaration see Domarus, Hitler, I, pp. 411 -28 (speech to the Reichstag, 13 July 1934), 
447 -8 (Proclamation, 5 September 1934); Baynes. N. H. (ed.), The Speeches of Adolf Hitler. April 
1922- August 1939 (London, New York, Toronto 1942), I, p. 805. For the legal basis of Hitler's 
"charismatic" rule see Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, I, pp. 198f ; Kettenacker, "The German 
View ", pp. 32ff; Broszat, Hitler State, pp. 207ff 
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1933) the former was recognised as the sole political organisation but was tied to the 
state and was thus frustrated in its hoped to be the sole "source of the will of the 
state "284. The party could draw some consolation from the fact that Hess, head of the 
Politische Organisation and Hitler's Deputy, was given immediately a position in the 
cabinet and possessed the privilege of being the only spokesman for Hitler with 
strong power to control state appointments285. However, ironically, the increased 
powers of Hess led to the strengthening of Hitler's authoritarian rule. The Führer, 
who had deliberately divided G. Strasser's former functions between Ley and Hess, 
used the PO against Ley's effort to accumulate power through the extension of the 
DAF286. He also exploited the SA purge to ban intra -party political debate and to 
cleanse the party of dissident voices287. In contrast to Italy, where the Council of 
Ministers remained in function until the fall of the regime, in Germany the Cabinet 
lapsed into oblivion from 1934 onwards, thwarting a more effective fusion between 
state and party, and strengthening the PO's reliance upon Hitler's personal will. 
The old fighters were disappointed by the slow pace of fascistisation of the 
state288. Frick, the Minister of the Interior, had successfully fought an institutional 
battle against the NSDAP in 1933, legislating against the mass influx of party 
members into the civil service289. By 1937 none of the department heads of the 
Ministries had been members of the party before 1933, and only two could claim any 
connection with the NSDAP290. The alte Kämpfer opposed the opening of the party 
membership in 1937, as they were deeply distrustful of the "newcomers "' motives 
284 Diehl- Thiele, pp. 135ff; Mommsen, H., "Ausnahmezustand als Herrschaftstechnik des 
Nationalsozialistischen -Regimes ", in Funke, M. (ed.), Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte. 
Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches (Düsseldorf 1977), pp. 35f 
`85 Schoenbaum, D., Hitler 's Social Revolution. Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933 -1939 (New 
York & London 1980), pp. 22f 
286 Diehl- Thiele, pp. 210f; Orlow, Nazi Party, II, pp. 131ff; Mommsen, H., "NS: Continuity and 
Change ", pp. 170 -1 
287 See Hitler's orders issued on the day of the SA purge in Domarus, Hitler, I, pp. 401 -2 
288 Orlow, Nazi Party, II, pp. 138f 
289 Caplan, Government without Administration, Chs. 5 -6; Mommsen, H., Beamtentum im Dritten 
Reich. Mit ausgewählten Quellen zur nationalsozialistischen Beamtenpolitik (Stuttgart 1966), pp. 
45ff; Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, II, pp. 223 -5. For the role of the Ministry of the Interior 
under Frick see Peterson, E. N., The Limits of Hitler's Power (Princeton 1969), pp. 77 -148, who 
however exaggerates the importance of these institutional limits to the actual power of the Nazi 
leader. 
290 Orlow, Nazi Party, II, pp. 226 -7 
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and feared the loss of the élite status of the party291. They also regretted the party's 
lack of control over powerful institutions and policy areas. Attempts to fascistise the 
armed forces by establishing commissars in charge of indoctrinating the soldiers did 
not have much success until the war years292. As for the party's ambition to 
"determine the final form of foreign policy ", as the Völkischer Beobachter claimed in 
May 1933, the mere presence of Neurath as Foreign Minister, his good relations with 
Hitler until 1937 and the very limited fascistisation of the Wilhelmstrasse during the 
same period underlined the failure of the party's totalitarian ambitions293. 
Contrary to Italy, the role of leading party members was enhanced as a result 
of the radicalisation of Nazi policies after 1936. Goering supervised the Four -Year- 
Plan with enhanced powers over economic planning and rearmament; under the new 
law of 1937, Hess controlled all appointments to the Civil Service; Ribbentrop 
established himself as the new start of Nazi diplomacy, while Himmler was allowed 
to expand the political and military jurisdiction of the SS294. Hitler himself became 
increasingly reclusive, indifferent to day -to -day internal affairs and concentrating 
more and more on his foreign policy plans. His gradual retreat from domestic affairs 
after 1936 allowed a small group of leading party officials significant latitude in 
implementing Nazi policy and in running the government. Apart from those already 
mentioned, Goebbels rose to prominence in the last years before the war as 
Propaganda Minister, while Bormann gained Hitler's confidence and strengthened 
his position as the main link between the leader and the outside world as Hess' power 
diminished295 
291 Mommsen, "NS: Continuity and Change ", pp. 166 -9; Orlow, Nazi Party, II, pp. 202 -7; Brooker, 
pp. 88 -104. On the NSDAP's membership trends see Kater, M., The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of 
Members and Leaders, 1919 -1945 (Oxford 1983), pp. 263 -7, figs. 1 -5; Orlow, History of the Nazi 
Party, I, pp. 202f 
29' Berghahn, "NSDAP und `Geistige Führung "', pp. 19ff. See also Ch. 6, Section VIa 
293 Quote from Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, pp. 45ff 
294 In sequence: Broszat, Hitler State, pp. 300ff and Overy, Goering, Chs. 3 -5; Orlow, Nazi Party, II, 
pp. 178f; Michalka, "Joachim von Ribbentrop ", pp. 168f; Lösener, B., "Als Rassereferent im 
Reichsministerium des Innern", Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 9 (1961), pp. 135 -61; Hausser, 
P., Soldaten wie andere auch. Der Weg der Waffen -SS (Osnabrück 1966), pp. 152ff. Also, see 
Mommsen, H., "NS: Continuity and Change ", pp. 171f 
29$ Speer, A., Inside the Third Reich (London 1970), Chs. 7, 9; Kube, A., "Hermann Goering: The 
Second Man in the Reich" and Froehlich, E., "Joseph Goebbels: The Propagandist ", both in 
Smelser, Zitelmann (ed.), Nazi Elite, pp. 62 -73 and 48 -61 respectively 
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This, however, did not result in the strengthening of party influence as a 
whole at the expense of Hitler's authoritarianism. In fact, delegation of power took 
place mainly on the administrative, and not the political, level only after the PO in 
association with Hitler had neutralised the last major enclaves of opposition within 
the party. The Führer's confidence in the unshakeable basis of his supreme power is 
manifested by the delegation of the Führerprinzip to the Reich ministers at the 
beginning of 1936296. He also believed that differences of opinion could be resolved 
and settled through time without necessitating his bureaucratic intervention297. His 
authoritarian concept of rule actually presupposed a considerable level of party 
political autonomy and experimentation with alternative, radical forms of policy - 
making. The party provided a dynamic mechanism for implementing Hitler's 
policies, deciphering his intentions and ensuring optimal conditions for successful 
policy -making. As state institutions and traditional élites were becoming increasingly 
inflexible with the Führer's political demands, he relied on party officials and 
strengthened party influence over the state. Like Mussolini, however, he perceived 
politics as a matter of personal trust and avoided any permanent institutionalisation 
of power298. The party was important as a reservoir of multiple alternative solutions 
to policy problems. This explains why he was willing to defy government protocol in 
favour of a party favourite or to abandon one previous party ally for another. Yet, in 
the end, the NSDAP as a whole institution lacked any form of collective 
representation or political power in the Nazi system. Hitler's authoritarian system 
increasingly made use of the party's totalitarian ambitions against the authority of the 
state, but also created a sphere of administrative responsibility for party officials 
which remained separate from, and subordinate to, his exclusive prerogative to 
generate policy or have the ultimate say as mediator in policy disputes. 
This dualism between authoritarianism and totalitarianism becomes evident 
in the realm of foreign policy, an area which Hitler, like Mussolini, strove to 
296 Orlow, Nazi Party, II, 172 -3 
292 von Kotze, H., Krausnick, H. (eds.), Es spricht der Führer (Gütersloh 1966), pp. 132 -57; 
Mommsen, H., "Ausnahmezustand ", pp. 30 -45 
298 Mommsen, H., "NS: Continuity and Change ", pp. 173 -4 
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monopolise". Initially, the party played a limited role in either influencing or 
implementing policy decisions. After the failure of Rosenberg to make an impression 
with his London visit in 1933, Hitler relied on Neurath and the Wilhelmstrasse for 
the execution of the regime's official foreign policy. The party's autonomy in dealing 
with subversive organisations outside the Reich, like the Austrian National Socialists 
and Henlein's Sudeten German Party, was supported by Hitler as a Trojan horse for 
future German irredentist claims over these states3oo However, the failure to control 
party activities during the Vienna Coup of July 1934 convinced him of the need to 
curtail party political initiatives and to strengthen Hess' role in co- ordinating and 
monitoring more effectively the NSDAP301. In this sense, the contribution of the 
party to foreign policy decision -making until 1936 was minimal, but the party itself 
continued to operate as the laboratory of radical solutions for future expansionist 
projects, like the Anschluss, the Sudeten problem and the Polish Corridor. 
Ribbentrop's special role in dealing with Britain and Goering's responsibility for 
Danzig and the promotion of German -Italian relations underline Hitler's 
determination to exploit all possible avenues in search of the best solution for foreign 
policy -making. 
The party's role became more influential with the Spanish Civil War. Against 
the wishes of Neurath, Hitler allowed significant latitude both to the AO members in 
Spain and to Prince Philip of Hessen in dealing directly with Franco's officials in 
Spain and with the Italian Fascist leadership respectively302. A year later, Hess was 
authorised to establish the "Office of the Special Assistant for Foreign Policy 
Questions ". This was an important development as it highlighted Hitler's decision to 
enhance the party's involvement in foreign affairs while retaining his grip over 
decision -making through subjecting party activities in this field to the scrutiny of his 
loyal Deputy. Hess had accumulated powers since 1934 and his office played a 
299 For Hitler's special interest in foreign policy see Mommsen, H., "Ausnahmezustand ", p. 43; and 
for his opt -out from domestic affairs, Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, p. 627, and II, p. 245. For 
Mussolini's attempt to concentrate more power and supervise more foreign policy activities see 
Gallo, M., Mussolini 's Italy. Twenty Years of the Fascist Era (London 1973), pp. 212 -3 
300 Weinberg, Diplomatic Revolution, pp. 225 -6, 312ff; Starting World War II, pp. 288ff, 327ff 
301 Ross, D., Hitler und Dollfuss. Die deutsche Österreichpolitik. 1933 -1934 (Hamburg 1966), passim 
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pivotal role in the Anschluss, alongside Goering. In the aftermath of the crisis, Hess - 
and not the Reich ministers - acquired the right to control and approve the legislation 
of the new Austrian government under Seyss- Inquart3 °3 
However, Hitler's shift to the party did not entail either a waning of his 
autonomous basis of power or an institutional boost to the party as a whole. The 
Führer retained his right to appoint Gauleiters and make them directly accountable to 
hint °4. He also favoured certain groups and individuals within the NSDAP - 
Himmler's SS were again linked directly to Hitler, bypassing both the Wehrmacht 
leadership and the party bureaucracy, while Goering enhanced his power -base by 
assuming control of the Aryanisation programme in the occupied areas305. The 
NSDAP participated in the decision -making process as a conglomerate of individuals 
and agencies with no institutional cohesion and no permanent political roles. 
Responsibilities and jurisdictions were allocated on an ad hoc basis, lacking any co- 
ordinated plan for division of labour. If the party played a crucial role in the Austrian 
crisis of March 1938 (through its direct links with the Austrian National Socialist 
Party), its contribution to Hitler's policy towards Czechoslovakia in 1938 was 
confined to continued dealings with the Sudeten party leadership, while with regard 
to Poland in 1939 the party's role again was limited to cooperation with the local 
organisations in Danzig. Ribbentrop was by then the indisputable tsar of Nazi 
diplomacy, overshadowing even Goering who after the Anschluss, shifted to a less 
warlike and aggressive policy of German expansion, thus losing favour with 
Hitler306 However, Ribbentrop was never a "party" man. He had always been 
regarded by the alte Kämpfer as an outsider. Rosenberg, for most the obvious "party" 
3022 Schieder, W., "Spanischer Bürgerkrieg und Vierjahresplan. Zur Struktur der nationalsozialistischen 
Aussenpolitik ", in Michalka, W. (ed.), Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik (Darmstadt 1978), pp. 
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3C14 Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, II, pp. 196 -7: Diehl -Thiele. pp. 216 - See also, in general, 
Hüttenberg, P., Die Gauleiter (Stuttgart 1969) 
365 For the special status of the SS see Krausnick, H., Buchheim, H., Broszat, M., Jacobse H.-A. 
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expert in foreign affairs, did not refrain from criticising the main parameters of Nazi 
foreign policy in the last years before the war. Using the 1936 Party Rally at 
Nuremberg as a forum for expressing his alternative ideas, he gave a speech on the 
"ideological character" of Nazi foreign policy, repeating his basic motto of eastern 
expansion and alliance with Britain. Two years later, at the last Party Rally before the 
war, he emphasised the importance of Germany's "interests in the east ". He was 
relatively relieved when Ribbentrop promoted the Anti- Comintern Pact, but was 
extremely sceptical of what he perceived as its predominantly anti -British 
implications'. However, by entering one of the senior offices of the state 
Ribbentrop had been placed in the sphere of Hitler's authoritarian power, insulated 
from criticism and invested with significant powers for the handling of foreign 
affairs. This underlines the idiosyncratic character of the partification of the state in 
Germany - Nazi figures eroded the state mechanism but, once in state positions, they 
fell more firmly under Hitler's political influence and weakened their ties with the 
party organisation. 
V: Conclusions 
The establishment of a fascist state in Italy and Germany reflected the relative 
gains and losses in a triangular institutional battle between traditional élites, fascist 
leaderships and fascist parties. The initial cohabitation of the two leaders with the 
traditional groups in the context of a caesarist state, based on the "minimum 
consensus" compromise, strengthened the authoritarian tendencies in Mussolini's 
and Hitler's rule. Both the traditional élites groups and the fascist parties looked to 
the two leaders as guarantors of their political influence at the expense of the other. 
This situation allowed the two leaders to use the party in order to erode the 
legitimacy of the state while preserving the institutional dualism between state and 
307 Cecil, R., The Myth of the Master Race. Alfred Rosenberg and Nazi Ideology (London 1972), pp. 
77ff, 141ff 
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party as a means to curtail the party's totalitarian aspirations. The authoritarian basis 
of their rule facilitated the institutional subordination of the traditional élites and their 
relegation to the status of functional bureaucracies for the execution (and not co- 
decision- making) of fascist policies. In Italy this was achieved through the total 
identification of the Duce with the state and the centralisation of political authority in 
his hands. In Germany, the traditional strength of state bureaucracies ruled out a 
similar etatist approach, dictating instead a different strategy of subordination, 
whereby state functions were constantly being duplicated by party organisations, thus 
reducing the state to one amongst many policy- making options available to the 
Führer. 
With regard to the party as institution, in both countries it was allowed to 
perform its totalitarian functions on a social level, but was carefully excluded from 
any mechanism of collective political decision -making. In general, the party was 
integrated into the institutional structure of the fascist system at a lower level of 
authority than the leader, who established his exclusive role as policy originator. In 
this sense, the party's totalitarian aspirations were accommodated only to the extent 
that they did not infringe upon the leader's authoritarian power. The differences in 
the style of leadership exercised by Mussolini and Hitler determined different 
margins of activity for the PNF and the NSDAP respectively. The former was so 
heavily involved in so many everyday affairs of the regime (even if his involvement 
was superficial) that left very limited space to the party as a whole for political 
initiative. Instead, he relied on a number of party officials who were transferred to 
responsible state posts. Hitler, on the other hand, was so mesmerised by long -term 
foreign policy plans that, especially after 1936, he had little time for the internal 
issues of the German state. This released significant space for party activities in 
implementing the Fiihrer's will, but was carefully monitored either by Hitler himself 
(as the ultimate mediator) or by his loyal Deputy Hess and, later, by his right -hand 
man Bormann. Although the role of the party increased in Germany after 1936, 
ironically, its political significance as a whole diminished, because Hitler either 
moved his favoured party officials to state posts or made them directly accountable to 
him independently of central party control. In both cases, this resulted in their 
integration into the sphere of Hitler's authoritarian power and thwarted their primary 
obligation to the party. Unlike in Italy, however, where the PNF continued to lose 
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political influence, Hitler encouraged the radicalism of the NSDAP as a reservoir of 
alternative options for policy- making and showed an increasing inclination to make 
ad hoc use of agencies and individuals for the pursuit of specific goals3o8 
Therefore, the centrality of the leader in the fascist system's decision -making 
process was predetermined neither by any plans nor by clear fascist theory of state. 
The way the fascist state evolved until the outbreak of the Second World War does 
reflect the two leaders' determination to safeguard their authoritarian rule against 
power- sharing with other fascist and non -fascist élite groups. The separation of their 
sphere of power from the administrative layers of policy -making resulted in a chaotic 
system of government where no clear or permanent division of labour and 
jurisdiction was ever imposed. This uncoordinated polyocracy plagued even the 
etatist model of Italian Fascism. Confusion, however, was more acute in Germany, 
where the traditional strength of state bureaucracies and the higher degree of party 
autonomy from state control resulted in multiple jurisdictional conflicts which Hitler 
never resolved with a definite institutional arrangement. In both cases, however, the 
central authority of the fascist leaders emanated from their exclusive prerogative of 
defining the framework of policy -making and of acting as the ultimate arbiter of 
political battles. 
In this sense, Mussolini and Hitler's authoritarian power should be placed in 
a perspective that rejects both the concept of omnipotence and the idea of weakness 
resulting from the party's totalitarian power or the administrative chaos of the fascist 
systems. Especially in the field of foreign affairs, which the two leaders perceived as 
the preserve of their charismatic authority, the institutional separation of the leader's 
decision -making prerogative (objectives) from implementing policies (strategy, 
means) was rigid and offset any prospect of power- sharing. Co- decision -making was 
simply an ephemeral stage in the transition to authoritarian rule which reduced the 
influence of the traditional élites and of the party as a whole to a functional level of 
providing solutions for the promotion of the regimes' objectives. This system did not 
prevent individuals from winning the leaders' trust and influencing their short- and 
medium -term plans or strategies. These were, however, not institutional limitations 
on the leaders' power, in the sense that they did not obligate the leaders to treat either 
For this tendency during the war years see, in this study, Ch. 6, Section VIa 
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state institutions or party agencies as normative features of the decision -making 
process. As it happened with the ephemeral popularity of Grandi's peso 
determinante, Rosenberg's APA, Ribbentrop's "tripartite" alliance and Admiral 
Raeder's "Mediterranean strategy ", Mussolini and Hitler were institutionally free to 
choose from the available policy options and then discard policies and individuals 
without any obligation to accountability. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Ideology in practice? Fascist foreign policies from 
revisionism to large -scale expansion (1922 -1939) 
I: Introduction 
Hindsight is a dubious privilege for a historian. The acrimonious debate 
about the programmatic or not character of the Italian and German foreign policies in 
the interwar period exposed its ambiguous nature. On the one hand, knowledge of the 
evolution of the two regimes' expansionist plans into the Axis alliance and war has 
helped to relate the radicalisation of fascist expansionism to early ideological 
elements in the worldviews of the two leaders, thus highlighting a degree of internal 
consistency in their objectives and policies. On the other hand, accusations of reading 
history backwards attacked the notion that either the alliance or recourse to war had 
been pre -determined by any programmatic core in the expansionist policies of the 
two regimes. The notion of a consistent programme of expansion has been contrasted 
with the view that the drive to large -scale territorial aggrandisement and war was 
determined by either opportunism or social imperialism, or both. At the same time, 
even the originality of fascist foreign policies has been questioned. The debate about 
the continuities between liberal and fascist expansionist programmes revolves around 
similar questions - did the fascist take -over mark a break with previous foreign 
policies, sponsoring a new vision and style of expansion, or did it simply reproduce 
traditional great -power objectives, albeit couched in a more dynamic fashion? 
Overall, the existing literature has treated the two regimes rather differently. 
The Nazi regime has been regarded as more ideological and consistent in its 
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expansionist pursuits'. Hitler's fanatical exposition in Mein Kampf and his 
unwavering commitment to rearmament and reckless activism have formed the basis 
of the so- called intentionalist approach. H. Trevor -Roper's rigid conception of 
Hitler's ideology as a "blueprint for power " - was followed by K. Hildebrand's and A. 
Hillgruber's notion of a "stage -by- stage" plan for territorial expansion'. G. Schubert 
located the ideological origins of Hitler's foreign policy in the 1920s, a view shared 
by G. Stoakes who regarded the 1919 -1925 period as pivotal for the evolution of 
Hitler's worldview4. Even more flexible intentionalist arguments, such as A. 
Bullock's distinction between "consistent aims" and "opportunistic methods ", 
underlined how such ideological aims underpinned the regime's foreign policy - 
making and were never contradicted by tactical vacillations'. However, the 
intentionalist orthodoxy has been challenged from a variety of viewpoints. A. J. P. 
Taylor's classic and controversial account denied any ideological substance in Nazi 
foreign policy, arguing instead that expansionist goals were shaped according to 
traditionally German objectives and were pursued in reaction to inauspicious 
international developments'. H. Rauschning and H. Mommsen share the conviction 
that Nazi foreign policy originated from an unprincipled and blind pursuit of absolute 
power, devoid of any particular objective or strategy'. H. Mommsen also underlined 
' The best overall discussion of the different interpretations of Nazi foreign policy is to be found in 
Kershaw, I., The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation (London 1989, 2nd 
edition), Ch. 6. See also Williamson, D. G., The Third Reich (Harlow 1995, 2nd ed.), pp. 49 -77 
' Trevor -Roper, H. R. (ed.), The Table Talk of Adolf Hitler, 1941 -1944 (London 1953) 
3 Hildebrand, K., Vom Reich zum Weltreich. Hitler, NSDAP und die koloniale Frage 1919 -1945 
(Munich 1969); and "Hitlers Programm' und seine Realisierung, 1939 -1942 ", in Funke, M. (ed.), 
Hitler, Deutschland, und die Mächte. Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches (Düsseldorf 
1977), pp. 63 -93; Hillgruber, A., Hitlers Strategie. Politik und Kriegführung, 1940 -1941 (Frankfurt 
1965) 
4 Schubert, G., Anfänge Nationalsozialistischer Aussenpolitik (Cologne 1961); Stoakes, G., "The 
Evolution of Hitler's Ideas on Foreign Policy, 1919- 1925 ", in Stachura, P. D. (ed.), The Shaping of 
the Nazi State (London 1978), pp. 22 -47 
5 Bullock, A., "Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War ", in Robertson, E. M. (ed.), The 
Origins of the Second World War (London 1971), pp. 189 -224 
6 Taylor, A. J. P., The Origins of the Second World War (London 1961). For a discussion of his views 
see Wippermann, W., Wessen Schuld? Vom Historikerstreit zur Goldhagen -Kontroverse (Berlin 
1997), pp. 61f 
Rauschning, H., The Revolution of Nihilism (New York 1939); "Ausnahmezustand als 
Herrschaftstechnik des Nationalsozialistischen -Regimes ", in Funke, M. (ed.), Hitler, Deutschland 
und die Mächte. Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches (Düsseldorf 1977), pp. 30 -45, 
and "National Socialism: Continuity and Change ", in Laqueur, W. (ed.), Fascism: A Reader 's 
Guide. Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography (London 1979), pp. 151 -192 
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the social imperialist function of territorial expansion, especially in appeasing the 
radicalism of the Nazi party old fighters, while T. Mason echoed a similar argument 
when he described Hitler's foreign policy as a reaction to domestic pressures in a 
"barbaric variant of social imperialism ". According to Mason, these internal 
deadlocks prompted a radicalisation in the Nazi expansionist policies which 
culminated in the invasion of Poland as a desperate move to divert attention from the 
terminal crisis of the German economy in 19398. 
By contrast, the "traditional" interpretation of the Italian Fascist foreign 
policy has underlined the opportunistic, non -programmatic and diversionary 
character of Mussolini's expansionist plans9. Total rejection of the notion of a 
programme forms the basis of G. Salvemini's classic accounts, which emphasise 
both the improvising and the propagandistic nature of the Duce's foreign policy - 
making10. Similar views have been echoed by D. Mack Smith, who dismissed 
Mussolini as a "cloud- cuckoo -land" amateur and presented his whole policy as 
fraudulent ". More moderate was the analysis of E. Di Nolfo, who nevertheless 
detected no clear ideas in the regime's foreign policy in the 1922 -1930 period'. 
Social imperialist connotations pervade G. Rochat's extensive writings on Italian 
Fascist military policy, stressing that expansionist ventures were aimed at increasing 
the regime's domestic security13. In a similar vein, F. Catalano linked the 
radicalisation of the regime's foreign policy from 1935 onwards with the mounting 
8 Mason, T., "The Legacy of 1918 ", in Nicholls, A., Matthias, E. (eds.), German Democracy and the 
Triumph of Hitler - Essays in Recent German History (London 1971), pp. 215 -40; "Innere Krise und 
Angriffskrieg 1938 -9 ", in Forstmeier, F., Volkmann, H. E. (eds.), Wirtschaft und Rüstung am 
Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Düsseldorf 1975), pp. 158 -88. For a more detailed discussion of 
his arguments see, in this study, Ch. 6, Section II 
4 For a good account of the historiography on Italian fascist foreign policy see Petersen, J., "La 
politica estera del fascismo come problema storiografico ", in De Felice, R. (ed.), L 'Italia fra 
tedeschi e alleati. Vigezzi, B., La politica estera fascista e la seconda guerra mondiale (Bologna 
1973), pp. 11 -56; Politica estera e opinione pubblica in Italia dall'unità ai giorni nostri. 
Orientamenti degli studi e prospettiva della ricerca (Milan 1991), pp. 98ff; Azzi, S. C., "The 
Historiography of Fascist Foreign Policy ", The Historical Journal, 1 (1993), pp. 187 -203 
10 Especially, Salvemini, G., Prelude to the Second World War (London 1953) 
Mack Smith, D., Mussolini's Roman Empire (London 1982). For an assessment see Finney, P. (ed.), 
The Origins of the Second World War (London 1997), pp. 7 -8 
12 Di Nolfo, E., Mussolini e la politica estera italiana 1919 -1933 (Padova 1960) 
13 Amongst others see "Il ruolo delle forze armate nel regime fascista: conclusioni provvisorie e 
ipotesi di lavoro ", Rivista di Storia Contemporanea, 1 (1972), pp. 188 -99, esp. p. 101; Militari e 
politici nella preparazione della campagna d 'Etiopia (Milan 1971 
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economic crisis which hit the country later than other European countries14. 
However, a growing number of historians have attempted to overcome the absence of 
a Mussolinian Mein Katnpf and to trace an ideological consistency in the regime's 
foreign policy which could unify the relatively quiet 1920s with the aggressive 
expansion in the 1930s and the decision to enter the war in 1940. G. Rumi dated the 
origins of a programme in the early 1920s, while M. Knox and P. Alatri agreed on 
the existence of a general disegno finale (living space in the Mediterranean) which 
was formulated in the mid- 1920s'. Although most of these approaches 
acknowledged a high degree of continuity between liberal and Fascist expansionist 
goals, they attacked the notion that Fascist foreign policy changed objectives and 
style in the 1930s'6. Instead, they underlined an internal continuity and consistency in 
Mussolini's revisionist objectives, rejecting the notion that the radicalisation of 
Fascist expansionism in the 1930s was the result of Nazi influence or mounting 
domestic deadlocks. 
It becomes obvious that any notion of a programmatic foreign policy has to 
be established against three major objections. The first is that expansion as a policy 
option had little to do with the general fascist worldview and was mainly useful as a 
tool for diversion. The second is that the two fascist leaders were not in a strong 
position domestically which would enable them to shape and dictate foreign policy 
according to their beliefs and visions. The third is that fascist expansionist policies 
were dictated by short-term developments and traditional aspirations, thus lacking 
both internal cohesion and long -term objectives upon which they eventually 
converged. So far, we have established that expansion had an esoteric value for 
fascist ideology, as an expression of fascist (and national) superiority and as a 
process of instilling the new fascist mentality in the population. In this sense, 
14 Catalano, F., L 'economia italiana di guerra. La politica economico-finanziaria del fascismo dalla 
guerra d 'Etiopia alla caduta del regime, 1935 -1943 (Milan 1969). For a discussion and rejection of 
Catalano's economic arguments see Petersen, "La politica estera del fascismo come problema 
storiografico ", pp. 47 -8 
j5 Rumi, G., "`Revisionismo' fascista ed espansione coloniale (1925- 1935) ", in Aquarone, A., 
Vernassa, M. (eds.), Il regime fascista (Bologna 1974), pp. 435 -64; Knox, M., "Conquest, Domestic 
and Foreign, in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany ", Journal of Modern Histomy, 56 (1984), pp. 1 -57, 
and "The fascist regime, its foreign policy and its wars: an `anti- anti -fascist' orthodoxy ? ", in Finney 
(ed.), Origins of the Second World War, pp. 148 -68; Alatri, P., Le origini del fascismo (Rome 1963) 
This view is expressed mainly by Pastorelli, L., "La storiografia italiana del dopoguerra sulla 
politica estera", Storia e Politica, 10 (1971), pp. 603 -49 
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expansion constituted a goal of the fascist worldview and not just a policy option 
reduced to diversionary considerations. We have also shown that the charismatic 
basis of Mussolini's and Hitler's rule remained the sole institutional unifying element 
of the two fascist regimes until the end. The legal acquisition of power resulted in a 
polycratic arrangement, in which the fascist parties and the traditional elite groups 
co- existed in a constantly antagonising relationship. This fact ruled out a monolithic, 
totalitarian fascist regime but fostered the position and legitimacy of the two leaders 
in an extreme authoritarian system of rule, in which supreme responsibility for 
policy -making was the prerogative of the charismatic leaders. 
The third objection, however, is strengthened by two indisputable facts. First, 
given the legal acquisition of power in 1922 and 1933, and the co- existence of fascist 
groups and traditional elites, the foreign policy of the two regimes remained 
dependent on traditional institutions, processes and even personalities during the long 
period of fascist consolidation. This points to the direction of a continuity between 
liberal and fascist foreign policies, at least in the first years of fascist rule, during 
which the conduct of foreign affairs remained inextricably linked to traditional 
notions of revisionism, colonialism and irredentism. Even if we accept the existence 
of a fascist programme of large -scale expansion, such goals had to be deferred for the 
future in anticipation of more auspicious domestic and international circumstances. 
Such a dualism, however, between traditional and alleged fascist expansionist 
objectives renders the notion of an unwavering, concrete programme of fascist 
expansion problematic ". Second, the fascist take -over did not take place in a political 
vacuum. Domestic and international factors produced opportunities for, and 
limitations on, the fascist intentions for expansion. This dialectical relation between 
intentions and structures makes the idea of a linear unfolding of a programme or 
"blueprint for action" methodologically unattainable. Short-term vacillations or even 
contradictions are in ample evidence for both regimes. Hitler's policy towards Poland 
shifted from the Non -Aggression Pact of 1933 to the compromise offer of 1938 -39 
and finally invasion, while Mussolini's attitude to Yugoslavia fluctuated between 
fruitful negotiations in 1924, overt hostility in the 1927 -1936 period, the 1937 
" See the discussion in Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, pp. 122 -3, 129 -30 
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agreement and finally renewed opposition, culminating in plans for attack during the 
summer of 1940. 
Are we to conclude from these contradictions, as M. Broszat did for Nazi 
Germany, that they highlight the lack of clear ideological goals in fascist 
expansion's? The answer lies in a less rigid definition of the notion of "programme" 
which distinguishes long -term ideal goals from short- or even medium -term tactics 
and steps. It also presupposes the abandonment of the rigid distinction between 
traditional and "fascist" foreign- policy objectives. The ideological fusion in the 
Italian and German Right since the First World War enabled fascist ideology to 
reproduce traditional "great power" and revisionist themes in a new, dynamic and 
activist style of policy -making. Fascism's emphasis on the esoteric value of 
expansion gradually radicalised the tactics for attaining widely shared goals. At the 
same time, it aimed to eliminate any political distinction between utopian and 
realisable objectives, a distinction implicit in the Realpolitik of the previous liberal 
and conservative governments in the two countries. In legitimising the notions of 
space expansion and historic irredentism, the fascist regimes introduced territorial 
expansion as a central element of their worldview. However, in the short-term, 
foreign policy -making displayed a flexibility and even opportunism which allude to 
lack of an all- encompassing "programme ". Instead, decision -making remained for a 
long time circumscribed by domestic and international limitations, adhering to 
traditional arguments and justifications such as revisionism and irredentism, and thus 
upholding an impression of continuity. 
This is where hindsight becomes a crucial privilege: knowing the ultimate 
scope of fascist expansionist aspirations (as manifested in the two regimes' war 
aims), can it be shown that the short-term expansionist policies of the fascist regimes 
served an integrated long -term and large -scale vision? The aim of this chapter is to 
discuss the short-term expansionist initiatives of the Italian and German regimes, and 
to analyse their experiments with traditional arguments of expansion. Revisionist, 
irredentist and colonial policies will be examined separately in order to highlight the 
function and importance of each form in the overall fascist expansionist policies. In 
'B Broszat, M., "Soziale Motivation und Führer -Bindung des Nationalsozialismus ", Vierte jahrshefte 
fir Zeitgeschichte, 18 (1970), pp. 392 -409 
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the context of this analysis, two questions will be addressed. First, how innovative or 
not were the foreign policies of the two regimes in comparison with traditional 
expansionist aspirations? Second, to what extent can we integrate the revisionist, 
irredentist and colonial goals pursued by the two regimes into a consistent, large - 
scale expansionist vision which underpinned the foreign- policy decisions of the two 
regimes and was not contradicted in the long term by diplomatic flexibility or 
opportunism? 
II. Revisionism: the legacy of the Peace Treaties and the juridical 
argument for territorial expansion 
From the outset it became clear that the Peace Treaties had failed to base the 
postwar settlement upon a stable compromise between the conflicting claims of the 
European states. Strong feelings of dissatisfaction were common not only among the 
defeated, but also in the case of victorious or newly founded states. While the former 
had anticipated a conciliatory peace with mild territorial terms, the latter's 
expectations had been so inflated after the victory of the Entente powers and the 
declaration of Wilson's Fourteen Points, that it was impossible to be satisfied in toto 
under any conceivable peace plan'. This concerted attack by winners and losers alike 
at the Peace Treaties undermined the legitimacy of the postwar settlement and 
challenged its permanent character. Thus, the notion of revisionism was introduced 
into the political vocabulary of European affairs, becoming a catch -phrase for both 
territorial losses and unsatisfied promises or claims. 
Since the Peace Treaties had intended to provide a definite solution to 
territorial rivalries in Europe and overseas'0, revisionism formed the political 
platform for a synthesis of the European and colonial policies of the discontented 
19 For the text of Wilson's Fourteen Points see Snyder, L. L., Historic Documents of World War I 
(New York 1958), p. 164; and for his "vision" of a future Europe, Walworth, A., Wilson and his 
Peacemakers. American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (New York & London 
1986), pp. 40 -63. For the problems involved in the implementation a clear "ethnic" solution to the 
territorial problems of post -1918 Europe, see Walworth, pp. 435ff; Weinberg, G. L., Germany, 
Hitler, and World War II. Essays in Modern German and World History (Cambridge 1995), pp. 13ff 
2° Foster, A. J., "Britain and East Central Europe, 1918 -1948 ", in Stirk, P. (ed.), Mitteleuropa. History 
and Prospects (Edinburgh 1994), pp. 112 -5 
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states. It managed to adapt the traditional expansionist attitudes to the new 
circumstances that the end of war and the spirit of the Peace Treaties had established. 
As an open -ended commitment to future expansion'-', it succeeded in keeping the 
whole territorial debate alive and in presenting it as a juridical issue with concrete 
references to the "unjust" treaty. The previous tensions between colonial and 
continental expansion were brushed aside in favour of the right to expansion per se 
which seemed to subside in the face of the postwar exhaustion and craving for 
security. The discontented states exploited the plurality of their expansionist claims 
to achieve revision of the Peace Treaties not merely for the sake of specific 
amendments. Their ultimate goal was to deconstruct the permanent character of the 
settlement and to create a precedent for future, more concrete expansion. In this 
sense, revisionism should not be seen as either a form, or an autonomous goal, of 
expansion. It was rather a political and judicial excuse to re- legitimise the right to 
expansion in all its diverse forms (colonialism, irredentism, prestige expansionism 
etc.) in a manner that was politically relevant to, and acceptable in, the postwar 
circumstances. 
The Versailles settlement was regarded as a setback for the expansionist 
aspirations of Italy and Germany for entirely different reasons". As the main 
defeated nation of the First World War, Germany saw its territory reduced in two 
ways. First, as a result of the application of the concept of self -determination, she 
was forced to concede vast areas of her pre -1914 national territory to the victorious 
powers and the new states of central Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia). She lost the 
province of Alsace -Lorraine to France, nearly the whole of west Prussia to the 
resurrected Polish state, the Memel area to Lithuania, and small western districts to 
21 von Strandmann, H. P., "Imperialism and Revisionism in Interwar Germany ", in Mommsen, W. J., 
Osterhammel, J. (eds.), Imperialism and After. Continuities and Discontinuities (London, Boston & 
Sydney 1986), p. 93. 
22 For a discussion of the territorial implications of the Versailles Treaty upon postwar Germany see 
Weinberg, G. L., Germany, Hitler, and World War, pp. 11 -22, who also underlines that anti - 
Versailles feelings in Germany were grossly exaggerated, as the Treaty itself still left Germany in a 
privileged position in Europe [op. cit., pp. 19 -22]. Cf. a similar assessment of the Treaty in 
Matthias, "Influence of Versailles ", pp. 11 -28. In my view, however, both approaches miss a crucial 
psychological point: namely, that the German "defeat" never became obvious to the German 
population, and thus the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty were seen as exceptionally harsh, 
punitive and artificial. 
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Belgium''. Furthermore, the Rhineland area was demilitarised in order to strengthen 
the security of France's eastern frontier with Germany'-. At the same time, Germany 
had to accept the geographical separation of East Prussia from the rest of Germany 
due to the establishment of the so- called Polish Corridor, linking mainland Poland 
with the "Free City" of Danzig25. The treaty also acknowledged the independent 
character of Austria, thus rejecting the German claim for a union between the two 
states'''. Finally, the Saar territory was placed under international control for a period 
of fifteen years (with the provision for a plebiscite after fifteen years)'', while other 
plebiscites in North Schleswig'8 and Upper Silesia' determined the extent of the 
territories that were to be ceded from Germany to Denmark and Poland respectively. 
In the field of colonies, the Weimar Republic was forced to renounce all her rights 
over all her colonial possessions. The German colonial argument had been 
significantly weakened by the German military defeats in Africa during the First 
World War, defeats that had resulted in a virtual territorial decimation of her colonial 
empire30. On top of that, the Entente powers used as a pretext the accusation that 
Germany had proved incapable of administering colonies (the "Colonial Guilt" 
clause31), and distributed the former German colonies to Britain, France, Belgium, 
='Sharp, pp. 104 -6 
For an account of the compromise on the Rhineland issue at Paris see McCrum, R., "French 
Rhineland Policy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919 ", Historical Journal, 21 (1978), pp. 623 -48 
'5 On the settlement of the differences between Germany and the Polish delegation see Lundgreen- 
Nielsen, K., The Polish Issue at the Paris Peace Conference. A Study of the Policies of the Great 
Powers and the Poles, /918 -1919 (Odensee 1979). 
Y6 Stadler, K. S., The Birth of the Austrian Republic, 1918 -1921 (Leyden 1968); Meyer, H. C., 
Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 1815 -1945 (The Hague 1955), pp. 291 -310; Low, A. 
P., The Anschluss Movement 1918 -1919 and the Paris Peace Conference (Philadelphia 1974); 
Howard, "The Legacy ", p. 48 
27 Nelson, H. I., Land and Power. British and Allied Policy on Germany's Frontiers, 1916 -1919 
(London 1963), pp. 272 -81 
`8 Temperley, vol. 2 (London 1920), pp. 203ff 
29 Campbell, F. G., "The Struggle for Upper Silesia, 1919 -1922 ", Journal of Modern History, 42 
(1970), pp. 361 -85 
3° Henderson, W. O., The German Colonial Empire, 1884 -1919 (London 1993), pp. 117 -33; Stoecker, 
H. (ed.), German Imperialism in Africa. From the Beginnings until the Second World War (New 
Jersey 1986), pp. 270 -96; Louis, Great Britain and Colonies, pp. 50ff 
31 See Schmokel, W. W., Dream of Empire. German Colonialism, 1919 -1945 (New Haven and 
London 1964), pp. 64ff; Dockrill, M. L., Goold, J. D., Peace without Promise. Great Britain and the 
Peace Conferences, 1919 -1923 (London 1981), pp. 64 -8; Sharp, p. 165 
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Japan, Australia, south Africa and New Zealand in the form of "mandates" from the 
League of Nations'. 
In contrast to Germany, postwar Italy - as a nominal victor - made modest 
gains in the Peace Conferences. After long and difficult negotiations she secured the 
extension of her northern frontier up to the strategic Brenner Pass. This meant that 
not only the territories of Trento, but also a large part of the South Tyrol region - 
with a German- speaking majority - were incorporated into the Italian state" 
Additionally, in 1920 Italy signed the Treaty of Rapallo with Yugoslavia, under 
which she secured moderate territorial gains in Istria, Zara and Dalmatia'. 
Furthermore, the Italian government succeeded in securing her position in the 
Aegean Sea, by extending her occupation of the Dodecanese and by acquiring control 
of the Adalia "sphere of influence" in Asia Minor under the Treaty of Sèvres 
(1920)''. Even after the triumph of nationalist Turkey in 1922, and the consequent 
overthrow of the 1920 Treaty36, Italy successfully defended her right over the 
Dodecanese. 
At the same time, however, the territorial gains from the Peace Treaties fell 
significantly short of the expectations which had prompted the Salandra government 
to enter the war in 1915. The London Treaty of 1915 included provisions for 
substantial territorial compensations in Europe and Africa which were not fully 
realised in the postwar negotiations ". The Entente powers could not disregard the 
'- Sharp, pp. 163 -5 
" On the significance of Italy's northern frontier see Anderson, M., Frontiers. Territory and State in 
the Modern World (Cambridge 1996), pp. 45 -8. For the negotiations for the Brenner see Temperley, 
vol. 4, pp. 278 -95 
'' Albrecht -Carrie, R., Italy at the Paris Peace Conference (New York 1966), pp. 114ff. For the 
inconclusive Italo- Yugoslav negotiations at Paris see Temperley, 4, pp. 296 -326; and pp. 327 -37, 
for Rapallo. 
35 Cassels, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy (Princeton, New Jersey 1970), pp. 21 -3 ; Smith, M. L., The 
Ionian Vision. Greece in Asia Minor (London 1973) , pp. 68 -82, 129; Helmreich, P. C., From Paris 
to Sevres. The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conferences of 1919 -1920 (Columbus 
1974), pp. 314 -37 
36 For the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 see Cassels, pp. 21 -45; Walworth, pp. 351 -5; Smith, M. L., Ionian 
Vision, pp. 266 -336 
J7 See Lowe, Marzari, Ch. 7; Saladino, S., "Italy ", in Rogger, H., Weber, E. (eds.), The European 
Right. A Historical Profile (London 1965), pp. 249 -53 
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new reality on the east coast of Adriatic with the formation of the Yugoslav state3S. 
They were also reluctant to give up their predominant position in the Mediterranean 
by conceding part of their colonial possessions in north Africa to Italy, despite their 
promises for colonial compensation in 1915. Orlando, on the other hand, went to 
Paris with a programme of territorial claims that not only took the London Treaty for 
granted, but also succumbed to the nationalist propaganda by adding Fiume to the 
long list of Italian demands39. In these circumstances, it is easy to understand the 
Italian resentment at the decision, first, to establish Fiume as a Free State under the 
Rapallo Treaty of 19200 and, second, to exclude the issue of the Italian colonies 
from the final treaties. The occupation of Fiume by D'Annunzio in September 1919 
was the first ominous indication of Italian revisionist aspirations'. Such was the 
annexationist fervour in postwar Italy that the dissatisfaction for the unfulfilled 
territorial claims totally overshadowed the enthusiasm for victory and the Brenner 
issue'. 
A detailed account of Italian and German revisionist activities prior to the 
advent of the PNF and NSDAP to power does not lie within the limits of this study. 
In Italy, this period was a short interlude, fraught with social divisions and economic 
encumbrances which kept the liberal governments occupied with the task of domestic 
consolidation rather than with any serious effort to advance revisionist plans. In the 
field of foreign policy, the 1918 -1922 liberal interregnum was marked by endeavours 
to defend the precarious postwar territorial gains and to stabilise Italy's new 
international position in Europe and the Mediterranean. It was a period of 
normalisation in her relations with Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and the western 
powers'. At the same time, the Fascist movement emerged as the fiercest vocal critic 
38 On the attitudes of the Great Powers towards Yugoslavia see Sharp, pp. 135 -42. On the claims of 
the Yugoslav side see Lederer, I. J., Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference. A Study in 
Frontiermaking (Yale 1963) 
39 De Grand, Nationalist Association, pp. 102 -5 
4o Albrecht -Carrié, Diplomatic Histoiy, pp. 231ff. For a nationalist contemporary view, see Federzoni, 
L., Il trattato di Rapallo. Con un' appendice di documenti (Bologna 1921) 
4' Ledeen, M. A., The First Duce (Baltimore & London 1977); Clark, pp. 203 -5 
42 Howard, "The Legacy ", pp. 50 -1; Albrecht -Carrie, Diplomatic Histoiy, pp. 100 -3, 141 -9 
43 See Hughes, S., "The Early Diplomacy of Italian Fascism: 1922 -1932 ", in Craig, G., Gilbert, F. A. 
(eds.), The Diplomats 1919 -1939 (Princeton, New Jersey 1953), pp. 210 -4; Knox, M., "Il fascismo e 
la politica estera italiana", in Bosworth, R. J. B., Romano, S., La politica estera italiana (1860- 
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of the foreign policy strategy of the Italian liberal governments and formally 
introduced the claim for revision of the peace settlement`. The occupation of Fiume 
by D'Annunzio was eventually suppressed by the new Giolittian administration in 
1920, but this show of strength did not silence the nationalist and Fascist propaganda, 
which kept up the pressure for a "just" regulation of the Dalmatian issue'. In 
Germany, on the other hand, Weimar revisionism covered a significantly longer 
period (1919- 1932). Such was, however, the extent of the country's postwar 
problems and restrictions under the Versailles settlement that territorial revisionism 
presupposed advances in four more basic forms of revision: economic, against 
reparations; diplomatic, against isolation and exclusion from the international 
system; legal, against Germany's inequality of rights; and military, against the 
massive restrictions on the armed forces. The moderate policies of Stresemann made 
significant advances in all four fields, but peaceful revisionism failed to deliver any 
tangible gains with regard to the territorial issue'. By 1933 the Weimar governments 
had managed to free the country from most of its previous legal and economic 
restrictions; yet Germany still remained confined within the humiliating territorial 
arrangement of 191947. 
1985) (Bologna 1991), pp. 290f; Albrecht- Carrié, R., Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini (New York 
1950), pp. 190 -6 
44 Di Nolfo, A., Mussolini e la politica estera italiana 1919 -1933 (Padova 1960), pp. 12ff; 00, XIII, 
154; XIV, 213 -4; XVIII, 416 
45 On the removal of D'Annunzio from Fiume, see Ledeen, First Duce, pp. 187ff; Clark, pp. 204 -5. 
Note, however, Mussolini's cool attitude towards D'Annunzio in late 1919 -early 1920 [Di Nolfo, 
Politica estera, pp. 17 -21] 
46 For a concise analysis of the Weimar foreign policy see Hiden, J. W., The Weimar Republic 
(London 1974), pp. 25 -31. See also Jacobson, J., Locarno Diplomacy (Princeton, New Jersey 1972); 
Lee, M. M., Michalka, W., German Foreign Policy 1917 -1933 (Leamington Spa, Hamburg & New 
York 1987), pp. 112 -48. For the role of Stresemann in German revisionism see Bretton, H. L., 
Stresemann and the Revision of Versailles (Stanford 1953); Zimmermann, L., Deutsche 
Aussenpolitik in der Ära der Weimarer Republik (Berlin & Frankfurt 1958); Gatske, H. W., 
Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany (Baltimore 1954) 
47 On the connection between the failure of the Weimar Republic to amend the territorial clauses of 
the Versailles Treaty and the demise of Republic, see Zimmermann, passim. Cf. Matthias, 
"Influence of Versailles ", p. 23 
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Italy: Revisionist policies 
The Fascist episode in European politics started with the March on Rome in 
October 1922. As Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of a government with high 
nationalist credentials, Mussolini realised the priority of dealing with the 
complications of the Peace Treaties in a manner suggestive of the regime's 
dynamism'. He was also conscious, however, of two main limitations on his 
revisionist aspirations. The first pertained to the necessity to reassure foreign 
governments and international public opinion about the law -abiding intentions of the 
new Fascist government'. The second was related to the reluctance of the major pro - 
status quo powers in Europe (namely Britain and France) to discuss any revision of 
the postwar settlement, especially after such difficult and time -consuming 
negotiations. These two considerations seemed to prevail in the first year of Fascist 
rule, and Mussolini hastened to affirm his respect for the Peace Treaties in his first 
foreign policy speech to the Chamber and again throughout the first half of 1923. He 
concluded, however, with an ominous remark about the ephemeral character of 
treaties in general, and this reflected his long -term unwillingness to accept the 
postwar settlement as a definite territorial solution to Italy's aspirations'. 
There were two categories of territorial issues that the new Italian 
government could include in its revisionist agenda. The conclusion of the Peace 
Treaties in 1920 had still left a number of territorial questions pending for a future 
solution. Of particular interest to Italy's expansionist aspirations were the issues 
pertaining to the final adjustment of the Italo- Yugoslav border", to the Italo- Turkish- 
48 Mack Smith, D., Italy (Ann Harbor 1969), p. 446; De Felice, R., "Alcune osservazioni sulla politica 
estera mussoliniana ", in Aquarone, A., Vernassa, M. (eds.), Il regime fascista (Bologna 1974), pp. 
488f 
49 The reactions of the foreign governments to the appointment of Mussolini were mixed. See Cassels, 
pp. 3 -18, DDI, 7th, I, 38/50/84/127/130; Orsini, F. G., "La diplomazia ", in Del Boca, A., Legnani, 
M., Rossi, M. C. (eds.), Il regime fascista. Storia e storiografia (Rome & Bari 1995), pp. 285f; Di 
Nolfo, A., "L'opinione pubblica europea e l'ascesa di Mussolini ", II Mulino, 10 (1954), pp. 635 -47 
5° The speech is printed in Atti del Parlamento italiano. Camera dei deputati. Sessione 1921 -23. 
Legislatura XXVI. Discussioni (Rome 1923), vol. IX, pp. 8389 -94, and reprinted in Mussolini, B., 
Scritti e discorsi di Benito Mussolini (Milan 1934 -1939), III, pp. 59 -73. For a translation of the most 
important excerpts see Delzell, C. F. (ed.), Mediterranean Fascism, 1919 -1945 (New York, 
Evanston & London 1970), pp. 45 -51. See also Hughes, S., pp. 216ff 
51 For an general analysis of the Italo- Yugoslav frontier see Moodie, A. E., The Italo- Yugoslav 
Boundary (London 1945). The postwar negotiations for the issue of Dalmatia, Istria and Fiume are 
also dealt with in Reichman, S., Golan, A., "Irredentism and Boundary Adjustments in Post -World 
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Greek dispute over the sovereignty of the Dodecanese5', and finally to the colonial 
compensation which had been promised to Italy under the London Treaty53. The 
postwar liberal governments had dealt with the first two questions, yet the 
settlements remained inconclusive at the time of Mussolini's appointment. The Santa 
Margherita Accords, adjusting territorial issues in the area surrounding Fiume54, were 
handed over to the new Fascist government for final ratification. Mussolini honoured 
his promise to respect the concluded treaties and ratified the accords in February 
1923, but refused to sanction the secret protocol. This complication laid the 
foundations for the re- examination of the Italo- Yugoslav frontier in 1923. With 
regard to the issue of the Dodecanese, there was the Italo -Greek agreements of 1919- 
20, according to which the islands (except Rhodes) were to be ceded to Greece'. 
This had been cancelled by the Treaty of Sèvres, which reaffirmed the temporary 
sovereignty of Italy over the Dodecanese56. By the time of Mussolini's appointment, 
however, the resurgence of nationalist Turkey in Asia Minor had completely 
overthrown all previous adjustments and the whole question of the Aegean Sea was 
opened again for negotiations. By contrast, the issue of deciding the extent of Italy's 
colonial compensation in Africa had not received any concrete response up to 
October 1922, given the evasive attitude of the British and French governments'. 
Italy's Entente partners had no intention of sharing their joint domination of the 
War I Europe ", in Chazan, N. (ed.), Irredentism and International Politics (London 1991), pp. 57- 
61; Dockrill, Goold, Peace without Promise, pp. 105 -10; Lowe, Marzari , Chs. 7 -8 
52 A general analysis of the negotiations on the issue of the Dodecanese is provided by Lowe, Marzari, 
pp. 186 -91. For the handling of the issue by the fascist government see Cassels, Chs. 1, 4, 10. The 
Greek claims over the Dodecanese at the Paris Peace Conference are discussed in Smith, M. L., 
Ionian Vision, pp. 72 -4. 
53 The text of the Treaty of London has been translated and reprinted in Clough, S. B., Saladino, S. 
(eds.), A History of Modern Italy. Documents, Readings and Commentary (New York and London 
1968), pp. 308 -17 
54 On the agreements of 1920 between Italy and Yugoslavia see Lederer, pp. 246ff; Temperley, 4, pp. 
307ff; Moodie, pp. 173 -6. Due to the compromise on the issue of Fiume, it was understandable that 
the nationalist- fascist opposition to the liberal government was united in attacking the Rapallo 
concessions. See De Grand, Nationalist Association, pp. 117f; Salvatorelli, L., Mira, G., Storia 
dell 'Italia nel periodo fascista (Turin 1957), pp. 153ff] 
ss Albrecht -Carrié, Diplomatic History, p. 190; Di Nolfo, Politica estera, pp. 54 -5. The Agreement 
had united the nationalist right against concessions to Italy's neighbours. See De Grand, Nationalist 
Association, Ch. 7 
56 The course of negotiations which led to the Treaty of Sevres is documented in Helmreich, Ch. XIV. 
Especially for the renunciation of the Venizelos- Tittoni agreement, see p. 320. 
57 Di Nolfo, Politica estera, pp. 54ff. This explains Mussolini's pressure immediately after the March 
for a colonial mandate [DDI, 7th, I, 141/159] 
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Mediterranean with any other state, even less so with a Fascist state. Therefore, 
between 1922 and 1924 they refused Italy either a settlement on the issue of the 
Italian minority in Tunisia, or a prestigious Italian participation in the negotiations 
for the future status of Tangier". The loss of the Adalia "sphere of influence" in Asia 
Minor under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) was a further blow to the Italian dreams 
for domination of eastern Mediterranean. It strengthened, however, the Italian 
argument for colonial compensation and became the sharp edge of Fascist 
propaganda against Britain and France for concessions in Africa'. 
Mussolini's revisionist policies delivered tangible gains in all three fronts. 
The re- negotiation of the Italo- Yugoslav frontier produced the Rome Protocols of 
January 1924, according to which Italy acquired control of the city of Fiume by 
granting the surrounding territories to Yugoslavia. There was no real concession 
there - these same territories had been initially granted to Yugoslavia under the secret 
protocol of the Santa Margherita Accords, which Mussolini had refused to ratify'. 
This was the first victory of Italian revisionism, not only against the new state of 
Yugoslavia but also against the French concept of security in the Balkans and the 
Adriatic. It was also a symbolic triumph for the Fascist regime on the highly emotive 
issue of Dalmatia -Istria which had become the cornerstone of Italian irredentism 
since the beginning of the twentieth century'. The Italo- Yugoslav rapprochement 
was achieved through the co- operation between Mussolini and Salvatore Contarini, 
Under -Secretary to the Foreign Ministry. Although he was the main representative of 
the liberal diplomatic establishment, Contarini had kept his position after the March 
on Rome and succeeded in exercising a restraining influence on Mussolini's reckless 
expansionist ambitions'''. 
Furthermore, the Treaty of Lausanne sanctioned the continuing occupation of 
the Dodecanese by Italy, thus annulling the 1919 Tittoni -Venizelos agreement for the 
58 Cassels, pp. 201 -15; Mack Smith, D., Le guerre di Mussolini (Rome & Bari 1976), pp. 43 -58 
59 Cassels, p. 218. For the origins of the Italian infiltration in Asia Minor prior to the First World War, 
see, in this study, Ch. 1, Section V 
60 Moodie, pp. 203f; Cassels, pp. 127 -45; Di Nolfo, Politica estera, pp. 170ff 
61 For the importance of Adriatic irredentism in Italian nationalism see Vivante, A., Irredentismo 
Adriatico (Florence 1954); De Grand, Nationalist Association, Ch. 6; Webster, passim, esp. pp. 
333ff 
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return of the islands (except Rhodes) to Greece63. The most important victory, 
however, for the Italian regime was the decision of the new British government to 
cede an extensive part of the Jubaland district (between Ethiopia, Somalia and 
Kenya) to Italy in early 1924, and then Jarabub (between Egypt and Libya) in 1925. 
This was a success not simply in territorial and colonial terms, but primarily as a 
manifestation of the Fascist regime's diplomatic consolidation in the European 
systemG4. Under this agreement Britain gave up a previous crucial precondition for 
colonial concessions to Italy: the return of the Dodecanese, or part of them, to 
Greece65. The cession of Jubaland regardless of the fate of the Dodecanese ensured a 
prestige victory for Italian colonial revisionism not only in east Africa but also in the 
neuralgic part of the eastern Mediterranean. Finally, the Italo- Albanian Treaty of 
1927 re- established Italian influence over the region after the much -criticised 
decision of the liberal administration to withdraw the troops from Valona in 192066 
In general, Mussolini's revisionist policies added very little to the traditional 
ambitions of Italian diplomacy for border readjustments in the Balkans and in Africa. 
The successes in Fiume, the Dodecanese, Jarabub and Jubaland were endorsed by the 
diplomatic establishment as constructive steps in the direction of strengthening 
Italy's influence in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. This impression of continuity 
was reinforced after Mussolini's adherence to the Locarno Pacts of 1925 and the 
absence of aggressive expansionist ventures during the so- called "decade of good 
behaviour" until 1935. At the same time, Mussolini's highly selective and 
inconsistent invocation of the revisionist principle has been criticised by historians as 
62 On the role of Contarini see Knox, "Politica estera italiana", pp. 290 -1; Orsini, pp. 285f; Di Nolfo, 
Politica estera, pp. 48 -51, 167 
63 Cassels, pp. 21 -22; Lowe, Marzari, pp. 173 -5 
64 The origins of this agreement are to be found in the Milner -Scialoja agreement of 1920, which 
related the compensation to Italy under Art. 13 of the Treaty of London to the cession of Jubaland 
and Jarabub. See Cassels, pp. 216 -8; Di Nolfo, Politica estera, pp. 147ff; Hughes, S., pp. 221 -2. For 
the positive reception of this development by the traditional diplomats, see Guariglia, R., Ricordi 
(Naples 1950), pp. 22ff, 35 -6 
65 On the British proposal for a quid pro quo between Jubaland and part of the Dodecanese see DDI, 
7th, II, 513 -4. Mussolini replied negatively (II, 532). For the negotiations between the two sides see 
Di Nolfo, Politica estera, pp. 112 -4. See also the text of the final agreement in DDI, 7th, III, 388 
66 For the halo- Albanian negotiations see Veneruso, D., L'Italia fascista, 1922 -1945 (Bologna 1981), 
pp. 137 -45; Di Nolfo, Politica estera, pp. 173 -95. 
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evidence of the absence of a coherent expansionist strategyó7. Such a reading, 
however, overlooks two major factors. First, the Duce showed little interest in the 
normative value of revisionism as a principle for border readjustment. His 
endorsement of anti -Versailles rhetoric was circumscribed by his perception of 
Italy's strategic and security interests. This meant that he was determined not only to 
pursue the Adriatic claims of the revisionist argument but also to encourage other 
countries (for example, Hungary) in their revisionist aspirationsó', but also to oppose 
the same principle regarding the sensitive issue of the Anschluss, which could 
jeopardise Italy's security at the Brenner. Second, Mussolini's ambitions in the 
Adriatic and the wider Mediterranean basin went beyond what the traditional 
revisionist agenda could justify as legitimate territorial readjustments. The violent 
occupation of Corfu in August 1923 was not simply "a colossal error of 
miscalculation and blind ambition "69; it was decided before the assassination of 
Tellini and provided Italy with the ultimate control point to the whole of the Adriatic 
Sea. Mussolini's subsequent policy of penetration pacifique in Albania and his 
ambition to provoke an internal collapse in Yugoslavia revealed his long -term 
intention to establish a virtual monopoly of power in the Adriatic and the Balkans. 
Such an objective implied a radical reorientation of Italian foreign policy towards the 
Balkan states which included traditional revisionist claims but was by no means 
confined to them. 
Germany: revisionism 
In contrast to the Italian case, the revisionist policies of the Nazi regime in 
Germany after 1933 took place in a completely different diplomatic context. Hitler 
had to take into account two severe limitations on his anti- Versailles plans. The first 
limitation concerned the inauspicious diplomatic and military position of post -1918 
Germany. With the Locarno Treaty, the Disarmament Conference and the plans for 
67 Salvemini, G., Prelude to the Second World War (London 1953), pp. 353f; Hughes, S., "The Early 
Diplomacy of Italian Fascism: 1922 -1932 ", in Craig, G., Gilbert, F. A. (eds.), The Diplomats 1919- 
1939 (Princeton, NJ 1953), pp. 223 -5; Vigezzi, Politica estera e opinione pubblica, pp. 87ff 
68 Hughes, pp. 224f; Lowe, Marzari, Ch. 11 
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the amendment of the reparations obligations, the policies of the Weimar Republic 
had improved Germany's standing in the international system70. They had failed, 
however, to achieve either equality of rights or the restoration of the country's 
military potential. This double reality meant that the new Nazi government had both 
limited diplomatic margins for peaceful revision and still no chance of success 
should it choose to resort to forceful changes of the Versailles status quo. The second 
limitation originated from the unfavourable international attitudes and reactions to 
the intentions of the new Nazi regime in Germany. If the British and French 
governments had been sceptical, or even irritated, at Italy's great -power aspirations 
in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, they were now significantly more alarmed at 
the rise to power of a politician who had never concealed his determination to shatter 
the Versailles Treaty and reclaim Germany's lost power. At the same time, the Italian 
Fascist leadership continued to have mixed feelings about the restoration of the 
Reich's position in the European system. Although a possible ally in exercising 
pressure over France, a strong Germany represented a tangible threat to Italy's 
position in central Europe and the Balkans. As Mussolini was moving to a pro- status 
quo attitude in 1933 -471, Hitler's gambles on the sensitive issue of Austria in July 
1934 turned Italy from a possible (and future) partner in revisionism into a temporary 
opponent'. 
Despite these limitations, Hitler could take advantage of a much more 
developed revisionist conscience in 1933, not only among the discontented nations 
but also among the guarantors of the postwar territorial settlement. The careful 
handling of the revisionist issue by the Weimar Republic, and the progress in all 
69 Salvemini, G., Mussolini Diplomatico (Bari 1952), pp. 382 -3 
70 On the importance of the Locarno Treaty for German foreign policy see Zimmermann, Ch. VII. For 
Germany's position in the Disarmament Conference see Craig, G., "The German Foreign Office 
from Neurath to Ribbentrop", in Craig, Gilbert (eds.), pp. 409 -14; Heineman, J. L, Hitler's Foreign 
Minister. Constantin Freiherr von Neurath, Diplomat and Statesman (London 1979), pp. 51 -8. For 
the issue of reparations see Helbig, W., Die Reparationen in der Ära Bruning (Berlin 1962). 
Generally, see Kaiser, D. E., "Hitler and the Coming of the War ", in Martel, G. (ed.), Modern 
Germany Reconsidered (London & New York 1992), p. 180 
71 Lowe, Marzari, pp. 223ff 
72 On the Vienna putsch and Mussolini's angry reaction, see Jagschitz, G. Die Nationalsozialisten 
1934 in Österreich (Graz 1976); Weinberg, Germany, Hitler and World War II, p. 98; DDI, 7th, III, 
781/787; Di Nolfo, Politica estera, pp. 132, 5; Vogelsang, T., "Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der 
Reichswehr 1930 -1933 ", Viertel ahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 2 (1954), pp. 432 -4 
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other directions except for the territorial issue73, had greatly legitimised Germany's 
claims for the return of, at least part of her pre -1914 territories, in Europe and 
overseas'. Moreover, the revisionist experiments of Fascist Italy in the 1920s had 
exposed the difficulties in defending the postwar settlement as a definite territorial 
solution for the European system. Consequently, the Versailles status quo had 
become much less unassailable in 1933 than it was, or had appeared to be in the 
previous decade. This was something that even Britain and, to a lesser extent, France 
had come to acknowledge, first on the issue of reparations and then in the question of 
equality of legal and military rights. Undoubtedly, the transition from legal to 
territorial revisionism proved significantly more time -consuming for interwar 
Germany. By 1935, however, re- adjustments in all other aspects of the postwar 
settlement had resulted in a restoration of Germany's power, so that territorial 
revision ceased to be a purely juridical matter. Nazi Germany now possessed both the 
diplomatic status to pursue peaceful revisionism and the economic -military potential 
to expand by force. This was the main consideration behind the shift in British and, 
later, French foreign policies to tolerance and appeasement from the mid -1930s 
onwards'. 
In purely territorial terms, Nazi revisionism adhered to the traditional lines of 
the policy sponsored by the Wilhelmstrasse and the Reichswehr leadership 
throughout the Weimar Republic7ó. Billow's April 1933 Declaration of Principles 
73 Zimmermann, Chs. VI, IX -XII 
74 On the German "legal" arguments against the colonial provisions of the Versailles Treaty see 
Schmokel, pp. 1 -17, 76 -87; von Strandmann, "Imperialism and Revisionism ", pp. 94ff. From the 
contemporary literature see, among others, Townsend, M. E. "The Contemporary Colonial 
Movement in Germany ", Political Science Quarterly, 43 (1928), pp. 64 -75; Dix, A., Weltkrise und 
Kolonialpolitik (Berlin 1932). 
75 See a number of articles on British and French appeasement policies in Mommsen, W. J., 
Kettenacker, L. (eds.), The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement (London 1983). 
Especially, Douglas, R., "Chamberlain and Appeasement ", pp. 79 -88; Parker, R. A. C., "The Failure 
of Collective Security in British Appeasement ", pp. 22 -9; Frankenstein, R., "The Decline of France 
and French Appeasement ", pp. 236 -45. See also Weinberg, Germany, Hitler and World War II, pp. 
109 -11 
7A Michalka, W., "Die nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik im Zeichen eines 'Konzeptionen- 
Pluralismus' - Fragestellungen und Forschungsaufgaben ", in Funke, M. (ed.), Hitler, Deutschland 
und die Miichte. Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches (Düsseldorf 1977), pp. 53 -4; 
Hillgruber, A., "Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in der deutschen Aussenpolitik von Bismarck bis 
Hitler ", in Hillgruber (ed.), Grossmachtpolitik und Militarismus im 20. Jahrhundert (Düsseldorf 
1974), pp. 22ff; Nipperdey, T., "1933 and the Continuity of German History", in Koch, H. W. (ed.), 
Aspects of the Third Reich (London 1985), pp. 489 -508 
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described the revision of the Versailles Treaty as Germany's "most pressing 
concern ". Priority was given to the "transformation of the Eastern Frontier" at the 
expense of more far -reaching changes (such as the Anschluss), which presupposed a 
radical international realignment. At the same time, however, the Memorandum 
placed primary emphasis on the need to "recover our [military and economic] power" 
by pursuing a consistent policy of rearmament and exploiting "the most favourable 
moment for the revision of each particular part of the treatys77. After 1933, 
conscription was regarded as a necessary prerequisite for rebuilding the power of the 
Reichswehr by the military leadership, given the anticipation of failure at the 
Disarmament Conference at Geneva78. Furthermore, the remilitarisation of the 
Rhineland, a traditional objective of German revisionism since Locarno, constituted a 
medium -term priority for both the army and the Wilhelmstrasse in order to strengthen 
German security vis -à -vis France79. 
After his appointment as Chancellor in January 1933, Hitler exploited every 
opportunity to reassure military and diplomatic circles about his cautious revisionism 
intentions. In the famous speech to the Reichswehr Generals in early February 1933, 
he described rearmament as the "most important prerequisite for achieving ... 
political power" with a view to conducting a "battle against Versailles "80. The 
77 For the Memorandum see Wollstein, G., "Eine Denkschrift des Staatssekretärs Bernhard von Bülow 
vom März 1933. Wilhelminische Konzeption der Aussenpolitik zu Beginn der 
Nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft ", Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 1 (1973), pp. 77ff; Krüger, 
P., Hahn, E, J. C., "Der Loyalitätskonflikt des Staatssekretärs von Bülow im Frühjahr 1933 ", 
Vierte jahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte. 20 (1972), p. 376 -410; Michalka, "Nationalsozialistische 
Aussenpolitik ", pp. 56ff. A translation of its important points may be found in Noakes, J., Pridham, 
G. (eds.), Nazism. A Documentary Reader, vol. III: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination 
(Exeter 1988), pp. 653 -7. See also Michalka, W., "Conflicts within the German Leadership on the 
Objectives and Tactics of German Foreign Policy, 1933 -1939 ", in Mommsen, W. J., Kettenacker 
(eds.), The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement (London 1983), pp. 50ff; and the 
translation of the excerpts used above in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 653ff 
78 Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 632 -3; Deist, W., Messerschmidt, M., Volkmann, H. -E., 
Wette, W., "Causes and Preconditions of German Aggression ", in Deist, W. (ed.), The German 
Militauy in the Age of Total War (Leamington Spa 1985), pp. 336 -53, here pp. 343f 
79 Heinemann, J. L., Hitler's First Foreign Minister. Constantin Freiherr von Neurath, Diplomat and 
Statesman ( Berkeley, Los Angeles & London 1979), pp. 110ff; ADAP, C, II, 452; Laffan, M., 
"Weimar and Versailles: German Foreign Policy, 1919 -33 ", in Laffan (ed.), The Burden of German 
History, 19/9 -1945 (London 1989), pp. 81 -102 
8° Vogelsang, T., "Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr 1930 -1933 ", Vierte jahrshefte fier 
Zeitgeschichte, 2 (1954), p. 435, excerpts of which are translated in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, 
III, pp. 628 -9. See also "National Socialism: Foreign Policy and Wehrmacht ", in Laqueur, W., 
Fascism: A Reader's Guide. Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography (Harmondsworth 1979), pp. 
142f 
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withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations in October 
1933 was the culmination of a consistently obstructive Germany policy throughout 
1933 which was master -minded by the Wilhelmstrasse and was endorsed by the 
military leadership'. Neurath had never concealed his dislike of the League, and 
Blomberg continued to press Hitler for an immediate withdrawal from Geneva$'. 
Ironically, the particular timing of the decision to withdraw is the only case in which 
Hitler postponed, rather than pushed forward, a foreign policy initiative. His 
reluctance to sanction an earlier withdrawal stemmed not from scepticism about the 
advisability of this move (he had made his decision clear since May 193383), but from 
a determination to avoid negative repercussions from the impression that Germany 
had deliberately sabotaged the disarmament negotiations84. As for the next major 
revisionist move, namely the introduction of conscription, it took place in early 1935 
with the complete agreement of Blomberg and with the tacit approval of the Foreign 
Office". 
However, the real pièce de résistance of Nazi revisionism was the unilateral 
remilitarisation of the Rhineland in March 1936. Given the endorsement of the 
objective by the military and diplomatic conservative elites, the French -Soviet Pact 
of 1935 provided Hitler with the diplomatic ammunition to announce the termination 
of Germany's commitment to the Locarno pacts". This implication was not missed 
by Neurath who worked consistently throughout 1935 to pave the way for a 
diplomatic solution to the problem of the Rhineland - a solution which was also 
8' Weinberg G. L., The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany. Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933- 
1936 (Chicago 1970), pp. 159 -67; Wheeler- Bennett, J. W., The Disarmament Deadlock (London 
1934), pp. 86ff; Craig, G. A., "The German Foreign Office from Neurath to Ribbentrop", in Gilbert, 
F., Craig, G. A. (eds.), The Diplomats (Princeton, New Jersey 1953), pp. 409 -18 
8' Heinemann, pp. 100f; Geyer, M., "The Dynamics on Military Revisionism in the Interwar Years. 
Military Politics between Rearmament and Diplomacy ", in Deist (ed.), German Militmy, pp. 100- 
51, here pp. 118 -9; Michalka, "Conflicts ", pp. 49 -50 
83 See his speech of that day in Domarus, M., Hitler: Reden and Proklamationen, vol. I: Triumph 
(1932 -1938) (Würzburg 1962), pp. 270 -9, esp. 278 -9 
84 Craig, "German Foreign Office ", pp. 413ff; Wheeler -Bennett, Disarmament Deadlock, pp. 113ff. 
See also his speech announcing the withdrawal in Domarus, Hitler, I, pp. 305 -14 
85 Geyer, "Dynamics of Military Revisionism ", pp. 127 -8; Heinemann, pp. 110 -1. See also, in this 
study, Ch. 3, Section III 
86 See DBFP, 2nd, VI, pp. 803ff; and, for French fears about the fate of Locarno and German 
intentions, DDF, 2nd, I, 36 
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favoured by the Reichswehr leadership87. Although Hitler eventually decided to 
overcome the hesitations of Neurath and Blomberg, opting for a speedy military 
action, Neurath endorsed the move and advocated the completion of the operation in 
the face of Hitler's temporary panic- attack during the first days of the action". 
The continuity between conservative and Nazi revisionist objectives 
demonstrated in 1933 -36 period renders G. Weinberg's description of early Nazi 
foreign policy as a "diplomatic revolution" rather exaggerated89. A. J. P. Taylor used 
this high degree of conservative consensus until 1936 to make the provocative 
statement that "Hitler's foreign policy was that of his predecessors, of the 
professional diplomacy at the Foreign Office and of virtually all Germans '90. Even if 
Taylor overstated the case of continuity, other historians have questioned the 
originality of Hitler's revisionist policies, highlighting instead the traditional 
character of its major objectives91. This impression was further strengthened by the 
fact that, unlike in Italy, the commitment of the traditional diplomatic and military 
elites to revisionism was temporary and open-ended', disguising wider expansionist 
schemes in the east. The example of Poland is indicative of such intentions. In 
Billow's memorandum there is an explicit reference to the need to reject any solution 
which "applies to Danzig alone ", favouring instead another "partition" of Poland. 
The same intransigent attitude dominated Neurath's briefing of the cabinet in April 
1933, which restated Billow's assertion that any agreement with Poland was "neither 
possible nor desirable "93. As for the Reichswehr, the scenario of a war against Poland 
87 DGFP, C, 4, Enclosure 529 (Ribbentrop's report, 20 January 1936); C, 4, 71 -2; Funke, M., "7 März 
1936. Fallstudie zur aussenpolitischen Führungsstil Hitlers ", in Michalka, W. (ed.), 
Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik (Darmstadt 1978), pp. 277 -324 
88 Weinberg, Diplomatic Revolution, pp. 58 -9; Funke, M., Sanktionen und Kanonen. Hitler, Mussolini 
und der nationale Abessinienkonflikt 1935 -1936 (Düsseldorf 1970), pp. 135ff 
89 Weinberg, Diplomatic Revolution, pp. 357 -64 
90 Taylor, Origins, pp. 67 -8 
91 Kettenacker, L., "The German View ", in Douglas, R. (ed.), 1939. A Retrospect Forty Years After 
(London 1983), pp. 26 -8; Heinemann, pp. 90f; Brüning, H., Memoiren 1918 -1934, vol. I (Munich 
1972), p. 203; Craig, G. A., Germany 1866 -1945 (Oxford 1978), pp. 678ff. 
92 von Strandmann, H. P., "Imperialism and Revisionism in Interwar Germany ", in Mommsen, W. J., 
Osterhammel, J. (eds.), Imperialism and After. Continuities and Discontinuities (London, Boston & 
Sydney 1986), pp. 90f 
93 DGFP, C, 1, 142 (Conference of Ministers, 7 April 1933); Heinemann, pp. 97 -8 
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had been one of the favourite hypotheses of the military exercises organised by 
Blomberg since the late 1920s94. 
However, from the outset Hitler's eastern policy revealed an interesting 
divergence. In a speech delivered on 23 March, he appealed to Germany's 
neighbours for peaceful relations'. This message was interpreted by the Polish 
leader, Pilsudski, as a departure from the traditional anti -Polish line of German 
diplomacy. For this reason, and at Polish request9', negotiations for an agreement 
carefully by- passed the Wilhelmstrasse97 and soon extended far beyond what Neurath 
regarded as an economically beneficial treaty98 to the possibility of a political pact99 
In this direction, Hitler instructed the Nazi party in Danzig to avoid any provocation, 
paving the way for an extensive agreement between the Free City and the Polish 
government in August 193310°. The ensuing negotiations in Berlin made significant 
progress in the last three months of 1933, leading to the signing of the Non - 
Aggression Pact in January 1934. 
On its own, the pact with Poland appeared to thwart Germany's revisionist 
ambitions in the east but did not seriously alarm the Wilhelmstrasse101, as most 
diplomats interpreted Hitler's surprise mainly as the result of Germany's diplomatic 
isolation after withdrawing from Geneva in October10'. However, the developments 
in German- Polish relations should be contrasted with the changing Nazi policy 
towards the Soviet Union. The importance of maintaining good relations with the 
USSR - first recognised by von Seeckt in the early 1920 and realised in the Treaty of 
94 Geyer, M., Aufr-üstung oder Sicherheit? Die Reichswehr und die Krise der Machtpolitik 1924 -1936 
(Wiesbaden 1980), pp. 188ff; Craig, G. A., Germany 1866 -1945 (Oxford 1978), pp. 680 -1 
95 Domaris, Hitler, I, pp. 229 -38 and, for a repetition of the same appeal in May 1933, pp. 270 -9 
" Weinberg, Diplomatic Revolution, pp. 63ff. See also Roberts, H. L., "The Diplomacy of Colonel 
Beck ", in Craig, G. A., Gilbert, F. (eds.), The Diplomats, 1919 -1939 (Princeton, New Jersey 1953), 
pp. 579 -614 
97 See, for example, DGFP, C, 1, 168 (Wysocki to Foreign Ministry, 20 April 1933) 
98 DBFP, 2nd, 6, 59. For Neurath's attitude to the Pact see, in this study, Ch. 3, Section III 
99 DGFP, C, 2, 79/81/82 
too For Hitler's instructions see DGFP, C, 1, 273. See also Weinberg, Diplomatic Revolution, pp. 65ff. 
101 Seabury, P., The Wilhelmstrasse. A study of German diplomats under the Nazi regime (Berkeley 
1954), pp. 38f 
1O? There is some truth to this, although it should be reminded that the negotiations had started in late 
spring. See, for example, Hitler's comments in Rauschning, H., The Revolution of Nihilism (New 
York 1939), pp. 428ff 
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Rapallo in April 1922 and the Treaty of Berlin in 1926103 -, was emphatically 
reiterated in Billow's memorandum of April 1933. Although Neurath was not the 
most fervent advocate of Soviet friendship, he did play a crucial role in the 
ratification of the Berlin Treaty in April 1933104. For his part, the new German 
Ambassador in Moscow, Nadolny, pressed his government in Berlin to consolidate 
friendly economic and political relations with the Soviet Union10'. However, by 
October 1933 Hitler considered an improvement in German- Russian relations as 
"impossible" and rejected Nadolny's numerous appeals for a rapprochement106. After 
the pact with Poland in January 1934 Nadolny expressed his opposition to this policy 
and, when the Soviet proposal for a comprehensive political agreement submitted to 
the German government in May 1934 was not even considered by Hitler, he resigned 
in protest107. At the same time, the Führer used Göring as a special envoy to Poland 
in order to explore Pilsudski's attitude to the prospect of a military alliance against 
the Soviet Union108. He also appeared determined to preserve the atmosphere of 
rapprochement by dealing with problems in such sensitive areas, such as the Corridor 
and Upper Silesia, in an accommodating spirit109 
In this sense, Hitler's commitment to revisionism in the 1933 -36 period 
displayed a selectivity dominated by the prerequisites of a more far -reaching eastern 
policy. Although he seemed to share the traditional diplomats' view of revisionism as 
a short -term formula to disguise more extensive expansionist ambitions, he was also 
willing to sacrifice emotive revisionist claims (Corridor, Upper Silesia) and the 
colonial argument for the sake of an eastern policy dominated by a distinctly anti - 
Soviet orientation. The conclusion of the pact with Poland shows his flexibility with 
diplomatic opportunities, but his subsequent thoughts about a German- Polish alliance 
against the USSR highlights his ability to align short-term experiments with long- 
term plans for eastern expansion. Similarly, he relied on the traditional revisionist 
agenda of rearmament- conscription- Rhineland but was also eager to shelve the 
103 Geyer, Ar f üstung, pp. 78ff; Deist et al., "Causes and Preconditions ", pp. 338f 
104 DGFP, C, 1, 136/140/147 
los Craig, "German Foreign Office ", pp. 417 -8 
106 DGFP, C, 1, 457; C, 2, 118 -9/122 
107 Weinberg, Diplomatic Revolution, pp. 182 -3; Craig, "German Foreign Office ", pp. 417 -8 
108 DGFP, C, 3, 474 
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Wilhelmstrasse's claims for border readjustments in Eupen -Malmedy and North 
Schleswig10. Therefore, the impression of continuity in German foreign policy was 
mitigated by these divergences which alluded to a more radical Hitlerite vision for 
long -term expansion. 
III. Irredentism: the distortion of an argument 
In its original form, irredentism had been a liberal argument, theoretically not 
linked to territorial expansionism but to certain populations, according to the 
principle of self -determination 'H. The emergence of nationalism in the nineteenth 
century gave rise to the idea of nation -state, a territorial entity which should include 
the whole of an ethnically and culturally homogeneous population, and only that. In 
the first chapter we analysed the great difficulties in implementing this principle in 
the European mosaic of peoples up to 1914. The First World War revived the debate 
of national frontiers in the European system, and the Wilsonian Fourteen Points 
offered a new popularity to irredentist claims ''. The failure, however, of the Peace 
Treaties to balance the conflicting claims of the different states and the desire of the 
victors for a punitive arrangement against the vanquished aggravated an already 
problematic situation13. The dissolution of the three great multinational empires 
109 Weinberg, Diplomatic Revolution, pp. 186 -7 
10 Heinemann, pp. 93f; Weinberg, Diplomatic Revolution, pp. 282ff 
On the theoretical debate about the concept of irredentism, and the difficulties of a uniform 
definition, see Chazan, N., "Irredentism, Separatism and Nationalism ", in Chazan (ed.), Irredentism 
and International Politics (London 1991), pp. 139 -51. Cf. the theoretical framework of discussing 
irredentism in Horowitz, D. L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London 1985), 
pp. 229 -88 
1'2 Weinberg, Germany, Hitler and World War II, pp. 13ff 
13 See Dehio, L., Germany and World Politics in the 20th Centuiy (London 1959), pp. 109 -23 (116- 
23). See also Sharp, pp. 185ff 
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(Habsburg, Russian, Ottoman) in 1918 produced a plethora of new states with more 
or less inflated territorial aspirations. These were satisfied at the expense of the 
defeated powers. Given, though, the impossibility of drawing clear ethnic frontiers in 
central and eastern Europe, old irredenta were simply replaced - or complemented - 
by a long list of new ones. The further provision of plebiscites in some disputed areas 
proved how difficult it was to apply the principle of nationality in areas with limited 
tradition in etatist culture14. 
Not surprisingly, the irredentist argument gained greater currency in interwar 
Germany than in Italy. To the traditional German irredenta in vast areas of the 
erstwhile Habsburg and Russian empires the Peace Treaties added the ethnically 
German populations of the territories ceded from the Reich to France, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and the new Baltic states. At the same time, the collapse of the 
Habsburg empire stimulated hopes for the long- standing alldeutsche claim for a 
German- Austrian union, which the Treaty of Versailles eventually banned15. Finally, 
the extension of the northern Italian frontier up to the Brenner Pass placed a strong 
German- speaking minority in South Tyrol under the sovereignty of the Italian state. 
What Germany lost in South Tyrol became the major gain of Italian 
irredentism from the postwar territorial settlement. The other gain was the modest 
extension of the north -eastern frontier in Istria and Dalmatia by the Treaty of Rapallo 
in 1920. In this sense, the problem with Italian postwar irredentism was totally 
different from the German case. Under the Peace Treaties Italy had succeeded in 
expanding her territory by capitalising on the international popularity of irredentism. 
Such was, however, the traditional strength and scope of Italian irredentism that it 
could not possibly have been satiated by any conceivable postwar settlement. It 
might have been easy to satisfy its anti- Austrian claim for Alto Adige and the 
Brenner, but it would be impossible to reward its anti -French (Corsica, Nice) or anti - 
British (Malta) ambitions, especially under a settlement that was mainly defined and 
14 For the problem of minorities in interwar Europe, and the complications created after the 
plebiscites see Macartney, C. A., National States and National Minorities (Oxford 1934) 
"5 For the German -Austrian support for Anschluss in 1918 -9, and the final prohibition, see Low, The 
Anschluss Movement (1918 -1919); Meyer, pp. 291 -7; Temperley, vol. 4, pp. 465 -9. For a 
contemporary presentation of the pro -union argument see Renner, K., Deutschland, Österreich und 
die Völker des Ostens (Berlin 1922) 
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guaranteed by Britain and France'''. As in the case of colonialism, it was the feeling 
of limited compensation and injustice that offered a new lease of life to Italian 
irredentism in the interwar period. 
In spite of this fundamental difference, however, there was a common 
element in the revival of the irredentist debate in postwar Italy and Germany. On the 
one hand irredentism was a major form of attack upon the principles of the Peace 
Treaties. It could exploit the issue of nationality in order to expose the inconsistent, 
selective application of the maxim of self -determination in redrawing the map of 
Europe after the First World War. In this way, irredentism could disguise significant 
territorial claims in the framework of a legal revisionism that appeared more 
justifiable, yet no less extensive than any conceivable Italian or German plan for 
continental expansion after the war. On the other hand, irredentism, whether in the 
context of revisionism or not, was the only available platform for the justification of 
territorial claims in the continent '''. This was of particular importance for the future 
of fascist foreign policies in both Italy and Germany, since "unredeemed" territories 
formed a crucial part of the greater expansionist visions held by the two fascist 
leaderships. Mussolini needed Fiume as a strategic port in the Adriatic18, needed 
Malta and Corsica as control points for the centre of the Mediterranean1' in order to 
consolidate Italy's geopolitical position in the area. In a similar way, the Polish 
Corridor stood in Hitler's way towards the unification of the western and eastern 
German territories and the conquest of Lebensraum in Russia. In order to achieve 
that he also required the economic and defensive advantages of the neighbouring 
states in central Europe. In all these cases, irredentist arguments succeeded in 
covering the middle ground between traditional claims for irredenta, continental 
revisionism, and the large -scale expansionist ambitions of the two fascist regimes. 
16 The scope of the Italian irredentist claims is discussed in "Irredentismo ", in Levi, F., Levra, U., 
Tranfaglia, N. (eds.), Storia d'Italia (Florence 1978), II, pp. 573 -82. For the claims discussed at the 
Paris Peace Conference see Temperley, vol. 4, pp. 280f, 287f, 301ff 
'17 The "political" use of irredentism, namely as justification for expansionism, is discussed in Ben - 
Israel, H., "Irredentism: Nationalism Reexamined ", in Chazan (ed.), Irredentism, pp. 23 -35 (31 -35) 
18 On the economic importance of Fiume for Italy see De Grand, Nationalist Association, pp. 105 -7; 
Webster, pp. 106 -7, 336 
19 Knox, " Politica estera italiana", p. 296; Tamaro, A., "L'Italia tradita nell'Adriatico", Politica, 3/3 
(1- 1920), p. 339 
218 
Foreign policy -making (1922 -1939) 
There is ample evidence to support the thesis that the national -ideological 
character of postwar Italian and German irredentism was overshadowed by political 
considerations. Even during the postwar negotiations for the final peace settlement 
the Italian government exploited the irredentist argument only as part of the 
justification for its territorial claims against the erstwhile Habsburg empire''0. The 
same may be said about the cession of German territories to Poland and France under 
the Versailles Treaty. In both cases, territorial adjustments that were justified on 
irredentist terms produced a plethora of other irredenta that were not accounted for 
by the Peace Treaties'''. Theoretically, even after the new territorial map of Europe 
had been ratified, the Italian Fascist regime could sustain irredentist claims over the 
south -eastern coast of France, over Kustenland and Dalmatia, over the islands of 
Malta and Corsica, and finally over certain Swiss cantons. Postwar Germany, on the 
other hand, could exploit irredentist issues in all possible directions: in Austria, in the 
Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia, in Alsace -Lorraine, in the Polish Corridor, in 
Silesia, in Lithuania, in North Schleswig, and - after 1919 - also in South Tyrol. 
The incorporation, however, of the irredentist principle into the wider 
geopolitical framework of fascist expansionism was marked by a highly selective and 
unprincipled application by the two regimes. Instead of being a normative concept 
referring to populations, fascist irredentism focused on territories and was exploited 
as part of the justification for wider expansionist plans. This, of course, was not a 
fascist novelty: a similar radical irredentist tendency had developed between 1890 
and 1914 in the two countries. It was this pre -war tradition of radical irredentism that 
initiated the shift in the focus of irredentism from the ethnic character of populations 
to the geographical and historic dimensions of territorial claims. The fascist regimes, 
however, were innovative in that they came to value the significance of irredentist 
issues on an individual and flexible basis, according to their expansionist priorities 
and their wider political alliances or rivalries. This tendency resulted from the fact 
120 The acceptance of the strategic Italian argument for Brenner by Wilson facilitated the agreement 
for Italy's northern frontier, despite the creation of a vast German- speaking minority within the 
Italian state. See Sharp, p. 138; Albrecht -Carrié, Diplomatic History, pp. 80f; Temperley, IV (1921), 
pp. 280 -7; De Grand, Nationalist Association, pp. 102 -3. That the Brenner was defined as Italy's 
frontier in accordance with security and not ethnic principles is highlighted in Seymour, C., 
"Woodrow Wilson and self -determination in the Tyrol ", The Virginia Quarterly Review, 38 (1962), 
p. 574 
121 Kaiser, "Coming of the War ", pp. 184 -5; Foster, p. 115; Walworth, pp. 468 -84 
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that the irredentist argument lost its political autonomy in postwar Italy and 
Germany. Until the First World War it had more or less managed to retain its 
normative character within the nationalist discourse. It had also been treated as a 
semi -utopian concept which kept it away from the tests of political action. This 
situation changed completely in the interwar period. The gradual absorption of the 
nationalist movement into Fascism in both countries deprived the irredentism 
argument of those implications that were incompatible with the spirit of radical 
nationalism. Evidently, there was no room in Fascism for the "liberal" respect for 
other nationalities that had limited the territorial scope of irredentism in the past and 
kept it free from aggressive implications'". Thus, irredentism was transformed into 
an aggressive principle serving the irrelevant (i.e. territorial and not ethnic) ambitions 
of a large -scale territorial expansionism. 
Furthermore, the Peace Treaties had greatly individualised and politicised the 
issue of "unredeemed" territories. Interwar irredentism was not simply about 
ethnically kin populations that had not as yet been incorporated in the national Italian 
or German territory. It also involved peoples and geographic areas that had been 
transferred to other states, old and new, through the legal force of the Peace Treaties. 
The political conflict between rival nationalisms had conceptualised the issue of 
irredenta in terms of international antagonism and had increased the number of 
potential territorial conflicts. Before the First World War, Italian irredentism was 
directed mainly against those territories still under the control of the Habsburg 
empire in particular, and to some extent those of France and Switzerland also. After 
1919 the Yugoslav state was added to the list as the usurper of certain Habsburg 
territories with an alleged Italian character. Interwar German governments faced a 
similar, yet more extensive and complicated problem. German "unredeemed" areas, 
previously under Russian or Habsburg control, were divided among a plethora of 
new states in central and eastern Europe. Additionally, Germany lost even part of her 
pre -1914 territory to France, Belgium and Poland. Finally, the issue of Austria and 
1222 See Lowe, Marzari, Ch. 8; De Grand, Nationalist Association, pp. 88, 103 -4 
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the fate of the German -speaking minority in South Tyrol opened a new front in the 
south, against Italy this time'''. 
Both Mussolini and Hitler were aware that they needed allies in order to 
pursue their great -power aspirations. In this sense, irredentism in its postwar form 
was unsuitable as an overall principle of foreign policy strategy. Its full implications 
would engage Italy and especially Germany in a quixotic battle against every single 
European state. This realisation prompted the selective political use of the irredentist 
arguments by the two fascist regimes. Mussolini focused on the Italo- Yugoslav 
conflict over Fiume, and the defence of Austria's independence as a safeguard 
against German influence in the Brenner. His main interest lay in upholding the 
European balance of power in the decade between Locarno and the Ethiopian 
campaign'', and this induced him to tone down the anti -French and anti -British 
goals of Italian irredentism. Of course, he was a politician who resisted definite 
commitments, and the irredentist objectives in the Mediterranean were important for 
his plans for transforming the region into an Italian mare nostrum. Yet, control of the 
Adriatic and stability in the northern frontier were more immediate tasks. Therefore, 
although he never ceased to support irredentist activities in Malta and Corsica, he 
nevertheless abstained from a hard line on this issue until the late 1930s125. 
The success of Italian irredentism in Fiume in 1924 did not shift Mussolini's 
attention from the Adriatic region. This tendency was intensified in the following 
years as the restoration of the German power and the rise of Hitler to power 
appeared to threaten the balance of power in central Europe'''. As, however, the 
rapprochement between the two fascist regimes was growing (complemented with a 
German opt -out on the issue of South Tyrol), the focus of Italian irredentism started 
123 On Hitler's view on the importance of South Tyrol and the German- Italian relations see Hitler, 
Mein Kampf pp. 571ff 
124 This distinction between the decade of "good behaviour" and the "aggressive" post -1935 foreign 
policy is meaningful when we speak of appearances, but does not reflect pacifist or pro -status quo 
intentions [on the distinction see Halperin, S. W., Mussolini and Italian fascism (Princeton, new 
Jersey 1964); Siebert, F., Italiens Weg in der Zweiten Weltkrieg (Frankfurt 1962), pp. 14f; 
Wiskemann, E., Fascism in Italy (London & Basingstoke 1970), pp. 50ff]. Quite symbolically, 
Mussolini spoke of the "universality of fascism ", and Italy's "right to revision" in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s. See Cassels, p. 395; Hughes, S., pp. 223ff. See also, in this study, Ch. 5, Section II 
125 The fascist involvement in Irredentist movements in Corsica and Malta is documented in Cassels, 
pp. 86ff; Morewood, pp. 170 -1 
126 See below, Ch. 5 
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to move again towards the Mediterranean. This was reflected in the popularity of the 
studies on various regions of the Adriatic -Mediterranean area that were published in 
Italy in the late 1930s'''. At the same time, as relations with France were steadily 
deteriorating, the neglected Italian claims on the south -east coast of France were 
resuscitated'''. Quite symbolically, Ciano's speech in front of the Chamber in April 
1939 was dramatically interrupted by loud cries for "Corsica, Nice, Savoy'''. 
Hitler's irredentism, on the other hand, showed a similar selectivity, but a 
more stable pattern of political priorities. The Führer's unwavering emphasis on 
eastward expansion provided the German irredentist claims - traditional or revisionist 
- against Poland and the Baltic states with the highest political significance. Quite 
conveniently, the Polish Corridor and the "unredeemed" territories of East Prussia 
were also the top priorities of the Reichswehr leadership and the conservative 
diplomats130. In an event organised by the War Minister von Blomberg only a few 
weeks after the Nazi Machtergreifutng, Hitler spoke clearly to an audience of army 
officials about the need for rearmament in order to achieve the goals of eastward 
expansion'3'. Similarly, the Declaration of Principles of April 1933 echoed the 
traditional diplomats' endorsement of the revisionist -irredentist claims against 
Poland and Lithuania (Memel) as the central objectives of German foreign policy in 
the near future. 
At the same time, the alldeutsche ideological platform of the NSDAP, which 
had contributed to its electoral appeal up to 1933, brought the issues of Austria and 
the Sudetenland to the forefront of the political debate about Germany's role in 
central Europe. Before the war the irredentist claim for the incorporation of the 
German territories of the Habsburg empire into the Reich had been the sharp edge of 
the pan -German propaganda against the Bismarckian notion of a "satiated" 
12' For an account of the contemporary irredentist bibliography see Bianchini, "L'idea fascista ", pp. 
174ff; Casella, F. "L'immagine fascista dell'impero: Quale ruolo all'Adriatico ", in Di Nolfo, 
Rainero, Vigezzi (eds.), Politica di potenza, pp. 187 -203 
128 Morewood, pp. 181 ff 
'29 DGFP, D, 4, 412 
13° Weinberg, Germany, Hitler and World War II, pp. 149 -50 
131 For the text of the speech see Vogelsang, "Neue Dokumente", Document n. 7, pp. 434ff. See also 
Craig, Germany, pp. 571f. For a translation of some excerpts see Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, 
III, pp. 628 -9 
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Germany13'. In the postwar period the unifying web between the Austrian and the 
Sudetenland claims (i.e. the Habsburg empire) ceased to exist and the fates of the two 
territories /populations diverged. Austria became a homogeneous German- speaking 
independent state, while the lands of the Sudeten German minority were incorporated 
in the new Czechoslovak which was formally protected by France133. Consequently, 
conservative German diplomacy and the Reichswehr leadership continued to view 
the Austrian issue as a more feasible and politically justifiable irredentist claim. By 
contrast, they temporarily relinquished the Sudetenland claim because of its 
secessionist implications threatening the integrity of Czechoslovakia. This different 
assessment was also reflected in the Nazi strategic planning for central Europe. Hitler 
had been prepared to raise the issue of Austria's union with the Reich as one of the 
top priorities of his foreign policy - and this was manifested in the premature Nazi 
Putsch in Vienna in July 193413 ;. Towards Czechoslovakia, though, he had initially 
requested only a defensive plan with no immediate annexationist implications1'' 
This situation changed radically in 1936 -7. Austria and Czechoslovakia were 
linked in Hitler's foreign policy strategy as necessarily complementary steps towards 
the consolidation of a German sphere of influence in central Europe. The 
indispensability of this objective was further underlined by its defensive and 
economic significance for the Nazi plans for large -scale eastward expansion in the 
near future13G. As the Nazi regime was embarking on a course of rapid rearmament 
13' On the concept of territorial "satiation ", and its criticism by radical nationalist and fascist ideology, 
see, in this study, Chs. 1 and 2 
13 For the regulation of the two issues at Paris see Sharp, pp. 148 -51. See also Perman, D. The 
Shaping of the Czechoslovak State (Leiden 1962); Stadler, K. S., The Birth of the Austrian Republic 
1918 -1932 (Leyden 1968) 
134 Pauley, B. F., Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis. A History of Austrian National Socialism (London & 
Basingstoke 1981), pp. 122 -37; Gholdner, F., Dollfuss: Im Spiegel der US -Akten (St. Pölten 1979 ), 
pp. 132 -41 
"` Irving, D., The War Path. Hitler's Germany, 1933 -1939 (London 1978), p. 61. See also (p. 90) 
how the slogan "Grossdeutschland" was gradually dropped after 1937, as it implied an irredentist 
intention behind the German claim against Czechoslovakia. This reflected Hitler's lack of interest in 
the irredentist aspects of his plans against Czechoslovakia [Meyer, pp. 315 -25] . For Hitler's 
political manipulation of the irredentist issue see Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 711ff; 
Ben -Israel, pp. 25ff 
16 For the defensive considerations see Müller, K. -J., General Ludwig Beck. Studien und Dokumente 
zur politisch- militärischen Vorstellungswelt und Tätigkeit des Generalstabchefs des deutschen 
Heers 1933 -1938 (Boppard 1980), pp. 512ff. For the economic and defensive justifications see 
Wright, J., Stafford, P., "Hitler, Britain and the Hossbach Memorandum ", Militärgeschichtliche 
Mitteilungen, 42 (1987), pp. 77 -123 
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and on a high -risk foreign policy from 1936 onwards, the question of economic 
resources and security became of the utmost importance for the attainment of the 
Nazi long -term expansionist goals. These considerations formed the new unifying 
link between the Austrian and the Sudeten irredentist issues, in the latter case 
transforming the defensive planning into offensive13'. 
Hitler's handling of the two issues in 1938 -9 revealed the limitations of his 
irredentist beliefs. The ethnic argument might have been a sufficient political formula 
for the pursuit of the Anschluss, and the western powers - especially Britain - had 
long ago implied their disinteressement for a peaceful absorption of Austria by the 
German Reich138. Mussolini's eventual consent to the union in March 1938 opened 
the way for a solution which at least kept up irredentist appearances'39. For their part, 
the National Socialist leaderships in Berlin and Vienna did their best to uphold an 
image of legality, by presenting the German intervention as emanating from the 
wishes of the Austrian, not the German side'. The Sudeten crisis, however, in the 
summer and autumn of the same year was based on quite different issues. Hitler's 
strategy after 1937 aimed at the occupation of the whole Czechoslovak state, a goal 
for which the irredentist claim over the Sudetenland provided only a politically 
insufficient and geographically partial justification ''. When in September 1938 
Hitler raised his price in his negotiations with Chamberlain by demanding the 
Sudetenland and Bohemia, he exploited the card of Slovak, Polish and Hungarian 
irredentism'', but he also implied his determination to liquidate the Czechoslovak 
state by force. This was hardly an irredentist objective and it exposed the Führer's 
137 DGFP, D, 7, Appendix III, Doc. K; Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Documents, pp. 529 -30 
18 For example, Lord Halifax had implied to Hitler that a peaceful revision of the Austrian issue 
would be acceptable to Britain (DGFP, D, 1, 145/147/151; Weinberg, Starting World War II, pp. 
122f) 
139 The change of the Italian policy on the Anschluss issue is documented in Lowe, Marzari, pp. 291- 
305; Weinberg, Germany', Hitler and World War II, pp. 103 -4; Noakes, Pridham, Documents, pp. 
535 -6 
140 Weinberg, Germany, Hitler and World War II, pp. 106ff, and Starting World War II, pp. 297 -8 
lai Wheeler -Bennett, J. W., Munich: Prologue to Tragedy (London 1962); Murray, W., The Change in 
the European Balance of Power, 1938 -1939. The Path to Ruin (Princeton, New Jersey 1984), pp. 
195 -263; Taylor, T., Munich: The Price of Peace (London, Sydney, Auckland & Toronto 1979) 
14' Kirkpatrick, I. S., The Inner Circle (London 1959), pp. 114ff; Craig, Germany, pp. 704 -5. On 
Hitler's abortive attempt to implicate Hungary in his campaign against Czechoslovakia, by urging 
the Hungarians to raise irredentist claims see Irving, p. 125; DGFP, D, 4, 202. For Slovakia see 
Hönsch, J. K., Die Slowakei und Hitlers Ostpolitik (Cologne 1965); Kaiser, "Coming of the War ", p. 
187. For the Directive "Green" see DGFP, D, 2, encl. to Doc. 175; and Doc. 554 
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political manipulation of the ethnic argument in order to promote purely expansionist 
plans. The problem was that the British government took the irredentist alibi of Nazi 
expansionism quite seriously, eager to make concessions on these lines, without 
realising that no territorial offer on ethnic grounds would ever satisfy the 
geographical prerequisites of the fascist "new order '. The final, if ephemeral, 
solution, namely the cession of the Sudetenland to the Reich, was authorised on the 
grounds of the overwhelmingly German character of the population and the region's ;. 
This irredentist justification offered a new lease of legitimacy to Nazi expansionism, 
provided Germany with valuable time for military preparation, and removed a 
significant obstacle to eastward expansion'. 
The insincerity of the alldeutsche pretensions of Hitler's foreign policy, 
however, were even more clearly manifested in the dropping of the German 
irredentist claims in Alsace and South Tyrol. The two German- speaking minorities 
living in these regions had been traditionally seen as integral parts of the dream of a 
pan -German state at the heart of Europe. It was with regard to these two minorities - 
and their home territories - that the alleged irredentist principle of Nazi foreign 
policy was totally overshadowed by the crude geopolitical considerations of Hitler's 
large -scale expansionist plans. In the first case, the region of Alsace was 
geographically irrelevant to the Nazi vision of Lebensraum expansion in the east. 
This greatly explains Hitler's cool attitude towards the fate of this minority, at least 
compared with his active interest in the German populations in central and eastern 
Europe. Undoubtedly, the Alsatians had developed a fairly idiosyncratic cultural 
identity, quite distinct from either the French or the German, and had also resisted 
legislation aiming at political, cultural or religious assimilation by either of the two 
'43 Weinberg, Germany, Hitler and World War 11, p. 117; Trevor -Roper, H. R. (ed.), The Testament of 
Adolf Hitler. The Hitler -Bormann Documents, Februaryy -April 1945 (London 1961), p. 58 
144 The text of the Treaty (DGFP, D, 2, 675) repeatedly emphasises the "German" character of the 
ceded territories. For the irredentist justification behind Chamberlain's appeasement efforts in 
September 1938 see Douglas, R., "Chamberlain and Appeasement ", in Mommsen, Kettenacker 
(eds.), Fascist Challenge, pp. 83ff 
145 In February 1939 Hitler made a retrospective assessment of his foreign policy successes. He 
insisted on the strategic indispensability of the union with Austria and the cession of the 
Sudetenland. See Michalka, Das Dritte Reich (Munich 1985), vol. I: Volksgemeinschaft und 
Grossmachtpolitik, pp. 224 -5. An excerpt is translated and reprinted in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), 
Nazism, III, p. 725 
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sides'''. However, the symbolic significance of the region, if not only in irredentist at 
least in revisionist and historic terms, would have justified a more energetic political 
exploitation of this issue by the Nazi regime - something that was far from the case. 
The second ethnic issue, namely of the minority in South Tyrol, is more 
enlightening about the political manipulation of the irredentist argument by Hitler. 
Directly linked to the status of Austria, this question acquired a symbolic importance 
for the revisionist and alldeutsche aspirations of German nationalism after the war'''. 
It was, however, its interrelation with the Anschluss issue that implicated the fate of 
the South Tyrolese German- speaking minority in another sensitive aspect of 
European stability - Italo- German relations1'. The political and defensive importance 
of the Brenner for Italy transformed this problem into a bone of contention in her 
relations with the Nazi regime. This put Hitler in a complex political dilemma: to 
adhere to the priority of the pan -German argument at the expense of Italian 
friendship or to sacrifice a vital irredentist claim in order to achieve an Italo- German 
alliance19? It was a difficult political question, but Hitler's decision to pursue the 
second option had been an unwavering guideline of his foreign policy strategy since 
the early 1920s. Consequently, German irredentism in the Brenner was dropped in 
favour of a strategic consideration (alliance with Italy) which was far more important 
for the Nazi wider expansionist plans in the long term. What is more striking, 
however, is that the irredentist issues of Austria and South Tyrol were politically 
separated and treated on a completely different political basis, despite the fact that 
they were interrelated and referred to the very same principle. 
146 Gutmann, E., "Concealed or Conjured Irredentism: The Case of Alsace ", in Chazan (ed.), 
Irredentism, pp. 44ff. See also Domarus. Hitler, I, pp. 901(speech to the Nuremberg Party Rally, 12 
September 1938) , and II, pp. 1149, 1178 (response to President Roosevelt, 28 April 1939) 
147 On the irredentist dimensions of the South Tyrol issue see For the issue of South Tyrol, see 
Toscano, M., Alto Adige - South Tyrol. Italy's Frontier with the German World (Baltimore 1975), 
pp. 1 -15; Alcock, A. E., The History of the South Tyrol Question (Geneva 1970), pp. 19 -45; De 
Felice, R., II problema dell' Alto Adige nei rapporti italo -tedeschi dall'Anschluss alla fine della 
seconda guerra mondiale (Bologna 1973), Ch. 1 
los The complications in the German- Italian relations in the 1920s due to the question of South Tyrol 
are discussed in Cassels, pp. 272 -87; Schubert, G., Anfänge Nationalsozialistischer Aussenpolitik 
(Cologne 1961), pp. 76ff; De Felice, I rapporti tra fascismo e nazionalsocialismo fino all ' andata al 
potere di Hitler /922 -1933. Appunti e documenti (Naples 1971), pp. 206f. For the importance of the 
German- Italian relations for the radicalisation of fascism in the late 1930s see below, Ch. 5 
149 Hitler, Mein Kampf pp. 571 -5 
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This inconsistency in the application of the irredentist principle by both the 
Italian and the German fascist regimes leads us to three main conclusions. First, the 
irredentist argument under fascism was reduced to a propagandistic function in the 
much wider context of fascist expansionism. For the purposes of such an aggressive 
territorial policy, irredentism was deprived of its remaining "liberal" elements that 
had survived from the initial concept after the bitter struggle of the First World War 
and the acrimonious peace negotiations. In this sense, it was transformed into an 
expansionist justification with aggressive connotations of political or even racial 
character. Second, the irredentist argument gradually lost its normative value. It was 
subjected to an opportunistic function that assessed the desirability of individual 
claims over populations according to the political significance of the involved 
territory for the wider plans of fascist expansion. Third, as the scope of the Italian 
and German great -power ambitions gradually increased in the 1930s, the ethnic 
element of the irredentist justification became a limitation to fascist expansionist 
aspirations. As large -scale expansion became the top priority of the two fascist 
regimes in the late 1930s, irredentism could no longer sustain its primary emphasis 
on disputed and territorially limited claims based on the ethnic identity of 
populations. When the territorial potential of both revisionism and ethnic irredentism 
had been almost exhausted, the need to justify wider expansion introduced the 
argument of space as the main idea underpinning further expansionist objectives. 
IV. From border to space policy: towards large -scale fascist 
expansion 
The adherence of the two fascist regimes to traditional arguments of 
territorial expansion, such as anti -Versailles revisionism and irredentism, upheld an 
impression of continuity between pre- fascist and fascist foreign policy objectives. 
Until 1935 -6, both Mussolini and Hitler exploited the legitimacy of such traditional 
claims to achieve territorial changes of limited scale, in the form of border 
readjustments. However, as we saw, the fascist commitment to border policy was 
227 
Foreign policy- making (1922 -1939) 
mitigated by a selective endorsement of certain goals and a tepid attitude towards 
others, as well as by specific moves (the Corfu incident, the 1934 German- Polish 
pact) which were either against or beyond the logic of revisionism. From the fascist 
point of view, adherence to border policy was an interim step towards the unfolding 
of a larger -scale space policy, dominated by emphasis on constant activism and 
expressing the right of the two peoples to expand in their historic spheres of 
influence. In Mein Kampf Hitler had rejected the "absurdity of the 1914 frontiers ", 
advocating the need to avoid a myopic border -policy in favour of a "soil policy of the 
future'''. This argument was reactivated with renewed vigour at the Hossbach 
conference, where the Fiihrer stated that "the aim of German policy is to preserve the 
national community and to enlarge it. It is therefore a question of space's'. For his 
part, Mussolini's early vague references to the Mediterranean as a mare nostrum took 
a more concrete form after 1935: in his Milan speech of 1936, he alluded to Italy's 
wide expansionist intentions in order to escape from geopolitical imprisonment in the 
Mediterranean"', while in February 1939 he spoke of the need to "march to the 
Oceans" in terms of a "historic necessity ''' 
In this sense, the radicalisation of the expansionist policies of the two fascist 
regimes from the mid -1930s onwards reflected a change of focus and pace towards 
space policy as an open -ended leitmotif for large -scale expansion. This change had 
been facilitated by a number of factors and developments. The strengthening of the 
authoritarian tendencies of the two systems removed institutional and political 
restrictions on the two leaders' freedom to shape and implement foreign policy 
decisions'. At the same time, the emergence of a powerful Germany generated a 
new dynamism in international affairs, while the gradual consolidation of the Axis 
alliance subverted the post- Locarno balance of power in the continent, creating new 
150 Hitler, A., Mein Kampf, pp. 597 -8 
151 DGFP, D, 1, 19 (Hossbach Conference report); and, for a translation, Noakes, Pridham, Nazism, 
III, p. 681 
152 Quartararo, 307f 
153 Quoted in Deakin, F. W., The Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler and the Fall of Italian Fascism 
(New York & London 1962), pp. 5 -6. See also, Quartararo, pp. 424f; Lowe, Marzari, pp. 315 -6 
's» On this issue see, in this study, Ch. 3, Section III 
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opportunities for realignments and readjustments in the European system''' 
However, what is of particular importance to this chapter is that each of the two 
regimes made specific strategic choices and followed different tactics in 
implementing their space policies. These raise complex questions about the pre- 
determined or not character of these decisions, and about continuities or 
discontinuities in Italian and German foreign policy. In the following part we will 
examine the colonial and continental expansionist ventures of the two regimes, 
assessing their relevance to the wider expansionist visions of the two leaders and 
their function in the overall framework of the Italian and German foreign policies. 
Colonialism 
As we have seen, colonialism had been the most symbolic form of prestige 
expansionism for Italy and Germany since the 1870s. The determination of the 
European powers to stabilise the territorial pattern in the continent and divert their 
antagonisms to the colonial field grew of 
colonial expansion as alternative expression of the great -power aspirations of the 
European nations. The First World War re- focused attention on the long -standing 
claims for continental expansion, especially for "latecomers" such as Italy and 
Germany. This was, however, a temporary shift, largely due to the irregular situation 
created by the European war. With the conclusion of the Peace Treaties the new 
territorial map of Europe was again presented as unalterable, and the colonies 
resumed their political function as the field of territorial compensation for the 
discontented and as the legitimate prize for international antagonism156 
Mussolini had both the political freedom and the ideological propensity to 
integrate colonial claims in the framework of his large -scale expansionist vision. His 
aspiration to make Italy the superpower of the Mediterranean required control of a 
155 A detailed discussion of the importance of the Axis alliance in radicalising the expansionist 
policies of the two regimes is provided in Ch. 5 
)56 Segrè, "Il colonialismo", p. 132; Rumi, G., "'Revisionismo' fascista ed espansione coloniale 
(1925- 1935) ", in Aquarone, Vernassa (eds.), pp. 448 -9, 460, 463; DDI, 7th, III, 829; IV, 320 
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vast area from Gibraltar to the Red Sea'''. This involved a strong position not only in 
the European coast, but also on the African sides. In this sense, the prestige factor of 
Fascist colonialism could also serve the ideological and geopolitical ambitions of the 
Fascist regime in the Mediterranean. Two further developments encouraged 
Mussolini's focus on colonial policies at the expense of continental expansion. The 
stabilisation of the European system between the Locarno Pact (1925) and the advent 
of Hitler to power (1933) rendered any desire to alter the territorial arrangements in 
the continent inopportune, if not totally inconceivable during the above period. Thus, 
the greatest part of the Italian efforts for prestige were channelled into the colonial 
field, in which the western powers were more willing to make promises or even 
concessions in return for Italy's support for the European status quo159. Furthermore, 
the emergence of Nazi Germany made Mussolini himself more sensitive to the 
importance of the European balance of power. Thus, in order to preserve his 
"determinant" position in the continent and increase his fascist prestige towards 
Germany, the Duce exploited the colonial card, taking advantage of what he had 
perceived, from 1932 onwards, as favourable British and French attitudes towards a 
colonial campaign against Ethiopia16'. 
In territorial terms, Mussolini's colonial policy was undoubtedly the most 
successful part of his expansionist activities. In 1922 he inherited from his liberal 
predecessors a meagre colonial "empire" in north (Libya) and east (Somalia, Eritrea) 
Africa, where Italian control had almost collapsed due to the pressure of indigenous 
rebels1''. In spite of his failure to elicit a colonial mandate in 1923'62, Mussolini 
157 On Mussolini's references to the need to control Suez, Malta, Corsica and Gibraltar, see Knox, 
"Politica estera italiana", pp. 296, 298 -9. See also De Magistris' essay on "Mediterraneo" in the 
Dizionario di Politica (Rome 1940) 
158 This distinction corresponds to Segrè's analysis of the "two poles" of fascist foreign policy: one in 
the Adriatic and the Mediterranean coast, and the other in North and East Africa. See Segrè, "Il 
colonialismo", pp. 140 -1 
159 Segrè, "Il colonialismo", p. 132 
1GO The origins of the French policy of disinteressement politique are to be found in 1931. See Knox, 
"Politica estera italiana", pp. 312 -3; De Felice, "Alcune osservazioni", pp. 65ff. On the diplomatic 
background of the developments that led to the Ethiopian campaign see Robertson, E. M., Mussolini 
as Empire -Builder. Europe and Africa 1932 -36 (London & Basingstoke 1977), esp. Ch. 10 for the 
Stresa Conference 
16' On the collapse of Italian control in Libya after the First World War, see Segrè, The Fourth Shore. 
The Italian Colonization of Libya (Chicago & London 1974), pp. 47f. For Somalia see Rochat, G., II 
colonialismo italiano (Turin 1973), p. 136; Del Boca, Italiani in Africa orientale, pp. 861 -72 
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showed an unwavering determination to restore Italy's colonial reputation, pursue 
traditional colonial aspirations and instil some sort of colonial enthusiasm among the 
population1G3. First of all, he achieved the cession of Jubaland and Jarabub by the 
British, two territorial additions to Italy's existing colonies in east and north Africa 
respectively. Second, he initiated comprehensive campaigns in Libya and Somalia in 
order to restore Italian control over the rebellious regions". Emphasis on restoring 
Italian control over Libya and Somalia dated back to the beginning of the 1922, when 
the liberal Minister of Colonies, G. Amendola, spoke of the need to resurrect Italy's 
Impero''. A few months after he had been appointed Prime Minister, in early 1923, 
Mussolini adopted an intransigent attitude towards the indigenous populations in 
Somalia and in Cyrenaica. In the former case, the Italian governor, Cesare Maria de 
Vecchi, eliminated any trace of resistance from local tribes and established total 
control in the region by 1928166. In Libya, the previous policy of compromise with 
the Sanussis was repudiated by the Italian government in 1923, followed by a long 
drawn -out military conflict. Lack of tangible progress by 1930, however, prompted 
Mussolini to grant control of the operations to Graziani who, in co- operation with 
Marshal Badoglio, instigated a ruthless policy of eliminating the Sanussis. Through a 
combination of extensive warfare and genocidal methods, Graziani was able to 
announce the "pacification" of Libya by 1932167. 
'620n the developments associated with the Italian claim for a mandate see Cassels, pp. 24 -45. For the 
discussions at the Lausanne Conference see Di Nolfo, Politica estera, pp. 56ff; DDI, 7th, I, 
141/189/221 
163 De Felice, R., Mussolini, Part 2: II fascista, vol. I: La conquista del potere, 1921 -1925 (Turin 
1966), p. 375; II: L'organi_:azione dello Stato Fascista, 1925 -1929 (Turin 1968), pp. 652ff 
164 Rochat, Colonialismo, pp. 96 -105, 136. Especially for the case of Libya see Evans -Pritchard, E. E., 
The Sanusi of Cyrenaica (Oxford 1949); Segrè, Fourth Shore, pp. 41, 46 -8; and ibid., pp. 57 -157 for 
the efforts for reconstruction and exploitation after the completion of conquest. 
165 Rochat, Colonialismo, pp. 98f; Bosworth, R. J. B., Italy and the Wider World, 1860 -1960 (London 
1996), pp. 104 -5 
166 Rochat, Colonialisme, pp. 136 -7 
167 Rochat, Colonialismo, pp. 103 -5 
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The Ethiopian campaign 
However, the most impressive part of Mussolini's colonial policy was the 
successful execution of the Ethiopian campaign in 1935 -6168. This has undoubtedly 
been the most hotly debated foreign policy initiative of the Italian Fascist regime in 
the 1930s, raising all sorts of questions about continuities in Italian foreign policy 
and about Mussolini's long -term expansionist intentions. R. De Felice has described 
the Ethiopian campaign as "Mussolini's masterpiece "169, in the sense that the Duce 
pursued it with obsessive determination and increased the regime's prestige both 
domestically and on the international level. Such a view directly challenged the 
Salveminian orthodoxy of viewing the campaign as the "prelude to the Second World 
War ", and was disputed by C. Segrè and R. J. B. Bosworth, who underlined the long- 
term destabilising effects of the campaign for the whole European system10. Both 
authors compared the invasion of Ethiopia with the ill- conceived Libyan campaign of 
191217', but they also detected a lack of foresight in Mussolini's strategy which 
contrasted with Giolitti's more realistic expansionist policy. Others, like L. 
Pastorelli, analysed the Ethiopian campaign as the beginning of a new, more 
aggressive phase in the expansionist policies of the Fascist regime, breaking a line of 
continuity which had been upheld by the allegedly moderate foreign policy of the 
previous decade'. By contrast, an influential interpretation of Mussolini's decision 
to attack Ethiopia in 1935 pointed to the direction of its utility for domestic purposes. 
F. Catalano viewed the venture as a diversionary move, aimed to distract attention 
168 There is ample bibliography on the Ethiopian campaign, both in English and Italian. See, for 
example, Rochat G., Militari e politici nella preparazione della campagna d'Etiopia. Studio e 
documenti, 1932 -1936 (Milan 1971); Rochat, Colonialismo, pp. 136 -45; Badoglio, P., La guerra 
d'Etiopia (Milan 1936); Graziani, R., II fronte sud (Milan 1938); Robertson, Empire -Builder, Chs. 
14 -15. See also below, Ch. 5, Section IIb 
169 De Felice, R., Mussolini il duce, vol. 1: Gli anni del consenso, 1919 -1936 (Turin 1968), pp. 758ff. 
Cf. the discussion of this view in Knox, M., "The fascist regime, its foreign policy and its wars: an 
`anti- anti -fascist' orthodoxy ? ", in Finney, P. (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War (London & 
New York 1997), pp. 151 -2 
170 Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World, pp. 48ff; Segrè, C. G., "Il colonialismo e la politica estera: 
variazioni liberali e fasciste ", in Bosworth, R. J. B., Romano, S. (eds.), La politica estera italiana, 
1860 -1985 (Bologna 1991), pp. 121 -46 
171 Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World, pp. 49 -51, 107ff; Segrè, "Colonialismo ", pp. 135ff 
17 Pastorelli, L., "La storiografia italiana del dopoguerra sulla politica estera ", Storia e Politica, 10 
(1971), pp. 603f 
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from the mounting economic crisis which hit Italy later than many other countries ''. 
This social imperialistic argument was shared by G. Rochat and G. Baer, who 
underlined Mussolini's conscious exploitation of foreign policy for primarily 
domestic purposes, as a means to strengthen the legitimacy of the regime after a 
period of stagnation and waning public enthusiasm for Fascism14. An intriguing 
middle way is reflected in M. Knox's thesis that the Ethiopian campaign combined a 
long -term ideological goal of the Duce's expansionist vision with his ambition to use 
an impressive foreign policy success to promote a revolutionary transformation of the 
domestic system in a more totalitarian direction '''. 
In terms of continuity with the liberal foreign policy, there was nothing 
particularly novel in choosing Ethiopia as a goal for territorial expansion16. Italian 
interests in east Africa had been consolidated since the 1880s, when successful 
expansion in Eritrea and Somalia laid the foundations of an Italian colonial Impero in 
the last available region of Africa'. Crispi's ill -fated campaign against Ethiopia in 
the 1890s seemed the obvious policy in order to establish a large colonial network 
around the southern exit of the Suez Canal. The humiliating defeat of 1896 at Adowa 
caused a deep national trauma but did not thwart the Italian expansionist ambitions in 
the region. In 1906 a tripartite agreement between Italy, Britain and France 
comprised a secret acknowledgement of an Italian sphere of influence in Ethiopia'''. 
Strategic plans for an attack on Ethiopia from Eritrea dated back to 190819. Even 
under Fascist rule, the diplomatic establishment of the Palazzo Chigi nurtured 
concrete hopes of an expansionist move in Ethiopia. The Italian -British agreement of 
December 1925 reaffirmed the informal division of the country into spheres of 
13 Catalano, F., L'economia italiana di guerra. La politica economico-finanziaria del fascismo dalla 
guerra d 'Etiopia alla caduta del regime, 1935 -1943 (Milan 1969), pp. 7ff. Cf., Lyttelton, A., 
"Italian Fascism ", in Laqueur, W. (ed.), Fascism: A Reader's Guide. Analyses, Interpretations, 
Bibliography (Harmondsworth 1979), pp. 107 -8 
14 Rochat, G., "II ruolo delle forze armate nel regime fascista: conclusioni provvisorie e ipotesi di 
lavoro ", Rivista di Storia Contemporanea, 1 (1972), pp. 188 -99; Baer, G. W., The Coming of the 
Italo- Ethiopian War (Cambridge Mass 1967) 
15 Knox, M., "Conquest ", pp. 43 -9; and "II fascismo ", pp. 329 -30 
16 Rochat, G., 11 colonialismo italiano (Turin 1973), pp. 219 -24 
"' Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World, pp. 98 -9, 106 
18 Bosworth, R. J. B., Italy, the Least of the Great Powers. Italian Foreign Policy Before the First 
World War (Cambridge 1979), pp. 329ff; Candeloro G., Storia dell'Italia moderna, vol. 9: II 
fascismo e le sue guerre (Milan 1998, 8th ed.), pp. 369 -70 
19 Militari e politici nella preparazione della campagna d 'Etiopia (Milan 1971), pp. 21f 
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influence, implying a British recognition of Italy's continuing interest in the 
region180. In the ensuing period until 1932 the Italian government followed a policy 
of "friendship ", culminating in the 1928 agreement with Menelik, while at the same 
time encouraging the consolidation of Italian economic interests in Ethiopia'''. 
However, by 1932 this policy was officially described as a failure by the Palazzo 
Chigi. In one of his last initiatives as Foreign Minister, Grandi gave priority to the 
politica periferica in early 1932, requesting a detailed examination of the prospects 
of an aggressive war in east Africa18'. In an extensive memorandum published in 
August 1932, R. Guariglia expressed the need to strengthen Italy's military presence 
in Ethiopia on the basis of British and French consensus183. A year before, the same 
diplomat had also spoken of Italy's expansionist ambitions at the expense of 
Ethiopia, alluding to a future course of expansion, "probably with wari18`''. 
However, this continuity between liberal and Fascist foreign policy strategies 
towards Ethiopia should not overshadow Mussolini's consistent personal interest in 
the prospect of a war in east Africa. This interest dates back to 1925, at the time of 
the agreement with Britain over Ethiopia, when the Duce spoke of his desire to 
pursue an "integral violent solution" when more auspicious international 
circumstances prevailed18'. Such an idea took a more concrete shape by 1932, when 
Mussolini asked the Ministry of Colonies to draft an operational plan for an offensive 
action against Ethiopia1S'. The memorandum presented by De Bono envisaged a 
large -scale invasion in the near future, but at the same time reiterated the same 
strategic precondition with Guariglia's report: the consent of Britain and France1s'. 
At the same time, Mussolini asked his supreme commander of the army, Badoglio, to 
examine the prospects for an offensive action in east Africa. Badoglio's subsequent 
vehement criticism of De Bono's plan had much to do with his personal antipathy 
1ß0 Lowe, Marzari, pp. 242 -5 
181 On the 1928 accords see Vedovato, G., Gli accordi Italo -Etiopici dell'agosto 1928 (Florence 
1956), pp. 101 -5; Candeloro, pp. 336f 
18' These initiatives are discussed in Knox, "Il Fascismo ", pp. 320 -1 
lab Guariglia, pp. 763 -73; Rochat, Militari, pp. 276 -93; Candeloro, pp. 337f 
184 De Felice, R., Mussolini il duce, vol. I: Gli anni del consenso, 1929 -1936 (Turin 1974), pp. 399f 
188 See Mussolini's comments in 00, XXIX, 465; Rochat, Militari, pp. 26ff 
186 Rochat, Colonialismo, pp. 137f; Lowe, Marzari, pp. 246ff 
187 For the memorandum see Del Boca, A., Gli italiani in Africa orientale (Rome & Bari 1976), pp. 
177f; Candeloro, pp. 337 -8; Rochat, Militari, pp. 276f 
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towards the Minister of Colonies and his anger with Mussolini's decision to appoint 
De Bono as commander in the event of a war in Ethiopia's'. However, Badoglio's 
hostility to the plan also reflected a fear that the assumption of British and French 
consensus to the invasion of Ethiopia was dangerously misplaced's9. 
It is in this light that we should examine Mussolini's eventual decision to 
authorise the campaign against Ethiopia in late 1934. The directive of 30 December 
1934 unequivocally stated as its goal the "whole destruction of the Ethiopian armed 
forces and the occupation of the whole of Ethiopia "190. Security in Europe, however, 
had been relegated to a secondary condition under the impression of French 
acquiescence. This optimism dated back to 1931, when, in a conversation between 
Grandi and Laval, the latter had used the example of Ethiopia as a possible 
compensation for an Italian compromise on the issue of Tunisia191. A few days after 
the directive, the Mussolini -Laval agreement consolidated the former's impression 
that Italy had been granted a "free hand" in Ethiopia19'. The diplomatic omens 
became even more favourable in the spring of 1935 with the formation of the Stresa 
front. The final text of the agreement made a specific reference to the need to uphold 
stability "in Europe" - a reference which was added by the British delegation but was 
interpreted by the Italian leadership as a further indication of tacit consensus for 
expansion in Africa193. At the same time, a separate Italian- French military agreement 
to oppose any German plans in Austria strengthened the impression that German 
aggression in the Danube region would be effectively contained by the Stresa front19 ;. 
The ambiguity, however, of the British position prompted the Italian diplomats to 
press for a more definite clarification of the British attitude to Italy's claims in east 
Africa. Eden's visit to Rome in June 1935 was accompanied by a proposal for a 
diplomatic compromise, under which Italy would be granted a corridor via Zeila to 
1ß8 On this issue see in this study, Ch. 3, Section III 
189 Rochat, Militari, pp. 225ff, 324 -7; Lowe, Marzari, pp. 248 -50; Candeloro, pp. 381ff 
190 Rochat, Militari, pp. 376 -9; Colonialismo, pp. 138f; Knox, "Il fascismo", pp. 322f 
191 DDI, 7th, X, 413 
192 De Felice, R., Mussolini il duce, I, pp. 526ff; Candeloro, pp. 332 -3; Quartararo, pp. 97f 
193 For the text of the agreement see DBFP, 2nd, 12, 722. See also Baer, pp. 159ff; Kirkpatrick, S. I., 
Mussolini. Study of a Demagogue (London 1964), pp. 275ff; Lowe, Marzari, pp. 262ff 
194 Quartararo, pp. 100f 
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Somaliland, but the plan was explicitly rejected by both Mussolini and Guariglia'95. 
In July 1935, another initiative to refer the issue to international arbitration under the 
aegis of the League of Nations was dismissed by the Duce as "humiliating for 
Italy "196, while a similar attempt in August- September to place Ethiopia under an 
international mandate and to recognise a formal Italian interest was rejected by the 
Fascist Grand Council197. Instead, plans for a large -scale mobilisation of the Italian 
armed forces went forward during the summer of 1935, with over 300,000 soldiers 
transferred to Eritrea and Somaliland accompanied by planes and heavy artillery198. 
Mussolini's determination to pursue a violent occupation of the whole of 
Ethiopia, in spite of alarming indications that Britain would oppose such an action 
and France was opposed to an aggressive campaign, is further illustrated by his 
rejection of the objections raised by both the King and Marshal Badoglio. Their fears 
stemmed from the traditional belief of the conservative establishment in the 
indispensability of British friendship and reflected their conviction that such a 
friendship would be seriously jeopardised by an attack on Ethiopia199. It is true that 
Mussolini and his diplomatic advisers, including Ciano, chose to underestimate the 
indications of British hostility to the campaign200. Until June 1935 he kept the 
channels of communication with London open in the hope that the issue would not be 
brought to the League of Nations and that Britain would not risk the cohesion of the 
Stresa front by adopting an intransigent line towards Italy. However, the referral of 
the dispute to the League in July and the British -German Naval Agreement a month 
earlier caused considerable irritation and alarm to the Italian Fascist leadership201. 
From that point onwards, British acquiescence ceased to be a prerequisite for Italian 
action in Ethiopia. The self -confidence of the regime was further strengthened by 
intercepted information by the Servizio Informazione Militari (Intelligence Service, 
195 For Eden' proposal, see Eden, A., The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden, KG, PC, MC, 
vol. 2: Facing the Dictators (London 1962), pp. 221f; Lowe, Marzari, pp. 272ff. For Guariglia's 
negative attitude see Guariglia, pp. 245 -6; Quartararo, p. 134 
'96 Candeloro, p. 377 
197 00, XXVII, pp. 728ff 
198 Rochat, Colonialismo, pp. 138 -40 
199 Candeloro, pp. 383f; Mack Smith, Italy and its Monarchy (New Haven & London 1989), pp. 270 -1 
zoo Bottai, Diario, 19.11 and 24.11.1935 
201 Candeloro, pp. 374f; Lowe, Marzari, pp. 270ff, esp. Mussolini's reply to Drummond in which he 
accused Britain of destroying "collective decisions" (quoted in ibid., pp. 275 -6) 
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SIM) about the low level of mobilisation and fighting potential of the British fleet in 
the Mediterranean'''. Therefore, Mussolini pushed forward his aggressive plans in 
the belief that Britain would refrain from counter -measures in the Mediterranean and 
in Africa, but also in the knowledge of British opposition to the campaignX'' 
In this sense, the decision to launch the invasion in October 1935 combined a 
long-term significance with a short-term assessment of the international situation. 
Throughout the 1920s, Mussolini displayed a determination to reconstitute and 
expand Italy's colonial empire in Africa. After restoring control in Libya and 
Somaliland, he turned his attention to east Africa and the Arabian peninsula with a 
two -edged policy of penetration in Ethiopia and Yemen'. By the end of 1931, while 
plans in Yemen foundered, the impression of French and British acquiescence in an 
Italian expansion in Ethiopia convinced Mussolini that the situation was opportune, 
an impression which was further strengthened by the Stresa front and Germany's 
diplomatic isolation. This favourable short-term realignment of international 
relations, according to J. Petersen, constituted the catalyst for prioritising the 
invasion plan in the first half of 1935'01. 
When this window of opportunity dramatically narrowed in August with the 
failure of the Tripartite conference in Paris'0', and in September with the British 
mobilisation in the Mediterranean'07, Mussolini appeared determined to pursue his 
geopolitical ambitions in Ethiopia in spite of the adverse international circumstances. 
He gave explicit instructions to the Italian delegation in the League of Nations to 
refuse to negotiate any concessions108, and when Guariglia advised him to accept a 
compromising solution to refer the issue to an international committee'', he 
dismissed the suggestion without further discussion. However, Mussolini had not as 
20' Robertson, E. M., pp. 155 -83 
203 Baer, pp. 248ff 
204 For Italy's policy towards Yemen see the detailed analysis of Quartararo, R., "L'Italia e lo Yemen. 
Uno studio sulla politica di espensione italiana nel Mar Rosso ", Storia Contemporanea, 190 (1979), 
pp. 811 -867 
205 Petersen, J., "La politica estera del fascismo come problema storiografico ", in De Felice, R. (ed.), 
L'Italia fra tedeschi e alleati. La politica estera fascista e la seconda guerra mondiale (Bologna 
1973), pp. 45 -55 
206 Aloisi, P. Journal 25 Juin -14 Juillet 1936 (Paris 1957), 17.8.1935 
207 Lowe, Marzari, pp. 280 -1 
208 Aloisi, 9- 10.8.1936 
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yet finalised his strategy, aware of the French intentions to broker a wider agreement 
and of the British reluctance either to support the imposition of economic sanctions 
or to block the Suez Canal'10. The eventual decision of the League of Nations to 
apply sanctions did cause some alarm to the Italian government and led to a 
somewhat more accommodating attitude towards the French proposals of ceding 
extensive Ethiopian territories to Italy while reducing the remaining regions to the 
status of a virtual Italian protectorate' '. This willingness to discuss a negotiated 
settlement regarding Ethiopia seems to endorse R. Quartararo's assertion that 
Mussolini had not irreversibly decided on the whole conquest of Ethiopia and 
remained interested in a certain diplomatic solution that would enable Italy to 
consolidate her position in east Africa'''. However, throughout the autumn of 1935, 
Mussolini became increasingly disillusioned with the British procrastination. By the 
time of the Hoare -Laval compromise plan in December 1935 he had reverted to an 
intransigent position: after having initially dismissed the offer, he was convinced by 
Aloisi to consider it but only as a basis for future discussion and with a series of 
counter -proposals for revisions'1'. Given the negative assessment of the plan by 
Suvich '4, Mussolini's procrastination tactics until 18 December should hardly be 
interpreted as a sign of interest in a compromise agreement with the British and the 
French7'. Instead, Grandi's reports from 16 December about the massive opposition 
to the Hoare -Laval plan amongst the British parliament and public opinion76 should 
have convinced Mussolini that the compromise offer was about to be dropped in 
London before any serious discussion. Indeed, on 19 December, Hoare resigned and 
Vansittart informed Grandi that no other initiative outside the framework of the 
League of Nations should have been expected from the British side'. 
109 Guariglia, pp. 265ff 
210 Lowe, Marzari, pp. 278ff 
211 For the plan see DDI, 8th, II, 354/360; and, for the Italian reply, II, 366 
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The ensuing period until Badoglio's entry into Addis Abeba in May 1936 
was marked by the advance of the Italian armed forces in Ethiopia and growing 
popular support for the campaign at home. Especially after the imposition of 
sanctions in November 1935, the popularity of the Fascist regime reached 
unprecedented heights'18. Even the initially sceptical King endorsed his Prime 
Minister's uncompromising attitude towards the League of Nations'19, while 
Badoglio, by then commander of the forces in Ethiopia, confessed to Giuseppe Bottai 
his wish to lead the Italian army into the Ethiopian capital7'. Alfredo Rocco and 
other ex- Nationalists did not conceal their delight with the prospect of "avenging 
Adua""'. On their part, prominent members of the PNF welcomed the campaign as a 
real opportunity for action and a prelude to the spiritual regeneration of Italy"'. But it 
was also a wave, albeit ephemeral, of public enthusiasm which greeted the official 
declaration of the Impero by Mussolini on 9 May 1936. Although the occupation of 
the whole of Ethiopia was far from complete with the capture of Addis Abeba, there 
was genuine exaltation when Mussolini called the people "to salute, after fifteen 
centuries, the re- emergence of the Impero on the hills of Rome "''3. 
This implication of the Ethiopian campaign gives considerable credence to 
the social imperialistic argument that Mussolini's colonialism was chiefly a device of 
social imperialist policies''a. This is only partly correct, in the sense that any other 
regime, Fascist or not, would have attempted to capitalise on a success against the 
whole international community such as the victory in Ethiopia. Undoubtedly, success 
in Ethiopia was not simply a territorial acquisition, but it also signified the 
218 Eatwell, R., Fascism. A History (London 1996), pp. 70 -1; Colarizi, S., "L'opinione pubblica 
italiana di fronte all'intervento in guerra ", in Di Nolfo, Rainero, Vigezzi (eds.), Politica di potenza, 
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193 -7; Clark, pp. 281 -2; Knox, M., Mussolini Unleashed, 1939 -1941. Politics and Strategy in 
Fascist Italy's Last War (Cambridge 1982), pp. 13 -4; Hamilton, pp. 68 -9 
219 Mack Smith, D., Italy and its Monarchy (New Haven & London 1989), pp. 270 -1; Bottai, Diario, 
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220 Bottai, G., Diario, 3.5.1936 
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restoration of Italian imperial tradition and the symbolic inauguration of the "new" 
Italy into the pantheon of "great powers ""'. However, exclusive or primary emphasis 
on the diversionary function of the decision to attack Ethiopia in 1935 tends to 
obscure two crucial long -term implications of the campaign for the whole foreign 
policy of the Fascist regime. The first pertains to the geopolitical significance of the 
occupation of Ethiopia and the creation of the Italian East Africa (Africa Orientale 
Italiana). This was the culmination of a consistent colonial policy of expansion in the 
Mediterranean and the Red Sea which consolidated Italian control over the traditional 
possessions of Libya, Eritrea and Somalia, extended them with the cession of 
Jubaland and Jarabub, and attempted to expand the whole colonial empire with the 
penetration of Yemen and the occupation of Ethiopia. 
The second long -term implication of the Ethiopian campaign regarded the 
change in Mussolini's strategic planning for territorial expansion. The second half of 
1935 proved a highly formative period for the Duce's future expansionist strategy. 
From 1929 onwards Italian foreign policy had attempted to establish the country as 
the "determinant weight" and the ultimate international arbiter in a fluid European 
system". Since 1933 this policy had acquired a more concrete shape with the 
formation of the Four Power Pact which, in De Felice's opinion, aimed at a policy of 
"equidistance" between Paris and Berlin'. Despite Mussolini's disillusionment with 
Nazi foreign policy after the July coup in Vienna and the unilateral introduction of 
conscription, the timing of the Ethiopian campaign reflected his ambition to achieve 
a "speedy victory" and return to his role as arbiter of the European system with 
enhanced prestige78. However, his disappointment with the policy of the western 
powers in the autumn of 1935 initiated a change in his strategic thinking which 
would be felt in 1936. His intransigent attitude to the Hoare -Laval plan was followed 
by the German- Italian agreement over Austria in January 1936 and later by the two 
225 Domarus, Mussolini and Hitler, pp. 195 -203 
226 De Felice, R., "Alcune osservazioni sulla politica estera mussoliniana ", in De Felice (ed.), L'Italia 
_Pa Tedeschi e Alleati. La politica estera fascista e la seconda guerra mondiale (Bologna 1973), pp. 
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227 De Felice, Mussolini il duce, I, pp. 415ff. For the Four Power Pact see ibid., pp. 464ff 
78 Rochat, Militari, pp. 376 -9; Lowe, Marzari, Ch. 12 
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countries' cooperation in the Spanish Civil War79. By the beginning of 1936 the 
prospect of a rapprochement with Nazi Germany had ceased to be the ultima ratio of 
Mussolini's strategy'30; by the autumn of the same year, after the conclusion of the 
Axis alliance, it was regarded as the default orientation of Italian foreign policy. 
Nazi foreign policy and colonialism: a half- hearted affair 
Unlike Mussolini, Hitler did not wish to antagonise the other European 
powers in the colonial field. For a start, he knew that he did not possess the necessary 
means (strong navy, economic resources) to sustain a colonial campaign. He was also 
aware that the Versailles Treaty had placed Germany in a highly underprivileged 
colonial position, from which it would be time -consuming, if not impossible at all, to 
recover. He therefore chose to restrict himself to the colonial revisionist argument, 
while antagonising the European powers in the continental field, for which Germany 
was better equipped131. This left colonialism outside the nucleus of German great - 
power aspirations in the 1930s and reduced it to an ancillary function in the wider 
context of revisionism132 . 
The advocates of colonialism in Germany faced two main problems. First, 
they were aware that the return of German colonies was meaningful only within a 
wider framework of anti -Versailles revisionism which included continental 
expansion'33. Given, however, the emotive power of the argument for the restoration 
of the former German territories in Europe, colonial revisionism per se was less 
229 For the two regimes' cooperation in the Spanish civil war see, in this study, Ch. 5, Section IIc 
2J0 For the view that Mussolini's foreign policy remained decidedly anti -German see De Felice, 
Mussolini it duce, II, pp. 333ff. Cf. Quartararo's view in Roma tra Londra e Berlino, passim. See 
Knox's criticism of this view in "The fascist regime ", pp. 153 -5 
2J1 See von Neurath's relevant comments in DGFP, C, 1, pp. 256 -60; and von Billow's memo in 
Michalka, W. (ed.), Das Dritte Reich, vol. 1: Volksgemeinschaft and Grossmachtpolitik (Munich 
1985), pp. 216ff 
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241 
Foreign policy- making (1922 -1939) 
suitable for generating a revisionist consensus, both within and outside Germany. 
Second, the colonialists were divided in their arguments. Some, like Schacht, 
advocated the return of the colonies as an autonomous goal of German foreign policy 
and as a solution to Germany's postwar economic problems (raw materials, foreign 
exchange etc.)'34. Others, like the DKG (Deutsche Koloniale Gesellschaft), viewed 
the colonial issue as a legal or prestige question of equal significance to the goal of 
continental revisionism'''. For the former, the return of all, or part of, the German 
pre -war colonies was an objective in itself that would fulfil Germany's great -power 
aspirations through a predominant economic position in the international system. For 
the latter, it was simply a means to an end, an instrument of prestige complementary 
with the goal of continental revisionism in an attempt to overthrow the Versailles 
settlement. 
Hitler's erratic political handling of the colonial issue underlined its 
secondary importance in the overall framework of Nazi foreign policy. In December 
1935 he emphasised the link between the return of the pre -1914 German colonies and 
Germany's return to the Disarmament Conference, from which she had withdrawn in 
the autumn 1933736. Three months later, in the shadow of the widespread alarm at 
the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, he made a similar offer, now relating colonial 
revisionism to Germany's return to the League of Nations'3'. At the same time, 
Schacht was authorised to conduct wide -ranging negotiations with British and French 
officials, offering the same quid pro quo: security in Europe, return of Germany to 
the collective security system, renunciation of war in return for colonial 
concessions-38. Hitler, however, had never been a colonial enthusiast-39. His 
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ephemeral interest in the colonial issue was more of a diplomatic manoeuvre than an 
actual political U-turn". Colonial revisionism was diplomatically useful in 1935 -6 in 
sustaining the legal attack on the concept of Versailles security, and it was even more 
useful in 1937 -9 in keeping the channels of communication between Berlin and 
London open. As, however, the British government was lowering the price for an 
agreement with Germany (with Lord Halifax stressing that "it was not necessarily 
thought that the status quo must be maintained under all circumstances '''), Hitler's 
confidence after the successes of the post -1936 period made him increasingly 
uninterested in a colonial agreement per se'. In the last two years before the 
outbreak of the war he continued to invoke the colonial argument in order to 
underline Germany's unjust treatment by the victors of the First World War, but his 
proposals either lacked any concrete reference to specific goals or were 
overshadowed by the priority of continental expansion'- ;3. In two occasions, the first 
in November 1938 and the second in January 1939, he repeated Germany's vague 
claim for a return of all pre -war colonies, but noted that this issue would not be 
solved by the use of force'. In front of his own military leadership he was even 
more explicit: in May 1939 he spoke of the colonies as no solution to the food and 
space problems of the Reich'4'. Even at the eleventh hour, in his peace offer to the 
British on 25 August 1939, he did include the return of the colonies to Germany as a 
condition for the proposed agreement (of lesser importance, though, to the revision of 
the German- Polish frontier) but he showed no urgency, eager to "fix the longest 
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possible time limit" -a flexibility he was unwilling to show with regard to the timing 
of the Polish campaign246. 
There is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the Führer had a clear plan 
for world domination which involved the establishment of a vast colonial empire'47. 
The continental focus of his exposition at the Hossbach Conference in November 
1937 reaffirmed his position that Germany's Lebensraum lay in eastern Europe and 
could not be satisfied outside the continent in the form of colonies748. At the same 
time, however, Hitler was a true social Darwinist and it is difficult to imagine that his 
drive for expansion had a rigid territorial terminus' In the years immediately prior 
to the attack on Russia he appeared convinced that success in his campaign against 
the Soviet Union would reduce both Britain and the USA to a state of panic and 
facilitate the establishment of Germany's domination not only in Europe but in the 
whole world'S0. Especially in the period 1939 -41 he made repeated references to a 
vague central African empire and the domination of the Pacific alongside Japan after 
the eventual defeat of the USA'''. However, until 1941 his tour d' horizon was 
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dominated by the sheer volume and significance of the Soviet Union. This was the 
goal which had given substance to his Lebensraum vision and encapsulated all his 
opposition to communism and the Jews. Beyond that, his plans were limited to 
abstract declarations, projecting his ideological belief in constant struggle and in the 
superiority of the German nation, but falling significantly short of a crystallised 
strategy for world domination. The reversal of Germany's fortunes on the eastern 
front from 1942 onwards prevented the widening of Hitler's expansionist horizon and 
ensured that such plans, even if they existed, would remain confined to Hitler's 
personal utopian sphere. 
Expansion on the continent: beyond traditional justifications of expansion 
On the continental level, the prevailing intention of the victorious powers in 
1918 to agree on a stable, long -lasting territorial pattern to the European map 
manifested their determination to establish a semi -permanent territorial settlement in 
Europe and to stave off future territorial disputes. Even if the invocation of the 
revisionist and irredentist principles came to be seen as a legitimate argument for 
frontier readjustments (as in the case of Fiume, Austria and the Sudetenland), claims 
for further aggressive territorial revisions were unacceptable by the main guarantors 
of the Versailles system. The sensitivity of the European Great Powers to territorial 
revision on the continent was shown on a number of occasions, from the reaction to 
the occupation of the Corfu in 1923 to the formation of the Stresa front in 1935 and 
the Munich conference in September 1938. 
Nevertheless, ever since the 1920s, the Italian Fascist foreign policy had 
displayed double standards regarding the principle of maintaining European stability. 
While the participation of Italy at the Lausanne conference and in the Locarno pacts 
had turned her into one of the pillars of the European status quo, Mussolini's Balkan 
policy entailed the expansion of Italian interests in the region without ruling out the 
use of military force to effect territorial changes. Apart from the Corfu incident and 
Aigner, pp. 254f. See an interesting discussion and assessment of the various arguments in Kershaw, 
Nazi Dictatorship, pp. 125 -30 
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the plans for war against Turkey and Yugoslavia in the early 1920s, the Duce 
continued to plot with Croat and Macedonian separatists against the integrity of the 
Yugoslav state and to entertain hopes of a civil war which would justify Italian 
intervention. At the same time, his geopolitical designs included a consolidation of 
Italy's position in Albania, something that was achieved with consensual, rather than 
military, methods after the two treaties of 1926 and 1927''2. 
The shift of Mussolini's attention to the politica periferica from 1932 
onwards did provide an ephemeral diversion from aggressive plans in the Balkans. 
The traditional diplomats were relieved that the turn to east Africa entailed the 
abandonment of the "Croat plan" in favour of a more traditional policy of colonial 
expansion's'. However, with the successful conclusion of the Ethiopian campaign in 
May 1936, Mussolini felt obliged to return to the issue of the European balance of 
power, reconsidering his policy options in the light of French hostility and the 
resurgence of Nazi Germany. Participation in the Spanish Civil War was the first 
indication that the Duce intended to use aggressive means on the continent to 
promote his wider geopolitical ambitions in the Mediterranean, in defiance of 
international agreements and the need to in the continent. This 
prospect alarmed the traditional diplomats and the King, who feared an irreversible 
re- orientation of Italian foreign policy towards Nazi Germany''. Such fears were 
strengthened after the official declaration of the Axis alliance in 1936, the signing of 
the Anti -Comintern Pact and Italy's withdrawal from the League of Nations in 
1937''5. Yet, the pro -German tendency in Italian foreign policy remained short of a 
definite commitment until 1939. If Mussolini conceived the 1937 pact with 
Yugoslavia as a means to subvert the cohesion of the Little Entente and limit French 
influence in the Balkans256, he also showed increasing alarm at German expansion 
252 For all these issues see, in this study, Ch. 3, Section III 
153 Robertson, E. M., Mussolini as Empire -Builder. Europe and Africa, 1932 -36 (London & 
Basingstoke 1977), pp. 84 -5; Rumi, G., -Revisionismo' fascista ed espansione coloniale ", pp. 461- 
4 
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256 Lowe, Marzari, pp. 294 -6 
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southwards with the Anschluss and the annexation of the Sudetenland'-''. During 
1938, extensive talks with Britain took place on the Italian initiative'-'S, leading to the 
Easter Accords of April 1938 which were meant to discourage German aggressive 
intentions against Czechoslovakia-59. 
As, however, the European system gradually disintegrated into chaos in 
1938 -39 as a result of German aggression, Mussolini identified new opportunities for 
making forceful changes in the Balkan territorial status quo. His major expansionist 
initiative in the period before the outbreak of the Second World War, namely the 
invasion of Albania in April 1939, appeared as the logical conclusion of his Adriatic 
policy ever since the mid- 1920s. He considered Albania as instrumental for Italy's 
Mediterranean aspirations in two ways - first, because of its geographic position at 
the entrance to the Adriatic Sea and, second, as a bulwark against both Yugoslavia 
and Greece. In a meeting of the Council of Ministers in December 1936 he described 
the establishment of a semi -protectorate in 1927 over Albania as a political anomaly, 
creating "an Italian province without a prefect "'60. He reiterated emphatically the 
geopolitical argument in his speech to the Grand Council in February 1939, adding 
that Albania was the only concrete territorial goal of Italian foreign policy in the 
continent'61. Furthermore, the geopolitical importance of the country was 
complemented by its historic ties with Italian culture and civilisation throughout the 
centuries. A plethora of studies on Albania were published in Italy during the late 
1930s, emphasising the "racial" and "cultural affinities between the two peoples, as 
well as their difference from the predominantly Slav character of Yugoslavia'6'. 
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The annexation of Albania in April 1939 prompted Mussolini to restate the 
country's significance as a "geographic `constant ' in Italy's Mediterranean 
aspirations and to conclude that this success had transformed the Adriatic into an 
"Italian lake' 263. Although the idea that Albania held the key to the balance of power 
in the Balkan region was grossly exaggerated, these statements shed light on 
Mussolini's subsequent tactics towards Yugoslavia and Greece in the spring and 
summer of 1939. With the fall of Stoyadinovic early in 1939, Mussolini abandoned 
his brief flirtation with Yugoslav friendship, based on the pact of 1937, and reverted 
to the policy of internal subversion with the co- operation of Croat separatism'. In 
June 1939 Ciano spoke of the need to consolidate the success in Albania by 
dismembering Yugoslavia, taking the whole of Dalmatia and creating "a territorial 
continuity as far as Albania '. At the same time, after the Greek rejection of the 
Italian proposal for renewing the 1928 Pact of Friendship, Mussolini started thinking 
in terms of using Albania to put pressure on Greece or even launching a military 
campaign towards the Aegean Sea. In August, he ordered the drafting of such a plan 
to be used in the contingency of a large -scale European war'66 
With the exception of the consistent policy towards Albania, the shift of 
Italian foreign policy towards expansion in the Balkans reflected the geopolitical 
reasoning of a Mediterranean mare nostrum but lacked either definite medium -term 
expansionist priorities or a crystallised long -term strategy of alliances. The 
expansionist venture in Albania and the continuous subversion of Yugoslav and 
Greek interests underlined Mussolini's determination to promote a wide expansionist 
vision in the Balkans which would complement his peripheral strategy in the 
Mediterranean and the Red Sea (Ethiopia- Yemen). In this sense, the conjunction of 
aggressive colonial and continental expansion in the 1935 -39 period advanced a 
single long -term vision, but the uncertainty about both German and British intentions 
encouraged Mussolini to experiment with a number of diplomatic and military 
options. Undoubtedly, his increasing willingness to use military force against his 
263 Bottai, 13.4.1939; Lowe, Marzari, pp. 326 -30 
264 Lowe, Marzari, pp. 323 -9; Candeloro, vol. 9, pp. 478 -9; Jankovic, B. M., The Balkans in 
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Balkan neighbours marked a departure from the post -1918 liberal policy of peaceful 
co- existence and acknowledgement of the Balkan status quo. Another departure 
began during the Ethiopian campaign, which strengthened the pro -German 
orientation of Italian foreign policy. However, taking Salvemini's view of the 
Ethiopian war as presage to Italy's participation in an Axis war or presenting Italy's 
entry into the war in 1940 as a culmination of her aggressive policy in 1935 -3926' 
disregards the fact that the tactical flexibility of Mussolini's foreign policy during 
that period mirrored a lack of clear interim strategies and an uncertainty about the 
opportunities offered by the international system for the advancement of his 
Mediterranean vision. Therefore, the use of geopolitical and historic irredentist 
arguments to justify the gathering pace of Italian expansionism in the late -1930s may 
be seen as evidence of long -term intentions but not of a categorical guiding principle 
which dictated short-term action. 
In Germany, the focus of the revisionist and irredentist agenda on territorial 
readjustments in Europe gave a predominantly continental character to the Nazi 
expansionist policies. Until the summer of 1938 Hitler had adhered to the logic of the 
"artichoke theory", extending the Reich's territory in the west (Rhineland) and the 
south (Austria) while gradually rebuilding Germany's military might and 
strengthening her strategic position in central Europe. He was aware of the need to 
present his expansionist ventures as legitimate actions originating from the "unjust" 
Versailles settlement and the principle of uniting the whole German population 
within the territory of the Reich. This was plainly reflected in the wording of the 
Operation Otto for Austria which was drafted on 11 March 1938 and stated that the 
Anschluss should be presented "in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the 
population "268. 
In this sense, there was a major qualitative difference between the annexation 
of Austria and the preparation for Operation Green against Czechoslovakia later in 
1938. Although Hitler had since 1937 expressed his intention to liquidate the whole 
of Czechoslovakia, his initial plan involved a pre -emptive strike in the context of a 
767 Petersen, pp. 45ff 
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future war against France'69. However, in the aftermath of the Hossbach Conference 
he spoke of his intention to carry out "an offensive war against Czechoslovakia" in 
order to "solve the German problem of living space"". The same plan envisaged the 
execution of the operation even "before the completion of Germany's full 
preparedness for war" if there were indications that there would be no opposition 
from the western powers to the plan. This latter assumption did not contradict the 
views of the traditional military leadership, since General Beck had already been 
working on the offensive plan against Czechoslovakia on condition that Britain 
would remain neutral. However, by the end of May 1938 Hitler had again altered his 
plan for Operation Green - now the crisis was described as unavoidable' and the 
liquidation of the whole Czechoslovak state would take place "in the near future ". 
For the first time, the Führer was determined to pursue a large -scale space policy 
without seeking recourse to the legitimate argument of irredentism and was willing 
not simply to await, but to "bring about the suitable moment "272 . 
The escalation of the Czech crisis during the summer and early autumn of 
1938 divided not just the army generals but also the Nazi leadership down the 
middle. The views of General Beck, the Secretary of State von Weizsäcker, Goebbels 
and Göring converged upon a platform of opposing a military showdown as 
potentially disastrous for Germany. This widespread opposition may have weighed 
upon Hitler's mind and led him to change his mind on 28 September and accept the 
proposal for an international conference'73. Equally influential must have been 
Mussolini's decision to request a postponement of the military mobilisation and to 
endorse Chamberlain's proposal for a negotiated compromise solution''. If, 
however, the crisis was temporarily resolved with the Munich Agreement and the 
cession of only the Sudetenland to Germany, the events of August- September 1938 
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were indicative of far -reaching changes in Hitler's foreign policy'75. The Führer now 
appeared to be working on the assumption that Britain would not oppose German 
expansion in central Europe, not because of a lack of interest in the region but mainly 
due to her military unpreparedness which would not allow an effective military 
action before 1941 or 1942276. The opposition of Beck, Göring and Goebbels to 
"Operation Green" originated from their rejection of exactly this strategic 
assumption' '. For them, it had become obvious that Hitler was thinking in terms of a 
"lightning" campaign which assumed British non -involvement but no longer 
depended on it278. However, on this point the predicaments of Göring and Goebbels 
diverged from those of the traditional conservative elites in the armed forces and the 
Wilhelinstrasse. Göring was not averse to the idea of a general war, although he 
wished to first exhaust the function of diplomatic compromise and peaceful 
expansion in the pattern of the Anschluss. He was aware of German military and 
economic unpreparedness for an all -out war and would have preferred to risk a major 
confrontation only after full mobilisation and fighting power had been achieved, 
especially after the conclusion of the airforce rearmament programme'7'. He 
nevertheless viewed a German victory in a general war as possible even in 1938 and 
proceeded with the preparations for a showdown with Czechoslovakia'80. For Beck, 
however, the possibility of risking a war against a great coalition of western powers 
for the sake of a secondary target such as Czechoslovakia was inconceivable'8'. He 
was conscious that the whole strategic planning of the army rested on the assumption 
that a conflict with Britain and France should be avoided, if not altogether, at least 
until the early 1940s. His active objections reflected the traditional military view that 
the army should co- decide both the military and the political prerequisites for action, 
as opposed to Hitler's opinion that there should be a clear separation of jurisdictions. 
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Contrary to Beck, the new leadership of the Wehrmacht, Keitel and Brauchitsch, had 
also come to accept Hitler's view and went on dutifully to translate Hitler's political 
instructions into military action'. They removed Beck's political arguments from 
his first memorandum in May 1938 before showing it to Hitler'83. Therefore, while 
Beck expressed a political assessment of Nazi foreign and military policy, the 
adherence of Brauchitsch and Keitel to Hitler's strategy was irrelevant to their own 
personal and political beliefs. Having accepted Hitler's monopoly of authority in the 
handling of foreign affairs, any expression of disapproval would be incongruous. 
The shift of Hitler's strategy to a high -risk space policy was not disguised by 
the irredentist justification behind the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia at Munich. 
Less than a month after the agreement, he gave explicit orders for the liquidation of 
the "remainder of the Czech state" at any time'''. This obscurity, however, regarding 
the timing of the operation reflected a much wider uncertainty about his short-term 
strategies and priorities. During the last months of 1938 Hitler turned his attention 
back to Poland. As he confessed to his generals in August 1939, his preference was 
for a compromise solution over Danzig before a war with the west'85. He therefore 
ordered Ribbentrop to approach the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Lipski, with 
concrete proposals for the incorporation of the Free City to the Reich in return for a 
guarantee to respect Polish sovereignty and a renewal of the 1934 pact'86. The 
proposal, first presented in October and renewed in November 1938'87, was met with 
a flat rejection by the Polish government1S'. By the time the Polish leader, Beck, 
came to Berlin to discuss the issue with Hitler (January 1939) and to propose a 
division of the Free City between the two countries, the Chancellor had reverted to a 
puzzlingly intransigent position, ruling out any compromise solution and demanding 
nothing less than the return of the whole city789. In the meantime, he had readjusted 
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his strategy - Poland would be dealt with first, after the liquidation of the rump Czech 
state which was traditionally regarded as a strategic prerequisite for any attack on 
Poland'. Within three weeks from the march into the rest of Czechoslovakia, Hitler 
issued instructions for Operation White against Poland which envisaged the 
completion of preparations by 1 September'9'. The new strategic plan prioritised a 
"lightning" action (Blitz) to destroy the Polish state and armed forces ", then war with 
the west and finally "turning against the east "'9'. His decision to attack was 
accompanied by a unilateral abandonment of negotiations with Poland at the 
beginning of April'93 
German foreign policy after the end of 1937 confirmed the shift from the 
limited border policy of the previous years to the living space principle which 
underpinned the large -scale expansionist ventures of the Nazi regime in the following 
years. The "expansion in the east" theme dominated the rationale of Hitler's major 
foreign policy actions and strategic moves, adding an element of historic urgency to 
his Lebensraunz vision and relegating colonial goals to a secondary, if not 
insignificant, level of importance. Although the territorial objectives of Nazi 
expansion in 1938 -39 were shared by the conservative military and diplomatic elites, 
the Führer's decision to force the pace of expansion, disrupt traditional priorities, use 
the military power of his armed forces and risk a major confrontation were in sharp 
contrast to the long -term strategic planning of the conservative establishment. 
Having said that, even by the beginning of 1939 Hitler did not appear to know what 
kind of war he wanted. His experiments with Poland between autumn 1938 and 
spring 1939 forced him to adjust his strategic plans, abandoning his initial proposal 
for turning Poland into an essentially vassal state of Germany and choosing instead 
to invade the country2'. He was unsure of the British attitude and had no tangible 
indication of Russian intentions towards Poland and Germany. By the time he spoke 
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to the army commanders of 23 May he seemed poised to unleash his military 
machine but betrayed his uncertainty as to the west's attitude and the most favourable 
date for the invasion. His strategy regarding the conflict continued to change in the 
few following months in the face of international developments and was not 
crystallised until the last days of August'. 
V: Conclusions 
According to fascist ideology, foreign policy was meant to be the instrument 
of mediation between the political and the mythical, between reality and utopia, in 
order to promote the large -scale historic vision of a new territorial order. Yet, for a 
long time after the assumption of power by Mussolini and Hitler their foreign policy 
objectives followed traditional priorities and entertained a high degree of support 
from traditional political, military and diplomatic figures. This continuity with 
previous liberal policies was a necessity for the fascist regimes not simply because of 
the circumstances in which they were forced to operate (coalition cabinets, 
institutional checks, international fears) but also because the two leaders lacked 
concrete short- and medium -term strategies for promoting their expansionist visions. 
Therefore, their adherence to traditional arguments, such as revisionism, irredentism 
and colonialism, served an important triple function. First, it upheld the impression 
of continuity and thus alleviated initial fears about fascist intentions, on both the 
domestic and the international level. Second, it provided possibilities for legitimate 
expansion in an international system that was particularly sensitive to territorial 
issues after the trauma of the First World War. Third, it also offered a guiding 
principle for short- and medium -term action in the handling of foreign affairs. Each 
traditional argument fulfilled a different but significant function. Revisionism 
provided a legal argument for disguising and legitimising territorial claims and 
undermined the permanent character of the Versailles territorial settlement. 
Irredentism offered the opportunity to use the same principle which underpinned 
border readjustments at the Paris Peace Conference, namely national self- 
295 This issue is discussed later in this study, Ch. 6, Section II 
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determination, in order to justify further territorial claims. Finally, colonialism 
became a bargaining trump card when the circumstances did not allow expansion on 
the continent and was also used as the currency of political prestige in the European 
system. 
However, there were limits to this continuity between liberal and fascist 
foreign policies. Both fascist regimes treated the traditional expansionist arguments 
and claims with selectivity, even to the point of abandoning some of them altogether 
(Germany's policy in South Tyrol, Eupen- Malmedy, Alsace). They also gave early 
indications of more far -reaching designs which transgressed what was generally 
regarded as legitimate expansion (Corfu incident, the July 1934 putsch in Vienna). At 
the same time, each regime laid different emphasis on the various expansionist 
arguments: while the Italian regime integrated colonial, irredentist and revisionist 
claims into its expansionist agenda, Nazi foreign policy focused on continental 
expansionist objectives, displaying only a sporadic and vague interest in colonial 
goals. The selective treatment of the traditional arguments and the varying degrees of 
emphasis on them by each regime can only be adequately understood as an indication 
of specific underlying geopolitical priorities in the foreign policies of the two fascist 
regimes. 
The radicalisation of Italian and German expansionism in the mid- and late - 
1930s entailed both a quantitative and a qualitative change. It rested on a shift from 
border to living space policy, alluding to more ambitious, large -scale territorial goals 
both on the continent and, for Italy, in the colonial field too. Since most of these 
goals went beyond what the guarantors of the Versailles system perceived as 
legitimate expansion, their attainment presupposed the increasing use of military 
means instead of diplomatic procedures. Although a start was made with the Italian 
aggressive campaign against Ethiopia, it was the Nazi regime which started to 
gravitate towards war from 1938 onwards at a time when Mussolini strove to keep 
his options open by experimenting with both diplomatic and military strategies. 
Having said that, there was a high degree of continuity between the early objectives 
of Fascist expansion and the more radical goals of the late- 1930s. Mussolini's east 
African and Adriatic ventures were intended to consolidate or extend previous 
successes, while Hitler's expansion in Austria and Czechoslovakia rested upon the 
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Wehrmacht's restored military capacity through rearmament and, in the case of the 
Anschluss, aimed to succeed where there had been failure in the past (Vienna putsch). 
This continuity underlined the determination of both fascist leaderships to exploit 
opportunities offered and to produce favourable conditions for the promotion of their 
long -term designs for acquiring vast living space in eastern Europe (for Germany) 
and the Mediterranean region (for Italy). 
War had come significantly closer in 1938 -39, as the two regimes showed an 
increasing determination to pursue their more extensive territorial objectives. Yet, the 
ideological nature of the two leaders' expansionist visions cannot on its own account 
for the occurrence of the particular military conflict which Germany started in 
September 1939 and Italy joined in July 1940. Their strategies and priorities 
continued to be affected by both domestic and international developments not only in 
the remaining period until the beginning of the war but also throughout the duration 
of the conflict. The next two chapters will examine the conditions which gave the 
final momentum to the radicalisation of the two regimes' foreign policies and defined 
the parameters as well as the fate of the great fascist war. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Between co- operation and rivalry: Italian and German 
expansionism and the radicalisation of fascist foreign 
policies (1933 -1939) 
I: Introduction 
In one of the concluding remarks of his study on Nazi foreign policy Klaus 
Hildebrand emphasises the need to set the evolution of Hitler's foreign policy "in the 
historical context of international politics in the 1930s and 1940s ". In this way, he 
continues, it will become easier "to establish how far Hitler was able to influence the 
course of world affairs during the twelve years of his rule, and how far international 
circumstances enabled him to carry out his plans or forced him to limit or modify 
them '. This raises the question of the relation between ideological goals and 
political actions in the realm of fascist foreign policy. The questions he asks about 
Nazi Germany are relevant to the nature of foreign policy under fascism in both 
Germany and Italy. If there is a consensus among researchers about the traditional 
"revisionism" of fascist foreign policies in the first stages of the two regimes' 
domestic consolidation, the radicalisation of fascist expansionism in the second half 
of the 1930s remains an issue of heated historical debate. Hildebrand's conclusion 
seems to suggest that, notwithstanding the validity of the primacy-of- domestic- 
politics thesis, the analysis of the Italian and German fascist foreign policies in the 
1930s requires a wider European or even international perspective. This would 
enable us to extend beyond the domestic origins and functions of foreign policy 
decisions, and beyond the debate about their ideological consistency, in order to 
' Hildebrand, K., The Third Reich (London 1984), p. 151 
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relate foreign policy ambitions with the opportunities and limitations arising from the 
international situation. 
Inevitably, the radicalisation of the Italian and German foreign policies in the 
late 1930s has been conceptualised in terms of the principal historiographical debate 
about the programmatic or not character of expansionist foreign policies. A distinct 
and influential branch of the intentionalist approach has acknowledged the primacy 
of ideological considerations in the shaping of Fascist and Nazi foreign policies'. In 
this sense, radicalisation has been interpreted as the logical, pre- meditated, and 
indispensable product of the two regimes' programmes and the two leaders' 
Weltanschauungen. However, this alleged primacy of ideological considerations in 
foreign policy decision -making has been challenged with reference both to Italian 
and German fascist foreign policy in three different ways. First, the two regimes 
were accused of being primarily social imperialist. A number of interpretations has 
focused on the impact of the domestic grievances that the economic crises of 1929 -32 
and 1935 -38 inflicted upon the Italian and German regimes respectively. The danger 
of diminishing credibility and internal collapse of fascism dictated a diversion of 
discontent outwards, and it appeared that the two fascist regimes could capitalise on 
the popular issues of revisionism and "great power" aspirations by pursuing more 
aggressive foreign policies regardless of previous ideological pronouncements'. 
Second, the radicalisation of the Italian and German foreign policies in the late 
1930s has been seen in the light of the two regimes' need to complete their domestic 
consolidation by "conquering" the last strongholds of the traditional élite groups. 
Successful aggressive expansion expected to foster the prestige of the fascist 
leaderships which, in turn, would eventually enable them to destroy the remaining 
2 Amongst a great number of intentionalist studies see Jäckel, E., Hitler's Weltanschauung. A 
Blueprint for Power (Middletown, Connecticut. 1972); Trevor -Roper, H. R., "Hitlers Kriegsziele ", 
Vierte jahrshc fte für Zeitgeschichte, 8 (1960), pp. 121 -33 
3 This approach is more common with regard to Italian fascism. See Baer, G. W., La guerra italo - 
etiopica e la crisi dell'equilibrio europeo (Bari 1970); Catalano, F., L'economia italiana di guerra. 
La politica economico-finanziaria del fascismo dalla guerra d'Etiopia alla caduta del regime, 
1935 -1943 (Milan 1969); Di Nolfo, A., Mussolini e la politica estera italiana, 1919 -1933 (Padova 
1960). For Germany, see Mommsen, H., "Ausnahmezustand als Herrschaftstechnik des 
Nationalsozialistischen -Regimes ", in Funke, M. (ed.), Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte: 
Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches (Düsseldorf 1977), pp. 30 -45 
Knox, "Conquest ", pp. 43ff, and "Expansionist Zeal, Fighting Power, and Staying Power in the 
Italian and German Dictatorships ", in Bessel, R. (ed.), Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. 
Comparisons and Contrasts (Cambridge 1996), pp. 115 -33 
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checks to their political dominance. Despite the different nature of these checks 
between the two countries (the Vatican, the Crown and the conservative circles 
around it in Italy; the powerful military- industrial élites and the conservative political 
groups in Germany), the changes in the expansionist policies of the two regimes 
could be seen as manifestations of the common desire to strengthen their domestic 
authority and thus promote the vision of a truly "fascist" state. 
Third, the new aggressive tone in the Italian and German foreign policies in 
the late 1930s was also perceived as the only feasible response of the two regimes to 
the mounting domestic deadlocks. This approach, however, departs from the 
traditional social imperialist theory in that it interprets these changes as indications of 
the two regimes' diminishing ability to sustain their initial domestic and foreign 
policies. In the 1936 -8 period both Mussolini and Hitler came to face increasingly 
inauspicious circumstances in the conduct of their domestic and foreign policies. In 
Germany, the growing pace of rearmament placed considerable strains on an 
economic planning that was unwilling either to reduce military spending or to restrict 
demand for consumer products. In Italy, the cost of the Ethiopian campaign and the 
involvement in the Spanish civil war hampered the regime's ability either to engage 
in a more rational economic planning or to achieve an effective preparation for war. 
At the same time, both countries were faced with an unstable diplomatic conjuncture, 
isolated from the "western democracies" and distrustful of each other. In this sense, 
expansion, aggression and even war were not so much choices (as in the social 
imperialist thesis), but rather the inevitable product of the internal pressures and the 
suppressed dynamism of the two fascist regimes. 
All these approaches seem to disregard the importance of Hildebrand's 
suggestion about the international dimension in the radicalisation on Italian and 
German foreign policies. Without ignoring the decisive role of domestic 
considerations in foreign policy decision -making, we should not forget that the 
foreign policies of fascist Italy and Germany evolved within a European state system 
based on ideas of balance -of -power and security. The problem with studying foreign 
policies as simply domestic phenomena, as continuities and discontinuities with 
national history, is that it may produce misleading conclusions about the significance 
of international relations in the implementation of a foreign policy. It may also inflate 
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the role of personalities (as happened in the case of the "Hitlerite" and "Mussolinian" 
approaches) or the ability of a state to implement its foreign policy plans regardless 
of international circumstances. It is, therefore, essential to incorporate all the 
elements which defined the shaping of fascist foreign policies (ideology, 
opportunism, social imperialism, domestic crises) into a wider international 
framework, and to see how the intentions and actions of the Italian or the German 
regime interacted with the intentions and actions of the other European states. 
The first systematic attempt was made in the 1960s by A. J. P. Taylor, who 
produced a study of international relations in the 1930s and located the main causes 
of the Second World War in the escalating tension between the main European 
powers. Although Taylor's work was supposed to be a general account of the origins 
of the war from an international perspective, it focused heavily on Nazi Germany and 
Hitler, making only limited - and often dismissive- references to the responsibility of 
Italian Fascism'. In a similar vein, G. Salvemini played down the responsibility of 
the Italian Fascist regime for the outbreak and escalation of the war. In his famous 
arithmetic of blame, he attributed five- tenths of the guilt to Hitler, three- tenths to 
Stalin and only one -tenth to Mussolini's alleged reckless and irresponsible 
opportunisme'. In 1980, R. Quartararo published an extraordinary account of Italian 
foreign policy in the 1930s from the viewpoint of Italian- British relations. Building 
upon De Felice's and A. F. K. Organski's distinction between Nazi radical 
expansionism and Fascist more traditionalist foreign policy, she interpreted the 
radicalisation of Mussolini's expansionist policies as the consequence of his 
frustration with the unresponsive British attitude to Italian overtures and the alliance 
with Nazi Germany as the last alternative to diplomatic isolation'. 
What, however, neither of the above works sufficiently emphasised is the 
element of interaction between the two fascist regimes themselves. The classic study 
of Elisabeth Wiskemann The Rome- Berlin Axis covers basically the years after 1935 
5 Taylor, A. J. P., The Origins of the Second World War (London, 1961); Carr, W., "National 
Socialism: Foreign Policy and Wehrmacht", in Laqueur, W. (ed.), Fascism: A Reader's Guide. 
Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography (Harmondsworth 1979), p. 119 
6 Salvemini, G., Prelude to the Second World War (London 1953), pp. 515f 
' Quartararo, R., Roma tra Londra e Berlino. La politica estera fascista dal 1930 al 1940 (Rome 
1980); Organski, A. F. K., The Forms of Political Development (New York 1965); De Felice, R., 
Intervista sul fascismo (Bari 1975) 
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and is dominated by an emphasis on the importance of Nazi foreign policy for the 
radicalisation of fascist expansionism after 1937, while J. Petersen's work Hitler and 
Mussolini focuses on the interaction between the two fascist leaders in the pre -1937 
period, and does not therefore provide sufficient information on the reasons behind 
the radicalisation of fascist expansionism after 19378. The influence of Italian 
Fascism on the Nazi system should not be underestimated, and Italian foreign policy 
in the second half of the 1930s should not be interpreted simply as slavishly copying 
German expansionism, as first G. Salvemini and then D. Mack Smith and 
Wiskemann attempted to prove9. Through the interaction of their different 
expansionist visions Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany gradually established an 
idiosyncratic bilateral relationship that should be treated as a distinct aspect of the 
two regimes' expansionist policies10. The aim of this chapter is to draw attention to 
the importance of the exclusive political relation between the two fascist regimes for 
the radicalisation of Italian and German expansionist policies in the second half of 
the 1930s. It traces the origins of the process which led to the diplomatic 
convergence of Italy and Germany after 1935 and eventually produced a joint 
programme of expansion to be carried out collectively by the two fascist regimes. 
This internationalisation of the fascist expansionist vision, namely the co- ordination 
of the two expansionist policies and their incorporation into a wider framework of 
fascist territorial expansion, is the main focus of this chapter. Its importance lies in 
the changes it caused to the initial ideological and geopolitical doctrines of the two 
regimes, but also in the dynamism it released after the rapprochement of the two 
fascist regimes. This dynamism was not simply the sum of their cumulative energies, 
as the antagonism and mutual suspicion of the pre -1935 period survived after their 
diplomatic rapprochement after 1935. It is important to show that both the "political 
Wiskemann, E., The Rome -Berlin Axis. The History of the Relations between Hitler and Mussolini 
(London 1966); J. Petersen's, Hitler und Mussolini. Die Entstehung der Achse Berlin -Rom 1933- 
1936 (Tübingen 1973) 
9 Salvemini, Preludio, passim; ibid., Dal patto di Londra alla pace di Roma (Turin 1925); Mack 
Smith, D., Italy (1969, 2nd ed.); Wiskemann, E., Fascism in Italy (London & Basingstoke 1970), 
pp. 65ff. Wiskemann, however, acknowledges the impact of Italian fascism on Nazism in the 1920s 
[op. cit., Ch. 7] 
10 For an overview of this debate see Azzi, "Historiography of Fascist Foreign Policy ", pp. 187 -203 
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dynamism" of the alliance between the two fascist regimes" and their still 
antagonistic relations within the Axis contributed equally to the radicalisation of 
fascist expansionism after 1935. 
Il. Internationalisation of fascism: the difficult course of the Italo- 
German rapprochement 
Mussolini as "the Duce of Fascism" and the emergence of Nazism 
If the internationalisation of fascism has been related to the new diplomatic 
situation produced by the Ethiopian campaign and the Spanish Civil War, its origins 
should be located in the period between 1929 and 1935. From the March on Rome up 
to Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor the Italian Fascist regime remained the 
only political expression of the new "fascist" creed. Despite his dealings, either 
secret or official, with other European fascist movements and revisionist regimes, for 
the greatest part of the 1920s Mussolini insisted on the purely national character of 
Italian Fascism. As a reaction to the internationalism of his previous comrades, and 
now arch -enemies, in the Socialist and Communist parties, he renounced any 
aspiration to "export" Fascism. Even his contacts with the German nationalists (and 
most notably with NSDAP officials'') should be seen in the wider framework of his 
efforts to subvert the European Versailles system by encouraging the activities of 
various revisionist groups and countries. His principal aim was to promote his 
country's long- standing revisionist -expansionist aspirations in central Europe and the 
Mediterranean regardless of future alliances. In the absence of another discontented 
" Funke, M., Sanktionen und Kanonen. Hitler, Mussolini und der nationale Abessinienkonflikt 1935- 
1936 (Düsseldorf 1970), p. 102ff; ibid., "Die deutsche -italienische Beziehungen: Anti - 
bolschevismus und aussenpolitische Interessenkonkurrenz als Strukturprinzip der `Achse "', in 
Funke (ed.), Hitler. Deutschland und die Mächte, pp. 828 -30 
12 See Cassels, A., Mussolini's Early Diplomacy (Princeton, New Jersey 1970), pp. 135 -174; Pese, W. 
W., "Hitler und Italien, 1920 -1928 ", Vierteljahrshefte fir Zeitgeschichte, 3 (1955), pp. 113 -26; 
Ludecke, K. G. W. L., 1 Knew Hitler (New York 1937), and an assessment of the book by Layton, 
R. V. Jr., "Kurt Ludecke and `I Knew Hitler'. An Evaluation ", Central European History, 12 
(1979), pp. 372 -86; Domarus, Mussolini und Hitler. Zwei Wege - Gleiches Ende (Würzburg 1977), 
pp. 176 -81 
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country that was powerful enough to energetically challenge the postwar territorial 
arrangements, Mussolini played a dubious diplomatic role in the 1920s. On the one 
hand, especially after his acquiescence in the Locarno Treaties in 1925, he figured 
prominently among the guarantors of the European order. On the other hand, even 
during this period of "good behaviour" in foreign affairs, the Italian Fascist 
leadership never refrained from conspiring with Croat separatists, Bavarian 
nationalists, Hungarian revisionists, Maltese nationalists, Corsican separatists and 
others at the expense of the European stability it was supposed to defend13. Clearly, 
however, these dealings did not reflect any wider scheme for a new fascist order in 
Europe; they were rather exercises in political activism which originated from the 
traditional Italian "great power" ambitions. 
The landscape started to change in the autumn of 1930. In the celebrations for 
the eight anniversary of the March on Rome Mussolini for the first time declared that 
Fascism was an "export product ". Two years later, in his Doctrine of Fascism, he 
went even further and presented Fascism as a doctrine of universal applicability: 
"If every age has its own characteristic doctrine, there are a thousand signs 
which point to Fascism as the characteristic doctrine of our time. ... Fascism has 
henceforth in the world the universality of all these doctrines [socialism, liberalism, 
democracy] which. in realising themselves, have represented a stage in the history of 
the human spirit. "" 
In presenting the Italian Fascist prototype as the new "conquering creed" of 
the twentieth century" Mussolini was essentially responding to new international 
challenges. First, he wished to establish Fascism as a real political alternative - and 
not a simple short-term reaction or crisis phenomenon - to the crumbling liberal - 
democratic system, and as a barrier to the spread of the Marxist doctrine. Second, and 
most important, he intended to establish Italian Fascism as the ideological model and 
" Robertson, E. M., Mussolini as Empire -Builder. Italy and Africa 1932 -1936 (London & 
Basingstoke 1977), pp. 18ff (Malta), 24ff (Croatia); Knox, "Politica estera italiana", pp. 304f. 308, 
316 -8; DDI, 7th, V -VIII, passim (for Ustasi); 7th, I, 259 (Malta). 268 (Hungary), 282 (Corsica). See 
also, in this study, Ch. 3, Section III 
" Mussolini, B., Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions (Rome 1935), reprinted in Oakeshott, M. (ed.), 
The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe (New York 1949), pp. 178 -9. See also 
Knox, "Politica estera italiana", pp. 310 -1 
15 Wiskemann, E., The Rome -Berlin Axis. See also, in this study, Ch. 2, Section II 
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the political Mecca of right -wing polemic against socialism and liberal democracy in 
the post -1929 Europe. It is not coincidental that Duce's first pronouncement of the 
universality of Fascism came only weeks after the electoral triumph of the NSDAP in 
the elections of September 1930. The emergence of a powerful ultranationalist party 
in a country with the greatest thirst and potential for territorial revisionism against 
the Versailles settlement created both an opportunity and a challenge for the Italian 
Fascist regime. On the one hand, it could put Germany on the track of a more 
ambitious revisionist foreign policy at the expense of the British -French vision of 
security in the European system, expressed in the Peace Treaties of 1919 -20. This 
was a highly desirable prospect for Italian expansionism in the Mediterranean, since 
it could induce the British and French governments into making territorial 
concessions in exchange for Italy's support for order in Europe. On the other hand, 
the possibility of a nationalist regime in Germany posed certain logistical problems 
for Mussolini's territorial aspirations16. If Germany's revisionist aspirations in the 
west served Italy's plans to press France into colonial concessions in the 
Mediterranean, Hitler's irredentist declarations meant that the two countries would 
clash on the issue of Austria and South Tyrol ". 
Mussolini's hopes and fears were all confirmed after Hitler's appointment as 
Chancellor in January 1933. Despite the lack of major foreign policy initiatives 
during the first fifteen months of the Nazi regime, the emergence of a nationalist 
Germany revived the debate among the European powers about the need to reassess 
aspects of the territorial, economic and military postwar arrangement. At the same 
time, Hitler's Germany appeared as a potential second pole - and revisionist par 
excellence - in the European state system. This could enable Italy to play a crucial 
diplomatic role by capitalising on her privileged diplomatic position as guarantor of 
European security under the Locarno pacts, but also ideologically associated with its 
main challenger. In this vein, Mussolini achieved the signing of the Four Power Pact 
16 For such an analysis see Kirkpatrick, I. S., Mussolini. Study of a Demagogue (London 1964), pp. 
288 -9 
" Aloisi, P. Journal 25 Juin -14 Juillet 1936 (Paris 1957), 14 -1 -1933; Weinberg, Germany. Hitler and 
World War 11, pp. 45 -6 
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In July 1933', a treaty which emphasised Italy's new -found diplomatic confidence as 
the "determinant weight" of the European balance of power19. By pursuing his 
famous policy of "equidistance" towards Britain/France and Germany, he could play 
the one side against the other, using the former against the latter in central Europe 
and doing the reverse in the Rhine region. 
However, there were ominous signs from the outset. Germany's withdrawal 
from the Disarmament Conference was the first indication of the problems involved 
in the policy of incorporating Nazi Germany into the European security system. The 
German decision caused considerable vexation to the Italian leader, as it was 
interpreted as a blow to the Four -Power Pact'. The aggressive policy of the Nazi 
regime towards Austria, however, was not just a diplomatic problem for the Italian 
regime. Since it cast a serious shadow over the security of the Brenner, it impinged 
upon the issue of Italy's territorial integrity. Understandably, all postwar Italian 
governments had been extremely sensitive about the symbolic importance of the 
Brenner as the only reward for Italy's participation in the First World War, and 
Mussolini was not in the slightest prepared to jeopardise his nationalist credentials by 
making any concessions on this issue. Furthermore, the reactivation of German 
revisionism in central Europe posed an even more comprehensive threat to Italy's 
diplomatic position in the European system. By becoming the champion of the anti - 
Versailles revisionism the Nazi regime could question Italy's special relations with 
the revisionist bloc (i.e. Hungary) and remove those countries from the Italian sphere 
of influence. Such a development could restrict Mussolini's diplomatic flexibility 
and relegate the international image of Italian Fascism to a secondary position in 
favour of a potentially powerful and successful German version. 
1s For the importance of, and the political calculations behind, the Four Power Pact see Knox, 
"Conquest ", p. 315; Robertson, Empire- Builder, pp. 49 -51; Petersen, Hitler und Mussolini, pp. 137- 
185; Albrecht -Carrie, R., Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini (New York 1950), pp. 202ff 
19 De Felice, R., "Alcune osservazioni sulla politica estera mussoliniana ", in De Felice (ed.), L 'Italia 
fra tedeschi e alleati, pp. 57 -74; DDI, 7th, IX, 234 
20 This event is discussed, from the Italian perspective, in Lowe, C. J., Marzari, F., Italian Foreign 
Policy 1870 -1940 (London & Boston 1975), pp. 227f; Robertson, Empire -Builder, p. 59. For 
Mussolini's vexation at the German decision to withdraw from the Conference, see DGFP, C, 2, 4 
and 18. Note, however, the support of the Italian regime against the League of Nations [C, 2, 178], 
and Italy's counterproposals [C, 1, 431/ 494] 
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In this sense, from the beginning of 1933 the two fascist regimes were in an 
ambiguous political relationship. Hitler's rise to power was seen by Mussolini as a 
further triumph of the anti -democratic, anti -liberal and anti -socialist struggle that his 
regime had initiated in 1922. Moreover, the new German Chancellor never concealed 
his admiration for the Duce and the influence that his political techniques had exerted 
on the Nazi movement''. Mussolini, however, quickly realised that the success of the 
Hitler experiment in Germany included beneficial elements for the future of 
European fascism, but was also a potential threat to the co- operation between the two 
countries. In the framework of the German nationalist ideology, the irredentist claim 
for the unification of all German- speaking populations in central Europe possessed a 
similar symbolic significance to postwar Italy's obsession with the Brenner". The 
1920 Programme of the NSDAP expressly stated that "we do not abandon any 
German in Sudetenland, in South Tyrol, in Poland, in ... Austria ". This was, however, 
exactly the problem - that the alldeutsche aspirations of the Nazi regime involved not 
only the Anschluss question or the Polish Corridor, but also the future of the German - 
speaking minority in South Tyrol (Alto Adige). Having been incorporated into the 
Italian national territory in 1919 and undergoing a continuous policy of Italianisation, 
the German -speaking population of South Tyrol saw in Hitler's rise to power an 
excellent opportunity for their reunion with the German Vaterland. Of course, Hitler 
himself had since 1922 plainly declared that "for us the question of South Tyrol does 
not exist, nor will it ever exist '''. Both before and after 1933 he reiterated many 
times his basic thesis that "the fate of some thousands of erstwhile Austrian citizens 
should not influence the relations between the two states ''. There was, however, a 
21 For Mussolini's comments see DGFP, C, 1, 12; DDI, 7th, VIII, 182. For Hitler's admiration for 
Mussolini see Weinberg. Germany, Hitler and World War 11, p. 45; Knox, M., "Conquest, Domestic 
and Foreign, in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany ", Journal of Modern History, 56 (1984), pp. 23 -5; 
Pese, W. W., "Hitler und Italien, 1920 -1928 ", Viertel'ahrshefte far Zeitgeschichte, 3 (1955), pp. 
113 -26 
22 In Feder, G., Das Program der NSDAP und seine weltanschaunlichen Grundlagen (Munich 1932), 
pp. 19 -22. Cf. Ritschel, K. H., Diplomatie um Südtirol. Politische Hintergründe eines europäischen 
Vorsagens (Stuttgart 1966), pp. 133f 
`3 DDI, 7th, I, 131; Schubert, pp. 76 -81 
24 Hitler, A., Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen, edited by Jäckel, E., Kuhn, A. (Stuttgart 1980), pp. 727 -8 
(speech to party members in Munich, 14 November 1922); De Felice, I rapporti tra fascismo e 
nazionalsocialismo fino all'andata al potere di Hitler 1922 -1933. Appunti e documenti (Naples 
1971), p. 206f. In general, for Hitler's efforts to allay Italian fears about 
German plans for South 
Tyrol see Petersen, J., Hitler und Mussolini. Die Entstehung 
der Achse Berlin -Rom 1933 -1936 
(Tübingen 1973), pp. 65 -8; and, in this study, Ch. 4, Section III 
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crucial discrepancy in the geopolitical perspectives of the two regimes with reference 
to the Danubian area. For Hitler, the South Tyrol issue could be separated from the 
fate of Austria. He was, therefore, ready to sacrifice his irredentist credibility by 
offering a guarantee for the Brenner frontier in exchange for Italy's support on the 
question of Anschluss2'. For Mussolini, however, this separation was as yet 
inconceivable, both for strategic (an independent Austria was the perfect buffer state 
between Germany and Italy) and prestige reasons'6. While he offered his diplomatic 
support to the Dollfuss regime so as to draw Austria closer to the Italian sphere of 
influence'', Hitler never ceased to subvert the country's internal stability, aiming at 
her future peaceful absorption in the German Reich. 
The meeting of the two fascist leaders in June 1934 and the subsequent 
abortive coup in Vienna exposed the problems of the German- Italian diplomatic 
relations's. This indication of Hitler's expansionist aspirations seriously alarmed 
Mussolini and cast a shadow on the co- operation between the two regimes that was 
to last until 1936. Hitler became disillusioned about the prospect of an alliance with 
Italy, but was determined to continue his efforts to build a basis of understanding 
between the two regimes'9. Mussolini, on the other hand, strengthened his support for 
the independence of the Austrian government, reverted to the policy of equidistance 
and attempted to re- establish his relations with the west, despite long- standing 
25 Lowe, Marzari, p. 231. In May 1933 he even proposed a plan for the "fusion" of Austria (which 
removed the negative implications of the word Anschluss) in return for promises of Italian territorial 
compensation elsewhere [DGFP, C, 1, 262], in the not -so -near future [C, 1, 191]. See also 
Weinberg, G. L. (ed.), Hitlers weites Buch: Ein Dokument aus dem Jahr 1928 (Stuttgart 1961), pp. 
208ff 
'6 Weinberg, Germany, Hitler and World War II, pp. 46 -7; DGFP, C, 3, 7 
27 Lowe, Marzari, p. 232 -6; Heineman, J. L., Hitler's First Foreign Minister. Constantin Freiherr von 
Neurath, Diplomat and Statesman (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London 1979), pp. 103 -9; Quartararo, 
R., Roma tra Londra e Berlino. La politics estera fascista dal 1930 al 1940 (Rome 1980), pp. 68 -79 
28 For these two developments see, among others, Petersen, Hitler und Mussolini, pp. 344ff; 
Weinberg, G. L., The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany. Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933- 
1936 (Chicago 1970), pp. 87 -107; DGFP, C, 3, 5/119/143; Quartararo, pp. 80f; Domarus, Mussolini 
und Hitler, pp. 181 -5 
'9 See, however, the negative attitude of Neurath towards Papen's suggestions and attempts to make 
dramatic overtures to Italy in order to restore a good diplomatic climate in 
the German- Italian 
relations in DGFP, C, III, 566, fn. 7. Neurath, also, never endorsed the opinion of the German 
Ambassador in Rome, von Hassell, who sent numerous proposals and memoranda about the need 
for good German- Italian relations to the Wilhelmstrasse (DGFP, C, 
2, 28/67; 4, 61) 
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disagreements on the colonial issue30. The events of the summer of 1934, however, 
produced a positive development for the stability of the European system. Due to 
their mutual distrust and antagonism, the two fascist regimes became more interested 
in stabilising their positions rather than engaging in further expansionist plans31. 
Hitler's determination to bring Britain and Italy closer to Germany achieved equal 
priority with rearmament and economic preparation'', and dictated moderation in the 
conduct of foreign affairs in order not to further alienate his two potential allies33. At 
the same time, Mussolini' plans for a colonial campaign against Ethiopia3 had to be 
postponed, since the situation in Europe demanded vigilance and readiness. 
This was the first evidence that the incompatibility between the revisionist - 
expansionist objectives of the two regimes could act as a restraint upon each regime's 
propensity for aggression. In the period up to the Ethiopian war the antagonism 
intensified, reaching a climax at the beginning of 1935. The reintroduction of 
conscription in the Reichswehr, in violation of the disarmament clauses of the 
Versailles Treaty, prompted Italy to join Britain and France at the Stresa Conference 
in an effort to isolate Germany and discourage future challenges to the European 
status quo. The same logic was behind the Italian proposal for an Austro- Hungarian 
pact". The anti -German shift of the Italian foreign policy had become manifest in the 
Mussolini -Laval pact of January 193536, but was further consolidated at Stresa by 
3° For Mussolini's support for Austria see Petersen, Hitler und Mussolini, Ch. 5; for his relations with 
the West, Quartararo, pp. 82ff. Note that the Italian government did not issue a dernarché for the 
events of July 1934 [DGFP, C, 3, 127] 
3' The disillusionment of both sides is evident in DGFP, C, 1, 485; C, 3, 152/ 266/303/376; C, 4, 61. 
See also C, 3, pp. 329 -30 
32 For the concept of a "German- British -Italian" alliance in Hitler's thought see Petersen, Hitler und 
Mussolini, pp. 60 -1. See also Domarus, M., Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen 1932 -1945 
(Würzburg 1962), pp. 33ff, 434; Hitler, A., Mein Kampf(London 1972, trans. by Ralph Mannheim), 
pp. 554 -85; Weinberg, Hitlers Zweites Buch, pp. 217f; Michalka, W. (ed.), Das Dritte Reich, vol. I: 
Volksgemeinschaft und Grossmachtpolitik (Munich 1985), pp. 245 -6; ibid., "Joachim von 
Ribbentrop: From Wine Merchant to Foreign Minister ", in Smelser, R., Zitelmann, R (eds.), The 
Nazi Elite (Houndmills & London 1993), pp. 167ff 
33 See the determination of the German government to postpone or call off any forceful activity 
regarding the Austria issue, in DGFP, C, 3, 125/135/161/173 /179/424/435 
34 For the origins of the plans for a campaign against Ethiopia see Robertson, Empire 
-Builder, Chs. 1- 
4; Knox, "Politica estera italiana", p. 301 
33 For the Stresa front see Quartararo, pp. 118 -29; and, in 
this study, Chs. 3 -4. For the Austro- 
Hungarian pact see DGFP, C, 3, 320 
36 On the Mussolini -Laval pact of January 1935 see Laurens, F. 
D., France and the Italo- Ethiopian 
Crisis 1935 -1936 (The Hague 1967); Braddick, H., "The Hoare 
-Laval Plan: A Study in International 
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what Mussolini interpreted as a "free hand" for expansion in E. Africa conceded by 
France and, to a degree, by Britain37. However, the visit of Simon in Berlin, and the 
subsequent talks with Hitler, angered the Duce, who feared a British -German 
rapprochement over the colonial issue in Africa38. Evidently, the Italian Fascist leader 
intended to use his long -prepared campaign against Ethiopia as a further means of 
solidifying his diplomatic position towards Germany and of dissuading the Nazi 
leadership from following an aggressive policy in central Europe39. Abandoning the 
traditional line of Italian foreign policy (security in Europe as prerequisite for 
colonial expansion40), he aimed to use a military victory in Africa as a reminder of 
Italy's power in the European system. It was a risk, but a risk which seemed worth 
taking under the impression that it would be tolerated by France and Britain. 
Carving up "international fascism ": Ethiopia and Rhineland 
The reality was quite different. Mussolini's impression about the "free hand" 
was another manifestation of his penchant for misunderstanding situations: it was 
Britain and France who opposed the campaign, and Germany who gradually 
developed a positive attitude towards it41. With his Ethiopian war Mussolini dealt a 
double blow to the stability of the European system. First, he was the first to violate 
one of the two principal dogmas on which the postwar settlement rested: he turned 
his back to peaceful diplomacy and used violence to achieve his colonial aspirations. 
Second, by alienating Italy from the other guarantors of European security (Britain, 
France) he enabled Germany to play the role of the ally and supporter against the 
punitive attitude of the west (e.g. against the imposition of sanctions through the 
Politics ", Review,' of Politics, 24 (1962), pp. 69 -78; Robertson, Empire -Builder, pp. 114ff. On the 
origins of an Italian plan for an anti -German alliance see Aloisi, 13/17.4.1933 
37 Robertson, Empire- Builder, Ch. 10. Quartararo (pp. 85fí) notes, however, that there was little actual 
discussion about Ethiopia in Stresa. See also the reassurances that Britain would not use violence in 
Knox, "Politica estera italiana", p. 323 
18 Robertson, Empire -Builder, pp. 126 -7; Aloisi, 27.3.1935 
39 Cerruti, V., "Perchè Hitler aiuto il Negus", 11 Tempo, 20 -4 -1959, quoted in Robertson, Empire - 
Builder, p. 112; Knox, "Politica estera italiana", pp. 320 -1; DDI, 7th, X, 413/423 
40 Rochat, G., Militari e politici nella preparazione della campagna d'Etiopia (Milan 1971), pp. 
276ff; Robertson, Empire -Builder, p. 69 
41 On the declaration of German benevolent neutrality see DGFP, C, 3, 557; Noakes, J., Pridham, G. 
(eds.), Nazism 1919 -1945. A Documentary Reader, vol. III: Foreign Policy, War and Racial 
Extermination (Exeter 1988), pp. 667 -9 
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League of Nations). Diplomatic isolation, and a shared feeling of injustice brought 
the two fascist regimes for the first time to the same camp. In the meantime, Nazi 
leadership, taking advantage of the confusion that the Ethiopian war had caused to 
the European system, scrapped the last remaining restriction in the Versailles Treaty 
by re- militarising the Rhineland. This was a move designed to provoke the western 
powers, since Italy was neither against the German aspirations in the Rhine nor in a 
position to effectively react while engaged in war in Africa'-. Mussolini not only 
encouraged Hitler when he was informed of the plans for the campaign but he also 
hastened to declare the Stresa front "dead" in the aftermath of the crisis'. 
It is tempting to see the period of the Ethiopian war and the operation in the 
Rhineland as a turning point in the relations between the two fascist regimes and the 
establishment of fascism as an international force'. Undoubtedly, Germany's refusal 
to join the League of Nations in the imposition of the embargo on Italy was a crucial 
factor in the subsequent Italian -German diplomatic rapprochement'. This was further 
facilitated by the refusal of the Italian government to impose sanctions on Germany 
for breaching the Locarno Treaty after the remilitarisation of the Rhineland ". 
Moreover, Hitler's decision to abandon neutrality and initiate limited exports of 
military materiel, raw materials and foodstuff to Italy in November 1935 weighed 
decisively in Mussolini's change of direction on the Austrian issue two months 
later'. His declaration in favour of an Austrian- German pact which would render 
Austria a "German satellite" was welcomed by the German leadership, despite the 
47. Craig, G. A., Germany 1866 -1945 (Oxford 1978), pp. 688 -91; and Michalka (ed.), Das Dritte 
Reich, vol. I, pp. 224 -5. For the French reaction to the German move see Parker, R. A. C., "The 
First Capitulation: France and the Rhineland Crisis of 1936 ", World Politics, 3 (1951), pp. 353 -73 
43 See DGFP, C, 4, 579; and DGFP, C, 4, 414/525/579, DDI, 8th, III, 241 respectively 
44 Wiskemann, E., The Rome -Berlin Axis, p. 70; De Felice, R., Mussolini il Duce, vol. II: Lo Stato 
Totalitario 1936 -1939 (Turin 1981), Ch. 3 
i5 Grandi, D., I1 mio paese. Ricordi autobiografici, ed. by Renzo De Felice (Bologna 1985), pp. 401 -2 
46 See the relevant reference in Mussolini's article in Popolo d'Italia, 2 -11 -1936, reprinted and 
translated by Delzell, C. F. (ed.), Mediterranean Fascism 1919 -1945 (New York & Evanston 1970), 
pp. 201 -2; DDI, 8th, V, 67; Domarus, M., Mussolini und Hitler, pp. 215 -8; Robertson, E. M., 
"Hitler and Sanctions. Mussolini and the Rhineland ", European Studies Review, 7 (1977), pp. 409- 
35; and Domarus, Hitler, I, p. 812. On Italy's refusal to impose sanctions see DGFP, C, 4, 579; DDI, 
8th, III, 434/445 
47 This "neutrality" had been the outcome of Neurath's suspicious attitude towards Italy and of the 
suggestions of the German Ambassador in Rome von Hassell (DGFP, C, 4, 167). On the declaration 
of neutrality see also Petersen, p. 389. On exports of raw materials to Italy, in spite of the sanctions, 
see DGFP, C, 4, 372 and 485 
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tensions that it generated between the Duce and his anti -German Under- secretary to 
the Foreign Ministry, Suvich48. 
There are, however, strong arguments against treating the Ethiopian war as an 
actual turning point. The extent of Hitler's assistance to Italy during the campaign 
should not be exaggerated. On the military level, it has now been established that 
Germany had helped Ethiopia to rearm prior to the outbreak of hostilities, in order to 
make sure that the country could fight against Italy'. Hitler wished to avoid two 
extreme outcomes: defeat for Italy (which would shatter the prestige of European 
fascism in general) or a quick victory (which would enable Italy to use her newly - 
acquired prestige against Germany)50. The prolongation of the campaign enabled him 
to capitalise on his "good services" to Italy, and to bring Italy closer to Germany by 
taking advantage of deteriorating Italo- British relations'. Additionally, during the 
conflict he could promote his immediate rearmament and revisionist plans without 
significant reaction from the European powers. On the political level, Hitler was 
willing to help his "ideological" ally but not to the point of jeopardising his recent 
achievements in the German- British relations. In spite of his long- standing plans for 
an alliance between the two fascist countries and Britain, the signing of the Naval 
Pact with the latter in the summer of 1935 elevated the importance of Britain in his 
political calculations'. Therefore, faced with a possible dilemma to choose Britain or 
Italy (due to the clash between the two countries during the Ethiopian campaign), he 
would still opt for the former'. 
'8 For Mussolini's declaration of January 1936 see DGFP, C, 4, 485. For Suvich' disagreements with 
this pro -German shift in the Italian foreign policy see De Felice, R., Mussolini il duce, Vol. I: Gli 
anni del consenso, 1929 -1936 (Turin 1974), pp. 732 -4; Quartararo, p. 271; DDI, 8th, III, 
194/417/533; Knox, "Politica estera italiana", p. 317 
49 Robertson. Empire- Builder, pp. 111, 127, 152 -3; DGFP, C, 4, 83/212; C, 3, 557/558 
50 On Hitler's desire to see Italy engaged in a victorious, yet long, campaign in Ethiopia see Funke, 
Sanktionen und Kanonen, pp. 84ff, 181ff; DGFP, C, 4, 360 
51 Funke, Sanktionen und Kanonen, p. 60, 102ff 
52 On the implications of the Naval Treaty for German foreign policy see Ingrim, R., Hitlers 
glücklichster Tag - London am 18. Juni 1935 (Stuttgart 1962); and Watt, D. C., "The Anglo- German 
Naval Agreement of 1935. An Interim Judgment ", Journal of Modern History, 28 (1956), 
pp. 155- 
75. For the complete text of the pact see DGFP, C, 4, pp. 319 -26. 
A different interpretation, 
dismissing that Hitler really intended an alliance with Britain, 
is offered in Weinberg, Germany, 
Hitler and World War 11, pp. 85 -6 
53 Quoted in Irving, D., The War Path. Hitler's Germany 1933 -1939 
(London 1978), p. 47. See also 
Hildebrand, K., Von: Reich -,-um Weltreich. Hitler, NSDAP 
und die koloniale Frage 1919 -1945 
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The international "crusade" of fascism: the Spanish civil war 
Undoubtedly, the eventual success of Italy in Ethiopia and of Germany in the 
Rhine prepared the ground for the change in the European balance of power which 
was to become evident in the 1936 -8 period. Victory brought confidence to the two 
fascist regimes and introduced a dynamism in the conduct of their foreign affairs. At 
the same time, the consolidation of the British- French bloc prompted the two fascist 
regimes to join forces for the first time, even on a limited and opportunistic basis'''. 
This was still, however, a reaction to the opposition of the western powers, lacking 
the characteristics of a positive fascist alliance". It was the Spanish civil war which 
transformed the Italian -German relations and offered fascism the first chance for 
universality. This development did not become immediately evident, as the two 
fascist regimes decided to intervene on General Franco's side for quite different 
reasons and in different ways. After an initial period of hesitation, Mussolini 
committed a large, if ill- equipped and ill- trained, part of his armed forces to the 
struggle against the Republican government'. The main reason behind this 
transformation was the widespread belief among the Fascist leadership that the 
Nationalists would overrun the Republican forces within weeks. Mussolini intended 
(Munich 1969), pp. 497ff. Cf., however, Weinberg's suspicion about Hitler's genuine intentions for 
a long -term rapprochement with Britain [Weinberg, Germany, Hitler and World War II, pp. 85ff] 
54 Elements of an Italian shift towards an anti -British and anti -French policy may be traced in 
Mussolini's remark late in 1935, that "the decrepit powers search to bloc the young nations in their 
search for space" [DGFP, C, 4, 322 -emphasis added]. See also Petersen, Hitler and Mussolini, pp. 
483 -6. The "young nations" theme became a catchword of the Italian -German co- operation after 
1936 [for example, Domarus, Hitler, I, pp. 858, 860; II, 1522]. See also Santarelli, E. (ed.), Scritti 
politici di Benito Mussolini (Milan 1979), pp. 297ff; Simonini, A., Il linguaggio di Mussolini (Milan 
1978), pp. 146 -7 
55 See the scepticism on both sides that the Axis might have been a step "too far" [DGFP, C, 5, 89; C, 
6, 312; DDI, 8th, IV, 186]. Note also the Italian reassurances to the French government about the 
nature of the Italian -German rapprochement [DDI, 8th, IV, 109, 205]; and the German irritation at 
the British -Italian agreement [DGFP, D, 1, 784] 
56 For Mussolini's initial hesitation see DDI, 8th, IV, 583 (21 July 1936); V, 501 (Franco's pressurre 
for help, 23 September 1936). On the reaction of Italian military officials see Knox, Mussolini 
Unleashed, pp. 18, 25. On the extent of Italy's military commitment in Spain see DGFP, D, 3, 
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to use his army in a relatively safe and brief operation, in order to further enhance his 
diplomatic prestige, acquire part of Spain's raw materials, and establish Italy as the 
major power in the Mediterranean. He was also interested in preventing the 
consolidation of another Popular Front government (after France) in western 
Mediterranean, or even a successful revolution of the left in Spain'. There was, 
however, a further long -term geopolitical consideration that dramatically increased 
the importance of the Spanish civil war for Mussolini's expansionist aspirations: 
Gibraltar. The Italian leader had long ago emphasised that the Italian vision of a mare 
nostrum in the Mediterranean presupposed effective control of its two strategic exits 
(Suez Canal and Gibraltar)'$. Since a direct conflict with Britain was both unfeasible 
and undesirable, Mussolini decided to aid Franco hoping that a future nationalist 
Spain would co- operate with Italy against Britain's domination of the 
Mediterranean'. In the context of this strategy, Mussolini did not conceal his 
territorial ambitions for the Balearic Islands as a further step in consolidating his 
position in W. MediterraneanGO. In this sense, Italy's extensive engagement in the 
Spanish civil war originated not so much from the idea of a "crusade" against 
Bolshevism (as the regime later claimed), but from the anti -British Mediterranean 
strategy of the Italian regime and fear of losing control of a vital part of the 
Mediterranean. 
For his part, Hitler did not hesitate much in sending the first German troops 
in the summer of 1936. In his Second Book he had established Spain as a possible 
ally in his anti -French strategy'', but had seen his plans fail after the rise of left -wing 
governments in both Spain (1933) and France (1936). Now, Franco's revolt offered 
an opportunity to reverse the situation. A nationalist government in Spain would put 
18/130/199, and 156, where the Italian side presses the German government for acceleration of 
military aid but meets von Neurath's cautious attitude. 
57 Coverdale, J. F., Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War (Princeton, NJ 1975), pp. 7 -15, 388ff; 
Pastorelli, P., "La politica estera fascista dalla fine del conflitto etiopico alla seconda guerra 
mondiale ", in de Felice, R. (ed.), L 'Italia fra Tedeschi e Alleati. La politica estera fascista e la 
seconda guerra mondiale (Bologna 1973), pp. 105 -6 
58 Bernardi, G., Il disarmo navale fra le due guerre mondiali 1919 -1939 (Rome 1975), p. 46; Knox, 
"Politica estera italiana ", pp. 296 -7; 00, XVI, 106, 128, 159, 301; XVIII, 459; LX, 51 -2 
59 DGFP, D, 3, 130 
eo Pastorelli, P. "La politica estera fascista ", p. 105. Cf. DDI, 8th, 
V, 152, where the Nationalist side 
denies allegations about the cession of the Balearic Islands to "any foreign 
power ". 
61 Weinberg (ed.), Hitlers Zweites Buch, pp. 140, 167, 217 
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considerable pressure on the Popular Front in Paris, and even facilitate a military 
campaign against France sometime in the future. Furthermore, Germany's precarious 
economic situation in the summer of 1936 made the question of raw materials even 
more important for German rearmament'. Göring's plans for the shipment of copper, 
tungsten and ore from Spain played a significant role in Hitler's decision to 
interveneó3. As in the case of Mussolini, however, it was the anticipation of a swift 
victory by Franco's forces which gave the final impetus to Germany's involvement 
in Spain`. The overestimation of the Nationalists' fighting power created the 
impression to the Nazi leadership that they could obtain raw materials, test their new 
weapons, and achieve a diplomatic victory with minimum riskó'. There is nothing to 
suggest that either of the two fascist leaders initially sought co- ordination in their 
military involvement, or that the Italo- German rivalry for the title of the fascist 
Mecca had in any way diminished. Despite the rapprochement during the Ethiopian 
war, the geopolitical differences of the two countries remained unresolved, and their 
separate interference in the Spanish civil war increased mutual suspicion and 
antagonism. Undoubtedly, Hitler wished to avoid further deterioration in the Italo- 
German relations at any cost, and this explains why he sent Prince of Hessen and 
von Canaris to Italy in order to reassure the Duce about Germany's limited 
involvement and objectives in Spainó6. The plans, however, for military co- ordination 
were deferredó7. 
62 On the 1936 economic crisis see Hiden, J., Farquharson, J., Explaining Hitler's Germany (Totowa , 
New Jersey 1983), pp. 143ff; Mason, T., "The Primacy of Politics - Politics and Economics in 
National Socialist Germany ", in Woolf, S. J. (ed.), The Nature of Fascism (London 1968), pp. 
178ff; Can, W., Arms, Autarky and Aggression. A Study in German Foreign Policy 1933 -1939 
(London 1972), pp. 46 -65 
61 DGFP, D, 3, 603/702, Over, R. J., Göring. The 'Iron Man ' (London, Boston, Melbourne & Henley 
1984), pp. 44 -5; note, however, the problems in eliciting the materials: 463/469/470/529 
64 Weinberg, Diplomatic Revolution, pp. 291 -2. Note, however, that although Hitler was prepared for 
a short war in Spain, he did not wish an extremely quick victory for Franco. The civil war kept Italy 
busy in the Mediterranean and halted the Italian plans for further expansion in Africa or in Central 
Europe [Craig, Germany, pp. 695] 
65 Irving, p. 51; Craig, Germany, pp. 693f, and ibid., "The German Foreign Office from Neurath to 
Ribbentrop", in Gilbert, F., Craig, G. A. (eds.), The Diplomats (Princeton, New Jersey 1953), pp. 
428f 
66 Weinberg, Diplomatic Revolution, p. 292; Ciano, G., Europa verso it catastrofe (Milan 1948), pp. 
87 -99; DGFP, D, 3, 495 
67 Heineman mentions that Hitler asked Neurath to fly to Italy in order to co- ordinate the joint fascist 
military intervention in Spain, but the Foreign Minister refused (p. 
150, n. 5) 
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The situation started to change in the autumn of 1936. The decision of the 
British and French governments to abstain from involvement in the Spanish crisis 
( "non- intervention ") offered the Republican government the justification to turn to 
Stalin for the much needed military aid against Francoó8. The involvement of the 
Soviet Union in Spain coincided with the first indications that the conflict would not 
be as brief or pre -determined as Mussolini and Hitler had anticipated69. These two 
elements invested the civil war with an international significance which involved the 
two major conquering creeds of the twentieth century70. As Franco's victory seemed 
far from certain in 1936 -7, the "export" of Bolshevism in Spain and the prospect of a 
humiliating defeat of fascism by communism placed the issue of the Italo- German 
co- operation in a totally new light. Despite Neurath's cool attitude towards an 
alliance with Italy ", Ciano's successful visit to Germany in October 1936 paved the 
way for the first official declaration of fascism's international dimension: the Axis''-. 
Ironically, it was Mussolini who announced in Milan that "this vertical line between 
Rome and Berlin is not a partition, but rather an axis "73  ,and he reiterated his new- 
found confidence in the Italo- German relations many times thereafter. The anathema 
of "anti- Bolshevism" served as a pretext for fascist intervention in Spain, and co- 
operation between the two fascist regimes was provided with the element of an 
ideological crusade that it initially lacked". This new element transformed their 
involvement in a symbolic struggle for the prestige of fascism in general. The first 
fruits of this new rapprochement were an agreement between von Neurath and Ciano 
for military co- ordination of the two countries' armed forces in Spain, and the joint 
vs DGFP, D, 3, 100/117; DDI, 8th, V, 259 
69 DGFP, D, 3, 502; DDI, 8th, V, 491 
70 On the "moral significance" of the Spanish civil war for the fascist leaderships, see DDI, 8th, IV, 
627; V, 264/273; Domarus, Hitler, I, p.646 
71 See Neurath's cautious comments on Ciano's proposal for an alliance and the resolution of the 
long- standing Italo- German difference in Weinberg, Diplomatic Revolution, pp. 336 -7. See also 
DGFP, C, 5, 554 
" Ciano, G., Diplomatic Papers (London 1948), pp. 52 -61; DGFP, C, 5, 618/622/624 (conversations 
with Neurath, Goering and Hitler respectively, 21 -24 October 1936) 
73 The text of the speech is reprinted in Mussolini, B., Scritti e discorsi, X, pp. 201ff. For the 
repercussions of the speech see DDI, 8th, V, 329 -333/339/342/346 
74 Craig, Germany, pp. 693 -6. See also Mussolini's relevant 
references in his interview to the 
Völkischer Beobachter (18 -1- 1937), reprinted in Italian in Mussolini, 
B., Scritti e Discorsi, vol. XI 
(Milan 1938), pp. 43 -5 
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decision to recognise the Burgos government'. As, however, the prospect of victory 
was becoming more and more distant in the first half of 1937, the national interests 
which initially prompted Mussolini and Hitler to intervene were somewhat 
overshadowed by the common concern for a prestige victory against Bolshevism at 
any cost76. 
Antagonism, of course, did not fade away. Both Italy and Germany gradually 
increased their military commitment to the civil war, and this enabled General Franco 
to play the one against the other in order to elicit more aid'. At the same time, after 
the defeat of the Italian troops at Guadalajara and the parallel successes of the 
German units, Mussolini felt impelled to restore the honour of his armed forces and 
defend their efficiency against Spanish and German criticisms'. The implicit 
competition between Italy and Germany increasingly became a battle for prestige. 
Mussolini kept pressing Franco for a commanding role for the Italian forces in the 
conduct of war, while showing great alarm at the British -German contacts, and 
struggling to obtain more economic concessions from Franco at the expense of his 
Axis ally ". Especially towards the end of the war, when the outcome of the civil war 
had been determined in favour of the Nationalists, the military activity of the Italian 
air force (the fierce raids over Spanish cities) seemed to have little relevance to the 
needs of the situation. It demonstrated, however, the growing pressure on 
Mussolini's regime to re- establish its diplomatic and military significance vis -à -vis 
the Nazi challenge30. This was the first example of a radicalisation which was not the 
direct outcome of either ideological commitments or diplomatic initiative; the first in 
a long list of similar developments in the period between the Spanish civil war and 
the outbreak of war in September 1939. The need for prestige, which was the logical 
product of the "great power" ideology, committed Mussolini to a dynamic course of 
75 On the military agreement, see Weinberg, Diplomatic Revolution, pp. 294 -5; DDI, 8th, V, 256. On 
the issue of declaration of the Burgos government, see DGFP, D, 3, 110/121/123; DDI, 8th, V, 
133/180/280/375 /476 
76 See Mussolini's passionate anti -Bolshevik speech in Domarus, Mussolini und Hitler, pp. 206 -7 (12 
May 1938) 
77 See, for example, DGFP, D, 3, 363 
78 On the negative impact of the Guadalajara incident on the Italian leadership, see DGFP, D, 3, 
230/236; Ciano 's Diaries, 1937 -1938, 20.12.1937 
79 DGFP, D, 3, 654; 318/328/403; 786, respectively 
80 Ciano 's Dimy, 1937 -1938, 23.12.1937 
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action disproportionate to Italy's geopolitical interests, and beyond the capabilities of 
the country's domestic system. 
In this sense, the Spanish civil war is a real turning point in the radicalisation 
of fascist expansionist policies. The German successes in Spain were seen as the first 
tangible evidence of the country's dramatic military and diplomatic recovery from 
the limitations imposed upon her by the Versailles arrangement. The image of a 
powerful Nazi Germany, technologically advanced and domestically monolithic, 
crucially contributed to the transformation of the European balance of power in the 
1937 -9 period. After a long period in which fascism was indisputably an Italian 
innovation, Germany emerged as the unquestionable heir apparent. The direction of 
new fascist ideas and techniques was reversed: up to 1936 Italy had been the 
"exporter" and Nazi Germany the beneficiary81; now the evolution of fascism was 
becoming a German responsibility. This does not imply that Mussolini was forced by 
the Nazi dynamism to relinquish his autonomy in the shaping of the Italian 
expansionist objectives, as E. Wiskemann and D. Mack Smith have argued'-. The 
revisionist initiative, however, eluded the Italian regime and, even worse for the 
Duce, this seemed an irreversible process. The Nazi leadership, strengthened from 
the German successes in Spain and freed from the postwar military restrictions, was 
now in a position to dictate the terms of the European diplomatic game. 
Furthermore, the fascist military involvement in Spain produced a completely 
different verdict on the two fascist regimes. German weapons and air -force were 
utterly successful in military terms, while the performance of the Italian armed forces 
encouraged scepticism among the country's political and military circles about the 
degree of their readiness for a European conflict83. The difference was that, in 
81 Can, W., Hitler: A Study in Personality and Politics (London 1978), pp. 23ff 
82 Mack Smith, D., Italy. A Modern History (Ann Arbor 1969), esp. pp. 454ff; Wiskemann, Fascism 
in Italy, Ch. 5. For a criticism of this interpretation see Alatri, P., Le origini del fascismo (Rome 
1963), pp. 27ff; Petersen, J., "La politica estera del fascismo come problema storiografico ", in De 
Felice. R. (ed.), L'Italia fra tedeschi e alleati. La politica estera fascista e la seconda guerra 
mondiale (Bologna 1973), pp. 45 -6 
81 Minniti, F., "Aspetti della politica fascista degli armamenti dal 1935 al 1943 ", in De Felice, R. (ed.), 
L 'Italia fra Tedeschi e Alleati. La politica estera fascista e la seconda guerra mondiale (Bologna 
1973), pp. 127 -36, and "Il problema degli armamenti nella preparazione militare italiana dal 1935 al 
1943 ", Storia Contemporanea, 2 (1978), pp. 1 -56; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 28 -9. For the 
problems of the whole industrial infrastructure in Italy see Whittam, J., "The Italian General Staff 
and the Coming of the Second World War ", in Preston, A. (ed.), General Staffs and Diplomacy 
Before the Second World War (Totowa, New Jersey 1978), pp. 91 -4; Kennedy, P. , The Rise and 
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Germany's case, success in Spain belied the initial hesitations of the Foreign Office 
and of the Reichswehr about the level of the armed forces' readiness. The cumulative 
outcome was that these parallel successes in the domestic and international arena for 
the Nazi leadership intensified a propensity (ideological and political) for further, 
and more extensive expansion. By contrast, the Italian regime woke to the realisation 
that its armed forces were not in a position to contest militarily either the British 
domination in the Mediterranean or the German dynamism in central Europe. This 
was an uncomfortable admission at a period when the antagonism for the leadership 
of international fascism with Germany was escalating. 
Mussolini, however, did not give up. In the period up to the summer of 1939 
he followed a double strategy to offset the disadvantages of Italy's military 
weakness. On the one hand, building on the tradition of "determinant weight ", he 
endeavoured to use diplomacy in order to contain German expansionism without 
either jeopardising his newly established alliance with Hitler or risking a 
confrontation with the British -French bloc". On the other hand, he did his best to 
conceal his inferior position by struggling to keep up with German expansionist 
policies. With this strategy he intended to restore his country's prestige, to avoid a 
capitulation to the inflated Nazi expansionist aspirations, and to gain time in 
preparing for war. The problem was that these three goals proved to be either 
incompatible with each other or not within the control of the Italian leadership. Since 
the initiative had been usurped by a Germany determined to expand, and Mussolini's 
efforts to check German aggression had limited success, the Italian leadership was 
forced to conduct its foreign policy on a short-term basis, largely defined by German 
actions. Time was evidently running out, resources were limited, and co- ordination 
between military, economic and political circles was poor. Prestige, however, 
dictated a response to equal Nazi Germany in expansion and in "fascist" dynamism. 
The German success in the Rhineland and the impressive military showing of 
her armed forces in Spain had an immense psychological impact upon Mussolini 
Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London 
1989), pp. 379ff. 
84 The attempt of the Italian leadership to keep all options open towards both Germany and Britain - 
France is evident in the reassurances to both sides [DGFP, D, 1, 224/755/769/784]. For this 
interpretation see De Felice, R., Mussolini it duce, vol. I: Lo Stato Totalitario, 1936 -1940 (Turin 
1981), pp. 466ff 
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personally. The latent admiration of the Duce for the achievements of his German 
counterpart was further fostered during his visit to Germany in September 193755. 
Officially, he could now speak of a "community not only of ideas, but also of 
action ", of "many common elements in the [two regimes'] worldviews ", and of a 
"common destiny'''. In private, however, he was becoming fascinated by the power 
and dynamism that the Nazi regime had achieved in Germany within such a short 
time. He and his new Foreign Minister, Ciano, promoted the Axis project after 1935 
with an enthusiasm that found little response amongst the most prominent Fascist 
figures. Only R. Farinacci and G. Preziosi had been traditional supporters and 
admirers of Germany, both as a cultural entity and as Nazi system87. By contrast, C. 
Malaparte had been adamant in his rejection of Nazism since the early 1930s. In 
1930 he published the Technique du coup d'état, in which he described Hitler as a 
caricature of Mussolini, a man whose brutality betrayed his ideological weakness and 
whose party lacked the ideals of dignity, liberty and culture which, according to 
Malaparte, characterised Italian Fascism88. Bottai, on the other hand, did endorse the 
project of universal fascism but underscored the need to be cautious towards the Nazi 
regime. He saw the alliance as a necessity dictated by the two systems' 
common hostility to the democracies but remained sceptical about the ideological 
affinities between them. After the war, he described the alliance with Germany as an 
"ideological abdication in the hands of Nazism ", resulting from Mussolini's 
obsession with German power and Ciano's limited ability to appreciate the 
ideological differences between the two systems89. Yet, as he always did, Bottai 
publicly supported the regime's policy of rapprochement with Germany until the 
Grand Council meeting of July 1943. Balbo, on the other hand, was not as diplomatic 
as his friend and fellow quadrumvire Bottai. According to Ciano, he "detested the 
Germans" and regarded the Axis as a big mistake that might repudiate the autonomy 
and essence of Fascism. From the columns of his newspaper Corriere Padano he 
85 DGFP, C, 6, 568; Domarus, Mussolini und Hitler, pp. 209 -18 
86 See Mussolini's speech in Berlin, reprinted in Popolo d'Italia, 29 -9 -1937, excerpts of which can be 
found in Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 737 -8. For an English translation of the speech see Delzell, pp. 
202 -5 (28 September 1937) 
87 Hamilton, A., The Appeal of Fascism. A Study of Intellectuals and Fascism 1919 -1945 (London 
1971), pp. 77 -8 
88 Malaparte, C., Technique du coup d'état (Paris 1948), pp. 161 -72 
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launched a bitter anti -German attack in the autumn and winter of 1939, sending an 
implicit message to his Capo which Mussolini did not fail to understand and reject in 
anger90. From 1935 until his death in 1940 Balbo used every opportunity to make his 
strong objections to the Axis known, using the Grand Council meetings to openly 
criticise the Duce for his handling of foreign affairs and for his exaggeration of the 
affinities between the two regimes91. 
Mussolini himself felt uneasy sometimes about certain totalitarian aspects of 
the German regime (especially the anti -Semitic propaganda"), but as a social 
Darwinist he could not but interpret Germany's political, economic and military 
power as a sign of superior national qualities. In the same vein, he came to view 
German expansion as a necessity to be contained rather than opposed93. This was a 
significant transformation in Mussolini's foreign policy ideas, but at the time it was 
relevant mainly to the issue of Austria. As already indicated, the first signs of change 
in Italy's position on the Anschluss appeared in 1936 and was the outcome of a 
political gesture on Italy's part in recognition of Germany's aid during the Ethiopian 
campaign`". The first actual concession on the issue was the German- Austrian 
Agreement, signed between the German and Austrian governments in July 1936, 
which Mussolini welcomed as a step towards relieving tension in central Europe'. 
The pact with Yugoslavia in March 1937, and the thoughts about its extension to a 
Balkan- Danubian treaty with Bulgaria and Rumania or Austria and Hungary, did 
89 Bottai, G., Vent'anni e un giorno (24 luglio 1943) (Milan 1977), pp. 63ff 
90 For Mussolini's anger with Balbo see Ciano's Diaries, 8.12.1939; and 3.6.1937, for Balbo's initial 
anti -German comments. See also Segrè, C. G., Italo Balbo. A Fascist Life (Berkeley , Los Angeles 
& London 1987), pp. 375ff 
91 For Balbo's comments in the Grand Council see, in this study, Ch. 3, Section IVa 
92 Michaelis, M., Mussolini and the Jews. German- Italian Relations and the Jewish Question in Italy 
1922 -1945 (Oxford 1978), p. 138; Mack Smith, D., Mussolini (London 1981), p. 216; ibid., 
Mussolini's Roman Empire (London 1976), pp. 44ff; Vincent, A., Modern Political Ideologies 
(Oxford 1992), p. 151 
93 Lowe, Marzari, p. 305 
94 The same conclusion lay behind Neurath's negative attitude to Hassell's suggestion that Germany 
should respond to the Italian overture and foster its ties with the Italian regime. See Heineman, p. 
108. See also DGFP, D, 1, 758 
95 For the agreement see DGFP, D, 1, 152; and for the Italian positive reaction to the agreement, C, 5, 
p. 755; D, 1, 155. However, Quartararo (pp. 285 -6) notes that this endorsement did not signify 
capitulation to the German plans regarding Anschluss. See, for example, Mussolini's reaction to 
Göring's comments in DGFP, D, 1, 169 
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have the intention of forming a barrier to further German expansion in the south9ó 
These plans were, however, more of a deterrent than a threat to the plans of an 
Austrian reunion with Germany. Mussolini tried to postpone what seemed as a 
"fatal" event as long as possible, being aware of the negative repercussions of such a 
capitulation in the Italian public opinion97. Therefore, he rejected anew the traditional 
German bargain on the Brenner (guarantee in return for Anschluss) during his visit to 
Germany in 1937, he gave priority to rapprochement with Britain (culminating in the 
"Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1937 and the British recognition of the Impero), but at 
the same time alluded to a disinteresement with regard to the Austrian issue in a 
conversation with von Ribbentrop on 6 November 1937, noting that Italy now 
viewed Austria as "German state number 2s98. 
Ill. The evolution of the Italian- German relations and the 
radicalisation of fascist expansionist policies (1938 -1939) 
The events between the Hossbach conference (11 -1937) and the signing of 
the Pact of Steel (5 -1939) proved how significant the transformation in the Italo- 
German relations was for the radicalisation of fascist expansionism. In his discussion 
with the heads of the military, diplomatic and political organisations of his regime 
Hitler made clear that his foreign policy objectives were an open -ended commitment 
to expansion in central and eastern Europe for the acquisition of living space99. The 
96 Lowe, Marzari, pp. 292 -7; and DGFP, C, 6, 502. On Italy's imperialist ambitions in the Balkan area 
see Bianchini, F., "L'idea fascista dell'impero nell'area danubiano -balcanica ", in Di Nolfo, E., 
Rainero, R. H., Vigezzi B. (eds.), L 'Italia e la politica di potenza in Europa 1938 -1940 (Milan 
1986), pp. 173 -86 
9' DGFP, D, 1, 729; Colarizi, S., L'opinione degli italiani sotto il regime, 1929 -1943 (Rome & Bari 
1991), pp. 256 -61; Vigezzi, Politica estera e opinione pubblica, pp. 94 -5; Toscano, M., Le origini 
diplomatiche del patto d'acciaio (Florence 1956), pp. 28 -32, 385, 388 
98 Ciano, Diplomatic Papers, pp. 142 -6; Lowe, Marzari, pp. 300 -1. For the British -Italian Agreement 
see DGFP, D, 1, 733/739/755. Note also Mussolini's shift to an "evolutionary policy" in early 1938 
(D, 1, 256) 
99 On the Hossbach Conference see Heineman, pp. 159 -63; Weinberg, G. L., The Foreign Policy of 
Hitler's Germany. Starting World War JI, 1937 -1939 (Chicago & London, 1980), pp. 35 -42; Carr, 
Hitler, pp. 75ff; Craig, Germany, pp. 698 -700. For a different interpretation of the Hossbach 
Conference see Taylor, A. J. P., Origins of the Second World War, pp. 131 ff 
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launched a bitter anti -German attack in the autumn and winter of 1939, sending an 
implicit message to his Capo which Mussolini did not fail to understand and reject in 
anger90. From 1935 until his death in 1940 Balbo used every opportunity to make his 
strong objections to the Axis known, using the Grand Council meetings to openly 
criticise the Duce for his handling of foreign affairs and for his exaggeration of the 
affinities between the two regimes91. 
Mussolini himself felt uneasy sometimes about certain totalitarian aspects of 
the German regime (especially the anti -Semitic propaganda9'), but as a social 
Darwinist he could not but interpret Germany's political, economic and military 
power as a sign of superior national qualities. In the same vein, he came to view 
German expansion as a necessity to be contained rather than opposed93. This was a 
significant transformation in Mussolini's foreign policy ideas, but at the time it was 
relevant mainly to the issue of Austria. As already indicated, the first signs of change 
in Italy's position on the Anschluss appeared in 1936 and was the outcome of a 
political gesture on Italy's part in recognition of Germany's aid during the Ethiopian 
campaign9 ;. The first actual concession on the issue was the German- Austrian 
Agreement, signed between the German and Austrian governments in July 1936, 
which Mussolini welcomed as a step towards relieving tension in central Europe'. 
The pact with Yugoslavia in March 1937, and the thoughts about its extension to a 
Balkan- Danubian treaty with Bulgaria and Rumania or Austria and Hungary, did 
89 Bottai, G., Vent 'anni e un giorno (24 luglio 1943) (Milan 1977), pp. 63ff 
9° For Mussolini's anger with Balbo see Ciano 's Diaries, 8.12.1939; and 3.6.1937, for Balbo's initial 
anti -German comments. See also Segrè, C. G., Italo Balbo. A Fascist Life (Berkeley , Los Angeles 
& London 1987), pp. 375ff 
9' For Balbo's comments in the Grand Council see, in this study, Ch. 3, Section IVa 
92 Michaelis, M., Mussolini and the Jews. German -Italian Relations and the Jewish Question in Italy 
1922 -1945 (Oxford 1978), p. 138; Mack Smith, D., Mussolini (London 1981), p. 216; ibid., 
Mussolini 's Roman Empire (London 1976), pp. 44ff; Vincent, A., Modern Political Ideologies 
(Oxford 1992), p. 151 
93 Lowe, Marzari, p. 305 
94 The same conclusion lay behind Neurath's negative attitude to Hassell's suggestion that Germany 
should respond to the Italian overture and foster its ties with the Italian regime. See Heineman, p. 
108. See also DGFP, D, 1, 758 
95 For the agreement see DGFP, D, 1, 152; and for the Italian positive reaction to the agreement, C, 5, 
p. 755; D, 1, 155. However, Quartararo (pp. 285 -6) notes that this endorsement did not signify 
capitulation to the German plans regarding Anschluss. See, for example, Mussolini's reaction to 
Göring's comments in DGFP, D, 1, 169 
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have the intention of forming a barrier to further German expansion in the south9ó 
These plans were, however, more of a deterrent than a threat to the plans of an 
Austrian reunion with Germany. Mussolini tried to postpone what seemed as a 
"fatal" event as long as possible, being aware of the negative repercussions of such a 
capitulation in the Italian public opinion97. Therefore, he rejected anew the traditional 
German bargain on the Brenner (guarantee in return for Anschluss) during his visit to 
Germany in 1937, he gave priority to rapprochement with Britain (culminating in the 
"Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1937 and the British recognition of the Impero), but at 
the same time alluded to a disinteresement with regard to the Austrian issue in a 
conversation with von Ribbentrop on 6 November 1937, noting that Italy now 
viewed Austria as "German state number 2s9$. 
Ill. The evolution of the Italian- German relations and the 
radicalisation of fascist expansionist policies (1938 -1939) 
The events between the Hossbach conference (11 -1937) and the signing of 
the Pact of Steel (5 -1939) proved how significant the transformation in the Italo- 
German relations was for the radicalisation of fascist expansionism. In his discussion 
with the heads of the military, diplomatic and political organisations of his regime 
Hitler made clear that his foreign policy objectives were an open -ended commitment 
to expansion in central and eastern Europe for the acquisition of living space99. The 
9& Lowe, Marzari, pp. 292 -7; and DGFP, C, 6, 502. On Italy's imperialist ambitions in the Balkan area 
see Bianchini, F., "L'idea fascista dell'impero nell'area danubiano -balcanica ", in Di Nolfo, E., 
Rainero, R. H., Vigezzi B. (eds.), L'Italia e la politica di potenza in Europa 1938 -1940 (Milan 
1986), pp. 173 -86 
9' DGFP, D, 1, 729; Colarizi, S., L'opinione degli italiani sotto il regime, 1929 -1943 (Rome & Bari 
1991), pp. 256 -61; Vigezzi, Politica estera e opinione pubblica, pp. 94 -5; Toscano, M., Le origini 
diplomatiche del patto d'acciaio (Florence 1956), pp. 28 -32, 385, 388 
98 Ciano, Diplomatic Papers, pp. 142 -6; Lowe, Marzari, pp. 300 -1. For the British -Italian Agreement 
see DGFP, D, 1, 733/739/755. Note also Mussolini's shift to an "evolutionary policy" in early 1938 
(D, 1, 256) 
99 On the Hossbach Conference see Heineman, pp. 159 -63; Weinberg, G. L., The Foreign Policy of 
Hitler's Germany. Starting World War II, 1937 -1939 (Chicago & London, 1980), pp. 35 -42; Can, 
Hitler, pp. 75ff; Craig, Germany, pp. 698 -700. For a different interpretation of the Hossbach 
Conference see Taylor, A. J. P., Origins of the Second World War, pp. 131 ff 
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revisionist -irredentist facade of German expansionism remained almost intact during 
the plebiscite crisis which led to the Anschluss, but the Hossbach conference had 
established a wider concept of territorial aggrandisement. There was, however, a 
mixture of urgency and dynamism in his speech at the conference, which was to be 
the guiding principle of his foreign policy in the period up to the outbreak of war. If 
the urgency may have been primarily attributed to his personal obsessions (a 
pathological fear that he would soon die10 °) and to domestic pressures (inability to 
finance further rearmament under a peacetime economy, while his enemies were 
rapidly rearming), the dynamism was chiefly related to external factors. We shall 
turn now to these factors, and to their impact on the formulation of the Italian and 
German foreign policies between 1938 and May 1939. 
The "next victim" syndrome and the impact of the Nazi successes upon 
Mussolini 
The first external factor was the cumulative effect of the Nazi foreign policy 
successes from the beginning of 1938. Tim Mason has referred to the "next victim" 
syndrome which dominated German expansionism after the Anschluss in March 
1938. He thus attributed the "promiscuity of aggressive intentions" demonstrated by 
the Nazi regime in 1938 and 1939 to an expansionist momentum that was nurtured 
by each successful campaign101. Every objective attained confirmed the 
Führetprinzip102, increased the regime's confidence to its military potential and 
created a pressure for further expansion. Given Mussolini's diplomatic support and 
Britain's commitment to appeasement policies103, Hitler saw an opportunity to use 
10° Speer, A., Errinerungen (Frankfurt am Main 1969), p. 120. For the "psychoanalytical" approach to 
the fascist phenomenon see, amongst others, Köningsberg, R., Hitler's Ideology. A Study in 
Psychoanalytic Sociology (New York 1975); Binion, R., Hitler Among the Germans (New York 
1976). For an evaluation of this approach see Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, p. 63; Vincent, pp. 146 -7 
101 Mason, T., "Intention and Explanation. A Current Controversy about the Interpretation of National 
Socialism ", in Hirschfeld, G., Kettenacker, L. (eds.), Der "Führerstaat ": Mythos and Realität. 
Studien zur Struktur and Politik des Dritten Reiches (Stuttgart 1981), pp. 33 -4 
102. On the way in which Hitler's successes in foreign policy strengthened the appeal of the Führer- 
principle, but also created a further pressure for a constant affirmation of the principle through new 
foreign policy triumphs see Kershaw, I., The "Hitler-Myth". Image and Reality in the Third Reich 
(Oxford 1989), Ch. 5 (esp. pp. 134 -5) 
103 On British appeasement policies see Mommsen, Kettenacker (eds.), Fascist Challenge, Part II, pp. 
79 -206 
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expansion to fulfil his regime's Grossdeutschland pledges and to intimidate his 
conservative critics in the armed forces and the administration. In 1938 and in the 
first half of 1939 he achieved an unprecedented extension of the Reich's territory 
without engaging his country in war with the western powers104. This was not a major 
surprise in the Anschluss - after all, the British regarded the development as 
ineluctable since the late 1937 and did not refrain from saying so in their direct talks 
with Italian diplomats in February 193810'. Yet, during the Sudeten crisis, it certainly 
demonstrated the tolerance of both Britain and Italy towards German expansion106 
The same happened in the liquidation of the remaining Czech state in March 1939. 
This was not simply successful expansion with major military and economic 
benefits107. It also meant the affirmation of the Nazi expansionist ideology and of 
Hitler's personal control of foreign affairs. Consequently, the control of foreign 
policy planning and conduct shifted away from the various military and political 
organisations and was concentrated mainly on the figure of Hitler and his new 
foreign minister, von Ribbentrop. 
For Mussolini the effect of the German successes was ambiguous. On the one 
hand, he attempted to exploit the dynamism of Nazi foreign policy in order to put 
further pressure on Britain and France for concessions108. Italy's accession to the 
Anti -Comintern Pact in November 1937 brought about a co- ordination of 
international fascism not only against Bolshevism, but also against Britain and her 
empire, as stated in the text and acknowledged by Ciano109. Furthermore, the threat of 
German expansion in central and eastern Europe enabled Italy to play again a version 
10' See, for example, the enthusiasm of the population about Hitler's peaceful revisionism in Kershaw, 
Hitler -Myth, p. 131 
105 Quartararo, Roma tra Londra e Berlino, pp. 365ff; Ciano, Diplomatic Papers, 164ff (report of talks 
between Grandi and Chamberlain); Ciano's Diaries, 1937 -1938, 21.2.1938 
1oo For the British attitude see DGFP, D, 2, 88; and for the Italian, Santarelli, C., Storia del movimento 
e del regime fascista (Rome 1967), pp. 256 -61. By contrast, the French government adopted a more 
anti -German policy [DGFP, D, 2, 98/204/647] 
107 On the incorporation of the conquered territories into the German economy see Freeman, M., Atlas 
of Nazi Germany (London & Sydney 1987), pp. 164 -9 
los In this light we should see the conclusion of the British- Italian Agreement of February 1938. See 
Morewood, pp. 177 -81 
109 See the references in the original text of the protocol in DGFP, D, 1, 16; and Domarus, Hitler, II, 
pp. 1061 ff. From the first moment, Neurath reacted to the pact, because he recognised its 
unmistakable anti -British character. See Heineman, pp. 153 -6; and, for the attitude of the German 
diplomats, DGFP, D, 1, 17. For Ciano's comments see Lowe, Marzari, pp. 308 -9; Ciano's Diaries, 
1937 -1938, 6.11.1937 
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of the "determinant weight" policy in European affairs. Mussolini's role in the 
resolution of the Munich crisis established Italy as an important factor in the stability 
of the European system, due to her more or less good relations with both Germany 
and the western bloc10. This newly acquired prestige allowed the Italian Fascist 
government to negotiate with the British and the French for colonial concessions ", 
while at the same time constantly strengthening its alliance with Germany against the 
"plutocratic democracies '''. 
On the other hand, Germany's impressive military potential and her territorial 
aggrandisement in central Europe had a demoralising effect on Mussolini. 
Increasingly after the Austrian crisis he realised his relegation to a secondary position 
in the fascist partnership, stating that "when an event is fated to take place, it is better 
it takes place with you rather than despite of or against yous13. Until the beginning 
of 1939 he had hoped to utilise his diplomatic advantage in order to offset Italy's 
weak economic -military position. The Munich conference gave him the impression 
that he could re- establish his country's prominent position in the European system as 
a diplomatic arbitrator capable of influencing the German foreign policy". This 
anticipation was soon to be thwarted by Hitler's determination to pursue his 
expansionist objectives regardless of the diplomatic good offices of his ally. By that 
time Mussolini's efforts to split the British -French front by isolating France had 
failed ''. Chamberlain's visit to Rome in January 1939 failed to alleviate the tension 
in the relations of the Italian regime with the west and cast a fatal shadow on the 
110 For the improvement in the relations between Italy and the West, see Wiskemann, Rome -Berlin 
Axis, pp. 72 -3; Quartararo, pp. 375ff, 395ff 
"' On the negotiations of the Italian regime with France and Britain for colonial concessions see 
Lowe. Marzari, pp. 310 -4, and Morewood, pp. 181 -2. See also DGFP, D, 2, 359; Domarus, 
Mussolini und Hitler, pp. 253 -5 
"2 Vigezzi, B., "Mussolini, Ciano, la diplomazia italiana e la percezione della 'politica dei potenza' 
al'inizio della seconda guerra mondiale ", in di Nolfo, E., Rainero, R. H., Vigezzi, B. (eds.), L 'Italia 
e la politica di potenza in Europa (1938 -1940) (Milan, 1986), pp. 3 -18 
113 Quoted in Lowe, Marzari, p. 291 
14 DGFP, D, 2, 611/661; Domarus, Mussolini und Hitler, pp. 252 -3. This explains why Mussolini was 
initially negative to the idea of a military alliance with Germany presented to him in 1938 by 
Ribbentrop. This attitude changed in the aftermath of the Munich crisis, when the Duce became 
disillusioned with France's limited concessions. See Pastorelli, P., "La politica estera ", pp. 110ff 
115 Lowe, Marzari, pp. 312 -4; Pastorelli, P. "La politica estera ", p. 112 
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negotiations with France for a general agreement1'. Diplomatically, his only hope of 
retaining a role of prominence in European affairs was in a long -term alliance with 
Germany that would postpone war for the future, i.e. 1942 or after. This was his 
strategy behind an apparent Italian capitulation to Nazi foreign policy in the signing 
of the Pact of Steel in May 1939 '. The commitment of the two sides to consultation 
prior to the assumption of major activities, and the express agreement on a 
postponement of military plans for at least three years offered those guarantees which 
the Italian side desperately needed to safeguard her political autonomy within the 
Axis camp. 
Struggle for initiative: Italo- German antagonism within the Axis 
The second external factor in the radicalisation of fascist expansionism was 
the political interaction between the two fascist regimes. It has been argued that 
Mussolini was resigned to a secondary position in the fascist alliance, and that he 
actually succumbed to the German expansionist dynamism after 193718. This is only 
partly true. Objectively, the internationalisation of fascism after the Spanish civil war 
had resulted in an atmosphere of indirect competition between the two regimes. This 
was a battle that Italy, due to her inferior economic and military potential, was bound 
to lose. Increasingly from 1937, symptoms of an inferiority complex became evident 
in Mussolini's behaviour1'. This explains to a great extent his growing obsession 
with the "great power" ideology in the last years before the war. In the logic of this 
ideology, however, it was impossible for him to abandon the idea of regaining the 
initiative - and the prestige associated with it. This tendency culminated after the 
outbreak of the war, when in the summer and autumn of 1940 Mussolini welcomed 
the opportunity to lead the Axis war against Britain after the failure of the German 
16 Ciano, Diplomatic Papers, pp. 259 -66 (conversations of Chamberlain with Ciano and Mussolini, 
11/12 January 1939); Quartararo, Roma tra Londra e Berlino, pp. 413ff; Mack Smith, D., 
Mussolini 's Roman Empire (London 1982), pp. 137 -9 
'" Initially, Mussolini had rejected the plan [DGFP, D, 6, 426]. On the Pact see Quartararo, 396ff; 
Toscano, Le origini diplomatiche, pp. 46ff; Domarus, Mussolini und Hitler, pp. 265ff 
"$ Pastorelli, P., "La politica estera ", p. 114; Mack Smith, "Appeasement in Mussolini's Foreign 
Policy ", in Mommsen, Kettenacker (eds.), Fascist Challenge, pp. 258 -66 
19 See reports about `jealousy" on part of the Italian leadership in DGFP, D, 1, 743 (Weizsäcker 
report, 19 March 1938); D, 6, 199 (Heydrich to Ribbentrop, 14 April 1939) 
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operation "Sea Lion "120. The original elements, however, of his stubborn refusal to 
accept his relegation may be traced in his expansionist moves against Albania and, 
later, Greece. 
What, of course, Mussolini could not appreciate was that he had been forced 
to conceptualise his contest with Germany in military - rather than diplomatic - 
terms. This, in itself, was the outcome of the dynamism generated by the Nazi 
expansionism in 1938 and 1939, as well as a proof that the initiative completely 
eluded the Italian regime. After the Munich interlude, when diplomacy fared better 
than military threat, Mussolini followed an unorthodox diplomatic strategy towards 
Germany: either he made concessions to the German expansionism (i.e. acceptance 
of military alliance) in order to preserve his restraining influence on Hitler'''; or he 
too resorted to expansionism to strengthen his bargaining position and restrain 
Germany in geographical terms. The latter objective underpinned the timing of 
Italy's decision to invade Albania in the April of 1939, just a few weeks after the 
liquidation of Czechoslovakia by Germany'". As we saw, Albania had traditionally 
been an area of Italian political influence and economic penetration since the 
beginning of the century'''. Its geopolitical importance for the control of the Adriatic 
and eastern Mediterranean had been emphasised by Mussolini long before the 
decision for invasion was finalised'. Until 1937, however, there had been no 
ideological or political reference to plans for expansion in that area"'. The invasion 
plan was clearly timed by the Italian government to balance the successes of Nazi 
expansionism in the wider central European area and to block further German 
120 Knox, M., Mussolini Unleashed /939-/94/(Cambridge 1982), p. 193. A more detailed analysis of 
this is provided below, Ch. 6, Section IV 
121 See, for example, the denunciation of the 1935 Italian- French agreement [DGFP, D, 4, 374]; and 
the determination of the Italian government to initiate military talks with the other Axis states [D, 4, 
421/454/462] 
'" On the invasion of Albania see Lowe, Marzari, pp. 326 -31. That the move against Albania was 
designed to irritate Germany and to hinder further German infiltration in the Balkans is proven by 
Ciano's note about the Italian alarm at Zogu's contacts with Germany early in 1939 [see 
Muggeridge, M. (ed.), Ciano 's Diaries (London & Toronto 1947), 10/11 -2- 1939]. 
123 Webster, R. A., Industrial Imperialism in Italy 1908 -1915 (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1975), pp. 
316ff 
'24 See, in this study, Ch. 4, Section IVc 
125 Pastorelli, L., Italia e Albania, 1924 -1927 (Florence 1967); and ibid., "La storiografia italiana del 
dopoguerra sulla politica estera fascista", Storia e Politica, 10 (1971), p. 603 
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intervention in the Balkan sphere'. Ironically, it was supported by Germany alone 
and thus increased suspicion in the west that it was part of a concerted Axis activity 
in the region''-'. The result was a further radicalisation in the scope of fascist 
expansionist aspirations, as well as a deepening of the division between the Axis and 
the western blocs. It also reflected, however, how much the radicalisation of fascist 
expansionism from 1938 onwards had slipped away from the two regimes' capacity 
for rational foreign policy- making. 
Dropping diplomacy : the shift towards aggressive expansion 
The transformation of the two regimes' expansionist strategy was also a by- 
product of the dynamism unleashed by the expansionist ventures of the two fascist 
regimes in the 1930s. Until 1937 diplomacy constituted the primary technique which 
the two fascist regimes exploited in order to claim or acquire territorial concessions 
in Europe and overseas. At the same time, the demonstration of military power was 
mainly intended to enhance the impact of diplomatic pressure rather than consciously 
risk a major conflict. From the beginning of 1938, however, the situation started to 
change. Hitler, confident after his initial successes, decided to utilise his powerful - 
and now politically neutralised - diplomatic and military mechanisms in order to 
promote his expansionist plans more aggressively. By 1937, he had lost his patience 
with the diplomatic bargaining of the western appeasers, and subscribed to 
Ribbentrop's anti -British strategy, despite his contrary personal inclinations and 
long -term plans regarding Britain as an ally. The prospect of Britain's opposition to 
the German expansionist plans obliterated the last major use of diplomacy for 
Hitler''8. His foreign policy strategy between the Anschluss and the Polish campaign 
revealed a determination to pursue expansionist plans, by the use of force if 
necessary, without any intention of keeping up diplomatic appearances. In this way, 
he seemed increasingly prepared to risk a military confrontation and was determined 
126 See Mussolini's irritation with the liquidation of the Czech state [DGFP, D, 6, 87/140; Domarus, 
Mussolini turd Hitler, p. 257]. Also, Toscano, Le origini diplomatiche, p. 232 
127 See the Duce's support for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia in DGFP, D, 6, 15; and Germany's 
support for the annexation of Albania in April 1939 in D, 6, 158/166/172/205; Domarus, Hitler, II, 
p. 1130 
128 DGFP, D, 1, 793 
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to use the whole of his military potential as the major instrument for the German 
expansionist plans. The most striking indication of this shift was the emphasis on 
naval rearmament, which by definition was directed against Britain. Although signs 
of an anti -British naval policy were evident since 1935, the funds allocated to naval 
rearmament increased almost ten -fold between 1932 and 1938, and this upward trend 
continued in 1939 -40'2'. The traditional militarist spirit, which had somehow been 
overshadowed by a more rational co- operation between diplomacy and armed forces 
during the Weimar period, re- emerged in its most extreme form in 1938 -913°. The 
major consequence was that the political recognition of German power by its allies 
and enemies became now associated with the power of the German armed forces. 
This also meant that the attainment of the Grossdeutschland objectives of the Nazi 
regime was now expected to result entirely from the country's military 
performance131. 
Italian policies were not unaffected by this major change in the European 
system. Although militarism never had strong roots in the mentality of the Italian 
nation, the "export" of fascism from Germany and the antagonism between the two 
regimes introduced this novelty in the conduct of the Italian foreign policy. 
Mussolini had been traditionally more interested in the technological side of warfare 
- hence, his obsession with the plans to transform the Regia Aeronautica into the 
largest air force in Europet3'. Of course, the social Darwinist origins of the Italian 
Fascist ideology dictated a cult of war, relating national prestige with military power. 
This, however, was quite different from the German association of foreign policy 
129 Weinberg, Germany, Hitler and World War II, pp. 85 -6; Dülffer, J., "Determinants of German 
Naval Policy, 1920 -1939 ", in ibid. (ed.), The German Military in the Age of Total War (Leamington 
Spa 1985), pp. 152 -70; Salewski, M., "Navy and Politics in Germany and France in the Twentieth 
Century", in Müller, K. -J. (ed.), The Military in Politics and Society in France and Germany in the 
Twentieth Century (Oxford 1995), pp. 73 -88 (esp. 83ff) 
130 A very interesting analysis on the relation between diplomacy and militarism in interwar Germany 
is M. Geyer's Die Reichswehr and die Krise der Machtpolitik 1924 -1936 (Wiesbaden 1980) 
'31 Craig, Germany, p. 713. See also Reynolds, C., Modes of Imperialism (Oxford 1981), pp. 154 -5 
132 Minniti, F., "La politica industriale del Ministero dell'Aeronautica. Mercato, pianificazione, 
svillupo (1935 -43) ", Storia Contemporanea, 1 (1981), pp. 5 -55 and 271 -312; Rochat, G., 
Massobrio, C., Breve storia del 'esercito italiano dal 1861 al 1945 (Turin 1978), pp. 230 -5; Knox, 
Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 22 -4. On the development of the Aeronautica see Rochat, G., Italo Balbo. 
Aviatore e ministro dell'aeronautica, 1926 -1933 (Ferrara 1979); Rochat, G., "Mussolini e le forze 
armate ", in Aquarone, A., Vemassa, M. (eds.), Il regime fascista (Bologna 1 974), pp. 117 -9 
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with expansion and war'33. Mussolini had demonstrated his liking for the role of 
diplomatic mediator in the European system. In 1938 -9, he twice manifested his 
preference for a diplomatic solution to the claims of Nazi expansionism: in Munich 
and in the summer -autumn of 1939 with his plan for an international conference for 
the Polish issue134. His antagonistic relation to the Nazi regime induced him to use 
military force to enhance the diplomatic and political prestige of his own regime, but 
he was not initially prepared to succumb to the extremism of Nazi aggression. 
The situation changed from the moment that the alignment between the two 
fascist countries became closer. The accession of Italy to the Anti- Comintern pact 
and the signing of the Pact of Steel entailed the acceptance of a mainly offensive 
foreign policy by Mussolini. It is true that the Duce felt uneasy about the 
implications of these alliances, and this became evident in his refusal to enter the war 
in August 1939. He became, however, more accustomed to the idea of using his 
military potential to promote foreign policy goals and at the same time antagonise 
Nazi Germany - a tendency which eventually prompted the decision to enter the war 
in June 1940. Faced with the successful aggressive Nazi foreign policy, Mussolini 
too turned his back to the prospect of a diplomatic solution in the European affairs 
and subscribed to the option of war. This was the logical culmination of his own 
ideological and political commitments - his own expansionist vision of a vast 
Mediterranean Impero, but also his fixation with prestige and his desire to usurp the 
initiative from Germany135 
Ideology versus short -term developments 
The fourth factor of the radicalisation in fascist expansionist policies 
concerns the relation between ideology and action in fascism. As we have already 
seen, the programmatic approach to fascist expansionist tends to view ideological 
133 For the "cult of war" and the role of violence in fascist ideology, see, in this study, Ch. 2, Section 
IIIa 
14 DGFP, D, 6, 737; and Hitler's rejection of the idea, D, 7, 47. See also Lamb, R., Ghosts of Peace. 
1935 -1943 (London 1987), pp. 93 -120; Domarus, Mussolini und Hitler, pp. 285ff; Lowe, Marzari, 
pp. 354 -5 
"5 Vigezzi, Politica estera e opinione pubblica, pp. 106ff, 119. All these issues are analysed below, 
Ch. 6, Section III 
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commitments and pronouncements as determinant factors in the conduct of German 
foreign policy, while it is less willing to concede a similar degree of consistency to 
the Italian expansionist programme13'. The relation, however, between ideology and 
foreign policy is a significantly more complicated one. The impact of the political 
and military alliance between the two fascist regimes, the dynamism that their co- 
operation and antagonism generated, played a crucial role in the joint expansionist 
programme of the fascist "new order ". The expansionist element was inherent both in 
the ideological traditions of the two countries since unification137, and lay at the heart 
of the fascist worldview. Irredentist aspirations, colonial compensations and 
revisionist claims kept that element alive in the period between 1919 and the mid - 
1930s. There were, however, two restraining factors. First, the stability of the 
European system did not allow for any serious discussion of territorial changes. 
Second, neither of the two countries - and especially Italy, which has been described 
as the "least of the great powersi13s - initially possessed the necessary economic and 
military power to challenge this stability. For these reasons, at least until 1935, the 
idea of an extensive territorial expansion remained an active, yet essentially utopian 
characteristic of the Italian and German foreign policies. 
The situation changed after the first successful revisionist attempts by both 
Italy (Ethiopia) and Germany (Rhineland, overthrow of the Versailles economic and 
military restrictions). A crumbling system of European security and the tolerant 
attitude of its main guarantors (Britain, France, Italy) towards German revisionism 
further encouraged the "next victim" syndrome of the Nazi leadership13'. At the same 
time, expansionism became the platform of the two fascist regimes' co- operation and 
competition, unleashing new opportunities and speeding up the process of 
radicalisation. This new framework of Italian -German rapprochement facilitated the 
attainment of previously unfeasible goals of Nazi territorial expansion. Had it not 
13G See the interesting discussion of the debate in Azzi, "Historiography of Fascist Foreign Policy ", pp. 
187 -93 
137 On the ideological origins of fascist expansionism see, in this study, Chs. 1 -2 
18 Bosworth, R. J. B., Italy, the Least of the Great Powers. Italian Foreign Policy Before the First 
World War (Cambridge 1979); Cassels, A., Fascist Italy (New York 1968), pp. 71 -3 
`39 See, for example, Chamberlain's opinion that if Hitler desired to invade and liquidate 
Czechoslovakia, he saw no possible way of actually preventing him from doing it. See DBFP, 3rd, 
1, 198 -235; Douglas, R., "Chamberlain and Appeasement ", Mommsen, W. J., Kettenacker. L. 
(eds.), The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement (London 1983), pp. 79 -88 
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been for Mussolini's "friendly" passivity and resignation during the Anschluss crisis 
(in sharp contrast to his forceful reaction in July 1934), Hitler would have not have 
been able to push the situation to extremes. His relief and gratitude was reflected in 
his exchange with Prince Philip of Hesse on 11 March 1938, where he repeated many 
times that he "would never forget him [Mussolini] for this ". Yet, the new spirit of co- 
operation between the two fascist regimes was even more important for the Italian 
regime, as it has been disputed whether Mussolini would have embarked on an 
imprudently ambitious expansionist programme as early as in the late 1930s -early 
1940s had it not been for Hitler's influence and the Duce's passion for precedence140. 
Expansionism became the hard currency of fascist foreign policies, and by 1938 
Mussolini had given priority to territorial expansion, both to promote Italy's 
geopolitical interests and to compete against Nazi Germany. The new international 
climate reactivated a latent extremism in Mussolini's foreign policy programme and 
strengthened his determination to pursue anti -system goals at the expense of his 
previous more "realistic" handling of foreign affairs141. The Italian regime was now 
more willing to pursue wide expansionist plans against the interests of international 
security in order to strengthen national power and prestige. This suggests that the 
decision to expand was the product of both an ideological necessity, rooted in the 
fascist worldview, and a political opportunity for expansion offered by international 
developments. This new -found political dynamism which facilitated the transition to 
radical expansionism (both as a positive action prescribed by Fascist ideology and as 
a reaction to German expansion) found fertile ground in the ideological traditions not 
only of the Fascist regime per se, but also of Italian nationalism in general, of which 
Fascism claimed the spiritual heritage'. What differentiated Fascist expansionism 
from previous nationalist visions was the Fascist regime's intention not to confine 
itself to colonial issues or to a cautious border policy on the continent, but to abandon 
14° See, for example, De Felice, Mussolini il duce, II, pp. 780ff; Wiskemann, E., The Rome -Berlin Axis 
(London 1966, 2nd ed.), pp. 339 -52, and Chs. 5 -13; and Azzi, "Historiography of Fascist Foreign 
Policy ", pp. 196 -7, for a discussion. 
14' For Mussolini's initial "realism" see De Felice, R., Mussolini il duce, I, pp. 798ff; Quartararo, 
Roma tra Londra e Berlino, passim 
142 Bosworth, R. J. B., "Italian foreign policy and its historiography ", in Bosworth, R. J. B., Rizzo, G. 
(eds.), Altro polo. Intellectuals and their Ideas in contemporary Italy (Sydney 1983), pp. 65ff; The 
Italian Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism 
(London & New York 1998), pp. 99 -101 
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the policy of equidistance and to upset the European territorial system in order to 
realise these previously utopian visions. At this point, the importance of German 
influence in the context of the Axis alliance becomes a crucial factor in 
understanding the changing tone of Italian foreign policy after 1935. 
IV: Conclusions 
The further radicalisation of the fascist expansionist policies during the 
Second World War II are dealt with elsewhere'. This chapter has focused on the 
external origins of political radicalisation in the period from 1933 up to the last days 
of peace in August 1939. Within this chronological framework we should finally turn 
back to Hildebrand's question and apply it both to the German and Italian fascist 
regimes. How far, then, could Hitler and Mussolini implement their foreign policy 
ideas, and to what extent were they constrained by the international circumstances? 
The answer is that the radicalisation of fascist expansionism from the mid -1930s 
onwards owes much to the exclusive political interaction between the two fascist 
regimes. In the case of Germany, the diplomatic support that the Italian regime 
provided during the first stages of Nazi expansion (Austria, Czechoslovakia) was 
crucial to success and boosted the dynamism of Hitler's regime144. In the case of 
Italy, the co- operation with Germany revived and radicalised an expansionist 
ideological tradition, while Mussolini's competition with Hitler was often expressed 
in the form of counter -expansion and thus increased the overall expansionist 
dynamism of the Axis alliance. The internationalisation of fascism after 1936 - and 
especially the victory of the fascists in the Spanish civil war - succeeded in 
fabricating a uniform political concept of fascism in the European affairs, in 
opposition to the other two main creeds, bolshevism and liberal democracy. It also 
generated a new "fascist order ", based on alliance, expansion and the prospect of a 
future war. It did not, however, resolve the ideological and political differences 
'43 See, in this study, Ch. 6 
14 This was something that Hitler was perfectly aware of. He had repeatedly insisted on the 
importance of Mussolini's diplomatic position for the promotion of German expansionist interests. 
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between the two regimes themselves. Apart from the restrictions that the British - 
French bloc imposed on Hitler's and Mussolini's freedom of action, the two fascist 
leaders had also to consider the fragile balance between Italian and German interests. 
This proved to be a major mutual restraining factor. On the one hand, not only did 
the Nazi leadership renounce the South Tyrol irredenta, but it also proposed a 
transfer of the German- speaking population to the Reich1'. On the other hand, the 
Italian leadership reciprocated by making all the diplomatic concessions that led to 
the Anschluss in March 1938. However, the antagonism between the two regimes 
seemed to grow with every success in the expansionist policies of either fascist 
regime. In the end, the Axis was much more than a superficial political invention, 
aimed to collectivise the heterogeneous anti -systemic aspirations of the two fascist 
regimes146. It was the vehicle of an implicit competition between them which 
nurtured the process of fascist radicalisation and rendered even the most utopian 
aspirations of their visions appear realisable in the context of a fascist "new order ". 
Where does ideology stand in the radicalisation of fascist expansionism, 
then? The analysis of the domestic reasons and of the international circumstances 
which encouraged this tendency has resulted in a major reassessment of the role of 
ideological principles in this process. As we saw, the latter played an important role 
in producing a strong inclination for expansion and for equating national prestige 
with territorial aggrandisement. In political terms, however, an expansionist foreign 
policy also required an external political momentum147. This was provided within the 
framework of the Axis alliance, and was strengthened by both collaboration and 
rivalry between the two fascist regimes. Expansion was an option prescribed by 
fascist ideology but not the inevitable outcome of either domestic crisis or 
ideological beliefs alone. That this option came to be treated by the fascist 
leaderships as the only remedy reaffirms that a certain ideological penchant for 
expansion existed in the two regimes' worldview. The internationalisation of 
See Lochner, L. P. (ed.), The Goebbels Diaries (London 1948), 20.3.1942. Note, however, his 
disillusionment in 1943 with the achievements of Italian fascism, in Domarus, Hitler, II, p. 2016 
145 On the issue of transfer see DGFP, D, 6, 163; "Questione dell'Alto Adige ", in Levi, F., Levra, U., 
Tranfaglia, N. (eds.), Storia d'Italia, vol. II (Florence 1978), p. 925; Toscano, M., Alto Adige - 
South Tyrol. Italy's Frontier with the German World (Baltimore 1975), pp. 44 -51 
146 Funke, "Die deutsche -italienische Beziehungen", esp. pp. 828 -30 
147 Reynolds, pp. 160 -6 
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fascism, the dynamism unleashed by initial successes, and the complex alliance 
between Italy and Germany, created a further political stimulus to the expansionist 
visions of the two regimes. This stimulus, strengthened by domestic pressures, 
transformed an initial limited expansionist opportunity into a radical, aggressive 
large -scale priority which gradually monopolised the domestic and foreign policy 
activities of the two fascist regimes. The tension between collaboration and rivalry 
sealed the history of the Axis alliance and helps to explain why latent ideological 
extremes were activated in the second half of the 1930s, and why certain 
expansionist policies of the two regimes were pushed further than it was initially 
desired or justified in rational political terms. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Fascist expansionism and war: the triumph of the 
fascists and the collapse of fascism (1939 -1945) 
I: Introduction 
The military conflict which developed into the Second World War was 
intended to be, and indeed was, the ultimate test for the two fascist regimes and the 
future of fascism in the international system. The Italian and German fascist 
leaderships had long acknowledged the political and social dynamism inherent in the 
state of war, and endeavoured to exploit this potential by resorting to a large -scale 
campaign in pursuit of their long -term territorial goals. War was intended to be the 
ultimate formula for unifying the political with the mythical aspects of fascist 
worldview; or, in other words, for uniting reality with utopia and deeds with words. 
Furthermore, the realisation of the two leaders' geopolitical and historic visions 
presupposed a radical transformation of the international status quo which could not 
be brought about by consensual procedures such as diplomacy and peaceful 
expansion. The radicalisation of fascist foreign policies in the second half of the 
1930s widened the gap between what the two regimes demanded from territorial 
expansion and what the western powers were willing to concede in a long- drawn -out 
process of negotiation. The limited character of British and French appeasement 
confronted the two fascist leaders with the question of means -versus -ends: if 
Mussolini had failed to elicit sufficient territorial concessions from France in 1938 
' Arendt, H., The Origins of Totalitarianism (London 1967, 3rd ed.), pp. 389 -459. Cf. the remarks by 
Giuseppe Papini "A Nationalist Programme ", in Lyttelton, A. (ed.), Italian Fascisms: From Pareto 
to Gentile (London 1973), pp. 106 -7 
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and 19392, if Hitler had stumbled upon Chamberlain's "irredentist" proposals in 
Munich, these were indications that the mythical core of fascist expansionism could 
not be approximated by diplomatic means. At the same time, the establishment of the 
Axis alliance produced a powerful strategic alternative and a political momentum 
that were lacking before 1936. Taken together, these two factors transformed war and 
aggression from a vague ideological desideratum into a legitimate political 
instrument for future action. 
Having said that, an all -out military showdown remained a far- from -certain 
development until 1939. The increasing determination of the two leaders to use the 
threat of force, or even actual force, in the second half of the 1930s to advance 
territorial goals did not, as we saw earlier, originate from a fixed decision to launch 
the Second World War. If Mussolini and Hitler, confident after the signing of the 
Pact of Steel in May 1939, spoke more openly about preparing for war and the 
unavoidability of a general conflict3, there is no evidence whatever of any definite 
ideas about the timing and the form of the future conflict. This point has been 
emphasised by M. Geyer, who has warned against the tendency either to "over - 
determine" war, as the consequence of a fixed fascist ideology, or to "under- 
determine" it, as the sole by- product of structural problems or failures4. We should 
also not forget that the war of 1939 -1945 was both a decision (to enter the conflict, to 
set the targets for expansion) and a strategy (how to wage the war, given the various 
short- and long -term circumstances). There has been considerable discussion about 
the actual intentions of the two leaders in 1939 -1940: did they categorically seek a 
military confrontation or was war the ultima ratio of their expansionist strategies? 
This debate will be reviewed later in the chapter separately for each regime. This is, 
however, only part of the problem surrounding the aims of the two regimes in the 
Second World War. The conflict took its shape gradually, through a series of 
2 For the negotiations see Quartararo, R., Rogna tra Londra e Berlino (Rome 1980), pp. 359ff; 
"Appendice a Inghilterra e Italia. Dal Patto di Pasqua a Monaco ", Storia Contemporanea, 7 (1976), 
pp. 665ff; Lowe, C. J., Marzari F., Italian Foreign Policy 1870 -1940 (London & Boston 1975), pp. 
309 -31 
3 See. For example, DGFP, D, 6, 433; Quartararo, pp. 460ff; Toscano, M., Le origini diplomatiche del 
patto d'acciaio (Florence 1956), pp. 396ff 
4 Geyer, M., "Restorative Elites, German society and the Nazi pursuit of goals ", in Bessel, R. (ed.), 
Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Comparisons and Contrasts (Cambridge 1996), pp. 139f 
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decisions and reactions to them which produced new and largely unforeseeable 
circumstances: Germany's decision to invade Poland in September 1939 and the 
reaction of the western powers; Italy's path from non -belligerence to the entry into 
the war in June 1940; the launch of Mussolini's "parallel war" in the autumn of 
1940; and Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941. This chapter 
focuses on these pivotal decisions and assesses to what extent they were determined 
by ideological considerations or were imposed upon the two leaders by domestic or 
international pressures. In the context of this analysis, three main questions are 
addressed. First, did the two leaders intend to wage this particular war, at that 
particular time and in this particular form or sequence of events? Second, did they use 
the conflict to promote the mythical core of their expansionist visions or did their 
policies give way to war making with short-term considerations? Third, to what 
extent were their decisions compatible with, or antithetical to, the aspirations of non - 
fascist élite groups, on the one hand, and of party expectations, on the other? 
II. Germany's decision to launch the war 
There are various other indications that Hitler intended to use Poland as the 
pretext for launching his first war of aggression. The Munich conference represented 
for him exactly what should be avoided in the next crisis. He did not vent his 
irritation openly until little over than a week before invading Poland. In his speech to 
his generals on 22 August he declared his determination to avoid the interference of 
any Schweinehund and the repetition of the Munich compromise; this time he meant 
to "test [Germany's] military machinery"5. His vexation, however, was implicit in his 
secret speech to a group of Wehrmacht officers, where he stated that the war was 
5 The text of the speech is to be found in DGFP, D, 7, 192/193; Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1234 -1240. 
For a discussion of the speech see Baumgart, W., "Zur Ansprache Hitlers von den Führern der 
Wehrmacht am 22. August 1939 ", Vierteljahrshefte fair Zeitgeschichte, 16 (1968), pp. 120 -49 
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imminent and would not be avoided this time6. This conviction was emphatically 
restated in his other major speech to his army commanders on 23 May: "there will be 
war.. a short war [or] ... a war of from ten to fifteen years' duration "7. Once the 
failure of the negotiations with the Polish government established Poland as the next 
victim of German aggression, Hitler took concrete steps to pre -empt any possible 
"irredentist" compromise formula. He had already informed the Danzig Nazi party of 
his decision not to accept any negotiated solution before giving specific orders to the 
German minority's organisation in Poland to remain inactive during the period of the 
crisis8. He repeatedly responded to the British proposals for a negotiated solution 
with promises of talks after the Polish campaign9. He also kept up appearances by 
alluding to a compromise proposal to the Polish government but gave specific orders 
not to release the plan until 1 September10. In his speech to the Reichstag announcing 
the invasion of Poland he could hardly hide his enthusiasm that his "repeated 
proposals" had been rejected11 
At the same time, Hitler appeared to regard the campaign against Poland as a 
preliminary step in his plans for a showdown with the west. As he stated to the 
League of Nations' Commissioner for Danzig on 11 August, he would have to "beat 
the west" first before contemplating war in the east12. Such a war contradicted one of 
the ideological constants in his expansionist vision - alliance with Britain - and 
entailed a major diversion from his priority to Lebensraum expansion in the territory 
of the Soviet Union. As we saw, however, his change of strategy in the summer of 
1938 involved both an acceptance of the possibility that a war against the British 
Empire might occur and a decision to give priority to large -scale expansion 
6 For the 10.2.1939 speech see the discussion in Weinberg, G. L., The Foreign Policy of Hitler's 
Germany. Starting World War II, 1937 -1939 (Chicago 1980), pp. 514f; and Germany, Hitler, and 
World War II. Essays in Modern German and World History (Cambridge 1995), pp. 143 -4 
DGFP, D, 6, 433; Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1196 -1201, esp. pp. 1198 -9 
s DGFP, D, 6, 126; D, 7, 195/196 
9 See, for example, his reply of 14.8.1939 in Domarus, Hitler, II, p. 1229; and his reply of 25.8 in 
DGFP, D, 7, pp. 205, an excerpt of which is translated and reprinted in Noakes, J., Pridham, G. 
(eds.), Nazism. A Documentary Reader, vol. III: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination 
(Exeter 1988), pp. 746 -7 
10 Weinberg, G. L., A World at Arms. A Global History of World War II (Cambridge 1994), pp. 43 -7 
1' Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1312ff (1 September 1939) 
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regardless of the attitude of the western powers13. Even before the culmination of the 
Czech crisis, on 28 May 1938, he had expressed his determination to attack the west 
after settling accounts with "the east "14. The same hope of avoiding a two -front war 
was expressed in the August 22 speech to the generals, where Hitler repeated his 
decision to turn against the west after the conclusion of the Polish campaign and the 
full mobilisation of German resources's. 
When, however, the uncompromising British and French attitude in the 
summer of 1939 linked the two projects into one, determined to make Hitler's 
invasion of Poland a casus belli between Germany and the west, the prospect of the 
much -dreaded two -front war became a distinct possibility throwing Hitler's strategy 
once again in disarray16. The ratification of the treaty with Poland by the British 
government on 25 August caused considerable alarm and anger in the German 
leadership'7. On top of that, the Nazi leadership learnt on the same day about 
Mussolini's refusal to enter the conflict, contrary to Hitler's and Ribbentrop's 
expectations'$. This was a highly undesirable double volte-face which prompted 
Hitler to cancel the provisional order for invasion - initially arranged for the 26th - 
setting instead the 2nd of September as the last possible day for the attack'. Two 
days later, he spoke again to the Wehrmacht generals insisting that the war was 
12 Domarus, Hitler, II, p. 1225; the relevant excerpt is translated in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, 
III, p. 739 
13 See, in this study, Ch. 4, Section IVc 
14 Wiedemann, F., Der Mann der Feldherr werden wollte (Kettwig 1964), pp. 127ff 
)5 Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1236 -7; Weinberg, Starting World War II, pp. 557 -8, 582f 
16 On the changing British attitude after the Munich Conference see Dilks, D., "`We must hope for the 
best and prepare for the worst': the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and Hitler's Germany, 1937 -1939 ", 
Proceedings of the British Academy, 73 (1987), pp. 309 -52 
" For the treaty see Weinberg, Starting World War II, pp. 635ff; for its repercussions in Berlin see 
Jacobsen, Haider, I, pp. 34f 
1S On Italy's position see DDI, 8th, XIII, 147/154/167/182; DGFP, D, 7, 192/193. On Hitler's 
anticipation of Mussolini's help see Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1234 -5; for Ribbentrop's confidence 
see Hill, L. (ed.), Die Weizsäcker -Papiere, 1933 -1950 (Frankfurt 1974), p. 160, and DGFP, D, 6, 
enclosure to Doc. 185, where Hitler stated confidently that "Italy's attitude is determined by the 
Rome -Berlin Axis ". 
19 Robertson, E. M., "German Mobilisation Preparations and the Treaties between Germany and the 
Soviet Union of August and September 1939 ", in Boyce, R., Robertson, E. M. (eds.), Paths to War. 
New Essays on the Origins of the Second World War (Basingstoke & London 1989), pp. 345ff; 
Weinberg, Starting World War II, pp. 638f 
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inevitable20 and rejected anew the prospect of a compromise solution for Danzig 
alone21. On 29 August he also launched a diplomatic initiative asking for a Polish 
Plenipotentiary to go to Berlin by the 30th, but the extremely tight deadline set by the 
German government implied at best a half -hearted commitment to the plan; an 
implication which was not missed by the British government who refused even to 
communicate the proposal to the Poles unless more time was allowed for the 
negotiations22. In the final directive for Operation White Hitler preferred to start the 
invasion one day earlier than his latest acceptable date, ordering the attack for the 1st 
of September23. He also stated clearly that "if Britain and France open hostilities 
against Germany, it is the task of the Wehrmacht ... to contain their forces ... and thus 
maintain the conditions for a victorious conclusion of the operations against 
Poland "24. 
The other major diplomatic development of August 1939 was the signing of 
the German- Soviet pact of Non -aggression on the 23rd. The negotiations had started 
earlier that year, on a parallel level with the talks between the Soviet leadership and 
Britain25. Moscow's tenet behind its policy of rapprochement with other European 
countries was to avoid a military conflict at a time when the Red Army was 
unprepared to meet the task, due to limited resources and the widespread purges of 
193826. As negotiations with Britain reached a stalemate in early spring27, Hitler 
embarked upon his boldest diplomatic venture - to lure Stalin into a political and 
military agreement. The replacement of Litvinov, advocate of collective security and 
'0 Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1276 -7 
" DGFP, D, 7, 357 
11 DBFP, 3rd, 7, 538/539, an excerpt of which is translated in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 
748 -9 
23 Germany, Hitler, and World War II. Essays in Modern German and World History (Cambridge 
1995), pp. 146 -50 
24 For the directive see DGFP, D, 7, 477 -8; Weinberg, Starting World War II, pp. 645 -8 
25 For the negotiations see Weinberg, G. L., Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939 -1941 (Leyden 
1972); Starting World War II, pp. 602ff; Hitler, Germany and World War II, pp. 168 -81; Uldricks, 
T. J., "Soviet Security Policy in the 1930s ", in Gorodetsky, G. (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917- 
1991. A Retrospective (London 1994), pp. 65 -74 
Weinberg, Hitler, pp. 156ff; Erickson, J., "Threat identification and strategic appraisal by the Soviet 
Union, 1930 -1941 ", in Finney, P. (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War (New York & 
London 1997), pp. 334 -50, here pp. 338 -9 
-'7 Weinberg, Starting World War II pp. 613f 
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rapprochement with the west, by Molotov in May 1939 was a careful indicator of the 
changing Soviet attitude towards Germany and the Nazi government responded 
immediately28. While in London there was bewilderment at the rejection of a vague 
proposal from Stalin for co- operation against Germany, Hitler was anxious to reach 
agreement regardless of the price29. His offer of partitioning Europe was 
accompanied by an unconditional acquiescence in Molotov's demands for Russian 
control in the Baltic region and the northern Balkans. He also insisted that the date 
for the conclusion of the talks be brought forward to the 23rd, anxious to secure a few 
days' margin before launching Operation White, which at that time had been 
scheduled for the 26th30. The Secret Protocol to the Agreement cast the die: the 
Vistula river would be the line of partition in Poland, while the northern border of 
Lithuania would represent the frontier between the two countries' spheres of 
influence31 
Why, then, did Hitler decide to launch a campaign which contradicted so 
blatantly all his long -term strategic constants - alliance with Britain, Lebensraum at 
the expense of the Soviet Union and avoidance of two -front war? A. J. P. Taylor 
believed that he was the victim of "diplomatic miscalculation" by delaying his 
proposal for the Polish Plenipotentiary until the 29th instead of launching it earlier 
and allowing ample time for negotiations'. Although he had repeatedly spoken of his 
decision to attack Poland regardless of the British and French attitude, Taylor's 
Hitler was a traditional German Realpolitiker who kept bluffing in anticipation of a 
British compromise proposal which would avert a totally undesirable war with the 
west. He was essentially an old -fashioned opportunist whose main priority was the 
revision of the Versailles Treaty and was determined to exploit all circumstances 
offered by international developments in order to achieve a favourable territorial 
readjustment. The only programmatic consistency which Taylor conceded to Hitler 
was the latter's desire to avoid a conflict over Poland, especially with Britain. In this 
28 DGFP, D, 7, 228; 6, 325; Erickson, pp. 336 -7 
29 On the British proposal see DBFP, 3rd, 4, 597 
30 For the German offers to the Soviet Union see DGFP, D, 7, 56/70/75/79. For the demand to bring 
forward the date of the agreement see DGFP, D, 7, 149 
31 For the text of the pact see DGFP, D, 7, 284, parts of which (and the whole Secret Protocol) are 
translated and reprinted in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 743 -4 
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sense, invasion was reluctantly authorised in the very last days of August after the 
failure of diplomatic initiatives33. 
The significance of Taylor's interpretation lay in its effort to redirect the 
historiographical attention from the "demonic" nature of Hitler's personality to the 
international factors which contributed to the outbreak of the Second World War. It 
also introduced an interesting debate about the continuities in post -unification 
German expansionist policy, thus paving the way for Fischer's controversial work on 
the subject a few years later34. His account, however, of Hitler's strategic thinking at 
the period prior to the invasion of Poland was blurred by emphasis on long -term 
continuities and disregarded its deviation in two crucial areas. First, Taylor's 
insistence on portraying Hitler as averse to the prospect of a military conflict with 
Poland is incompatible with a substantial body of evidence. On numerous occasions 
during 1938 -39 Hitler provided a retrospective account of his foreign policy as 
following consistent priorities leading to an inevitable showdown with Poland and 
the west35. Taylor might have been correct in reading the Führer's comments as mere 
propaganda and ex post facto justification36 but he did not sufficiently account for the 
reasons behind the radicalisation of Nazi expansionist policies from 1938 onwards. 
Signs of this radicalisation may be detected in the Hossbach Conference in 
November 1937 (whose literal value Taylor summarily dismissed37), but it was the 
Czech crisis which provided the first tangible manifestation of Hitler's willingness to 
32 Taylor, A. J. P., A. J. P., The Origins of the Second World War (London 1961), pp. 69f 
33 Taylor, Origins, pp. 277 -8. See also the discussion in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 750- 
4; Williamson, D. G., The Third Reich (Harlow 1995, 2nd ed.), pp. 59 -60; Boyce, R., 
"Introduction ", in Boyce, R., Robertson, E. M. (eds.), Paths to War. New Essays on the Origins of 
the Second World War (Basingstoke & London 1989), pp. 1 -32. Indicative of the acidity of the 
debate in the 1970s is the collection of relevant contributions in Robertson, E. M. (ed.), The Origins 
of the Second World War. Historical Interpretations (London & Basingstoke 1971) - see, amongst 
others, Trevor -Roper, H., "A. J. P. Taylor, Hitler and the War ", pp. 83 -99, and Taylor, A. J. P., 
"War Origins Again ", pp. 136 -41 
34 Koch, H. W. (ed.), Aspects of the Third Reich (Basingstoke & London 1985), pp. 22, 181 -2; Boyce, 
pp. 3f 
35 See, for example, Michalka, W. (ed.), Das Dritte Reich, vol. I: Volksgemeinschaft und 
Grossmachtpolitik (Munich 1985), pp. 224ff; Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1196 -1201 (speech to 
generals, 23.5.1939); pp. 1234 -8 (speech to the generals, 22.8.1939) 
3e Taylor, "War Origins Again ", pp. 139 -41; Mason, T. W., "Some Origins of the Second World 
War ", in Robertson (ed.), Origins of the Second World War, pp. 107ff 
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use Germany's military power in an offensive campaign for expansion. The timely 
intervention of Chamberlain and Mussolini in September 1938 did avert a general 
conflict over Czechoslovakia but, ironically, strengthened Hitler's determination to 
deal with the rump state of Czechoslovakia and Poland in an uncompromising 
manner, rejecting diplomatic solutions or "a repetition of Czechia "38. The Polish 
government had been given a chance to yield to Germany's condition for the return 
of the Free City of Danzig to the Reich in return for a guarantee of Polish 
independence. Their adamant refusal to give in to pressure, and the British guarantee 
to Polish independence in March 193939, convinced Hitler that Poland should be the 
first victim of his formidable armed forces. As the Chief of the General Staff of 
Wehrmacht, Haider, commented in the summer of 1939, the Führer was determined 
to have his war in Poland40. 
Second, Taylor disregarded the impact of Ribbentrop's ideas on Hitler's 
strategic thinking in 1938 -3941. His belief in the unavoidable conflict with Britain 
dated back to 1936, during his term as Ambassador in London, but was reiterated 
even more emphatically in 1937 and 193842. Hitler's interpretation of the 
international situation before the Polish campaign incorporated two of Ribbentrop's 
pivotal strategic convictions: namely, that the large -scale war in the east would not 
be tolerated by Britain, thus rendering a reckoning with the west a conditio sine qua 
non for eastern expansion; and that the unpreparedness of British military forces 
would impede a large -scale war with the west until 1940 -143. Hitler did his best to 
37 Taylor, Origins, pp. 287ff. Cf. Koch, H. W., "Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War: 
Second Thoughts on the Status of Some of the Documents ", Historical Journal, 11 (1968), pp. 125- 
43 
38 DGFP, D, 6, 433; Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1195 -99 (conference with the Wehrmacht leadership and 
Goering, 23 May 1939) 
39 Weinberg, G. L., Hitler's Foreign Policy, vol. 2: Starting World War II, 1937 -1939 (Chicago 
1980), pp. 555 -6 
40 Jacobsen, H. -A. (ed.), Generaloberst Haider: Kriegstagebuch (Stuttgart 1962), vol. 1, pp. 7f 
4' Eatwell, R., Fascism: A Histoiy (London 1995), pp. 136 -7 
42 For example, his comments against Britain and France in 1937 in ADAP, D, 1, 19; Michalka, W. 
(ed.), Das Dritte Reich, vol. I: Volksgemeinschaft und Grossmachtpolitik (Munich 1985), pp. 241 -6. 
See also, in this study, Ch. 3, Sections III and IV 
43 Michalka, W., "Joachim von Ribbentrop: From Wine Merchant to Foreign Minister ", in Smelser, 
R., Zitelmann, R (eds.), The Nazi Elite (Houndmills & London 1993), pp. 165 -72; and "Die 
nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik im Zeichen eines `Konzeptionen- Pluralismus' - Fragestellungen 
und Forschungsaufgaben ", in Funke, M. (ed.), Hitler, Deutschland und die Mächte. Materialien zur 
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isolate the campaign against Poland from the project of war against the west. He had 
engineered the pact with the Soviet Union as the ultimate deterrent to British 
engagement in Poland, but Chamberlain's reply stressed that the pact would not 
impede Britain from honouring her guarantee to Poland44. The decision to cancel the 
attack on 25 August revealed the Fiihrer's willingness to allow some more time to 
the efforts of isolating Poland from Britain'. What, however, Taylor failed to take 
into account was that Hitler's strategy had undergone a far -reaching change, of which 
his intransigence during the Munich crisis was only the first indication. Apart from 
having accepted the probability of having to fight the west before turning to the east, 
he also decided that the attitude of Britain should not determine his expansionist 
priorities or timetable. By August 1939 his directives for Operation White stated that 
"the destruction of Poland is the priority" even if "war breaks out with the west "46. 
British neutrality would be a welcome development, but not a sufficient reason to 
call off the operation, a conviction reiterated in the final directive for the attack47. 
This was the impression of the majority of the Wehrmacht generals - Hitler and 
Ribbentrop meant war this time48. 
The choice of Poland as the battlefield for the first military campaign of the 
Nazi regime raises reasonable questions about social imperialist motives behind 
Hitler's decision to order the invasion. The Munich crisis had exposed the negative 
feelings of the majority of the German population at the prospect of aggressive 
expansion, while at the same time confronting Hitler with the reluctance of his 
generals to risk a general war for the sake of a secondary territorial goal like 
Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches (Düsseldorf 1977), pp. 59f. For a discussion of Michalka's 
assessment of Ribbentrop see The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation 
(London 1989, 2nd edition), p. 114 
44 Robertson, "German Mobilisation ", pp. 342 -50. For the British reply see DBFP, 3rd, 7, 
79/127/128/145. See also Aster, S., 1939: The Making of the Second World War (London 1973), 
Ch. 9 
Weinberg, Starting World War Il, pp. 638ff; Hill (ed.), Weizsäcker -Papiere, p. 160 
4e Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1299 -1300 
47 Jacobsen (ed.), Haider, I, pp. 46f 
48 See, for example, Wagner, E. (ed.), Der Generalquartiermeister. Briefe und 
Tagebuchaufzeichnungen des Gen eralquartiermeisters des Heeres, General der Artillerie Eduard 
Wagner (Munich 1963), pp. 98 -109; Hill (ed.), Weizsäcker- Papiere, pp. 158 -60; Weinberg, Hitler, 
pp. 143 -5 
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Czechoslovakia49. Poland, on the other hand, had traditionally been viewed with 
hostility by both the Reichswehr and the Wilhelmstrasse officials, not only due to the 
issue of Danzig but also because the whole state owed its existence to the Versailles 
Diktat50. Therefore, Hitler's determination to proceed with a united domestic front 
could be best served through the manipulation of the emotive issue of the Corridor in 
order to justify the risk of a military conflict'. In this calculation, Hitler proved right. 
The decision to prioritise Operation White and break off negotiations with Poland in 
April 1939 was greeted with enthusiasm by no more an opponent of war against 
Czechoslovakia in 1938 than the State Secretary von Weizsäcker52. The prospect of 
witnessing the re- incorporation of the territories of eastern Prussia to the Reich 
created an atmosphere of anticipation, both amongst the conservative élites and the 
German population, that was in complete contrast to the apathy or even alarm during 
the Czech crisis53. 
However, this impression of unity was shattered in August 1939, as a result of 
two separate developments. First, the alarming prospect of a showdown with the west 
revived the same fears that had dominated the conservative opposition to Hitler's 
plans for war against Czechoslovakia. Only a few high -ranking officials of the 
Wehrmacht could still express their unqualified support and optimism54. The 
majority had once again assumed the role of the "dove ", fearing the prospect of a 
two -front war55. During the Salzburg meeting between Ribbentrop and Ciano, 
Canaris had strove to elicit a definite refusal from the Duce, hoping that it would 
suffice to curb Hitler's reckless aggressive intentions56. Now, even Weizsäcker had 
second thoughts, especially after the reports about Britain's determination to fight 
alluded to a completely different picture than the one delineated by Hitler and 
Kershaw, I., The "Hitler- Myth ". finage and Reality in the Third Reich (Oxford 1989), pp. 132 -9. 
For the attitude of the military during the Czech crisis see, in this study, Chs. 3 -4 
5° See Billow's memorandum of April 1933 and its endorsement by the then Foreign Minister, von 
Neurath, discussed in this study, Ch. 3, Section III 
51 Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1234 -40 (speech to generals, 22 August 1939); Robertson, "German 
Mobilisation ", pp. 336ff 
52 ADAP, D, 7, 119 
53 Hill (ed.), Weizsäcker -Papiere, pp. 157 -8 
54 See Wagner (ed.), Generalquartienneister, pp. 108 -9 
55 Weinberg, Hitler, pp. 144 -5; Robertson, "German Mobilisation ", pp. 356f 
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Ribbentrop57. At the same time, although there was significantly less alarm amongst 
the population at the escalating crisis with the west, this was mainly due to the belief 
(or hope) that Hitler would still manage to repeat the Munich formula, namely to 
extend the Reich's territory peacefully58. 
The second development was the conclusion of the German- Soviet Pact of 
Non -aggression. This Nazi stratagem to avoid a two -front war convinced the 
Wehrmacht leadership that a major obstacle for Operation White had been lifted and 
restored some optimism amongst the high command59. The generosity, however, of 
the agreement to the Soviet Union, allowing her to occupy a large portion of Poland 
and to extend her supremacy in the Baltic region, mitigated the initial positive 
impression. Weizsäcker and Goering endorsed the pact only as a major trump card to 
avoid the impending confrontation with the west, in spite of his opposition to the 
extensive concessions to the Soviet Union60. Others, like Rosenberg, criticised what 
seemed to be an alliance with the ideological arch -enemy of the Reich. In the last 
crucial days of August Rosenberg deplored the "moral loss of face" of the Nazi 
regime and ventured a gloomy metaphysical prediction - "revenge will fall on 
National Socialism one day for this ideological repudiation'''. When eventually the 
war broke out in September 1939, the attitude of the public was calm but far from 
enthusiastic. In spite of the careful propaganda preparation of the population, the 
vilification of the Polish state and the triumphant rhetoric surrounding the return of 
Danzig to the Reich, public opinion remained desirous of a quick settlement to avert 
or, after the 1st of September, to end the war62. 
DDI, 8th, XIII, 10/67 
5= On Weizsäcker's changing attitude see Weinberg, Starting World War II, Ch. 14. On e reports 
from London see, for example, DGFP, D, 6, 608; and Ribbentrop's optimism in D, 6, 630 
Kershaw, Hitler -Myth, pp. 138 -47 
" Jäckel, E., "Hitlers Kriegspolitik und ihre nationalen Voraussetzungen ", in Hildebrand et al_ (eds.), 
1939: An der Schwelle zum Weltkrieg (Berlin 1990), pp. 26-29 
Hill (ed.), Weizsäcker- Papiere, pp. 180 -1; Overy, R. J., Goering_ The "Iron Man' (London 1984), 
pp. 91 -4 
6o Seraphin, H. G., Das Politische Tageshuch Alfred Rosenbergs 1934/5 und 1939'40 (Gegen, 
Berlin & Frankfurt 1956), entries for 22 and 25.8.1939. See also Cecil, R.., The Myth of the Master 
Race. Alfred Rosenberg and Nazi Ideology (London 1972), pp. 179ff 
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The waning public support for Hitler's political blend of militarisation and 
mobilisation for war in 1938 -39, combined with his hurried preparation to launch the 
attack on Poland against the counsel of prominent party figures, prompted T. Mason 
to formulate a modified version of the social imperialist argument with regard to the 
decision for war in August 193963. Mason's account was a far more elaborate attempt 
to restate the "primacy of domestic politics" thesis, in that he did accept that "Nazi 
Germany was always bent at some time upon a major war of expansion ", originating 
from the regime's ideological obsession with racial theories and anti- bolshevism64 
His emphasis, however, was on the timing of Hitler's project to launch war and his 
headlong preparation to embark on a campaign which contradicted all his long -term 
strategic preoccupations. According to Mason, Hitler and Ribbentrop were very well 
aware of the British determination to fight for Poland and launched Operation White 
in full awareness that it would lead to a general conflict with the west65. Mason also 
interpreted Hitler's wavering strategy towards Poland in 1933 -39 as an indication 
that he intended to use her as an ally against the Soviet Union in a future war of 
conquest. His sudden change of mind in early 1939 can only be attributed to 
domestic pressures which necessitated a quick, easy foreign policy triumph to raise 
public morale66. What were these domestic pressures then? Mason listed the regime's 
failure to produce a coherent overall social policy which caused considerable labour 
unrest, the "overheating" of the German economy by 1938 -39 which impeded the 
realisation of the extremely ambitious rearmament targets for 1939, the rapid decline 
in living standards as a result of the sacrifices needed to approximate these targets, 
and the crisis of the whole Nazi rearmament policy as a result of erratic, non- 
ti3 See Mason, T., "Innere Krise und Angriffskrieg 1938 -9 ", in Forstmeier, F., Volkmann, H. E. (eds.), 
Wirtschaft und Rüsttrog am Vorabend des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Düsseldorf 1975), pp. 158 -88; 
Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich (Opladen 1977); "The Domestic Dynamics of Nazi Conquest ", in 
Childers, T., Caplan, J. (eds.), Reevaluating the Third Reich (New York, London 1993), pp. 161 -89; 
Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft. Dokumente und Materialen zur deutschen Arbeiterpolitik, 
1936 -1939 (Opladen 1975); for a discussion of Mason's argument see Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, 
pp. 44 -9, 78 -81, 112 
Mason, T. & Overy, R., "Debate: Germany, `domestic crisis' and war in 1939 ", Past and Present, 
122 (1989), pp. 205 -40; "Innere Krise ", pp. 186f 
65 Mason, Sozialpolitik, pp. 40ff; "Debate ", pp. 219f 
66 Mason, T., "Intention and Explanation. A Current Controversy about the Interpretation of National 
Socialism ", in Hirschfeld, G., Kettenacker, L. (eds.), Der "Führerstaat ". Mythos und Realität. 
Studien zur Struktur und Politik des Dritten Reiches (Stuttgart 1981), pp. 23 -42 
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programmatic decision -making in the previous years67. This situation, according to 
Mason's analysis, amounted to a deep socio- economic crisis which necessitated 
expansion, a "smash- and -grab" policy and the ruthless exploitation of the resources 
and the populations of the conquered areas. This necessity underpinned Hitler's 
volte-face in August 1939, when he jettisoned his long -term strategic constant 
(alliance with Britain), allied Germany with her supposed arch -enemy and rushed 
headfirst into an unwanted general conflict68. 
Mason's argument offered an interesting perspective upon Nazi foreign policy 
and the decision for war from the viewpoint of a "history from below ". His 
interpretation of the timing of the invasion of Poland provided an emphasis on the 
structural factors behind the decision without, however, disregarding Hitler's long- 
term intentions. He correctly identified Poland as a secondary objective for Hitler's 
expansionist vision and highlighted the latter's lack of clear short-term strategy in 
those crucial months of 1939. He also accurately located serious problems in the 
regime's long -term economic and social policy and gave a rational assessment of the 
system's capabilities and weaknesses. Here lies, however, the major weakness of 
Mason's social imperialist argument. Whether the cumulative problems of 
rearmament and lack of coherent planning amounted to a crisis situation in 1938 -39 
is a technical matter of definition, as the acrimonious debate between T. Mason and 
R. J. Overy has shown69. Yet Mason's emphasis on perceptions of crisis, based on a 
rational reading of the socio- economic conditions, overestimated the capacity for 
rational assessment and decision -making in the Nazi system. There is absolutely no 
evidence in Hitler's expositions in 1938 -39 which alludes to a realisation of any 
deadlock, nor any indication that his volte-face in the first half of 1939 originated 
from any such awareness70. Examples of concern or even alarm from bureaucrats 
67 Mason, Arbeiterklasse, pp. 103ff; "Debate ", pp. 215ff. For a discussion of these arguments see 
Hancock, E., The National Socialist Leadership and Total War, 1941 -5 (New York 1991), pp. 19ff 
68 Mason, "Debate ", pp. 214ff; Sozialpolitik, pp. 30ff 
6° For Overy's rejection of the notion of crisis see Overy, R. J., "Germany, `Domestic Crisis" and War 
in 1939 ", Past and Present, 116 (1987), pp. 138 -68; "Hitler's War Plans and the German 
Economy ", in Boyce, R., Robertson, E. M. (eds.), Paths to War, esp. pp. 119 -21. See also Mason & 
Overy, "Debate ", pp. 205 -40 
70 Orlow, D., The History of the Nazi Party, 1919 -1945, vol. II: 1933 -1945 (Pittsburgh 1973), pp. 
230f; Carr, W., Arms, Autarky and Aggression. A Study in German Foreign Policy 1933 -1939 
(London 1972), pp. 64 -5 
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about the future of German economy abounded in Mason's accounts. Even such 
high -ranking Nazi officials such as Goering and Goebbels expressed doubts about 
risking a major war in these circumstances, the first because he wanted to see the 
completion of the 1938 -39 rearmament programme, the second fearing the impact on 
public opinion'. Yet, the authoritarian tendencies of the Nazi system had insulated 
Hitler's predominant position in the decision -making process, especially in the field 
of foreign affairs, which he regarded as a near -exclusive political privilege72. This 
might not have been rational, but it shows why a "history from below ", placing 
primary emphasis on social issues and economic decisions, distorts the significance 
of the leader -oriented character of the Nazi decision -making process and fails to 
show that this socio- economic reality very rarely reached the highest echelons of the 
Nazi leadership73. 
Furthermore, Mason overestimated the capacity of the system for rational 
assessment in the crucial area of international developments. He interpreted Hitler's 
decision to launch Operation White as bewildering since the German leader had been 
repeatedly warned by the British government that "any attempt by a state to dominate 
the world... must be resisted" and that "they are prepared to employ without delay all 
the forces at their command" even after the conclusion of the pact with the Soviet 
Union74. If experienced diplomats - such as Weizsäcker and Dirksen - or 
Wiedemann, Hitler's own adjutant, were almost convinced about Britain's 
determination to fight, there is no reason why Hitler should not have been. His 
declared belief that the western powers could not honour their commitments to 
Poland stemmed from his earlier impression that British defence policy would not 
achieve a sufficient level of mobilisation before 194175. Yet, his decision to call off 
the attack on the 25th and his subsequent instructions regarding a possible 
71 Overy, R. J., Göring: The `Iron Man' (London, Boston, Melbourne & Henley 1984), pp. 80 -108; 
Kube, A., "Hermann Goering: The Second Man in the Reich ", in Smelser, R., Zitelmann, R (eds.), 
The Nazi Elite (Houndmills & London 1993), pp. 65ff; Irving, D., Göring: A Biography (New York 
1989), pp. 255ff; Heiber, H., Goebbels (New York 1972), pp. 250 -2; Weinberg, Starting World War 
II, pp. 620 -1; Hancock, pp. 21 -2 
72 On this issue see, in this study, Ch. 3 
73 Overy, "Debate ", pp. 235 -40 
74 Chamberlain, N., In Search of Peace (London 1939), pp. 276 -7 (and the report of the speech in 
Germany in DGFP, D, 6, 23); DBFP, 3rd, 7, 145 
75 Domarus, Hitler, II, p. 1236; Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, p. 741 
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involvement of the west in Poland reveal his awareness of the high stakes involved in 
the launching of Operation White76. With hindsight, his decision to proceed with the 
invasion in the face of British opposition might have been a "miscalculation "77, but it 
was far more ideologically conditioned than Mason conceded. Hitler had chosen to 
play down the seriousness of the British threats, convinced that the British armed 
forces could not effectively fight a European war. His impression from Munich had 
fostered his view that the western leaders were "small fry" and "below average ", an 
accurate reflection of the declining "spiritual power" of the British and French 
nations. Poland would be overrun with a "lightning" action within a very short period 
of time, according to the natural law of "the stronger man is right ", he argued to his 
generals on 22 August78. In spite of British warnings that such swift action would not 
lessen the west's determination to fight, he ignored Goering's last- minute appeal to 
abandon the plan and decided to play for all or nothing79, still hoping that the danger 
from a British -French military action was minimal at that stage. 
This leads us to the last weakness in Mason's argument - the insufficient 
attention to Hitler's foreign policy strategy. Mason's emphasis on domestic, 
exclusively German factors seems less appropriate for interpreting the actions of a 
leader so alert to international circumstances and opportunities offered by external 
developments. He therefore disregarded the significance of the Führer's change of 
strategy just before the Czech crisis. In his speech to the Generals on 22 August 
1939, Hitler insisted that his international opponents' alleged political and military 
weakness offered a window of opportunity that would not last forever. He was 
determined to seize the initiative and dictate the rules of international relations rather 
than being constrained by the slow -moving, over -cautious western policy of 
appeasement. As he mentioned several times in August, he would rather fight the 
west now than in the distant future, alluding once again to his fear that time was 
76 For the instructions regarding the west see Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1299 -1300 (Directive 1, 31 
August 1939). This view is supported by Weinberg, Starting World War II, Ch. 14 
77 Robertson, "German Mobilisation ", p. 355 
Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1236 -7; Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, p. 743; DGFP, D, 7, 192/193; 
Overy, "Debate ", pp. 23 8 -40 
79 Hill (ed.), Weizsäcker -Papiere, pp. 207 -8 
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running out for Germany and for him personally80. Therefore, the invasion of Poland 
was a personal enterprise, a confirmation of Hitler's monopoly of strategic wisdom 
in foreign -policy decision -making, and a prelude to a wider confrontation first with 
the west and then with the east. Faced with a clash between his ideal vision of 
expansion and the adverse reality of domestic (not optimum level of preparation) and 
international circumstances (opposition from the west; Italian "non- belligerence "), 
Hitler made a decisive choice to pursue his mythical project regardless, confident that 
he would be able to shape the political prerequisites of victory in the process. His 
failure to choose the time of dealing with the Britain and France was regretted, as his 
sentimental reaction to the British ultimatum on 3 September showed81, but again it 
was not a sufficiently strong factor to detract him from his strategic agenda. At the 
same time, reservations expressed by prominent party figures (Rosenberg, Goering, 
Goebbels) had no effect and definitely no political place in a system where the 
leader's will was paramount. Most of them targeted Ribbentrop, but became 
unintelligible once the Führer had decided to proceed with his aggressive plans 
without any further delay. 
III. Italy's decision to enter the war 
Mussolini's decision to declare Italy's non -belligerence in September 1939 
and to enter the conflict ten months later raises complex questions about his 
ideological and strategic consistency, as well as his freedom of action. Undoubtedly, 
the refusal to join the war in September stemmed from an awareness of Italy's 
8° Burckhardt, C. J., Meine Danziger Mission, 1937 -1939 (Munich 1962), pp. 272 -3; Domarus, Hitler, 
II, pp. 1236ff. Cf. his similar comments at the Hossbach conference in Domarus, I, pp. 748 -9 (5 
November 1937) 
8' See Schmidt, P., Statist auf diplomatischer Biihne. 1923 -1945 (Bonn 1950), pp. 462 -4, translated 
and reprinted in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 756 -7. Weinberg doubts the accuracy of 
the account - see his Hitler, Germany and World War II, pp. 91 -2 
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military unpreparedness and a lack of strategic interest in a war in eastern Europe82. 
However, references in the Cavallero Memorandum of May 1939 to the need to 
postpone war for three or four years have raised doubts about Mussolini's overall 
inclination to use war as an instrument for promoting his expansionist vision. R. De 
Felice interpreted these references as an indication of the Duce's peaceful intentions, 
while Quartararo saw them as an attempt to avoid an irreversible commitment to the 
Nazi policy of aggression83. They both pointed to Mussolini's "decision" not to fight 
in August 1939, to his attempts to mediate between Germany and Poland and to his 
intention to break off the alliance with Germany after the signing of the German- 
Soviet pact as evidence that he neither meant to wage war nor to succumb to the 
alliance with Germany84. Quartararo also described Italian policy during the period 
of non -belligerence as a consistent attempt to avoid military commitment, to 
negotiate with the unresponsive British side and finally to postpone the half -hearted 
intervention as long as possible85. The eventual decision to declare war, according to 
De Felice and Rochat, entailed a "modest commitment ", underpinned by the belief in 
a short war and a swift, "better peace "86. A similar conclusion was reached by D. 
Mack Smith who saw Italy's entry into the war as a diplomatic move and not a real 
military commitment to large -scale expansion and war- making87. By contrast, M. 
Knox interpreted Mussolini's path to war as the culmination of an increasingly 
aggressive expansionist strategy since 1938. According to him, the Duce's references 
in May 1939 to the unavoidable showdown with the west should be taken at face 
82 Whittam, J., "The Italian General Staff and the Corning of the Second World War ", in Preston, A. 
(ed.), General Staffs and Diplomacy Before the Second World War (Totowa, New Jersey 1978), pp. 
77 -97; Rochat, G., "Mussolini e le forze armate ", in Aquarone, A., Vernassa, M. (eds.), II regime 
fascista (Bologna 1974), pp.127 -32; Bottai, G., Diario, 1935 -1944 (Milan 1994), 26.8.1939; 
Quartararo, R., Roma tra Londra e Berlino. La politica estera fascista dal 1930 al 1940 (Rome 
1980), pp. 521 ff 
83 De Felice, R., Mussolini il duce, vol. II: Lo Stato Totalitario, 1936 -1940 (Turin 1981), pp. 618 -40; 
Quartararo, Roma tra Londra e Berlino, Ch. 8 
84 De Felice, Mussolini il duce, vol. II, passim; Quartararo, pp. 519 -66. For Mussolini's thoughts 
about breaking off the Pact of Steel see DDI, 8th, XIII, 264 
85 Quartararo, pp. 604ff 
86 De Felice, Mussolini l'alleato, vol. 1: L'Italia in guerra, 1940 -1943 (Turin 1990), pp. 92 -105; 
Rochat, "Mussolini e le forze armate ", pp. 127 -32 
87 Mack Smith, D., Mussolini 's Roman Empire (London 1982), pp. 216ff 
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value instead of being dismissed as mere bluff 8. Similarly, P. Alatri viewed the same 
decision as the logical culmination of Mussolini's overall expansionist strategy since 
1935, while G. Rumi maintained that it stemmed from his vast geopolitical ambitions 
in the Mediterranean and was not simply dictated by the dynamism of Nazi 
expansionism89. 
This historiographical debate highlights two separate but interconnected 
issues regarding the long -term characteristics of Italian foreign policy. The first 
pertains to Mussolini's attitude to war as an option in his expansionist strategy. The 
second regards the Italian regime's commitment to the Axis alliance and the project 
of a new territorial order in Europe throughout the period of non -belligerence. We 
saw in the previous two chapters that the Italian Fascist regime displayed a growing 
determination to employ the threat of aggression or actual force in promoting 
expansionist goals after 1935, and that the alliance with Nazi Germany provided the 
impetus for the radicalisation of the Italian foreign policy objectives. Although 
Mussolini concluded the Pact of Steel under the assumption that war would not be 
considered at least until 19429°, there are indications that he had seriously considered 
the option of war before 1940. Since December 1937 he had given orders to General 
Pariani to draft operational plans for an attack on Egypt in the event of a German war 
against France91. This project was accompanied by a major study by the Regia 
Marina regarding the feasibility of a landing at the Suez Canal and a parallel 
occupation of Malta92. Although the plans were apparently abandoned in the wake of 
the Czech crisis in September 1938, just before the Munich Conference Mussolini 
B8 Knox, M., Mussolini Unleashed, 1939 -1941. Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War 
(Cambridge, 1982), p. 102; "The fascist regime its foreign policy and its wars: an `anti- anti -fascist' 
orthodoxy ? ", in Finney, P. (ed.), The Origins of the Second World War (London & New York 
1997), pp. 157 -65; "Conquest, Domestic and Foreign, in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany ", Journal 
of Modern History, 56 (1984), passim. On Mussolini's comments about war with the West see 
Muggeridge, M. (ed.), Ciano's Diaries, 1939 -1943 (London & Toronto 1947), 9 and 12.5.1939 
89 Alatri, P., Le origini del fascismo (Rome 1963); Rumi, G., "`Revisionismo' fascista ed espansione 
coloniale (1925 -1935) ", in Aquarone, A., Vernassa, M. (eds.), Il regime fascista (Bologna 1974), 
pp. 435 -64. For a general discussion of these views see Petersen, J., "La politica estera del fascismo 
come problema storiografico ", in De Felice, R. (ed.), L' Italia fra tedeschi e alleati. La politica 
estera fascista e la seconda guerra mondiale (Bologna 1973), pp. 45 -56 
9° Toscano, Origini diplomatiche del patto d'acciaio, pp. 308 -12; Mack Smith, D., Le guerre di Duce 
(Bari & Rome 1976, 2nd edition), pp. 218ff 
91 Ceva, L., Storia della società italiana: le forze armate (Torise 1981), Ch. 13 
92 Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 18 -21 
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ordered the mobilisation of the Italian army and navy for a possible war in the eastern 
Mediterranean in case of a conflict between Germany and the west93. A few months 
later, in his famous speech to the Grand Council in February 1939, he expressly 
stated that Greece and Egypt should be considered as "enemies of the Italian 
expansion" in the Mediterranean, impeding Italy's "march to the Ocean "94. In the 
same frame of mind, Ciano expressed his belief that the Balkans would soon become 
the battlefield of the struggle between the "totalitarian and the democratic" fronts, 
stating that the Axis alliance will enable Italy to extend her control over the 
Balkans93. In this general conflict between the two fronts, as Ciano claimed, Italy 
would "crush" France and establish her predominance in the Mediterr.anean96 
The Salzburg meeting between Ciano and Ribbentrop in August 1939, where 
the - hitherto secret - plans for the German attack on Poland were unveiled, caused 
indignation to the Italian leadership and prompted a re- examination of the regime's 
foreign policy97. In spite, however, of the Italian proposals for a negotiated solution 
to the Polish crisis and Ciano's angry comments about the insincerity of Nazi 
policy98, Mussolini's position remained far from certain throughout the rest of 
August99. Until the 19th he still contemplated military action against Greece and 
hoped that the long- awaited internal collapse of Yugoslavia would enable him to 
move into Croatia10 °. Ciano's conversion to a vehemently anti -German line divided 
the Fascist government and party, with Bottai, Grandi and Balbo in favour of 
neutrality and Farinacci, Starace and Alfieri supporting the Axis alliance. This 
division mirrored earlier disagreements within the Fascist party about the soundness 
9J See the relevant references in Muggeridge, M. (ed.), Ciano's Diaiy, 1937 -1938 (London 1952), 
25/26/27.9.1938 
94 Bottai, Diario, 4.2.1939 
95 Bottai, Diario, 9.6.1939 
96 See the relevant comments in ADAP, D, 6, 52 
97 On the Salzburg meeting see Ciano, G., Europa verso il catastrofe (Milan 1948), pp. 449 -59; DDI, 
8th, XIII, 1/4/21; DGFP, D, 7, 47; Siebert, F., Italiens Weg in den Zweiten Weltkrieg (Bonn 1962), 
Ch. 7; Lowe, C. J., Marzari F., Italian Foreign Policy 1870 -1940 (London & Boston 1975), pp. 
338ff. Cf. Bottai's opinion in Diario, 19.8.1939 
98 For the proposal see DDI, 8th, XIII, 27. For Ciano's comments see his Diaries, 15.2.1939 
99 De Felice believed that the decision not to enter the war had already been taken on 15 August. See 
Mussolini il duce, II, pp. 669ff. For a criticism of this opinion see Knox, "The fascist regime ", pp. 
156ff 
ioo Ciano 's Diaries, 18.8.1939; DDI, 8th, XIII, 162; Lowe, Marzari, pp. 344 -5 
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of allying Fascism with Nazism101. Mussolini kept vacillating, one moment 
acknowledging Italy's military unpreparedness and Germany's disloyal attitude and 
the other stating his obligation to honour his commitment towards his Axis 
partner] °2. The King's strong opposition to intervention and the subsequent 
indignation at the conclusion of the German- Soviet Pact strengthened Mussolini's 
non -belligerence frame of mind and prompted him to write the letter to Hitler 
explaining Italy's inability to intervene militarily at that stage103. Yet, as Ciano 
himself admitted in numerous occasions during September 1939, the Duce's 
conversion was far from secure - "I do not see him certain yet ", he confessed to 
Bottai as late as on 7 Septemberloa 
Throughout the following autumn and winter the split between Ciano's anti - 
German line and Mussolini's sentimental attachment to the Axis became increasingly 
evident. The Foreign Minister's support for the idea of a neutral bloc in the Balkans 
stumbled upon Mussolini's reluctance to commit Italy to a political formation 
underpinned by the principle of neutrality and was dropped in Decemberlos The 
Duce continued to order military preparations - apart from the revival of the "Croat 
Plan" early in 1940, he placed emphasis on the reinforcement of Libya, a long -term 
project which had started in the aftermath of the Ethiopian crisis106. At the Grand 
Council meeting of 8 December 1939 he gave a gloomy prediction about Italy's 
prospects in the future - whether the British or the Germans won the war, Italy would 
1o1 Candeloro, G., Storia dell'Italia moderna, vol. 9: Il fascismo e le sue guerre (Milan 1986), pp. 
487ff; Colarizi, S., L' opinione degli italiani sotto il regime, 1929 -1943 (Rome & Bari 1991), pp. 
315 -9; Bottai, Diario, 31.8.1939. On the earlier divisions within the PNF about the Axis see, in this 
study, Ch. 3, Sections III and IV; Ch. 5, Section IIc 
102 Ciano 's Diaries, 15.8.1939; Bottai, Diario, 31.8.1939; Siebert, pp. 282f 
103 On the King's arguments see DDI, 8th, XIII, 250/293/298; Mack, Smith, D., Italy and its 
Monarchy (New Haven & London 1989), pp. 280ff. Mussolini's letter to Hitler is printed in DGFP, 
D, 7, 271 
1°4 Bottai, Diario, 7.9.1939; Ciano 's Diaries, 7.9.1939 
105 For the Balkan bloc see Marzari, F., "Projects for an Italian -led Balkan Bloc of Neutrals, 
September- December 1939 ", Historical Journal, 13 (1970), pp. 767 -88; Lowe, Marzari, pp. Ch. 15; 
Ciano's Diaries, 19.9.1939; Quartararo, pp. 527ff; De Felice, R., "Alcune osservazioni sulla politica 
estera mussoliniana ", in De Felice (ed.), L' Italia fra Tedeschi e Alleati. La politica estera fascista e 
la seconda guerra mondiale (Bologna 1973), pp. 72 -4. For the abandonment of the plan see ADAP, 
D, 8, 266; DDI, 9th, II, 510 
106 DDI, 9th, III, 194; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 53 -5; Morewood, S., "Anglo- Italian Rivalry in 
the Mediterranean and Middle East 1935 -1940 ", in Boyce, R., Robertson, E. M., (eds.), Paths to 
War. New Essays on the Origins of the Second World War (London 1989), p. 192 
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lose a great part of her political autonomy. However, he alluded to the necessity to 
intervene at a later stage, when the two sides would be exhausted, and spoke of the 
need to prepare for the future conflict rejecting Ciano's analysis about the benefits of 
non- intervention107. If the Foreign Minister suggested to the British Ambassador 
Lorraine that the Pact of Steel had essentially been annulled, Mussolini compiled a 
memorandum later in December, in which he stated categorically that Italy would 
honour her commitments towards her Axis partner and that a war against Germany 
was not an acceptable option for Italian foreign policy 108 
The ambivalence of Mussolini's position during the period of non - 
belligerence reached its peak on the 3rd of January 1940 with the long letter he sent to 
Hitler109. The letter reminded the German leader of the priority of an ideological war 
against the Soviet Union, predicted that Germany could not win the war against the 
western democracies alone and restated the Italian proposal for a compromise peace 
with the west. On its own, the tone of the letter reveals Mussolini's disillusionment 
with the closer contact between Germany and the Soviet Union at the expense of 
Italy and epitomises the growing doubts of the Italian Fascist leadership about the 
soundness of the Nazi foreign policy after the Salzburg meeting. For De Felice, this 
amounted to a reaffirmation of the policy of peso determinante and a reminder to the 
German leadership that Italy was determined to pursue a policy of "open options ". It 
was the culmination of a shift in Italian foreign policy away from Germany and a 
last -ditch attempt to exploit the channels of communication with Germany to bring 
the conflict to an end110. Quartararo used Ciano's assessment of the letter as a 
masterpiece of "wisdom" to interpret it as evidence of Mussolini's non -committal 
attitude to the European conflict and of the strengthening of Ciano's influence upon 
107 Quartararo, 546ff; Bottai, Diario, 8.12.1939 
108 Ciano 's Diaries, 16.12.1939; DDI, 9th, III, 40; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 66 -7 
109 For the letter see DDI, 9th, III, 33; Wiskemann, E., The Rome -Berlin Axis (London 1966, 2nd ed.), 
pp. 225ff; Quartararo, pp. 572ff; Andrè, G., "La politica estera fascista durante il seconda guerra 
mondiale ", in De Felice, R. (ed.), L' Italia fra tedeschi e alleati. La politica estera fascista e la 
seconda guerra mondiale (Bologna 1973), pp. 118 -20 
110 De Felice, R., Mussolini il duce, II, pp. 669 -85; "Alcune osservazioni sulla politica estera 
mussoliniana ", in De Felice (ed.), L' Italia fra Tedeschi e Alleati. La politica estera fascista e la 
seconda guerra mondiale (Bologna 1973), pp. 72 -4 
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the Duce, rejecting the view that he had already made a definite choice to intervene 
on the side of rmany1 1. 
However, Mussolini's subsequent statements, long before Hitler's reply 
arrived in March, attest to a diametrically different frame of mind. On 23 January he 
spoke at the Council of Ministers against neutrality, urging instead the military to 
mobilise the armed forces for a "parallel war ... against France "112. Although the task 
of military preparation depended on the import of raw materials and on much -needed 
foreign exchange from exports, in February he rejected an attractive British trade 
proposal in favour of a much less beneficial barter agreement with Germany113. On 1 
March he emphatically spoke of the friendship with Germany which prevented Italy 
from selling weapons to the west114. To Ciano's dismay, Mussolini did very little to 
avert the imposition of British embargo on Italian trade and continued to talk of an 
offensive against Yugoslavia as part of the joint Axis struggle against "the 
democracies "115 
In this sense, the die had been cast before Hitler's reply to Mussolini's 
January letter arrived in Rome on 10 March, followed by the German Foreign 
Minister Ribbentrop116. Mussolini's declaration to Ribbentrop that Italy would join 
Germany in the war against the west when military preparations permitted it should 
not be attributed to a mysterious "conversion" which took place between the first and 
the second conversation with the German Foreign Minister117. Undoubtedly, as 
Andrè underlined, Ribbentrop's declaration that Germany's decision to fight against 
"the plutocratic clique ... is irrevocable" must have strengthened Mussolini's 
impression that his diplomatic freedom of action had already been severely 
Quartararo, pp. 572 -4. Cf. Ciano's assessment in Ciano 's Diaries, 3/5.1.1940 
11' Bottai, Diario, 23.1.1940 
113 Lowe, Marzari, pp. 363f; Quartararo, 570 -2; Ciano's Diaries, 7- 8/20.2.1940; DDI, 9th, I, 328 and 
3, 30; DGFP, D, 8, 627; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 70ff 
114 Bottai, Diario, 1.3.1940 
1 ` Ciano 's Diaries, 22.2.1940; Bottai, Diario, 1/2.3.1940 
116 On Hitler's reply see DGFP, D, 8, 663. On Ribbentrop's visit see Siebert, pp. 403ff; Andrè, pp. 
119 -20; Di Nolfo, E., "Mussolini e la decisione italiana di entrare nella seconda guerra mondiale ", 
in Di Nolfo, A., Rainero, R. H., Vigezzi, B. (eds.), L' Italia e la politica di potenza in Europa 
(1938 -1940) (Milan 1986), pp. 33 -8. For the talks see DGFP, D, 8, 665/667/669; and Ciano, Europe 
verso il catastrofe, pp. 527 -41 
11 For this interpretation see Siebert, 417f; Andrè, pp. 119 -20 
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compromised by the Nazi war initiatives 18. Yet, such a strong statement simply 
magnified Mussolini's previous sentimental predisposition instead of being the 
primary cause of it. After the meeting he had no illusions about either the German 
determination to attack France or the proximity of the showdown119. This would 
inevitably transform the war into an pan- European conflict and, as he had stressed in 
February, Italy could not "stay out of this drama which will re -make the 
continent "120. Only a few days after the meeting with Ribbentrop, Mussolini 
summoned Graziani and ordered plans for a "parallel war" in the Mediterranean with 
defensive preparations in the Alps and an offensive against Yugoslavia121. At the 
Grand Council meeting of the 2nd of April he was even more explicit - if Germany 
attacked France, Italy could not avoid the war but should join "as late as possible" in 
order to allow time for maximum military preparation122. 
The remaining period until the official declaration of war on 10 June 1940 
was dominated by Mussolini's growing impatience for intervention, magnified by the 
urgency which the March 1940 meetings with Ribbentrop and Hitler had introduced 
in his strategic thinking. He continued to contemplate a two -front attack on 
Yugoslavia (from Croatia and Albania), a plan which Ciano himself was not averse 
to as it offered the opportunity to realise the long- coveted goal of complete 
domination of the Adriatic123. The German attack on Norway at the beginning of 
April caused the widening of the conflict which the Duce had always considered as 
the prerequisite for Italy's intervention124. Since he now considered the German army 
"invincible ", he gave orders for the mobilisation of the navy for a parallel war in the 
Mediterranean against British targets125. By the end of April, the pace of German 
18 On Ribbentrop's comments see DGFP, D, 8, 663/665. See also Andrè, G., La guerra in Europa (Io 
settember -22 giugnio 1941) (Milan 1964), pp. 370ff; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 82ff 
"9 Cf. Ciano's comments in Ciano 's Diaries, 12/13.3.1940; Bottai, Diario, 12.3. 1940 
120 Bottai, Diario, 14.2.1940 
'21 DDI, 9th, III, 689 
112 Bottai, Diario, 2.4.1940; Quartararo, pp. 596 -7 
'''Bottai, Diario, 10.4.1940; Ciano 's Diaries, 10/11.4.1940; Lowe, Marzari, pp. 359ff 
124 For these comments see his speech quoted in Bocca, G., Storia d'Italia nella guerra fascista, 1940- 
1943 (Milan 1997), p. 131 
125 Bottai, Diario, 1.4.1940; DDI, 9th, 4, 37. Cf. previous comments, doubting the capacity of the 
German armed forces, in Diario, 8.12.1939, and in his January 5 letter to Hitler (DDI, 9th, 3, 33; 
Mack Smith, D., Le guerre di Duce (Bari & Rome 1976, 2nd edition), pp. 274f) 
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advances had overwhelmed him, deepening the rift between him and his Foreign 
Minister, who continued to view intervention as evidence of Italy's enslavement to 
the Nazi regime's ferocious will for expansion126. Another source of opposition came 
from King Victor Emmanuel III, who became alarmed at the changing tone of 
Mussolini's references to Italy's future foreign policy after the meetings with 
Ribbentrop in March. The King repeatedly singled out Ciano, either personally or 
through the Minister of the Royal Household Aquarone, for a concerted move to 
avert intervention127. On one occasion, in mid -March, Aquarone even hinted at a 
monarchical coup d' état with the toleration of Ciano in order to remove Mussolini 
from power, but Ciano's lack of alternative strategies and his personal loyalty to his 
father -in -law prevented him from acquiescing to the suggestion128. This was the 
highest point of the anti -interventionist opposition. Ciano continued to give vent to 
his disappointment with the pro -German orientation of the Italian foreign policy until 
the end of May but displayed increasing signs of resignation and fatalism''9. Grandi 
never concealed his opposition to a war on Germany's side and throughout May he 
kept warning Rome about the possible implications of intervention in the war13o 
Bottai privately remained a strong supporter of neutrality, but by May 1940 he also 
resigned to the inevitable and used the Critica Fascista to reiterate the official regime 
justification of Italy's necessary war against plutocratic powers who had imprisoned 
her in the Mediterranean131. Balbo made a last -ditch attempt to convince Mussolini 
not to proceed with the plan to intervene at a meeting on 31 May 1940, but he was 
frustrated even in his efforts to elicit a slight postponement. He went back to Libya 
extremely disappointed, but decided to place his loyalty to the Duce first and did his 
best to ensure that the armed forces in Libya were sufficiently prepared to wage war 
16 Ciano 's Diaries, 21.4.1940; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 93ff; DDI, 9th, 3, 116 
127 De Leonardis, M., "La monarchia e l'intervento dell'Italia in guerra ", in Di Nolfo, E., Rainero, R. 
H., Vigezzi, B. (eds.), L' Italia e la politica di potenza in Europa (1938 -1940) (Milan, 1986), pp. 
39 -67; Mack Smith, Italy and its Monarchy, pp. 282ff 
128 Ciano's Diaries, 14.3.1940; De Leonardis, pp. 50 -1; Knox, "Conquest ", pp. 48 -9; Mack Smith, 
Italy and its Monarchy, pp. 287f. For Ciano's failure to provide a political alternative see Knox, 
Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 46 -7 
129 His resignation is obvious in Ciano 's Diaries, entries for 11/14/19.5.1940 
130 Grandi, D., Il mio paese. Ricordi autobiografici, ed. by Renzo De Felice (Bologna 1985), Ch. 48 
"' Bottai, Diario, 23.4/7.5.1940. See also De Grand, A. J., Bottai e la cultura fascista (Rome & Bari 
1978), pp. 238 -9 
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against Egypt13'. As for the King, he reverted to his previous position of passive 
disagreement, angering Mussolini with his indecision and his initial refusal to 
delegate control of the armed forces to him, secretly hoping that the west would resist 
the Nazi attack, but eventually capitulating to Mussolini's demands and succumbing 
to the latter's warlike drive133 
The only ephemeral glimmer of hope for the anti -interventionist camp came in 
early May with the Duce's declaration that the entry into the war would probably 
take place after August, since a swift German attack on France was less likely after 
success in Scandinavia134. In a letter sent to Hitler at the end of April, he alluded to a 
similar date, invoking reasons of military preparation135. Events, however, were 
beyond Mussolini's control and wishful thinking. The Nazi attack on the Low 
Countries started on 10 May, catching the Italian leadership completely unawares as 
the news were communicated to Rome only half an hour before the invasion was 
scheduled to begin136. With the impressive advance of the Wehrmacht forces all 
voices of opposition vanished137. While Mussolini ordered preparations for a war 
against France and Yugoslavia, Ciano seized the opportunity to suggest an attack on 
northern Greece, territorial enlargement of Albania at the expense of Serbia and 
expansion in north Africa138. Also, ironically, the same man who on 7 May had 
welcomed modest French proposals for a territorial settlement between the two 
countries, now dismissed the French last -ditch concessions in north Africa as a step 
taken "too late "139. A few days later, Mussolini convoked the Military High 
13' Segrè, Italo Balbo. A Fascist Life (Berkeley , Los Angeles & London 1987), pp. 375 -91; De Felice, 
R., Mussolini il duce, vol. II: Lo Stato Totalitario, 1936 -1940 (Turin 1981), pp. 823ff 
133 De Leonardis, pp. 39 -60, pp. 65 -7; Ciano's Diaries, 21/26.5.1940; Mack Smith, Italy and its 
Monarchy, pp. 287 -8 
134 Quartararo, pp. 603ff; Ciano 's Diaries, 22.4 
135 For the letter see DDI, 9th, 4, 37. Voices of concern about Italy's military preparedness were 
abundant. See, for example, Badoglio's preference for postponement until 1942 (Bottai, Diario, 
28.3.1940) and Cavagnari's objections to an early intervention in Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 
93 -4 
136 DDI, 9th, 4, 353; Ciano's Diaries, 10/11.5.1940; Anfuso, F., Roma, Berlino, Salò (Milan 1970), 
pp. 148f 
137 Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World, pp. 52 -3 
138 Bottai, Diario, 25.5.1940; Jacomoni, F., La politica dell'Italia in Albania (Bologna 1965), pp. 225f 
139 Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 115f; DDI, 9th, 4, 607. For Ciano's earlier comments about the 
French proposal see Bottai, Diario, 7.5.1940 
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Command and asked Badoglio to complete mobilisation by 5 June140. Both Badoglio 
and the Chief of the Regia Marina Cavagnari did not question the political soundness 
of Mussolini's decision but invoked the slow pace of preparation and suggested a 
postponement until the end of the month, but the Duce did not budge from his earlier 
position. Only Hitler's letter, asking for a slight postponement due to strategic 
reasons, prompted a reluctant re- scheduling for the 10th. The only effect of 
Badoglio's concerns was a readjustment of the operational plan, ruling out an initial 
offensive action against France141. 
In the light of this evidence, it is indeed difficult to uphold Quartararo's - and 
to a certain extent also De Felice's - thesis that Mussolini remained uncertain about 
his allegiances until May 1940142. It is true that the Salzburg surprise and the 
German- Soviet pact of August 1939 angered the Duce, who did not take kindly to 
Italy's relegation to the status of a second reserve of Nazi Germany143. His bitterness 
with this "ideological revision" permeated his letter to Hitler on 5 January which has 
correctly been interpreted as the highest point in Mussolini's disillusionment with his 
Axis ally144. The policy of non -belligerence was intended to restore Italy's freedom 
of action in the face of the Nazi inclination to treat Italy, as Ciano put it, "like the 
Romans treated Messinissa "145. However, even at periods of crisis, the Duce never 
refrained from declaring his adherence to the Axis, arguing like a frustrated ally 
rather than an undecided neutral or a potential defector146 Both Quartararo and De 
Felice confused Ciano's opposition to the Axis with the Mussolini's desire to delay 
his set decision to intervene on the side of Germany "when we are ... absolutely 
certain about the victory"147. It was Ciano who alluded to the invalidation of the Pact 
of Steel at the same time that Mussolini added references in favour of the Axis to his 
10 Quartararo, pp. 616ff; Anfuso, pp. 147f 
141 00, XXIX, 397; DDI, 9th, 5, 728 
14' Quartararo, Ch. 8. For a discussion of these arguments see Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World, 
pp. 36 -9; and Knox, "The fascist regime ", passim 
143 Andrè, "La politica estera fascista ", pp. 115f 
144 For the first comment see Bottai, Diario, 28.8.1939. For the interpretation of the letter see Di 
Nolfo, "Mussolini e la decisione italiana ", pp. 30 -3 
145 Bottai, Diario, 12.5.1940 
146 Quartararo, pp. 609ff; Di Nolfo, "Mussolini e la decisione italiana ", pp. 29 -30 
147 Quoted in Bocca, pp. 131 -2 
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Foreign Minister's speeches148; it was Ciano who kept the "secret channel" of 
communication with the west open until May 1940149 in the face of the Duce's 
blanket refusal to discuss any conciliatory proposal from either France or Britain in 
the winter and spring of 1941. Furthermore, Mussolini's determination to postpone 
intervention as far as possible and his subsequent vacillation about the most suitable 
date reveal uncertainty about the practicalities of the joint Axis war and not about the 
orientation of Italian foreign policy15o As even De Felice conceded, the decision to 
enter the war was Mussolini's personal responsibility, a reaffirmation of his 
unassailable authoritarian position in a leader- oriented system, taken in the face of 
opposition from the Monarchy, his Foreign Minister, the leadership of the armed 
forces, and a number of prominent party gerarchi who saw it as a step too far in the 
misguided alliance of Fascism with Nazism151; it was not, as Quartararo described it, 
"a decision on the ninety -ninth hour "152. 
This said, Italy's entry into the war was far from the guerra fascista which 
Mussolini had envisaged since 1937 and strove to postpone until 1943 or 1944153 
His consistent references to "necessity" and "inevitability" of intervention, his 
urgency to bring the date forward after the invasion of Norway and, especially, after 
the attack on the west originated from a growing determination to abandon the 
embarrassing state of neutrality and participate in the re- shaping of Europel54 The 
necessity to avoid being relegated to the state of "Switzerland" had been 
acknowledged by no less a figure of opposition to the Axis as Ciano since the 1st of 
September, and was reiterated by Mussolini in March and Badoglio later in the 
spring155. In this sense, intervention was more dictated by the Nazi drive for 
18 Bottai, Diario, 8.12.1939 
149 See Quartararo, Ch. 14; DDI, 9th, 2, 217; and 3, 644 
15° For such an analysis see Quartararo, pp. 612 -22; De Felice, R., Mussolini il duce, II, pp. 762ff; Di 
Nolfo, "Mussolini e la decisione ", pp. 37 -8 
151 De Felice, Mussolini il duce, II, p. 844; Mussolini l'alleato, vol. Ia, pp. 3ff. See also André, "La 
politica estera italiana ", pp. 114 -5 
152 
Quartararo, p. 624 
153 Knox, "Conquest ", p. 48; Bocca, pp. 126 -43 
154 Di Nolfo, "Mussolini e la decisione ", pp. 19 -25. For the "embarrassing" state of non- intervention 
in 1939 see Bottai, Diario, 31.8.1939 
155 Bottai, Diario, 1.9.1939; Pieri, P., Rochat, G., Pietro Badoglio (Turin 1974), pp. 735f. Cf. Volpe, 
J., Pacifismo e storia Rome 1934), pp. 1 -5 
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expansion than chosen by Mussolini as the vehicle for launching the real guerra 
fascista156. His uncertainty regarding the time of the Italian entry into the war and his 
decision to move the date from 1942 to 1941 and finally to June 1940 reflected how 
little freedom of choice the frenetic pace of German expansion had left him. In the 
spring of 1940, especially after the meetings with Ribbentrop and Hitler in March, he 
realised that this was primarily Germany's war. In April he noted to the press that 
"our non -belligerence is the result of the fact that this great nation [Germany] has not 
yet needed us "157. A few days earlier he also spoke to the Council of Minister about 
"a war.. (of) six months, because a longer duration could cause grave financial 
problems; insurmountable "158. Awareness of structural limitations and acquiescence 
in the Nazi military initiative convinced Mussolini that a guerra fascista in these 
inauspicious circumstances would be impossible. He, therefore, entered the conflict 
with a short-term, mainly defensive agenda and in the hope that the main 
confrontation could be postponed at least until 1942, when Italian military 
preparation would justify a more ambitious expansionist policy159. Unlike Hitler, 
Mussolini decided to give precedence to political considerations and postpone the 
realisation of his mythical mare nostrum plans for the not -so- distant future. 
IV. Towards the guerra fascista: Mussolini's parallel war in the 
Mediterranean 
Italy's entry into the European conflict took place under conditions that 
Mussolini had tried to avoid and failed to avert since August 1939. When Badoglio 
spoke to the other commanders of the armed forces in April 1940, he described 
156 Cf. De Felice, Mussolini il duce, II, pp. 265 -6; Bosworth, R. J. B., "Mito e linguaggio nella politica 
estera italiana ", in Bosworth, R. J. B., Romano, S. (eds.), La politica estera italiana, 1860 -1985 
(Bologna 1991), pp. 59ff 
157 Araldi, V., Dalla non- belligerenza all 'intervento (Rome 1961), pp. 116f 
Ise Bottai, Diario, 2.4.1940 
159 De Felice, Mussolini il duce, II, pp. 807ff; Mussolini 1 'alleato, vol. Ia, pp. 92ff. For Mussolini's 
comments about better chances in 1941 see Bottai, Diario, 10.8.1940 
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Italy's intervention as "on the side of Germany" as opposed to "for Germany "16° 
Mussolini's numerous references to the guerra parallela after January 1940 
underscored his determination to reassert his country's political autonomy in a war 
that would complement Germany's campaigns in Europe but would also promote 
Italy's own strategic and geopolitical aims. Therefore, when he was forced to readjust 
the date of intervention according to Hitler's military faits accomplis in the west and 
to remain on the defensive until France surrendered on 17 June, he could hardly 
disguise his dejection161. He had hoped at least for an Italian advance to Marseilles 
but lack of resources and military unpreparedness thwarted his ambition'62. 
Mussolini's territorial demands against France were accepted by Hitler, in spite of 
the extremely modest military contribution of the Italian armed forces: free hand in 
the French African colonies, occupation of French territory up to the Rhône and in 
the southern coast163. Yet, only a few hours later, he alone decided to launch a 
limited offensive in the Alps in order to achieve a military success which would raise 
Italy's prestige. The attack did not achieve much, falling short of attaining the 
minimum target of occupying Nicer, but by the 22nd the French had already signed 
the armistice with the Germans. One of the French generals commented to the 
German delegation that, although "Italy had declared war but not waged it ", she 
would claim more than the Germans for territorial compensation165 For some 
mysterious reason they did not. Although the Germans had accepted Italy's territorial 
goals in Europe and Africa, on the 22nd Mussolini suddenly informed Hitler that 
Italy would abandon her substantial claims "in the Rhône, Corsica, Tunisia and 
Djibouti ", asking instead for a modest demilitarised zone adjacent to the Italian- 
French border1G6. The armistice signed on the 24th was extremely modest in its 
160 Quoted in Bocca, p. 133; Di Nolfo, "Mussolini e la decisione ", pp. 36 -8 
161 See, for example, Ciano 's Diaries, 17.6.1940 
162 Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 128f; Bocca, pp. 144ff ; Mira, G., Salvatorelli, L., Storia d 'Italia 
nel periodo fascista (Turin 1964), pp. 1039 -46; Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, pp. 221ff 
163 For the conditions of the armistice see Rossi, F., Mussolini e lo Stato Maggiore. Avvenimenti del 
1940 (Rome 1951), pp. 168 -75; De Felice, R., Mussolini l'alleato, vol. Ia, pp. 118ff; Bocca, pp. 
154 -6 
164 See Ciano's frustration in Ciano 's Diaries, 20/23.6.1940 
165 Quoted in Bocca, p. 161 
166 DDI, 9th, V, 76; and Mussolini's notice in 5, 83. See also Mack Smith, Mussolini 's Roman Empire, 
pp. 222 -5 
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claims, surprising even the French delegation167. When Ciano visited Berlin on 7 
July, he tried to resuscitate the Italian claims over Nice, Corsica, Tunisia and east 
Africa but this time Hitler was adamant in rejecting any new territorial settlement or 
a separate French -Italian peace before the defeat of Britain'68 
Although the German attack on the British Isles was far from certain at that 
point, Mussolini hastened to offer his assistance, fearing that the Germans might 
exclude Italy from a major reorganisation of the European system either by 
negotiating a separate peace with Britain or by defeating Britain alone169. His fears 
were partly confirmed, as Hitler rejected the offer of substantial Italian assistance 
against Britain. Instead, he urged Mussolini to concentrate on the Mediterranean and 
Africa, stressing that any strike in Egypt or Suez "is an enormous gain "17° 
Furthermore, informed about Ciano's plans for action against Yugoslavia and 
Greece, Hitler advised caution in the Danubian -Balkan area, pointing to the danger of 
a Soviet involvement in Rumania and Turkey171. This diversion from Europe to 
Africa amounted to a polite but plain indication that Germany viewed Mussolini's 
parallel war as a secondary device of the main Nazi war in Europe. The Duce 
dutifully replied that he would order attacks in east and north Africa so that they 
would coincide with Germany's launching of Operation Sea Lion172. The invasion of 
Britain was for him the definite deadline for any action, as he regarded British defeat 
inevitable and a prelude to peace173. At least, the prospect of a swift peace with 
Britain dissolved after Hitler's belligerent speech on 19 July and his conversation 
with Ciano on the following day174 
167 For the text of the armistice see DDI, 9th, V, 95; for the French reactions see Rossi, Stato 
Maggiore, pp. 70ff 
168 DDI, 9th, V, 200; DGFP, D, 10, 147 
169 Bottai, Diario, 4.7.1940. For Mussolini's assistance DDI, 9th, V, 109 and DGFP, D, 10, 26. For 
fears of a separate German- British settlement see Ciano 's Diaries, 28.6.1940 
17° DGFP, D, 10, 166; DDI, 9th, V, 242 
171 Conversation between Hitler and Ciano in DDI, 9th, V, 274; and Ciano, l'Europa verso il 
catastrofe, pp. 574 -6 
172 DDI, 9th, V, 264 
173 Ciano 's Diaries, 18.8.1940; Mack Smith, Mussolini 's Roman Empire, 224 -5 
174 Hitler's speech in Domarus, Hitler, II, 1540 -9 (speech to the Reichstag, 19 July 1940);. See also 
Mussolini's assessment of the situation in Ciano 's Diaries, 22.7.1940 
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Yet, the Italian successes in Sudan and British Somaliland in the end of 
July175 were only a slight consolation for Italy's exclusion from Europe and for lack 
of progress in Libya. Mussolini's orders for at attack on Egypt in mid -July had been 
thwarted by the procrastination tactics of the new Italian Commander in Libya, 
Graziani, who took up Balbo's position after the latter's sudden death in June176. As 
indications that the German attack on Britain was imminent at the beginning of 
August multiplied, the Duce decided to step up the pace177. He ordered Graziani to 
proceed immediately with the attack on Egypt and at the same time showed an 
increasing interest in Ciano's project for an invasion of Greece from Albania178. This 
last plan gradually became a higher priority than the offensive action against 
Yugoslavia, which had been prepared since July, as it was now essential to ensure 
control over the lines of communication between north Africa and southern 
Europe179. However, German opposition to any intervention in the Balkans remained 
a constant of Nazi strategy, as Ribbentrop made clear to Alfieri on a series of 
conversations throughout August180. Consequently, the plan had to be postponed in 
favour of action in Libya, remaining an open option for future action in more 
favourable circumstances181. 
Towards the end of August, however, a sequence of dramatic events started to 
unfold, transforming the shape of the Axis war and re- dimensioning Italy's 
importance. On 27 August Mussolini declared that he was happy with the prospect of 
facing a longer war, possibly lasting beyond the coming winter182! By that time, he 
had been informed of the problems which impeded the German attack on Britain and 
which Hitler and von Brauchitsch had used as justification for the delay in launching 
Operation Sea Lion183. At the same time, he realised the growing tension between 
173 For these operations see Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 150f; Bocca, Ch. 9 
16 Bocca, pp. 181ff 
177 For these reports by the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, Alfieri, see DDI, 9th, V, 357/371/393/411 
178 For the attack on Egypt see DDI, 9th, V, 467. For Greece, see Bottai, Diario, 12.8.1940; Ciano's 
Diaries, 12.8.1940; DDI, 9th, V, 386. See also Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 167ff 
179 Bocca, pp. 211ff 
180 DDI, 9th, V, 431/490/506; DGFP, D, 10, 353 
181 Bottai, Diario, 26.8.1940; DDI, 9th, V, 435/451/484; DGFP, D, 10, 501/538 
18' Ciano 's Diaries, 27.8/1.9.1940 
183 DDI, 9th, V, 376/507/516 
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Germany and the Soviet Union over the control of Rumania, which he interpreted as 
an opportunity to intervene in the Balkans and restore the balance of power in favour 
of the Axis184. While there were indications that the persistent bombardments of the 
Luftwaffe would exasperate the British and might force them to contemplate a peace 
deal, there was no talk of imminent collapse185. Neither the Führer's reassurances 
that the attack would go on as planned nor Ribbentrop's customary optimism in his 
meeting with the Italian leadership on 19 -20 September succeeded in allaying the 
impression of insurmountable problems1ß6. Although Hitler officially announced the 
postponement of Operation Sea Lion on 4 October, the Italian leadership considered 
the plan dead by 30 September187. By that time, Italy at last had achieved a first 
modest but encouraging success at an important sector of the war against Britain - 
Graziani had bowed to pressure from Rome and advanced to Sidi el Barrani in 
Egypt188. This advance had a tremendous psychological effect on Mussolini, offering 
him the first glimpse of the opportunity to use the German failure in Britain in order 
to transform this war into an Italian war, a true guerra fascista189. He therefore gave 
explicit orders to Graziani to continue his advance in Egypt towards Alexandria190. 
He was still willing to heed the German advice to avoid disturbances in Yugoslavia 
due to rising tension in the north Balkans, but he continued to consider an attack on 
Greece as part of his campaign against Britain in the Mediterranean191. He was in 
very good humour, as Ciano noted, and kept rejoicing at the possibility of facing a 
long war, in which Italy would lead the Axis effort against the west192. He took every 
184 Bottai, Diario, 29.8.1940. Cf. DDI, 9th, V, 516 
185 DDI, 9th, V, 582. Cf. Ciano 's Diaries, 28.8/20 and 22.9.1940 
186 DDI, 9th, V, 602/617; DGFP, D, 11, 68/73/79/87; Hillgruber, A., Hitlers Strategie. Politik and 
Kriegführung, 1940 -1941 (Frankfurt 1965), pp. 167 -78 
18' For the announcement of the postponement see DGFP, D, 10, 149; Ciano 's Diaries, 4.10.1940. For 
reports on 30.9 see DDI, 9th, V, 656 
188 USE, II Africa settentrionale. La preparazione al conflitto. L'avanzata di Sidi el- Baranni (Rome 
1953); Bocca, pp. 185 -6; Ciano's Diaries, 14/17/9/1940; Armellini, Q., Diario di guerra. Nove mesi 
al Comando Supremo (Milan 1946), pp. 78ff; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 163ff 
189 Cf. Bottai, Diario, 4.7.1940 
190 Armellini, pp. 98 -9; Ciano 's Diaries, 17.9/2.10.1940 
191 DDI, 9th, V, 609/634/665; Craveld, L. van, Hitler's Strategy 1940 -1941. The Balkan Clue (London 
1973), pp. 26ff 
192 Ciano's Diaries, 6/30/9/1940; Armellini, pp. 90ff; DGFP, D, 11, 149, esp. p, 254; Mack Smith, 
Mussolini's Roman Empire, pp. 231f 
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step necessary to ensure that this would be an unmitigated Italian triumph. He and 
Badoglio rejected the offer of German military assistance for the campaign in north 
Africa193. He also expressed his doubts about German plans for the occupation of 
Gibraltar (Operation Felix) and tried to ensure that Spain's possible accession to the 
Axis would not limit Italy's territorial claims or jeopardise her privileged position in 
the Axis hierarchy194. Freed from the deadline of the Sea Lion, aware that he had 
gained the military initiative from Germany for the first time since 1936, he was 
poised to succeed195 
Until 12 October, Mussolini's main priority was to set Graziani's forces in 
Egypt in motion again, overcoming his general's tergiversations and unwillingness to 
proceed any further. Ciano continued to work on the Greek project but not as an 
immediate task. This situation changed dramatically, however, after the 12th. The 
German move into Rumania, without any prior consultation with Italy or invitation 
for a joint operation, alarmed and angered the Duce, who had always been suspicious 
of German designs in the Balkans196. On 15 October he summoned his army 
commanders and declared his determination to occupy "the whole of Greece ", a plan 
he had contemplated for a long time as an integral part of his anti -British strategy197. 
To an ecstatic Ciano, who always considered the Greek plan as his own personal 
project linked to the previous occupation of Albania, he spoke of his decision to 
confront Hitler with a fait accompli in the Balkans and escalate his two -front attack 
on Britain, in Egypt and the Aegean198. As Graziani once more rejected demands 
from Mussolini to proceed and asked for a three -month postponement, Greece 
acquired the highest priority199. In his letter to Hitler on 19 October, the Duce 
described Greece as "one of the main points of English [sic] maritime strategy ", the 
'93 DGFP, D, 11, 107/149; DDI, 9th, V, 677; Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, pp. 222 -3 
194 For doubts over Gibraltar see DGFP, D, 11, 79; Ciano 's Diaries, 24.9.1940. For doubts over Spain 
see DGFP, D, 149 and pp. 166 -7; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, Ch. 5 
195 Ciano 's Diaries, 2.10.1940 
196 Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 208f; DGFP, D, 11, 192; DDI, 9th, V, 707/724; Bottai, Diario, 
12.10.1940; Ciano 's Diaries, 12.10.1940. For Mussolini's fears of German expansion in the 
Balkans see DDI, 9th, V, 506/557; Ciano 's Diaries, 6.9.1940 
197 Bocca, pp. 214ff; DDI, 9th, V, 728. Cf. ADAP, D, 11, 135 
198 Weinberg, World at Arms, p. 208; Ciano 's Diaries, 12.10.1940 
199 Bocca, pp. 258ff; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 208f; Ciano 's Diaries, 16.10.1940 
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key to holding the Mediterranean200. With the parallel advancement of Graziani 
towards Alexandria in the near future, Mussolini continued, Britain would be brought 
to her knees without the need to lure either France or Spain into the peripheral war. 
No German assistance was needed until the final confrontation in Cairo - Greece 
would be overrun within a few weeks, as Ciano had confidently predicted in 
October201. 
The radicalisation of Mussolini's attitude to the conflict could not have been 
more striking. This was not the man who spoke of a short war for a few months, the 
man who awaited a German triumph as a prelude to negotiations and a compromise 
with Britain, the man who did not intend to wage a large -scale war202. This was a 
man who would lead the assault against Britain, who would dictate terms to Nazi 
Germany and would eliminate every trace of British presence in the Mediterranean, 
the man who deplored his generals' aversion to war203. The Mussolini of September - 
October 1940 was overpowered by hubris, poised to promote his mythical vision of 
mare nostrum, eager to confer upon Italy "the glory she has sought in vain for three 
centuries "204. If the decision for non -belligerence in 1939 and for a defensive attitude 
in June 1940 were dictated by what Quartararo termed "realism "205, his two -front 
offensive action in the autumn of 1940 was decided in total defiance of the advice of 
his military experts. Apart from Graziani who refused to move prior to the 
completion of a "convenient military preparation ", the three heads of the General 
Staff and Badoglio backtracked from their acquiescence in the plan in their meeting 
with Mussolini on the 15th and expressed fears about both the state of the military 
forces and the feasibility of the operational plan206. However, the Duce's 
100 The letter is reprinted in DDI, 9th, V, 753; translated in DGFP, D, 11, 199 
201 Ciano 's Diaries, 12.10.1940 (and also 29.10); Bottai, Diario, 12.10.1940 
202 Knox, "The fascist regime ", pp. 164 -5; Mack Smith, Mussolini's Roman Empire, pp. 216ff. Cf. De 
Felice, Mussolini 1 'alleato, vol. Ia, p. 303; Hoggan, D. L., Der erzwungene Krieg (Tübingen 1964), 
passim, esp. pp. 611 ff 
203 DGFP, D, 11, 199, p. 332; Bottai, Diario, 19.10.1940 
22204 Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 289ff. The quote from Ciano 's Diaries, 30.1.1940 
205 Quartararo, Roma tra Londra e Berlino, Ch. 8. Cf. De Felice, Mussolini il duce, vol. I: Gli anni del 
consenso, 1929 -1936 (Turin 1974), pp. 800 -2 
Zoe Bocca, pp. 259 -60; USE, La prima offensive britannica in Africa settentrionale (ottobre 1940 - 
febbraio 1941) (Rome, n.d.), vol. I, pp. 45f; Ciano's Diaries, 17/18.10.1940; Bottai, Diario, 
24.10.1940 
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determination to proceed with his guerra fascista was much stronger than any 
awareness or reminder of military limitations. Badoglio, who by the beginning of the 
month considered the Greek plan indefinitely postponed, bowed to the inevitable on 
18 October without resorting to any of his strategic or logistical arguments207. The 
attack would go on as planned, with a slight postponement until 28 October. 
Compared to Ciano's earlier thoughts about a limited operation to seize strategic 
positions in the north and east of the country, this plan entailed total occupation. The 
ultimatum which would be given to the Greek government would allow neither the 
time nor the political basis for any negotiations - there was simply "no way out for 
the Greeks ", as Ciano commented on 22 October and Grazzi confirmed to the Greek 
leader Metaxas in the early hours of the 28th208. As Mussolini himself stated to Hitler 
in a meeting that took place on the morning of the Italian attack on Greece, emphasis 
should now be placed on guaranteeing the ultimate victory against Britain209 
V. Launching the Nazi "ideological" war: "Operation Barbarossa" 
In spite of his initial frustration with the British declaration of war in early 
September 1939, Hitler soon regained his self -confidence and the political initiative, 
especially after the tremendous success of his "lightning" campaign against 
Poland210. By the end of the month he could not hide his impatience for turning 
against the west immediately and destroying Britain's capacity to resist211. On 9 
207 Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 166 -7, 191 -2, 204 -5; Ciano 's Diaries, 18.10.1940; Bocca, pp. 
216 -7 
208 Ciano's Diaries, 22.10.1940; Cervi, M., Storia della guerra di Grecia (Milan 1965), pp. 150 -1; 
DDI, 9th, V, 803. Cf. Ciano's previous plan in Bottai, Diario, 12.8.1940; DGFP, D, 11, enclosure to 
Doc. 247. For a good account of the events see Weinberg, G. L., A World at Arms. A Global History 
of World War 11 (Cambridge 1994), pp. 208ff 
209 DGFP, D, 11, 246, p. 418; DDI, 9th, V, 807 
210 Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1354 -66 (speech to Gauleiters, 19 September 1939). For a detailed and 
interesting history of the German war against Poland see Kennedy, R. M., The German Campaign in 
Poland (Washington 1956); and Bethell, N., The War Hitler Won. The Fall of Poland, September 
1939 (New York 1972) 
211 See, for example, relevant comments in Haider, I, pp. 89 -91 
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October he issued Directive no. 6, in which he stated his decision to launch an 
offensive war against the western powers without any further delay212. His urgency 
stemmed from what he perceived as an extremely narrow window of opportunity, a 
favourable international situation, given Italy's support, Russia's inactivity and 
America's fragile neutrality213. He also warned his generals that an unnecessary 
prolongation of the war would stretch Germany's limited resources and project an 
image of weakness to prospective allies and potential enemies. Faced, however, with 
the opposition of his own Wehrmacht generals, who invoked logistical problems 
regarding the transfer of forces from the eastern to the western front, Hitler was 
forced to delay the operation until the middle of November and finally to postpone it 
indefinitely on the 15th due to adverse weather conditions214 
During the winter of 1939 -1940 the differences in the strategic perceptions of 
Hitler, the army generals and the navy leadership became evident. The Führer 
continued to refer to the necessity of bringing Britain "to her knees" and destroy her 
power completely21'. This prospect alarmed many officials of the Wehrmacht, who 
were desperate to avoid a headlong confrontation with the western powers. With the 
exception of the servile Commander -in -Chief of the Army, Brauchitsch, most of the 
other generals feared a repetition of the First World War scenario or expressed 
doubts about the ability of the German army to beat the western defences216. The 
navy leadership, on the other hand, did share Hitler's strategic principle that the real 
enemy in the west was in fact Britain but were extremely sceptical of the capacity of 
the German battleships or U -boats to wage an effective war before the completion of 
the rearmament programme (scheduled for 1944)217. Yet, Hitler continued to view a 
swift victory in the west and the ejection of the British forces from the continent as 
the pivotal sine qua non before contemplating his next major move. Operation 
212 For the text of the Directive see Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1394ff; Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, 
III, p. 762 
213 Jacobsen, H. -A. (ed.), Dokumente zur Vorgeschichte des Westfeldzuges, 1939 -1940 (Göttingen 
1956), pp. 5 -7 
214 Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1418f; Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 107ff 
215 Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1426 -7 (speech to the generals, 23 November 1939) 
216 Müller, K. -J., Das Heer und Hitler, 1933 -1940 (Stuttgart 1969), pp. 675ff 
217 On Admiral Raeder's objections see Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1348 (7 September 1939), 1450 (27 
January 1940). See also Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 766 -7 
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"Weser Exercise" against Norway in March 1940 was just a pre -emptive strike to 
secure supply of vital raw materials from Scandinavia and to stave off a British threat 
from the Baltic Sea218. From February 1940 priority had been given to the 
preparation for Operation Yellow, which would "bring about the decision on land ", 
remove the threat of a two -front war once and for all, and consolidate Germany's 
monopoly of power on the continent "after 300 years of British and French 
domination "219. Early successes in Poland and Scandinavia had strengthened his 
authority in foreign affairs and overcome the initial doubts of party figures about the 
advisability of his strategy. Even Rosenberg, a strong advocate of an alliance with 
Britain until September 1939 and one of the most vehement critics of Ribbentrop's 
anti -British arguments, had by early 1940 been converted to the official line of 
crushing the western powers at any cost70. The operation against France was hugely 
successful, with the German troops occupying Paris by 14 June and chasing the 
British forces out of the continent, although the failure of the German air -force to 
avert the evacuation of a large portion of the British troops at Dunkirk mitigated the 
enthusiasm of the Nazi leadership 221 
The signing of the armistice with France on 22 June signified the end of the 
first part of the war against the west and the fulfilment of the strategic preconditions 
for the attack on the British Isles, as Hitler had emphasised in November 1939222. 
Now, the Führer had three options for dealing with Britain. First, he could use the 
triumph of the German forces in the west and the consequent isolation of Britain in 
order to force the British government to acknowledge the German monopoly in the 
continent and come to a comprehensive peace agreement which would put an end to 
a war he never desired. This was the basis of his peace offer to Britain which he 
218 For the Directive see Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1471ff; Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 113ff. On 
Raeder's importance for the prioritisation of this operation see Gemzell, C. -A., Raeder, Hitler und 
Skandinavien (Lund 1965) 
219 For the Directive see Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1511 -12, translated and reprinted in Noakes, Pridham 
(eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 771 -2. For the comments about the significance of the Operation see 
Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1502 -3 (Proclamation to the soldiers of the Western Front, 9 May 1940) 
220 Seraphin, Tagesbuch Rosenbergs, 23.3/17.6. 1940; Cecil, pp. 184 -5 
22' ADAP, D, 9, 357/361; Jacobsen (ed.), Haider, I, pp. 319f; Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 122 -31 
222 See his remarks in ADAP, D, 8, 384 
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delivered in front of the Reichstag on 19 July223. Second, he could continue his 
military pressure on Britain by ordering air raids, intending to cause the collapse of 
the economic capacity of British industry, demoralise the government and the 
population, and thus force Churchill to capitulate224. Third, he could use his airforce 
to prepare the ground for the invasion of the British Isles and the total destruction of 
the British Empire. 
The first option was ruled out after the official British reply to Hitler's peace 
offer of the 19 July. Just like in the first peace sounding after the occupation of 
Poland, when the British government rejected any conceivable compromise proposal 
by the Nazi regime, Lord Halifax repeated his government's determination to fight 
against Germany225. However, Hitler himself appeared not to expect much from his 
vague, rhetorical appeals to Britain, as three days before the peace offer he had 
already issued Directive no. 16 for a landing operation against Britain226. The 
directive explicitly stated his determination to proceed with the preparation of the 
invasion and, "if necessary to carry it out ", but only as a last resort and after the 
failure of political and military pressure to induce Britain to accept compromise. On 
22 July Hitler reiterated to his army leadership the dangers implicit in the invasion of 
the British Isles and ten days later, in another meeting with the whole leadership of 
his armed forces, he did not refrain from expressing "scepticism regarding the 
technical feasibility [of the invasion plan] "227. In the meantime, he had encouraged 
his Axis ally, Italy, to concentrate on a peripheral campaign against British targets in 
north Africa, especially Egypt and the Suez Canal228. He appeared to have expected 
that Britain would yield to diplomatic and military pressure and accept defeat, and 
223 Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1540 -1558; Williamson, pp. 61 -2 
124 Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 151ff 
225 For the first peace offer of September 19, 1939 see Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 92f; Domarus, 
Hitler, II, pp. 1354ff. The second peace offer in Domarus, II, pp. 1540ff (speech to the Reichstag 19 
July 1940), and the British rejection, p. 1562 
226 DGFP, D, 10, 177; Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1538 -9 (16 July 1940), excerpts of which are translated 
and reprinted in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 783 -6. See also Wheatley, R., Operation 
'Sea Lion '. German Plans for the invasion of England 1939 -1942 (Oxford 1958), pp. 1 -15 
227 Jacobsen (ed.), Haider, II, p. 31 -50; Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1564 -5; Robertson, E. M., "Hitler 
Turns from the West to Russia ", in Boyce, R., Robertson, E. M., (eds.), Paths to War. New Essays 
on the Origins of the Second World War (London 1989), pp. 367 -82, here pp. 367 -72 
228 See, in this chapter, Sections III and IV 
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did not conceal his bewilderment with the British government's determination to 
continue fighting229. 
However, towards the end of July, two new options started to crystallise in 
Hitler's mind. In both expositions he gave to army officials on the 22nd and the 31st 
of July he attributed the perplexing British refusal to give in to "hopes pinned on 
Russia and the United States "230. According to his new analysis, if Germany 
succeeded in defeating Russia, then both Britain and the USA would abandon hopes 
for a German defeat and grant a free hand in the continent to the Reich. He, therefore, 
ordered preparations for a campaign against the Soviet Union to be carried out if the 
invasion of the British Isles did not take place, preferably in the spring of 1941. 
Although Hitler's rationale behind this new order pointed to a strategic war against 
the Soviet Union as secondary precondition for the successful outcome of the 
campaign against Britain, the Führer also described this operation's aim as the 
destruction of the whole state of Russia with one blow. The second option, which 
would be an extension of Italy's parallel war in the Mediterranean, involved 
attacking the British Empire in Gibraltar, Suez, north Africa and the Persian Gulf and 
"delivering the decisive blow" in the periphery. This plan was initially formulated by 
the OKM (Navy High Command) and revealed the disagreement of the navy 
leadership with the preparations for crossing the Channel. The main advantage of the 
plan was that it could be implemented parallel to the preparations for the invasion of 
the British Isles and could be given priority if Operation Sea Lion had to be 
cancelled231. 
Undoubtedly, Hitler preferred to establish a permanent settlement with the 
western powers before turning towards the east, thus avoiding the possibility of a 
two -front war. Conscious of the importance of establishing air control before any 
landing was contemplated, he issued Directive no. 17 on 1 August, in which he 
ordered the Luftwaffe to carry out intensive bombing operations and thus destroy 
229 Weinberg, Hitler, Germany and World War II, pp. 158ff; World at Arms, pp. 170ff; Hill (ed.), 
Weizsäcker -Papiere, pp. 204f; Jacobsen (ed.), Haider, p. 30 -1. See also Hildebrand, K., The Foreign 
Policy of the Third Reich (London 1972), pp. 102ff 
230 Jacobsen (ed.), Haider, pp. 46 -8; and for a translation of the relevant excerpt, Noakes, Pridham 
(eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 790 -1. See also the discussion in Craig, G. A., Germany 1866 -1945 (Oxford 
1978), pp. 721ff 
2231 Jacobsen (ed.), Haider, pp. 43ff; Robertson, "Germany Turns ", pp. 373 -4; Craig, Germany, p. 722 
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both the military defences and the morale of the population232. However, the failure 
to attain these prerequisites had become evident to Hitler by the beginning of 
September, when the losses of the Luftwaffe continued to be high and the British 
government showed no signs of contemplating surrender233. His speech on 4 
September included bitter verbal attacks against the British government but refrained 
from making any concrete references to the outcome of the German operations and 
the future of the Sea Lion234. Long before he announced his decision to his Italian 
ally the Führer had come to the painful decision to postpone Operation Sea Lion due 
to weather problems and the failure to establish superiority in the air235. Admiral 
Raeder had realised this failure even earlier and had approached Hitler on the 9th 
with an emphatic reminder of the Mediterranean option as the only effective means 
of continuing the war against Britain236. On 26 September, and encouraged by the 
postponement of Operation Sea Lion, Raeder gave a more detailed exposition of his 
Mediterranean project to Hitler. The Admiral stressed the importance of seizing both 
Suez and Gibraltar, while at the same time reinforcing the Italian front in north 
Africa. He did not conceal his pessimism about Italy's chances of defeating the 
British alone but expressed his confidence that, with adequate transfers of German 
troops, the Mediterranean could be "cleared up during the winter months" of 1941237. 
Hitler's foreign policy in the ensuing period until the end of 1940 has given 
rise to a historiographical debate about his actual intentions and priorities before the 
final decision to invade the Soviet Union. This debate has revolved around two 
separate but interrelated questions: first, did Hitler seriously pursue the 
Mediterranean project as an alternative to the campaign against the Soviet Union; 
232 For the Directive see Domarus, Hitler, II, p. 1566; Trevor -Roper, H. R. (ed.), Blitzkrieg to Defeat. 
Hitler's War Directives, 1939 -1945 (New York 1964), pp. 36ff. Cf. Hitler's later comments about 
the importance of controlling the skies before the invasion in DDI, 9th, V, 602 
233 Collier, B., The Battle of Britain (London 1962), pp. 111ff; Fleming, P., Operation Sea Lion 
(London 1957) 
234 Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1575ff (4 September 1940). Cf. Ciano's comments in Ciano's Diaries, 
5.9.1940 
235 Klee, K., Das Unternehmen 'Seelöwe' (Göttingen 1948), pp. 204ff 
236 Schreiber, G., "The Mediterranean in Hitler's Strategy in 1940. `Programme' and Military 
Planning ", in Deist, W. (ed.), The German Military in the Age of Total War (Leamington Spa 1985), 
pp. 254f; Robertson, "Hitler Turns ", pp. 376f 
237 See the translated text of Raeder's exposition in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 794 -5; 
and an analysis in Schreiber, pp. 256 -8 
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and, second, when and why did he decide to launch the war of annihilation against 
his former ally in the east. A group of intentionalist historians, including Weinberg, 
Hillgruber and Hildebrand, interpreted Hitler's flirtation with the Mediterranean plan 
as an interim and half -hearted move aimed to elicit the long- coveted compromise 
agreement with Britain or, at least, to stabilise the front against the British forces238. 
According to this interpretation, the Fishrer's interest in the Mediterranean was 
circumscribed by his unwavering priority to his Lebensraum war in the east, the 
decision for which had crystallised in his mind before the deterioration of the 
German- Soviet relations in the autumn and winter of 1940 -41. However, this thesis 
has been challenged in two different ways. First, Hitler's efforts to bring about a 
"continental bloc" during the second half of 1940 have been regarded by some 
historians as wholehearted and insistent, amounting to a real strategic priority to the 
plan advocated by his Foreign Minister Ribbentrop for the formation of a large anti - 
British alliance, even with the inclusion of the Soviet Union239. Second, Hitler's plan 
to attack the Soviet Union remained an open option until his meeting with Molotov 
in November 1940, or even until Franco's eventual refusal to join the war in 
December, and was only given priority after November 1940, that is after the 
mounting tension between Germany and Russia over the control of the Balkans had 
rendered their mutual alliance strategically unattainable24 °. 
The evidence shows that Hitler did his best to convince the Spanish and 
French regimes to accede to the anti -British bloc in the second half of 1940. In mid - 
September he sent a letter to Franco stating the reasons in favour of Spain's entry 
'8 See, amongst other works, Weinberg, G. L., "Der deutsche Entschluss zum Angriff auf die 
Sowjetunion ", Viertejahtshefte fir Zeitgeschichte, 1 (1953), pp. 301 -18; World At Arms, Ch. 4; 
Hillgruber, A., Hitlers Strategie und Kriegführung, 1940 -41 (Frankfurt 1965); Hildebrand, The 
Foreign Policy of the Third Reich; Deutsche Aussenpolitik, 1939 -1945. Kalkul oder Dogma? 
(Stuttgart 1970) 
'39 For Ribbentrop's idea of a "continental bloc" see Michalka, W., "From the Anti- Comintern Pact to 
the Euro- Asiatic Bloc: Ribbentrop's Alternative Concept to Hitler's Foreign Policy Programme ", in 
Koch (ed.), Aspects of the Third Reich, pp. 267 -84; "Joachim von Ribbentrop: From Wine Merchant 
to Foreign Minister ", in Smelser, R., Zitelmann, R (eds.), The Nazi Elite (Houndmills & London 
1993), pp. 165 -72; "Die nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik im Zeichen eines `Konzeptionen- 
Pluralismus' - Fragestellungen und Forschungsaufgaben ", in Funke, M. (ed.), Hitler, Deutschland 
und die Mächte. Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches (Düsseldorf 1977), pp. 59 -62 
2d9' Koch, H, W, "Hitler's Programme and the Genesis of Operation 'Barbarossa ", in Koch (ed.), 
Aspects of the Third Reich, pp. 285 -322; Craveld, pp. 28f, 92ff, 1 79ff_ Cf. Broszat, M., "Soziale 
Motivation und Führer- Bindung der Nationalsozialismus ", Vierteljahrs-hefte für Zeitgeschichte, 18 
( 1970), pp. 392 -400 
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into the war, but the Caudillo rejected the German request for the occupation of 
Spanish ports241. At the beginning of October Hitler discussed the plan with 
Mussolini and on the 20th he travelled to Spain and Vichy France to elicit Franco's 
and Petain's consent, but again he stumbled on the two leaders' evasive attitude242. In 
spite of these adverse results, he issued Directive no. 18 on 12 November 1940, in 
which he reiterated the strategic importance of Spain's participation in the Axis war 
effort and of the seizure of Gibraltar. He had already given orders for the preparation 
of this operation, code -named Felix, and he expressed his optimism to the Spanish 
Foreign Minister Suner that it could be carried out during the following winter if 
Spain decided in favour of entering the war243. However, Suner again objected to the 
German demands for Spanish ports and invoked economic and military problems as 
the main reason behind Spain's neutrality. Still, lack of a definite negative reply from 
Franco nurtured hopes in the Nazi leadership that the Mediterranean project was not 
dead yet. On 5 December Hitler issued new orders for the projected war in the 
Mediterranean, including Operation Felix with a provisional date for February 1941 
and an expected duration of four weeks244. However, Franco's negative reply on 7 
December caused considerable consternation to the Nazi leadership and prompted the 
halting of the preparations for Operation Felix245 
In the following two months Hitler continued to press the Spanish government 
for a re- consideration of its position, but Franco's continuing resistance forced him to 
abandon his efforts completely on 22 February 1941246. Yet, since the end of 
December the Mediterranean project had already been regarded as stillborn, in the 
sense that it had failed to achieve its main objective, namely the decisive German 
victory against British forces and targets in the Mediterranean. Not coincidentally, on 
18 December Hitler had also issued Directive no. 21 for Operation Barbarossa, which 
=4' DGFP, D, 11, 70/87; Koch, "Barbarossa ", pp. 307 -8; Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 177 -8 
24'- DGFP, D, 11, 220/207/227/246. 
243 For Directive 18 see Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1609ff; DGFP, D, 11, 323. The talks with Suner in D, 
11, 352/357 
244 Jacobsen, H. -A., (ed.), Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, vol. I: 1 August 
1940- 31 Dezember 1941 (Frankfurt 1965), 5.12.1940 [henceforward, OKW] 
?4$ DGFP, D, 11, 476/491; Schreiber, pp. 267 -8; Domarus, Hitler, II, p. 1625; Hillgruber, Hitlers 
Strategie, pp. 178ff 
246 Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 207 -8; DGFP, D, 12, 46/73 
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stated that the Wehrmacht's main priority would be the defeat of the Soviet Union 
"even before the conclusion of the war against England [sic] "247. 
Even before Franco's negative reply in December 1940, there were 
indications that Hitler's commitment to the Mediterranean project had specific limits 
and conditions. First of all, one of the basic tenets of the Axis alliance was the clear 
delineation of the two partners' spheres of influence and the alleged compatibility of 
their expansionist objectives. According to this tacit agreement, the Mediterranean 
and Balkan regions constituted Italy's exclusive zone of influence248. Although 
Mussolini had initially agreed to Hitler's plan for a "continental bloc" with the 
inclusion of Spain and Vichy France, his general attitude was determined by his 
desire to stave off any external interference in his own sphere of influence, especially 
during the conduct of the guerra parallela in north Africa. This was the point behind 
his doubts about France's and Spain's entry into the war that he expressed to Hitler 
in his letter on 18 October 1940 and again in his conversation with the German 
Ambassador in Rome, Mackensen, in December249. As we also saw, he refused the 
offer of German military assistance in the operation against Egypt in September25o 
Only when the Italian attack on Greece had seriously floundered in the Albanian 
front and Graziani's troops were on the defensive against advancing British forces in 
Egypt by early January 1941 did Mussolini allow the German troops to enter the 
Mediterranean theatre of war and assist in the conduct of the military operations251. 
Yet, by that time, Hitler had given up any illusions about the chances of defeating the 
British forces in the Mediterranean. His orders underlined the danger of a collapse in 
247 DGFP, D, 11, 532; excerpts translated in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 809 -10. See also 
Schreiber, pp. 268 -9; Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 187ff 
J8 Funke, M., "Die deutsche -italienische Beziehungen: Anti -bolschevismus und aussenpolitische 
Interessenkonkurrenz als Strukturprinzip der `Achse ", in ibid. (ed.), Hitler, Deutschland und die 
Mächte. Materialien zur Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches (Düsseldorf 1977), pp. 828 -30; Lowe, 
Marzari, p. 326. On the "compatibility" of the imperialist aspirations of the Axis countries see DDI, 
8th, XIII, 13 and 21; 9th, VIII, 117 and 142; and Weinberg, Hitler, Germany and World War II, p. 
45 
249 For Mussolini's initial acceptance of Hitler's plan see DGFP, D, 11, 79/149. For his letter to Hitler, 
expressing his reservations, see DGFP, D, 11, 192; the conversation with von Mackensen is in D, 
250 See in this chapter, Section IV 
251 Jacobsen (ed.), OKW, 8/9.1.1941; DGFP, D, 11, 643; Schreiber, pp. 270f; 
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the African front and intended to stabilise the Axis positions in the face of the Italian 
armed forces' incapacity to hold against the British252. 
This leads us to the second limit in Hitler's endorsement of the Mediterranean 
project - his lack of confidence in Italy's ability to defeat the British in north Africa 
on her own resources. The limited capacity of the Italian forces in Egypt was known 
to Hitler since July, when he stressed that the Italian contribution to the 
Mediterranean project would be of limited importance253. This impression was 
reconfirmed in September by Raeder, who predicted that the seizure of Suez by 
Italian troops only would not be feasible, and in November by General Thoma, who 
inspected the Italian positions in Egypt and conveyed his strong scepticism about the 
viability of the Italian front in north Africa254. By the time Hitler issued Directive no. 
18 on 12 November 1940, he had given up hopes for seizing Suez during the winter, 
limiting his maximum goals to the seizure of Gibraltar, although the one target 
without the other cancelled the whole effect of encircling the British forces in the 
Mediterranean255 
The failure of the Italian guerra parallela against Greece and Egypt 
complicated the situation even further for the German strategic planning and 
practically annulled the prospects of a decisive Axis victory in the Mediterranean 
during the winter of 1940/41. However, Hitler appeared much more inclined to 
rescue the Balkan front from collapse than to intervene in favour of Italy in north 
Africa. In Directive no. 18 he prioritised the operation in the Balkans but stated that 
any help in Egypt could be authorised only after the Italians had achieved a highly 
unlikely further advance towards Alexandria. On 13 December he hastened to issue 
the directive for Operation Marita, intending to occupy Greece by the end of April 
1941. It took him another month, during which the British advances on north Africa 
had decimated the Italian positions, to order the dispatch of additional forces to 
252 See his comments in DGFP, D, 11, 487 
253 Jacobsen (ed.), Haider, II, pp. 45ff 
254 See Raeder's analysis in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 794 -5. For General Thoma's 
report see DGFP, D, 11, p. 462. See also Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 182ff 
xss Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1609ff; DGFP, D, 11, 323. Cf. Jacobsen (ed.), Haider, II, pp. 160 -1 
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Egypt256. But this was as far as he would go in order to save the wounded prestige of 
his Axis partner. He showed no inclination to salvage Italy's east African Impero 
which fell to the British by late May 1941, despite the fact that Ethiopia was 
supposed to be the base for Axis operations against both the Suez and Sudan- 
EgyptZ57. Germany's intervention in Italy's Mediterranean- Balkan sphere of 
influence followed clear priorities which were meaningful only in the framework of 
strategic preparation for Operation Barbarossa. The strengthening of Germany's 
military presence in Rumania in October, the plans to bring Bulgaria to the Tripartite 
Pact in spite of fierce Soviet opposition, and the invasion of Greece in the spring of 
1941 were strategic prerequisites for covering the southern German flank against the 
Soviet Union258. Stabilisation of the situation in north Africa was also significant for 
the security of southern Europe, especially after the defeats of the Italian armed 
forces. Ethiopia and Somaliland, on the other hand, were of limited importance only 
for the moribund Mediterranean project which had already been demoted in Hitler's 
priorities by the end of 1940. 
There is another strong indication that Hitler's Mediterranean strategy in 
1940 -41 was subordinated to the prerequisites of Barbarossa - the time factor. His 
decision in July to postpone the attack on the Soviet Union until May 1941, with 
eight weeks of prior preparation, left him with a window of opportunity to tackle the 
Mediterranean theatre until the beginning of spring 1941. This deadline explains to a 
great extent Hitler's abandonment of the efforts to lure Spain into the Axis war in late 
February and the concurrent cancellation of Operation Felix. In his conversation with 
Suner in November 1940 he had spoken of late winter as the latest possible time for 
the operation in Gibraltar, envisaging completion by the end of March. During the 
winter, he kept contemplating the possibility of an action in Spain, but the 
pacification of the Balkan front after the Italian failure in Greece acquired a higher 
256 On the impact of the British counter -attack in Egypt see Ciano 's Diaries, 11.12.1940, 5/6/7.1.1941. 
Hitler's orders in DGFP, D, 11, 642; Ciano's Diaries, 18/19.11.1940 
257 For the collapse of Italian East Africa see Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 282f; Bosworth, R. J. 
B., Italy and the Wider World, pp. 108 -9; Bocca, Ch. 16; Ciano's Diaries, 30.5.1941 
258 DGFP, D, 12, 70/94/108/121; Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 187ff. For the strategic importance of 
Rumania in Hitler's strategic plans for Barbarossa see his Directives 18 and 21 in DGFP, D, 11, 
323/899 (and translation of excerpts in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 800 -1, 809 -11 
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priority259. The execution of Operation Marita in early spring 1941 necessitated a 
further slight postponement of Barbarossa, possibly until June, but this would be the 
latest conceivable deadline. As he had envisaged in July 1940, the complete defeat of 
the Soviet forces could be completed within three -to -five months; therefore, 
launching the operation by early summer would leave sufficient time to destroy the 
Soviet Union before the winter season26o 
How important, then, was the attitude of the Soviet Union towards Germany 
in Hitler's decision to launch Operation Barbarossa in June 1941? Koch has stressed 
that preparation against Russia had been initiated by the OKW ( Wehrmacht High 
Command) before Hitler made his first reference to the need to "crush" the Soviet 
Union in July 1940261. The Wehrmacht's plan was conceived as a reaction to fears of 
Russian mobilisation on the borders with Germany and entailed a pre -emptive action 
in case Russian expansion in the Balkans threatened Germany, either directly or by 
obstructing her position in central Europe262. However, Hitler was adamant in his 
belief that Russia would not take offensive action against the Reich due to her 
alleged military and economic weakness, a view he reiterated to his generals in 
January 1941, that is after the definite decision to launch Barbarossa in June263 
Unlike the mainly pre -emptive plan of the OKW, his project was a large -scale 
offensive action, intended to destroy Russia and force Britain and the USA to 
acknowledge the German domination of the continent. Interestingly, there was no 
reference in this speech to Russia's grandiose ambitions in the Balkans and the Baltic 
states, which Molotov had alluded to in his conversation with Hitler and Ribbentrop 
in November 1940264. This evidence seems to contradict Koch's analysis of the 
259 DGFP, D, 11, 325/511 
260 Hancock, E., The National Socialist Leadership and Total War, 1941 -5 (New York 1991), Ch. 2; 
Clark, A., Barbarossa: the Russian -German Conflict, 1941 -1945 (Harmondsworth 1966), pp. 69f; 
Hillgruber, A., "Das Russlandbild der führenden deutschen Militärs vor Beginn des Angriffs auf die 
Sowjetunion ", in Hillgruber (ed.), Die Zerstörung Europas. Beiträge zur Weltkriegsepoche, 1914 bis 
1945 (Berlin 1988), pp. 256 -72 
'61 Koch, "Barbarossa ", pp. 291ff 
262 Jacobsen (ed.), Haider, II, pp. 3ff; Koch, "Barbarossa ", pp. 291 -2 
263 See the relevant references in Jacobsen (ed.), Haider, II, pp. 30ff; and Hitler's speech to the 
generals in January 1941, in Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1652 -3 (8 -9 January 1941) 
264 For the talks see DGFP, D, 11, 325- 6/328 -9; Craig, Germany, pp. 727ff; Hillgruber, Hitlers 
Strategie, pp. 356ff; Schreiber, pp. 263ff. Excerpts of the conversations are translated in Noakes, 
Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 799ff 
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developments in the German -Russian relations during November 1940, which 
identified Stalin's increasing demands for Finland and the Balkans as the primary 
reason behind Hitler's decision to proceed with Operation Barbarossa265 
Undoubtedly, after Molotov's visit to Berlin Hitler could not conceal his 
disillusionment with the prospects of a constructive relationship with the Soviet 
Union266. This impression was strengthened by Molotov's reply to the German 
invitation to enter the Tripartite agreement on 13 November. In his response, 
Molotov asked for the complete withdrawal of the German troops from the Finnish 
territory and for an agreement with Bulgaria regarding Russia's access to the 
Dardanelles Straits267. Although the price asked by the Soviet leadership was high, it 
stemmed from the generous German concessions which accompanied the Non- 
aggression pact of 1939 but which the Nazi leadership had decided not to abide by in 
the critical situation of 1940 412ó8. Koch regarded this particular document as the 
catalyst in Hitler's decision to proceed with the preparation for Operation Barbarossa 
and the real turning point in the re- orientation of Nazi foreign policy towards the 
east. It seems, however, that Hitler had had few doubts about the viability of the 
German- Soviet alliance before Molotov arrived in Berlin. Two days before the 
Russian Foreign Minister's arrival he ordered the preparations for Operation 
Barbarossa to continue "regardless of what results the talks will have "269. Then, 
addressing his generals on 5 December, he emphasised his decision to prioritise the 
operation against the Soviet Union and reconfirmed his initial schedule for an early 
summer campaign. He did not even have to wait until Franco's negative reply on 7 
December to shelve the Mediterranean project. 
Undoubtedly, the Soviet leadership bore some responsibility for the 
deterioration in the German- Russian relations from the summer of 1940 onwards. It 
was the Red Army who occupied the whole of Lithuania, thus violating the 
265 Koch, "Barbarossa ", pp. 292ff 
266 Leach, B. A., German Strategy against Russia, 1939 -1941 (Oxford 1973), pp. 78f; Weinberg, 
Hitler, Germany and World War II, pp. 162 -7 
267 DGFP, D, 11, 404/405; Koch, "Barbarossa ", pp. 318 -9 
268 See the Secret Protocol to the 1939 pact in Domarus, Hitler, II, p. 1252, and Hitler's subsequent 
change of mind in Koch, "Barbarossa ", pp. 304 -5 
269 Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1609f (Directive 18, 12 November 1940); DGFP, D, 11, 323, translated 
and reprinted in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 800 -1 
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conditions of the Secret Protocol to the 1939 pact with Germany, although a 
compromise solution was eventually negotiated between the two countries in 
December 1940270. It was also the increasing Russian interference in the Balkans, 
with the occupation of Bessarabia and the claims over Bulgaria, that placed the 
bilateral relations of the two countries under considerable strain271. It was also the 
mobilisation of Russian troops on the border with Germany that first alarmed the 
OKW leadership and resulted in preparations for a preventive strike272. There is 
evidence that since the early summer of 1940 the Russian operational plans were 
based on the assumption that Nazi Germany would be the main enemy and envisaged 
a German attack in the near future, although it was known to the Wehrmacht 
leadership and to the German Ambassador in Moscow that the nature of this planning 
was purely defensive273. However, the real deterioration in the German- Russian 
relations after Molotov's visit to Berlin resulted primarily from German obstinacy or 
lack of interest in maintaining a minimum of co- operation. In spite of Russian 
complaints about the German military occupation of Rumania in October 1940, it 
was known to Hitler that Stalin did not contemplate any move to obstruct the German 
action274. At the same time, negotiations for an economic agreement between the two 
countries came to a fruitful conclusion in January 1941 with extremely beneficial 
arrangements for the German side275. As the German Ambassador in Russia noted to 
Ribbentrop, the Soviet leadership were prepared to pay a high price to restore good 
diplomatic and economic relations with the Reich276. Yet, none of these indications 
and arguments proved sufficiently strong to effect alterations in Hitler's strategic 
planning for Barbarossa. This was not a preventive, pre -emptive war, nor a strategic 
campaign of limited scope and goals. As he stressed to his generals in March, this 
270 DGFP, D, 11, 43/168/440/560 for the negotiations, and 579 for the final agreement 
271 Koch, "Barbarossa ", pp. 301 -7; Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 183 -5; Germany and the Soviet 
Union, pp. 134f; DGFP, D, 11, 376 
272 Koch, "Barbarossa ", pp. 312 -3 
273 Erickson, "Threat identification ", pp. 342 -4; Jacobsen (ed.), Haider, II, pp. 113f; DGFP, D, 12, 
423 
274 DGFP, D, 11, 88/166/170 
275 DGFP, D, 11, 568, and 636 for the text of the agreement 
276 DGFP, D, 12, 423/468/505/547 /628 
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was going to be a war of total extermination277. His directives for Barbarossa 
underscored the necessity of mobilising "all available units and resources ", including 
the reversal of a previous order for partial demobilisation, in order to ensure total 
success against both the Red Army and the whole Soviet state278. 
The launching of Operation Barbarossa on 22 June 1941 constituted the most 
emphatic affirmation of Hitler's monopoly of power in foreign policy decision - 
making. His decision to abandon the war against Britain and concentrate instead on a 
new target was criticised by prominent figures in both the military and the diplomatic 
hierarchy of the Nazi regime. The traditional, conservative line of criticism, 
epitomised by the objections of Raeder, Weizsäcker and Hassell, underlined the 
danger of a two -front war and questioned the soundness of the decision to attack a 
non -enemy country with which Germany still had advantageous economic and trade 
relations279. Others in the army, like Haider, did not express political objections to 
the project but criticised the lack of a clear strategic plan behind the preparations for 
Barbarossa280. Ribbentrop, on the other hand, initially voiced his reservations about 
the timing of the operation, pending the formation of the "continental bloc" against 
Britain and the struggle against the British Empire281, but he was eventually 
persuaded that the war against the Soviet Union would be short and have an 
extremely positive effect on the campaign against Britain. His personal anti -British 
strategy, however, had by then been irreversibly shelved, signifying the beginning of 
277 See his relevant comments in Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1683 -4 (Directive for the Liquidation of 
Russian Commissars, 30 March 1941); Jacobsen (ed.), Haider, II, 320 -37. See also Weinberg, 
World at Arms, pp. 190f. Koch believes that the campaign was both a preventive war and an act of 
aggression ( "Barbarossa ", pp. 319 -22). For an assessment of the rather exaggerated "preventive 
war" theory see Wippermann, W., Wessen Schuld? Vom Historikerstreit zur Goldhagen - 
Kontroverse (Berlin 1997), pp. 59 -79 
27$ See DGFP, D, 11, 323, p. 527; Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, p. 817; Weinberg, World at 
Arms, Ch. 4 
279 Schreiber, pp. 268 -70; Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 190 -3; Trevor -Roper, H. R., "Hitlers 
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(Basingstoke & London 1991), pp. 67ff. For Weizsäcker's memorandum containing strong critical 
comments see DGFP, D, 12, 419. For Canaris' objections see Streit, C., Keine Kameraden. Die 
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his declining influence upon Hitler in the remaining years until 1945'-8'-. As for 
Goering, his reservations again stemmed from logistical considerations, since both 
war production and rearmament had not yet reached the projected optimal level. 
Instead, he emphasised the need to concentrate all available resources against Britain 
and then refrain from further large -scale expansion in order to "digest" the vast 
resources of the occupied areas283. As, however, had happened in all the other cases 
of his disagreement with Hitler, he placed his loyalty to the Führer first and 
participated in the preparations. Only Rosenberg and the SS leadership understood 
from the first moment the ideological implications of the war and endorsed the effort 
wholeheartedly284. Rosenberg was ecstatic about Operation Barbarossa, regarding it 
as a return to the ideological core of Nazism and a historic opportunity to defeat 
Bolshevism and the Jews'85. Himmler was equally jubilant, not only for the 
ideological significance of the undertaking but also for the opportunities it offered to 
his SS for wider responsibilities and jurisdictions. In 13 March 1941 Hitler 
personally granted extensive powers to SS units in the Nazi empire, allowing them 
"to act independently and under [Himmler's] responsibility "'86. Himmler himself 
could not conceal what was at stake in this operation. In a speech to SS units on the 
day that Operation Barbarossa was launched he stressed that this war was the 
beginning of a fundamental reorganisation of Europe and the whole world'8'. 
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Germany ", in Deist, W., (ed.), The German Military in the Age of Total War (Leamington, Spa 
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As Hitler stated in his letter to Mussolini on the day of the invasion, this war 
was a return to his ideological origins and concepts, which at last had set him 
"spiritually free "288. In taking his decision he had contradicted his two pivotal long- 
term strategic principles - agreement with Britain, avoidance of a war on two fronts 
(or three, in this case, with the inclusion of north Africa). However, here lay the 
essence of the ideological nature of this war: namely, that it was launched in total 
defiance of material, structural and strategic considerations, with an unjustified 
confidence in swift victory which stemmed from an ideologically -driven 
underestimation of Russian power, and against the counsel of his most senior 
military and diplomatic advisors. At exactly this point in the history of the Nazi war 
Hitler abandoned his previous tactical flexibility, gave up his efforts to produce 
optimal preconditions for the attainment of his Lebensraum vision, and retreated 
irreversibly into the mythical sphere of his worldview. 
VI. The path to defeat: the end of the fascist war (1941 -45) 
Leaders and the monopoly of foreign policy -making in war 
So, the "fascist" war entered its most crucial stage, first for Italy in the autumn 
of 1940, and then for Germany in the summer of 1941. However, the monopolisation 
of the responsibility for decision -making by the two leaders remained a source of 
weakness for the two systems' capacity to wage an effective war. It is crucial to 
examine how effectively the two fascist systems combined the notion of "charismatic 
leadership" with the task of managing diverse national resources in pursuit of their 
respective war objectives. This was the first area where the interplay of long -term 
ideological features and structures greatly determined the fate of the two countries' 
war effort. On a number of occasions the ideological and political preconceptions of 
the two fascist leaderships were found incompatible with notions of co- ordination, 
diplomatic flexibility and effective sharing of authority which characterised modern 
foreign policy -making and warfare. However, the triumph of the "authoritarian" 
concept in the decision -making process of the two regimes diminished the possibility 
238 DGFP, D, 12, 660; Ciano's Diaries, 22.6.1941 
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of a well co- ordinated domestic organisation of resources and of a rational division of 
responsibilities289. War accentuated these pre- existing tendencies and impeded a 
more effective exploitation of resources, a more pragmatic redefinition of goals, and 
the adoption of a more sound overall strategy for the war. 
Undoubtedly, the principle of "charismatic leadership" proved to be the 
strongest element of integration and cohesion within the fascist states290. However, it 
gradually became a major cause of the two systems' dysfunctionality. The 
determination of the two fascist leaders to concentrate absolute responsibility for the 
conduct of foreign policy and, later, war in their hands eliminated the regimes' 
capacity for rational policy- making. In Italy, Mussolini imposed his wishful thinking 
on his military and diplomatic advisors, in spite of their opposition to his reckless, 
uncoordinated strategy. Yet, as Balbo had predicted since 1936, he fell prey to his 
own image of the "infallible" leader (Mussolini ha sempre ragione)291. Mussolini's 
assumption of total authority in both the political and military decision -making 
process during the war produced a decision -making process which gravitated 
dangerously towards his personal "charismatic" authority. He showed little 
inclination to heed the advice of prominent political and military figures. Neither the 
pleas of his foreign Minister, Ciano, for a more restrained policy towards Germany 
between August 1939 and May 1940, nor the explicit reservations of the King for 
Italy's intervention in the war prompted him to re- assess his decisions. He also 
stubbornly avoided any devolution of authority to his military leadership. Despite the 
military soundness of appointing a Supreme Commander to co- ordinate the three 
arms of the armed forces, he refused to promote Badoglio to this position, fearing 
such a concentration of power and mistrusting his Marshal's intentions292. He 
believed that political will was a sufficient guarantee for the successful execution of 
289 See, in this study, Ch. 3 
290 Michalka, "Die nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik", in Funke (ed.), Hitler, Deutschland and die 
Miichte, pp. 46ff; Nyomarkay, J., Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party (Minneapolis 1967), 
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L91 Segrè, Balbo, pp. 340 -1 
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military plans and perceived the military leadership as disposable293. He refrained 
from drafting an overall plan for the army's strategic goals to allow for a more 
rational distribution of resources between the African, the Balkan and the 
Mediterranean fronts. Instead, he resorted to an unnecessary and imprudent 
promiscuity of objectives, constantly shifting priorities and targets. In the summer 
and autumn of 1940 he kept oscillating between the plans for an attack against 
Yugoslavia and for a campaign against the northern part of Greece, while avoiding 
fixing the date of the operations in north Africa and the Balkans294. Lack of strategic 
planning proved fatal, both in Greece and in Libya, but the failures were interpreted 
by Mussolini as an indication of his generals' inability to comprehend the spirit of 
Fascism'''. At the most crucial stage in Italy's guerra parallela, in December 1940, 
he decided to force Badoglio to resign and replaced him with the much more servile 
and a- political figure of Cavallero296. Cavallero was the right choice in the sense that 
he could still nurture his leader's ambitions with his unjustified optimism about the 
prospects of the campaign against Greece. He was also willing to execute 
Mussolini's hysterical orders for attack in December and again March, in spite of 
objective logistical problems297. Yet, as Bottai wrote in his diary in December 1940, 
after the situation in all fronts had deteriorated to a critical point, this was a deep 
"crisis ", not just in military terms but primarily on a political level, a crisis of the 
whole system298. 
In Germany, the "Hitler- state" left no room for active opposition to the 
leader's opinion299. Those acting under the direct authorisation of the Führer could 
293 On these views see Ciano's Diaries, 21/22/27.11.1940; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 121f; 
Bottai, Diario, 30.11.1940 
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by -pass bureaucratic processes and ignore hierarchies. The Foreign Minister, von 
Ribbentrop, constructed a mobile and highly personal Foreign Office which issued 
orders without the prior consultation of the Wilhelmstrasse bureaucracy300 Himmler 
and the SS had the luxury of carrying out the "ideological" aspects of the total war 
(i.e. extermination policies), despite the opposition from military leaders based on 
doubts about the rationality of such an enterprise3o1 Bormann gradually gained 
special access to Hitler and thus increased the emphasis of the "ideological" character 
of the war at the expense of rational economic planning302. Speer, the architect of the 
rationalisation of German war economy in 1941 -3, became powerful with the support 
of Hitler, but was gradually overshadowed and side -lined, when the Führer changed 
his mind in 1943 -4 and accepted the arguments of the party hard- liners303 
The spectre of defeat after 1942 signified a decisive strengthening of the 
authority of the party at the expense of state institutions and bureaucracies. 
According to Hitler, the NSDAP was a guarantee of "victory- minded mentality ", a 
quality which was in short supply amongst the bureaucrats and the generals of the 
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armed forces304. This shift towards the party entailed the transfer of a vast range of 
responsibilities from the state to party organisations or individuals. The Gauleiters 
continued to report directly to Hitler about the situation in their provinces, and there 
was no co- ordinated policy at national level3o5 Ribbentrop's Foreign Ministry had to 
wage an enormous - and losing - battle against both the Ministry of Propaganda and 
the SS for the control of the occupied areas3o6 The pace of nazification of the armed 
forces was significantly accelerated after 1943 with the introduction of the institution 
of Commissioners307. At the same time, the Führer continued to concentrate even 
more authority in his hands, both in the shaping of the policies and in the conduct of 
the war effort. He even blamed the failure of the German offensive in Russia on the 
military leadership and assumed supreme command of the armed forces in December 
1941308 after dismissing his Commander -in -Chief of the Army Brauchitsch. Distrust 
of the abilities of his subordinates3o9 and excessive confidence in his own capacity to 
regulate such an immense system, prevented him from considering the advice of his 
party colleagues, his military specialists and the diplomats. Undoubtedly, his failure 
to effectively supervise the war effort alone made him increasingly dependent on a 
distorted, limited view of the events. Yet, he refused to admit failure in his own 
strategy, despite warnings from those immediately involved in the conduct of the 
war310 This tendency became most clear in the eastern front after 1941311 He 
brushed aside the advice of the Wehrmacht leadership in August 1941 to proceed to 
the occupation of Moscow, ordering instead advances in the north sector of the 
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306 Seabury, pp. 123 -4, 126ff; Orlow, II, pp. 403 -4 
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front312. He also rejected the appeals of the generals for a strategic retreat in the 
winter of 1941/42, issuing directives to all army groups in the eastern front to defend 
the occupied territory because "withdrawal would produce a crisis of confidence in 
the leadership "313. A similar inability to contemplate tactical withdrawal in the face 
of adversity led him to overrule Rommel's defensive strategy in north Africa and 
order his troops to stand firm in their positions. The result was that, by May 1943, the 
last German forces in Tunisia had surrendered after having suffered tremendous 
human and material losses314. 
Lack of administrative co- ordination significantly aggravated the situation by 
destroying the channels of communication between the various authorities within the 
regime. There was no real co- ordination between the military activities of the SS and 
the strategy of the Wehrmacht. Himmler, as the leader of the SS and Hitler's close 
associate, was in a position to impose policies for the eastern front which infringed 
the jurisdiction of the military leadership315. Even within the circle of Hitler's 
associates divergent concepts of strategy emerged. The very idea of "total war" held 
a different meaning for Speer (rational policy based on maximum economic 
efficiency), for Goebbels (the first step towards a long -term exploitation of the 
conquered regions and populations), and for Bormann or Himmler (the culmination 
of the regime's teleological visions)316. Hitler himself wavered: in 1940 -2 he 
supported Speer wholeheartedly, but failures from 1943 onwards induced him to 
radicalising, rather than rationalising and limiting, his goals. It is questionable 
whether he was aware that the war had been lost by 1943317, and in any case he was 
determined to maintain the fight until the very end. Yet, by that time, the domestic 
system had reached a critical point of paralysis. After such a long time of "Hitler - 
myth" propaganda, the Nazi system was unable to consider alternatives to Hitler's 
312 Jacobsen (ed.), OKW, pp. 1062 -3; DDI, 9th, VIII, 211 
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314 Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 431 -47; Howe, G. F., Northwest Africa. Seizing the Initiative in the 
West (Washington 1957); Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 846 -8 
315 Wegner, "`My Honour is Loyalty ", pp. 230ff; Orlow, II, Ch. 7 
316 On the different conceptions of total war within the Nazi leadership see Hancock, pp. 191f. See 
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personal strategy, to react to the self -destructive policies of the leadership, and to 
actively seek an alternative to the impending destruction318. The 20 July 1944 plot 
was the ultimate proof that it was impossible to change the course of Nazi policy 
with Hitler still in charge. In contrast to what happened in Fascist Italy, however, 
when defeat became apparent, allegiance to the Führer remained a powerful factor of 
the Nazi regime until the very end. Most Nazi officials remained loyal to their leader, 
while those who, like Goering and Himmler, sought to replace him in the last months 
before collapse, were effectively thwarted in their plans by Hitler and his faithful 
entourage319. 
International co- operation: an uncoordinated war 
Domestic co- ordination was just one prerequisite for the effective 
management of the war by the two fascist regimes. Since the war of 1939 -1945 was 
intended to be an Axis joint campaign for an overall "new order ", the question of 
political and military co- ordination in the framework of the Axis alliance 
complemented the task of domestic preparation and co- ordination in each fascist 
country. The internationalisation of fascism had been a fact long before the outbreak 
of war, first by the alliance between Germany and Italy, and then by the signing of 
the Anti- Comintern Pact and the Tripartite Agreement with Japan320. This prepared 
the ground for an international crusade of the fascist states against both the western 
powers and the Soviet Union. Spheres of influence had been defined among the Axis 
partners before 1939: central Europe and Russia for Germany, Mediterranean and 
parts of Africa for Italy, the Pacific Ocean for Japan321. The geographical extent of 
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these aspirations and their political implications (i.e. conflict with Britain, France, the 
USA and the Soviet Union) had rendered the task of co- ordination among the Axis 
partners indispensable for the success of the fascist new territorial order. 
We have already examined the factors which undermined the prospects of 
such a co- ordination prior to the outbreak of the war322. During the war, co- 
ordination seemed possible on the basis of mutual respect between the two partners. 
So long as Germany refrained from impressive initiatives and consulted the Italian 
leadership in the shaping of war policies, Mussolini was prepared to take into 
account German advice. When, however, in October 1940, German forces were 
transferred to Rumania without prior consultation with the Italian leadership323, the 
Duce 's wounded prestige shattered the hopes for a long -term harmonisation of Axis 
strategy. Against any notion of military rationality and co- ordination, the Italian 
leadership embarked upon the plans for an attack on Greece. The operation was 
prepared inadequately, upon the arbitrary assumption that it would be short and 
painless without considering the negative impact of such a diversion of resources 
from the north African front324 
Politically, the attack on Greece was a tour de force, in the sense that it caught 
the German leadership unawares and raised the stakes of Italy's war325. In military 
terms, though, it proved to be an utter disaster. The Albanian front became the first 
battleground in which Axis forces were forced to a humiliating retreat. The negative 
consequences, however, of the reversal of Italian fortunes in Greece were not 
confined to this particular theatre of operations. Priority in the allocation of military 
resources to the rescue of the Balkan front resulted in serious limitations on the 
assistance dispatched to Graziani in Libya, in spite of the latter's repeated warnings 
that the north Africa forces were not sufficiently equipped to face the British 
countries see DDI, 8th, XIII, 13 and 21; 9th, VIII, 117 and 142; and Weinberg, Germany, Hitler and 
World War II, p. 45 
37 See, in this study, Ch. 5 
323 DGFP, D, 11, 192; DDI, 9th, V, 676 and 707; Noakes, Pridham (eds.), III, pp. 798 -9 
324 Sadkovich, J. J., "The Italo -Greek War in Context: Italian Priorities and Axis Diplomacy ", Journal 
of Contemporary History, 28 (1993), pp. 493 -64 
325 Hitler remained calm during the meeting with Mussolini in Florence on 28.10.1940 [Domarus, 
Hitler, II, p. 1600], but the news of the Italian attack on Greece caused him irritation and anger [von 
Kotze, H., (ed.), Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 1938 -1943. Aufzeichnungen des Majors Engel (Stuttgart 
1974), p. 88, quoted in Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 229 -30. 
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troops326. The details of the fate of the Italian "parallel war" need not be recounted 
here327. In the morning of 12 November British forces attacked the Italian fleet at the 
southern port of Taranto, inflicting extensive damage on the new Italian battleships 
which were supposed to lead the campaign of the Regia Marina against the British 
fleet in the Mediterranean328. While the situation in Greece showed no signs of 
improvement, at the beginning of December the British troops in north Africa 
assumed the offensive and forced Graziani's forces to a steady retreat, first out of 
Libya and, by the end of January, also out of Cyrenaica329. Mussolini's misplaced 
hopes for a reversal of the situation in all fronts were quickly frustrated. By the early 
spring of 1941, the Italian armed forces had been defeated in north -western Greece 
and were steadily retreating both in Libya and in Sudan. The remaining prestige of 
the Italian fascist regime was shattered after Germany took over the first two 
operations and succeeded where Italy had so dramatically failed. It took the German 
armed forces a little more than a month to occupy Yugoslavia and Greece, while the 
joint German- Italian forces in north Africa resumed the offensive under the 
command of General Romme1330 No German interest existed in the E. African front, 
where the Italian troops fought their hopeless campaign unaided until they were 
overpowered by the British forces in May 1942. Mussolini's war, as an alternative, 
autonomous enterprise, was dead, and the Italian failure was irreversible, after the 
heavy human and material losses drastically reduced the fighting capacity of the 
Italian armed forces. From that point, Germany conducted her own war and enjoyed 
326 Sadkovich, "The Italo -Greek War ", pp. 440ff; "Of Myths and Men: Rommel and the Italians in 
North Africa ", 1940 -42 ", International History Review, 13 (1991), pp. 287 -301 
327 See De Felice, R., Mussolini l'alleato, vol. la: Dalla guerra 'breve' alla guerra lunga, 1940 -1943 
(Turin 1990), pp. 28ff; Sadkovich, J., J., "Understanding defeat: reappraising Italy's role in World 
War II ", Journal of Contemporary History, 24 (1989), pp. 27 -61; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 
231 ff 
328 See Bocca, pp. 231 -3; USM, La marina italiana nella seconda guerra mondiale, vol. 4: La guerra 
nel Mediterraneo (Rome 1959), pp. 200ff; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 236ff; Ciano's Diaries, 
12.11.1940; Bottai, Diario, 14.11.1940 
329 Bocca, pp. 261 -9; Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, pp. 251ff; USE, La prima offensiva britannica in 
Africa settentrionale, I. See also the repercussions of the reverse in Libya in Ciano's Diaries, 
10/11/12/15.12.1940; 5/22.1.1941 
330 Bocca, Ch. 14 (Africa), and pp. 295 -304; Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 225 -34 (attack on the 
Balkans), 348 -63 (German offensive in north Africa); Sadkovich, "Of Myths and Men ", pp. 287ff. 
Hitler underlined the importance of helping the Italians win the war in the Balkans before 
"Barbarossa" [Domarus, Hitler, II, p. 1664 (30 January 1941)]. For Romel's successes see DDI, 9th, 
VIII, 645/ 658/ 694; IX, 21; Lochner, 24.1, 7.2, 16.12.1942, 
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the whole prestige of Axis victories in Europe and Africa. This was reflected in the 
military planning of the Axis from 1941, where Italy ceased to be referred separately 
as a military force, and was placed as second in the "German- Italian war" 331 
Mussolini deeply resented the relegation of Italy's role in the Axis alliance and 
continued to be jealous of the successes of his German allies. In private he even 
expressed hopes that Germany's victory in Europe would be difficult and painful332. 
He was, however, aware that in his alliance with Germany there was no way back or 
out, and resigned to the fact that the window of opportunity for Italy's great power 
aspirations had been shut in the early months of 1941. When Ciano was replaced as 
Foreign Minister in early February 1943, Mussolini thanked him for his services, 
agreeing with his son -in -law that the impending defeat was the result of Germany's 
unilateral hasty initiatives and her refusal to consult the Italian leadership in the 
formulation of the Axis war's strategy333. Neither, however, the collapse of the war in 
Russia in 1943 nor the invasion of Sicily would make him consider alternative 
policies to his alliance with Germany. 
Lack of co- ordination within the Axis alliance also diminished the prospects 
of a German victory. The intervention in the Balkans caused problems and delays to 
the launching of Operation "Barbarossa" which proved fatal in the long- term334. At 
the same time, although the Japanese government had initially expressed its intention 
to assist the German campaign in the Soviet Union, it was subsequently put off by the 
poor performance of the Wehrmacht and refused to co- ordinate with Germany in a 
joint attack against the Soviet Union from the west and the east, or against the British 
in Asia335 Instead, the Japanese forces chose to enter a conflict with the USA in 
December 1941 by attacking the military base of Pearl Harbour in Hawai and, from 
331 [DDI, 9th, VIII, 169] 
33' Mack Smith, D., Mussolini (London 1981), pp. 269ff. See his relevant comments in Ciano 's 
Diaries, 30.6.1941 
333 Ciano's Diaries, 8.2.1943 
334 Craveld, L. van, Hitler's Strategy 1940 -1941. The Balkan Clue (London 1973), pp. 102ff. See also 
Hitler's relevant confession in Domarus, Hitler, II, p. 2208 (28 February 1945) 
335 On Hitler's strategic thoughts on this subject see DGFP, D, 11, 149. The arguments of the Japanese 
government are recorded in DDI, 9th, VIII, 152; IX, 359; and its refusal to join the war in DDI, 9th, 
VIII, 382. Cf. Goebbels' distrust of the Japanese declarations in Lochner, 22.4.1943 
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that point, concentrate on their war336 Although neither Germany nor Italy were 
bound by the provisions of the Axis pact to support Japan militarily in an offensive 
campaign, the German and Italian leaderships immediately declared war on the USA. 
Ironically, this was probably the best example of co- ordination among the three Axis 
partners337. It is difficult, though, to detect any trace of rationality behind this 
decision, especially given the critical stage of the German war in the east at the end 
of 1941338. There are indications that the Nazi leadership regarded the campaign 
against the Soviet Union as victorious from as early as October, and this belief was 
not questioned until well into 1942339 If the declaration of war against the USA 
reflected a certainty of triumph in the eastern front, it was a decision based on a very 
distorted view of the military situation there, and one that was not shared by the 
majority of the Wehrmacht's leadership. The same wishful thinking lay behind the 
conviction of the Nazi leadership that the Japanese forces were strong enough to 
overpower the Americans in the Pacific346 
As for Italy, the realisation of defeat did not prompt necessary changes in the 
attitude of the regime. Hopes were nurtured that a victory of the Axis forces in north 
Africa and the Balkans would offer Italy extensive territorial gains in the region341 
At the same time, the fascist regime decided to assist Operation "Barbarossa" by 
sending troops to the eastern front. Undoubtedly, the secretive way in which the 
whole operation was prepared by the Nazi leadership caused considerable irritation 
336 Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 310 -41 
337 On the background of the joint declaration of war against the USA by Germany and Italy, see 
DGFP, D, 8, 546/ 548/ 563/ 577/ 578 
338 Noakes, Pridham, Nazism, III, pp. 830 -4. First indications of problems were evident to the German 
leadership by the beginning of 1942 [DGFP, D, 13, 522; Lochner, 13.2.1942]. Cf., however, Hitler's 
unwavering optimism even in 1943 [ibid., 23.9.1943] 
339 See, for example, how the Nazi leadership changed its strategy towards the implementation of the 
`Final Solution'. Until August- September 1941, plans were postponed by Hitler on the basis of 
military and economic impact of such an enterprise for the operation "Barbarossa ". Plans could be 
executed as soon as the military situation had clarified [Trevor- Roper, Final Entries, 23/24.9.1941]. 
By 11 -1941 the Nazi political and military leadership thought of victory as imminent and 
triumphant (Hillgruber, A. (ed.), Staatsmänner bei Hitler: Vertrauliche Aufzeichnungen über 
Unterredungen mit Vertretern des Auslandes 1939 -1941 (Frankfurt 1967), p. 626, quoted in 
Browning, pp. 119 -20 
340 Noakes, Pridham, Nazism, III, p. 831 
341 See, for example, DGFP, D, 12, 510, where Germany concedes full control of Greece to the Italian 
government. Also, there is evidence that the Italian government regarded the Balkans as an 
exclusively Italian zone (D, 12, 379) 
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on the Italian side. In his instructions to the Wehrmacht in early March 1941 Hitler 
explicitly stated that neither the Italians nor the Japanese should be kept in the dark 
about Operation Barbarossa342. Yet, the Italian participation in the operation reflected 
Mussolini's desperate attempt to repair the damaged prestige of Italian Fascism343. 
He was ecstatic when in late September 1941 he was informed of the Italian 
contribution to the Axis victories against the Red Army344 He desperately desired an 
impressive showing of the Italian armed forces in order to re- establish Italy as 
Germany's major partner in the Axis alliance. So, when in October the Rumanian 
troops were making significant progress in the southern front of Ukraine, he 
confessed his sadness to Ciano for "having taken second place to the Rumanians" 34s 
The situation continued to deteriorate, however, and by the end of 1942 the Axis 
forces were fighting a losing war against the advancing Allied forces in N. Africa346. 
This meant that soon Italy would be exposed to an attack from the south347. 
Furthermore, as Germany's military position grew weaker on the continent, the 
northern parts of Italy suffered from increasing air attacks which disrupted industrial 
production and demoralised the population348. Collapse became imminent when in 
June 1943 the Allied forces invaded Sicily and steadily stepped up the pressure on 
Rome349. In a few weeks' time, the fascist Grand Council decided to curtail the 
powers of Mussolini and then, in co- operation with the King, to dismiss him from 
office. Under the new Badoglio regime, Italy negotiated an armistice and put a hasty 
342 Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 1672 -3 (Directive 24, 45 March 1941) 
343 Duce's anger is shown in his remarks in Domarus, Hitler, II, p. 1736 and Ciano 's Diaries, 
1.7.1941. On Italy' participation in the operation see Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 276 -7; Clark, 
M., Modern Italy, 1860 -1995 (London 1996), pp. 285 -9; DGFP, D, 12, p. 924; DDI, 9th, VIII, 
155/194. See also Ciano's and Mussolini's desperate attempt to persuade Hitler to include more 
Italian forces in "Barbarossa ", in DGFP, D, 13/424/522 
344 Ciano's Diaries, 30.9.1941 
345 Ciano 's Diaries, 17.10.1941 
346 Noakes, Pridham, Nazism, III, pp. 846 -8; DDI, 9th, IX, 421; X, 316 and 421. See also Goebbels' 
comments in Lochner, 28.4. 1943, and 7 -9 and 12- 14.5.1943 
347 DDI, 9th, X, 18/ 99/ 155/ 497/ 498. Cf. Lochner, 13.5.1943 
348 This tangible failure of the Italian regime was what transformed the passive disillusionment with, 
and rejection of, the fascist experiment into active opposition. See Thompson, D., pp. 146 -8; 
Aquarone, Stato Totalitario, pp. 310 -2, and "Public Opinion in Italy before the Outbreak of World 
War II ", in Sarti, R. (ed.), The Ax Within. Italian Fascism in Action (New York 1974), pp. 209 -20 
349 Aga- Rossi, E., "La politica degli Alleati verso l' Italia nel 1943 ", Studi Storici, 3 (1972), pp. 843- 
95 
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end to her participation in the Axis war35o Mussolini was rescued from his prison by 
German commandos and was re- established as the leader of a puppet -state in the 
north of the peninsula, but this did not save Fascism from a humiliating collapse. The 
Italian Social Republic ( Repubblica Sociale Italiana), as the state was called, 
remained under the political control of Germany and reflected long -term Nazi plans 
for a future Italian state under German tutelage351 
The last stage of the fascist war in 1942 -5 did not record any attempt to 
achieve an effective co- ordination between the European and the Pacific campaigns. 
In all respects, the Axis war in Europe had ceased to be a war of expansion since the 
end of 1941, when the German offensive in the eastern front failed to bring about the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. A glimmer of hope was offered to the Germans with 
the success of the second major summer offensive of 1942, but the Russian counter- 
offensives reduced the German campaign to a desperate exercise in hopeless defence 
and self -sacrifice, as the Nazi leadership continued to dismiss calls from the 
Wehrmacht generals for a tactical retreat. Hitler preferred to condemn his forces to 
defeat and decimation in Stalingrad than to accept capitulation or withdrawal352 
Attempts to seize the strategic initiative in the east continued in 1943 with the 
launching of Operation Citadel, but this was a limited offensive action which bore 
little relevance to the initial large -scale objectives of Barbarossa and it nevertheless 
failed to reverse the inauspicious situation in the east353 From mid -1943 onwards the 
German forces were forced into a steady retreat with minimum co- ordination and 
350 On the dismissal of Mussolini see De Felice, R., Mussolini l'alleato, vol. lb: Crisi e agonia del 
regime (Turin 1990), pp. 1089 -1410; DDI, 9th, X, 509 and 528; and, for the German view on the 
events, Lochner, 26- 8.7.1943. On Italy's armistice, see DDI, 9th, X, 754/ 769/ 773; Domarus, 
Hitler, II, p. 2024 
35' De Felice, R., "La questione dell' Alto Adige nei rapporti italo- tedeschi dall' Anschluss alla fine 
della seconda guerra mondiale (1938- 1945) ", Studi Storici, 3 (1972), pp. 765fí). See also Toscano, 
M., Alto Adige - South Tyrol: Italy's Frontier with the German World (Baltimore 1975); Collotti, E., 
L' amministrazione tedesca dell'Italia occupata 1943 -1945 (Milan 1963); Schröder, J., "La caduta 
di Mussolini e la contromisure tedesche nell' Italia centrale fmo alla formazione della Repubblica 
Sociale Italiana ", in De Felice (ed.), Italia fra Tedeschi e Alleati, pp. 137 -170. For the German plans 
for the occupation of northern Italy, see Domarus, Hitler, II, pp. 2033ff (Clarification to the Press 
regarding "Badoglio's Treason ", 8 September 1943) 
352 For the Battle of Stalingrad see Ziemke. E. F., Moscow to Stalingrad. Decision in the East 
(Washington 1987), pp. 430ff; Weinberg, World at Arms, pp. 447 -64. See also Hitler's refusal to 
order retreat or capitulation in Stalingrad in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 844 -5 
353 For Operation "Citadel" see Klink, E., Das Gesetz des Handels. Die Operation 'Zitadelle', 1943 
(Stuttgart 1966); and various documents in Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, Ch. 33 
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extremely heavy casualties. At the same time, after the successful landing of British 
and American forces in Normandy in June 1944, German forces were trapped in a 
two -front war in Europe, under huge pressure from numerically larger and 
psychologically confident armies354 Despite orders for an all -out defence and the 
"scorched earth" directive355, the Nazi military forces were in constant retreat. On the 
other hand, Japan was fighting her own war against the USA under increasingly 
inauspicious conditions. 
The change of the Axis war from an offensive to a desperate defensive 
campaign for survival destroyed the last prospects of co- ordination. As the number 
and power of Axis' enemies increased and their fighting capacity was enhanced, lack 
of cohesion in the fascist bloc transformed what was meant to be a joint campaign 
into three separate wars with inadequate co- ordination and planning. Such a strategy 
was self -defeating. The geographical location of Germany's expansionist plans gave 
the Nazi regime the role of Axis co- ordinator par excellence. This role was also 
justified by the significantly stronger fighting power of the German armed forces 
compared to Italy and, to a degree, Japan356 At no point, however, did the Nazi 
leadership attempt to co- ordinate the disparate interests of those involved in the Axis 
alliance. Even the efforts to plan along with Italy the European war in 1940/1 
reflected an assessment that this campaign was mainly a German war. Consequently, 
Italy waged her own war in the Mediterranean and Japan pursued her own plans in 
the Pacific. Faced with the better co- ordinated strategy and military effort of their 
enemies, the Axis states' individualism during the war reduced the whole fascist war 
to a state of political and military "uncontemporaneity ". As a result, the political - 
military initiative gradually eluded the fascist regimes and thus the chances of a 
fascist victory were seriously compromised. 
35a Noakes, Pridham (eds.), Nazism, III, pp. 865 -74 
35s Jacobsen, H. -A. (ed.), 1939 -1945, p. 474; Noakes, J., Pridham, G. (eds.), Documents on Nazism, 
1919 -1945 (London 1974), pp. 676 -7. On Hitler's insistence to fight all wars till the very end, see 
DDI, 9th, X, 31 and 733; Domarus, Hitler, II, p. 2022 (Proclamation for Operation "Citadel ", 4 July 
1943) 
356 Knox, "Expansionist Zeal ", pp. 115 -20. This was an uneasy situation, which, however, the Italians 
came to admit in the last stages of their war [DDI, 9th, X, 31] 
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IV: Conclusions 
From the viewpoint of the two fascist leaders, the Second World War was 
eventually fought with the determination to promote their long -term expansionist 
visions and to unify reality with utopia. The choice of war was consistent with 
fascism's ideological penchant for constant struggle, their sense of historic mission to 
advance a revolutionary international "new order ", and their radicalised objectives 
and methods in the second half of the 1930s. Mussolini's guerra parallela in north 
Africa and the Balkans in autumn 1940 originated from a commitment to a large - 
scale, long conflict which would dramatically reconfigure the balance of power in the 
Mediterranean region and would attain Italy's centuries -long dream of a mare 
nostrum. Hitler's decision to launch Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 was 
conceived as a total campaign of annihilation in an ultimate attempt to reclaim 
Germany's "historic Lebensraum" and to eradicate the Bolshevik- Jewish element 
from Europe. Both these decisions transformed the conflict from a conventional 
strategic struggle for limited political objectives into a war of far- reaching 
ideological ambitions and transcendental historic significance for the two regimes 
and the future of fascism. After 1940 -41 there was no turning -back option; the 
survival of fascism and any other outcome short of total victory had become 
mutually exclusive. 
Having said that, neither the timing nor the form of the war were shaped 
according to the two leaders' ideological or strategic desiderata. Although the 
decision to invade Poland reflected Hitler's conscious choice of aggression and his 
determination to avoid another Munich -style agreement, opposition from the western 
powers transformed a local into a general conflict. A campaign against the west had 
been envisaged by Hitler in 1939 in order to avoid the prospect of a two -front war, 
but the British -French ultimatum forced it upon him earlier than he had anticipated 
and before reaching optimal targets for rearmament. In this sense, his war plans until 
the summer of 1940 concentrated on the strategic target of neutralising western 
opposition in contradiction to his long -term objectives and strategic preconceptions. 
The failure of the campaign against Britain constituted the first major setback in Nazi 
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foreign policy and confronted the Nazi leadership with a clear discrepancy between 
reality and vision, or - put in more familiar terms - between structures and intentions. 
However, at exactly this point Hitler turned his back on strategic prerequisites and 
structural contradictions in order to concentrate on his ideological priority of 
expanding in the east. His decision to attack the Soviet Union marked a qualitative 
step from strategic to ideological war, but was also reached under the pressure of 
failure in the west and his personal impression that time was running out. 
In a similar vein, the timing of Mussolini's decision to enter the conflict in 
June 1940 was defined to the greatest extent by the ferocious pace of Nazi expansion 
and the ideological aversion of the fascist regime to neutrality. Although 
participation in the Axis war was expected to ensure concrete territorial gains in the 
Mediterranean, Mussolini was aware of the limited military capacity of the Italian 
armed forces at that point and of his equally limited initiative in a war dominated by 
German interests and successes. He had to join the conflict but there is no indication 
that he perceived this particular war as the real guerra fascista. Until early in the 
autumn of 1940 he had accepted a secondary role in the context of what he expected 
to be a short campaign leading to a better peace. When, however, the Germans failed 
to launch Operation Sea Lion and lost the initiative in the campaign against Britain, 
Mussolini hastened to exploit this window of opportunity by radicalising Italy's war 
aims and assuming the leadership of the Axis war against Britain. This was a major 
qualitative step which the Italian leader was compelled to take much earlier than he 
had desired, in military and economic circumstances that were far from optimal. Yet, 
at no point did material and structural factors play a decisive role in Mussolini's 
decision -making during the crucial months of September 1940 and March 1941. 
Faced with what he perceived as a historic opportunity, the Duce responded with a 
determination to fight and achieve large -scale war goals in defiance of any rational 
assessment of available means and strategic prerequisites. 
The fascist war practically ceased to be a war of expansion during 1941 -2. 
First, the defeat of the Italian armed forces in all fronts (Egypt, Greece, Ethiopia) put 
a swift end to Mussolini's aspirations for a real guerra fascista. Second, the failure of 
the German Blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union by the end of 1941 and the 
ineffectiveness of the Wehrmacht offensives in 1942 thwarted Hitler's ideological 
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goal of annihilating the Soviet army and leadership. From that point onwards the 
foreign policies of the two fascist regimes were reduced to war -making which 
gradually assumed a desperate defensive character and led to the fall of Mussolini in 
1943 and the eventual collapse of the Nazi regime in 1945. In the end, war intensified 
pre- existing qualities in the two regimes which severely hampered their prospects of 
success in the military effort. The problem that the fascist leaderships faced in 
finding a working balance between their objectives and the means for their 
implementation was related to failings in the whole context of foreign policy -making. 
The domestic victory of fascism undermined the capacity of the two systems for 
rational control and pluralism in the decision -making process, necessary for the 
success of the enterprise. The central role of Mussolini and Hitler in the two systems' 
foreign policy decision -making process thwarted any prospects for administrative 
rationalisation and for strategic reassessments which could openly question the 
soundness of the leaders' decisions, until the very end. It fixed their personal 
aspirations as the unalterable goals of their regimes, thus hindering a more flexible 
approach to what the two countries could seek from the war357. War fostered the 
leader- oriented, authoritarian tendencies of the two systems and limited even further 
the capacity of military/diplomatic groups or party officials to influence the 
formulation of major foreign policy goals and strategies. Alternative or opposing 
views were not, of course, eliminated, but their place in the two systems remained 
marginal and incompatible with the leaders' charismatic authority. Furthermore, lack 
of administrative rationality in the decision -making process of the two regimes 
affected negatively the potential for an effective co- ordination of resources. Finally, 
the antagonism between the two leaders for prestige and initiative destroyed the 
prospects of an effective international co- operation among the Axis partners in the 
conduct of what was supposed to be a joint military campaign. These failings 
resulted in a foreign policy which either ignored the problem of ends -means 
rationality, or attempted to remedy it by imposing increasingly less rational models 
357 On the identification of the "personal" with the "national" in fascism see Geyer, "Restorative 
Elites ", p. 154; Roseman, p. 216; Gentile, G., "The Philosophical Basis of Fascism ", Foreign 
Affairs, 6 (1928), p. 291 
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of foreign policy- making358. In 1940 -41 the two fascist leaders embarked upon the 
realisation of its ultimate expansionist visions, transforming the war into a 
fundamental campaign for the triumph or collapse of fascism as a whole. By the time 
domestic and international factors had annulled the hopes of a fascist victory, the two 
regimes had long before crossed the Rubicon of normality to be able to contemplate 
any form of compromise. Any alternative policy or course of action was meaningful 
only after the removal of the leader from power, constitutionally if that was possible 
(the Grand Council motion of 24/25 July 1943 in Italy) or in a conspiratorial manner 
(for example, the 20 July plot in Germany; and Victor Emmanuel III's schemes in 
March 1940). In the same way that the war had become the personal project of 
Mussolini's and Hitler's ideological obsessions, fascism itself completed its total 
identification with the decisions and the fate of its two charismatic leaders. 
358 For a short discussion of the problem of ends -means rationality in fascist foreign policy see Herf, 
J., Reactionary Modernism. Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich 




I. The study of fascist expansionism: ideology and other factors 
In concluding his Fascism: A History (1996), R. Eatwell notes that "fascism 
emerged as a significant force ... as a result of a complex inter -relationship between 
national traditions, the actions of key leaders ... and socio- economic developments, 
especially crisis '. It is vital to stress that the study of fascism and of its political 
choices - not least of all, territorial expansion - cannot be properly comprehended 
from a single viewpoint. There has been a plethora of studies in recent years which 
have highlighted diverse reasons why fascism became socially and politically 
dominant in Italy and Germany during the 1920s and 1930s. A number of studies 
have also accounted for the complexity of fascist expansionism, as ideology and 
practice. The debate about the programmatic or not character of fascist foreign 
policies has produced a vast diversification of arguments, each of which stresses the 
significance of some factors whilst questioning the validity of others. At the same 
time, research on continuities between pre -fascist and fascist foreign policy has 
provided invaluable insight into the place of fascism in the post -unification 
ideological and political traditions of the two countries. Fifty years after the collapse 
of the fascist regimes in Italy and Germany, fascist expansionism is still studied from 
a variety of points of view: as foreign policy, as ideological tradition, as domestic 
policy projected outwards, as pure opportunism, as atavism. 
The widening of the scope of research, encompassing ideology, structural 
factors and international relations, has contributed to the elaboration of our 
Eatwell, R., Fascism: A Histoiy (London 1996), p. 279 
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understanding of fascism, and of its expansionist policies in particular. It has helped 
to transgress the initial demonisation of Hitler, to cast aside our moral revulsion 
against Nazi crimes and to induce a more dispassionate assessment of Nazism's 
nature and roots. It has also effectively questioned the conventional portrayal of 
Mussolini as simply a buffoon, an inept imitation of Hitler with no defined 
ideological beliefs or political convictions. Furthermore, the debate about fascism's 
relations with the national past has introduced a fruitful interest in studying fascism 
not simply as sui generis case, but in relation to a plethora of long- and short-term 
dimensions: intellectual traditions, institutional developments, the crisis of the 
anciens régimes. In this new, wider framework of study, the importance of ideology 
for the analysis of fascist expansionist policies is still passionately debated and 
constantly reassessed, but is also summarily dismissed or played down by a 
considerable number of researchers of Fascism and Nazism. Extreme structuralists, 
like H. Mommsen, are still advocating an approach which highlights the "blind" 
character of Nazi expansionism as a symptom of uncontrolled radicalism and as a 
desperate diversion from domestic pressures. Ideological pronouncements, the 
argument goes, were a form of lip service to a mirage of constant revolution, an 
exercise in deception and propaganda in order to uphold the regime's legitimacy and 
to appease the radical critique of the old fighters. More recently, Roberto Vivarelli 
epitomised this reaction by denying Fascism any intellectual substance, arguing 
instead that we should focus only on its political practices. For him, "Fascist 
ideology" was an exercise in political "deception" and not a doctrine with any claim 
to coherence and validity. Words reflected neither convictions nor intentions; they 
were mere propaganda in the service of legitimising shifting policies and of giving 
the impression of consistency to otherwise unprincipled policy -making'. 
Why study ideology, then, in order to analyse fascist expansionism? The 
first reason for this is to gain a general insight into the most extreme fascist policies, 
of which expansionism (with all its consequences) was a striking example. The 
extension of the intentionalist- structuralist debate to the issue of the Holocaust, the 




bitterness of the Historikerstreit3, and the immense interest in the Goldhagen 
controversy, to mention only recent historiographical developments, have shown that 
the discussion on the significance of ideology in fascism is not over. If large -scale 
expansionism and war were responses to domestic deadlock or the outcome of 
cumulative radicalisation, then why should we assume that expansion was the 
obvious and logical choice for diversion from domestic problems? Why was 
radicalisation expressed in these terms? Even if we dismiss the ideological 
pronouncements of Mussolini and Hitler as propaganda, even if we interpret 
expansion as a reaction to domestic crisis, there is always a process which formulates 
intentions and prioritises options. This process is not a- historical: it takes place 
within a framework of long -term intellectual and political developments, and it 
reflects what a given individual or group perceives as legitimate and/or desirable in a 
certain historical context. As S. C. Azzi has noted, traffic accidents do not happen 
"solely because of the existence of automobiles'. Expansionism was neither the only 
nor the most obvious or predetermined policy option at the disposal of the two fascist 
leaderships. 
This justifies the focus of research on fascist Weltanschauung as a means 
to interpreting fascist practice. However, the capacity of ideological predispositions 
to determine foreign policy should not be exaggerated. The endeavours of the fascist 
regimes to translate ideas into action belonged to the realm of intentions. The reality 
was radically different. Neither of the two leaderships possessed any concrete idea as 
to how they could achieve their long -term objectives, what it entailed to promote 
them, and what the measure of success was in the short term. In fact, their obsession 
with long -term visions made them opportunistic par excellence. Fascist "new 
territorial order" was such a long -term goal, opening up vast new opportunities and 
fuelling their ambitions. It was associated with certain prerequisites: domestic unity, 
authoritarian state, rearmament, a new "fascist" mentality for the masses, a more 
3 Kershaw, I., The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation (London 1989, 2nd 
ed.), pp. 168 -91; Kühnl, R. (ed.), Vergangenheit, die nicht vergeht (Cologne 1987); Maier, C., The 
Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Munich 1988); Knowlton, 
J., Cates, T. (eds.), Forever in the Shadow of Hitler? Original Documents of the Historikerstreit, the 
Controversy concerning the Singularity of the Holocaust (New Jersey 1993) 




radical handling of foreign affairs. Yet, what was conspicuously lacking was a 
concrete idea about how to manage the process of change. This is true not only of 
Italian Fascism, where the lack of programmatic pronouncements by Mussolini has 
been widely discussed, but also of Nazism, where Hitler's alleged clarity of intention 
(as expressed in Mein Kampf and in the Second Book) should not be exaggerated. 
Both regimes provided the necessary short-term impetus by advocating an 
uncompromising activism, they could rally support by invoking the emotional power 
of their utopias, but the rest was left to experiment, risk and the alleged intuition of 
their leaders. 
In this sense, the study of ideology is a necessary, but not a sufficient 
factor in explaining the specific choice and sequence of expansionist initiatives 
undertaken by the Italian and German fascist regimes. Domestic structural conditions 
and long -term features of the two systems affected decision -making and often limited 
the freedom of the two leaderships to conduct foreign affairs according to their 
wishes and preferred style. R. De Felice attributed the relative lack of radical 
expansionist moves by the Fascist regime during the "decade of good behaviour" to 
the priority given to domestic consolidation and re- organisation'. A. Cassels also 
underlined the restraining influence of traditional bureaucrats, especially of the 
Foreign Office, on the Duce's diplomacy'. In the late 1930s, the low level of 
preparation and the limited capacity of the system for economic and military 
mobilisation delayed Italy's entry into the war until June 1940, in spite of 
Mussolini's ascertained desire to join Nazi Germany in the major territorial re- 
organisation of the "new order ". In Germany, the economic and military limitations 
of the Versailles Treaty convinced Hitler of the vulnerability of the country's 
defensive position and dictated a relatively more cautious and limited foreign policy 
until 1936. At the same time, the strength of the traditional elite groups and 
institutions - a feature that was much less pronounced in the Italian state - created a 
more pluralistic framework of foreign policy -making, in which the intentions of the 
Nazi leadership had to be negotiated with the expert advice and procedures of 
powerful state institutions, such as the armed forces and the Wilhelmstrasse. A 
5 De Felice, R., Mussolini il duce, vol. I: Gli anni del consenso, 1929 -1936 (Turin 1974), pp. 320ff 
6 Cassels, A., Mussolini 's Early Diplomacy (Princeton, New Jersey 1970) 
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further potential problem pertained to the NSDAP's more elaborate structure and 
more pronounced ambitions to replace the state and play a central role in the re- 
shaping of the domestic system in a totalitarian direction. Only gradually did the 
establishment of an authoritarian, leader- oriented system result in the subordination 
of elite groups and party ambitions to the rule of the two leaders, depriving the 
former of their right to co- decision -making and relegating the latter to a functional 
status of interpreting and executing the leaders' charismatic will. 
Another important factor for understanding the interaction between ideological 
intentions and structures was the framework of international relations. According to 
De Felice, the absence of radical initiatives in Italian foreign policy after the Corfu 
incident had to be linked with a general lack of external opportunities for expansion 
in a European system still geared to defending the stability of the postwar status quo 
at all costs. In the second half of the 1930s the Nazi expansionist momentum forced 
the pace and radicalised the style of Fascist expansionist policies, both through the 
opportunities offered by the Axis alliance and as a reaction to German unilateral 
actions. While the illusion of opportunity speeded up plans for the conquest of 
Ethiopia in 1935, the impact of Nazi successes in early 1940 forced the Duce to 
reconsider Italy's "non- belligerence" and to order participation in a war he could 
only partly control and even less shape. In Germany, the July 1934 coup in Vienna 
served as an eloquent reminder to Hitler that the attainment of anti- system goals 
presupposed a more favourable international constellation and a more developed 
revisionist culture amongst the other European powers which was wanting at that 
point. Munich was another lesson, this time regarding the aversion of the western 
powers to aggressive solutions and use of force for territorial changes. Much that A. 
J. P. Taylor exaggerated the importance of international developments in the ensuing 
period until September 1939 for the outbreak of war, he was right in one respect - the 
invasion of Poland took place in circumstances which had been neither anticipated 
nor desired by the Nazi leadership. In this sense, Nazi foreign policy until the 
launching of Operation Barbarossa reflected the necessity to cope with the 
inauspicious strategic consequences of September 1939 and the abject failure of 
Italy's "parallel" war. Failure to rectify the situation in late 1940 -early 1941 (namely, 
by forcing Britain to accept defeat) compromised the planning and execution of the 
invasion of Soviet Union in June 1941. 
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The significance of these factors in the shaping of foreign policy underscores 
the need to re -think our definition of programme. Much of the confusion and acidity 
surrounding interpretations of fascist foreign policies has emanated from a flawed 
distinction between programme as "general ideas" and programme as a rigid "stage - 
by- stage" guide for action. This has led to an equally inflexible contrast between 
opportunism and "blind" expansion, on the one hand, and programmatic consistency, 
on the other'. Just like ideology, "programmes" allude to long -term goals and 
priorities but not to the day -to -day conduct of foreign affairs. No political elite has 
ever come to power with a definite agenda for action and has managed to abide by it 
without diversions, reassessments and setbacks. In this respect, the only meaningful 
distinction should be between primary, that is persistent, and secondary, flexible and 
alterable goals of foreign policy -making, as well as between choice of objectives and 
decision about timing, strategies and means. The crucial test for the "programmatic" 
character of a regime's foreign policy is whether these primary objectives were 
consistently reflected in pronouncements and underpinned the long -term rationale of 
foreign policy -making; whether they were pursued with determination; and whether 
secondary goals were designed to aid - or, at least, not to contradict - the attainment 
of those primary objectives. Rather than dismissing opportunism and tactical 
flexibility as lack of ideological commitment, we should perhaps analyse the logic of 
such pliability and how it related to long -term priorities or declared goals. However, 
this is precisely what is lacking even in the most sophisticated social imperialist 
approaches. They correctly emphasise how the timing of certain initiatives reflected 
attempts to boost the popularity of the fascist regimes and how success was exploited 
by the regimes' propaganda industry to strengthen their legitimacy. They do, 
however, concentrate heavily on the short-term reasoning of foreign policy- making 
and thus lose sight of the wider priorities and aspirations which underpinned the 
long -term conduct of foreign affairs by the two leaderships. 
This long -term dimension in the foreign policy of the two fascist regimes 
was informed by a complex notion of living space. The visions of a Mediterranean 
mare nostrum in Fascism and of a vast eastern empire in Nazism encompassed 
' See the discussion in Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, pp. 122 -5; Azzi, "Historiography of Fascist 
Foreign Policy ", pp. 187 -90 
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concrete geographical areas of expansion and were prescribed by general ideological 
beliefs shared by the two regimes. The foci of expansion were defined through a 
combination of historic, geopolitical and ideological elements which linked each 
country's glorious past with the right to reclaim its historic position of greatness in 
the future. However, the acquisition of living space was also presented as a "natural" 
necessity, justified by the belief in history as the domain of the "fittest ", by the 
alleged "elite" character of the two nations, and by the symbolic significance of 
territory for great -power status. In this sense, the notions of spazio vitale and 
Lebensraum became figurative and composite expressions both of a general 
propensity for expansion -as an open- ended, permanent state of affairs- and of 
concrete aspirations, reinforced by historical, geopolitical and ideological factors 
specific to each country and regime. 
Particular goals were prioritised (Adriatic, north Africa, Suez and southern 
Balkans for Italy; Mitteleuropa and Soviet Union for Germany), but timing and 
planning were greatly determined by external opportunities and limitations. Because 
of the vague character of their long -term expansionist visions, each regime could 
constantly reassess its short-term strategy and choose from a plethora of options and 
methods of policy -making. Opportunity arose from the lack of clear -cut strategies, 
and this was both a curse and a blessing for the two fascist regimes. It was a curse 
because it could not generate clear standards, against which the achievements of the 
regimes could be assessed. This deprived the two regimes of a clear idea about the 
suitability of their means, the soundness of their strategies and the feasibility of their 
goals. It was, however, a blessing because it enhanced the tactical flexibility of the 
two leaders. In practice, many of the political ventures of the two regimes failed to 
produce desirable developments or conditions conducive to the advancement of the 
fascist visions. However, the extent of these failures was not as apparent to the 
leaderships then as it seemed with the benefit of hindsight. The far- reaching character 
of fascist visions rendered only one failure intelligible - total defeat. Anything short 
of that presented new opportunities and hopes. 
It is, indeed, ironic that the debate about the programmatic or not 
substance of fascist foreign policies consumed most of its intellectual energy in a 
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futile polarisation without realising the need for synthesis'. The dilemma of 
"intention versus structure" cannot be resolved by deciding a priori which is more 
significant, and then by applying the conclusion to the study of the two regimes' 
foreign policies. This study examined fascist expansionism in the three levels it was 
expressed and pursued - as ideology, as foreign policy and as a joint fascist 
undertaking which facilitated each regime's plans and (especially with regard to 
Fascist Italy) acted as a catalyst to a latent radicalism in the scope and style of 
expansionist policies. Understanding to what extent ideology underpinned, and was 
translated into action presupposes a critical awareness of the constant interaction 
between the above factors. 
II. "National" traditions and "fascist" innovations: the continuity debate 
The second major question pertinent to the nature of fascist expansionism is 
whether it was informed by idiosyncratic "fascist" values and aspirations or was 
simply an expression of pre- existing national traditions and practices. If fascist 
ideology was indeed a "scavenger ", amalgamating different nationalist and 
revolutionary traits into a new ideological edifice and re- launching past utopias as 
realisable goals of foreign policy', then how truly unique was the fascist commitment 
to territorial expansion in style and scope? With regard to style, fascism clearly 
followed a more active and uncompromising approach to the handling of foreign 
affairs. N. O'Sullivan has spoken of the "activist style of fascist politics" as a feature 
which distinguishes fascism from previous liberal and conservative regimes in Italy 
and Germany10. Emphasis on action, violence and war was dictated by pivotal beliefs 
at the heart of the fascist ideological minimum - social Darwinism, revolutionary 
dynamism, the ideal of a "citizen- soldier ", the glorification of military values in 
s Griffin, R., "Three Faces of Fascism ", Patterns of Prejudice, 30 (1996), pp. 65 -70 
Mosse, G. L., "Towards a General Theory of Fascism ", in Mosse (ed.), International Fascism. New 
Thoughts and New Approaches (London & Beverly Hills 1979), pp. 1 -41 
10 O'Sullivan, N., Fascism (London & Melbourne 1983), Ch. 2 -4 
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national history, as epitomised in the Roman Empire and the Teutons. At the same 
time, the leader- oriented, authoritarian style of rule signified an efflux of authority 
from traditional state institutions and bureaucracies to the fascist leaderships, whose 
approach to foreign policy- making was characterised by a distinct lack of attention to 
procedures and protocol. Charisma and routine proved extremely difficult to 
reconcile, thus resulting in a much more unpredictable and dynamic attitude to 
foreign policy, unbound by the usual prerequisites and subtleties of Realpolitik. 
Aggression became a legitimate weapon of fascist policy for attaining "just" goals, 
regardless of its destructive implications for others. 
It is, however, with regard to the nature and scope of fascist expansionism that 
the debate on continuity has raised a series of objections to the putative "fascist" 
character of the two regimes' expansionist policies. R. De Felice spoke of the "years 
of consensus" with reference to the period between 1929 and the Ethiopian 
campaign. His belief in the genuine, deep character of such a consensus might have 
been exaggerated, failing to take into account the superficiality of "fascistisation" at a 
societal level ". There was, however, undoubtedly wide popular support for the 
regime's foreign policy until the mid- 1930s, even for such "radical" initiatives such 
as the occupation of Corfu and the invasion of Ethiopia'. In Germany, a similar 
sense of consensus surrounded the successful pursuit of revisionist and irredentist 
goals by the Nazi regime until 1938. As I. Kershaw has shown, the cult of the Führer 
reached its peak in the second half of the 1930s, when the territory of the Reich was 
extended dramatically and dextrously without necessitating a military engagement13. 
Even when disagreements between the Nazi leadership and conservative officials in 
the armed forces and the Wilhelmstrasse arose in 1938 -39, these pertained mainly to 
the timing and the potentially disastrous international repercussions of the use of 
aggression. 
The debate on continuities between fascist and pre- fascist foreign policies has 
hit raw nerves in both countries, often offending the moral desire to castigate fascism 
by presenting it as an aberration of national history, alien to its long -term legacies 
" See the detailed analysis of the Dopolavoro in De Grazia, V., The Culture of Consent. Mass 
Organisation of Leisure in Fascist Italy (Cambridge 1981), esp. pp. 220ff 
12 De Felice, R., Mussolini il duce, vol. 1: Gli anni del consenso. See also, in this study, Chs. 3, 4 
13 Kershaw, I., The "Hitler-Myth". Image and Reality in the Third Reich (Oxford 1989), Ch. 5 
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and characteristics. However, much that fascism comprised a coherent, autonomous 
system of thought, it was also to a great extent the product of interwar crisis, derived 
from a different reading of the same historic data. Its place within the tradition of 
radical nationalism, as well as its ideological debts to previous currents, movements 
and mentors, have all been well established and documented. In this sense, continuity 
was the result of fascism's own process of production and systematisation, as well as 
an important factor in its popular appeal. As a "nationalism plus" phenomenon, 
fascism fused its own intrinsic ideological and political traits with conventional 
national beliefs, suppressed or frustrated aspirations, and more extreme, latent pre- 
existing tendencies. 
It was, however, the nature and parameters of this fusion that determined the 
limits of continuity. Each fascist regime displayed a selectivity towards traditional 
goals and forms of border policy, prioritising some and playing down or even 
relinquishing others. Even before the radicalisation of fascist expansionist policies in 
the second half of the 1930s, the regimes often showed a desire to go beyond these 
widely shared objectives (for example, intervention in the Spanish Civil War) in 
pursuit of wider goals and to the dismay of traditional diplomatic and military elite 
figures. From the extensive reservoir of what was perceived as legitimate territorial 
aggrandisement (revisionism, colonialism, continental living space, irredentism) each 
regime made choices and established priorities which were informed by a long -term 
vision of acquiring living space in areas identified through historic, geopolitical and 
ideological factors. The shift from border to living space policy might have been 
consistent with previous radical nationalist calls for world -power status, but was 
popularised, radicalised and pursued by the fascist regimes with a dynamism and 
historic urgency which emanated from a specifically "fascist" commitment to unite 
utopia with reality. In this respect, the unconventional fascist approach to foreign 
affairs cancelled the Realpolitik distinction between feasible and unattainable goals, 
dictating instead an attitude that took utopia at face value and pursued it to its 
extremes. This tendency became more conspicuous in the context of war from 1940 
onwards, when both regimes turned their back to rational assessments of domestic 
capabilities and international factors in pursuit of their more far -reaching 
expansionist goals. The legitimisation of violence /war and the elitist basis of fascist 
worldview opened up opportunities and offered solutions which previous liberal and 
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conservative regimes were less inclined to subscribe to. If we remove these elements 
from our interpretation of fascist foreign policies, then fascist expansionism is 
deprived of an overall explanation for its specific choices and methods. 
Therefore, while the long -term objectives of fascist expansionism were by no 
means the exclusive domain of fascist ideology, their systematisation, prioritisation 
and dynamic pursuit were underpinned by specific "fascist" values and prescriptions. 
This dualism between the national and the fascist underscores the need to abandon 
the rigidity of the "continuity versus discontinuity" debate, opting instead for an 
understanding of fascist expansionism as a special form of ideological commitment 
to living space expansion, whose individual goals and justifications were derived 
from nationalist utopias and mythmaking but synthesised according to "fascist" 
priorities and views. This formula does not exhaust the interpretation of idiosyncratic 
features in the policies of each regime. It does, however, provide a basis for the 
comprehension of the two regimes' distinct propensity for large -scale expansion as a 
special feature derived from a generic fascist "minimum ". 
III. Leaders, "fascist" values and "national" interest 
The cult of leader remained the most important cohesive factor throughout the 
life span of fascism, both for the fascist movements and, after the acquisition of 
power, for the two regimes too. Each leader occupied a special position in the 
collective mythology of fascism as the historic guiding force at the time of 
oppositional struggle, as the person who led fascism to power, codified disparate 
beliefs and systematised the fascist doctrine. In the hostile environment of the first 
coalition governments in 1922 in Italy and in 1933 in Germany the symbolic 
importance of the each leader increased - he now bore the responsibility of 
safeguarding fascism against "normalisation" and of ensuring its final dominance in 
the domestic system. Mussolini and Hitler used the powers derived from their 
position as Heads of leader- oriented regimes to identify themselves with two 
loyalties - to fascism and to the nation as a whole. This difficult task depended upon, 
first, their ability to express collective fascist values accurately and effectively in the 
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name of their movements; and, second, upon their success in convincing public 
opinion that these fascist values and aspirations would represent national interests in 
the best possible way. With regard to foreign policy, this task presupposed that they 
could fuse the spirit of fascism into foreign policy -making, combining expansionist 
goals with the fascist demand for a radical social -economic and spiritual 
transformation. It also rested upon their ability to show in a tangible way that fascism 
could interpret, formulate and promote national interests better than previous 
political ideologies, thus enabling their nations to fulfil their destiny. 
In this sense, the accumulation of power and responsibility by the two leaders 
in the handling of foreign affairs was not intended to render foreign policy a preserve 
of their personal visions. In theory, the two charismatic leaders acted in their capacity 
to express (and unite) fascist and national interests on behalf of their movements and 
nations respectively. Mussolini's vision of Mediterranean spazio vitale fused 
traditional great -power aspirations of the post- unification period, the myth of historic 
destiny for a "third Italy ", the fascist belief in activism/war as a vehicle for social 
transformation, and the ideological crusade of fascism against the "decadent" forces 
of liberalism and socialism. Hitler's dream of a Lebensraum empire in central and 
eastern Europe equally combined Nazi and German nationalist aspirations - the 
overturning of the "unjust" Versailles settlement, the right of the "talented peoples" 
to a fairer share of space, Germany's historic /cultural mission as an elite amongst the 
nations, and the crusade against the Bolshevik -Jewish alleged international 
conspiracy. 
In performing this fusion, however, each leader reached different levels of 
success and persuasion. Mussolini's decision to align Italy with Nazi Germany 
remained a phenomenally unpopular choice until the very end, both amongst most 
Fascist gerarchi and in public opinion. After the war, Bottai described the Axis and 
the war fought in 1940 -43 as a "Mussolinian", as opposed to a "Fascist" project`. 
This was probably an exaggerated statement, since all Fascist leaders eventually 
endorsed the regime's policy, reaffirming the symbolic capacity of their Capo to 
represent Fascist interest and values. It serves, however, to indicate that Mussolini 
did not convince even his closest colleagues in the regime and party that that 
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particular policy of expansion would promote general Fascist goals, both inside Italy 
and in the whole of Europe. As domestic transformation was an integral (and, for 
many Fascists, central) part of the Fascist worldview, Mussolini failed to relate the 
specific objectives of expansion in the context of Axis to such domestic goals. As 
Bottai commented, war and aggression halted civilian and cultural development 
when they were supposed to accelerate and deepen it''. Such doubts damaged the 
"infallible" image of the Duce and enhanced the gap between mussolinismo and 
Fascism, bringing prominent Fascists face -to -face with an uneasy clash of loyalties. 
At the same time, public apathy after the Ethiopian campaign and general hostility to 
Nazi Germany raised doubts amongst the population as to Mussolini's ability to 
represent the country's national interests in the framework of such a policy. Again, 
loyalty to the Duce remained for a long time a strong element of public perseverance 
to disasters, but it gradually became insufficient to overcome the impression that 
Fascism would not save the country and that defeat was impending. After 1941, 
when shortages of food and destruction by Allied bombardments dislocated domestic 
life, the Italian population did not exempt Mussolini from their bitter attacks on 
Fascism: he, Ciano, the other Fascist leaders, the detested party, the whole Fascism 
had to go'. 
Hitler faced a similar challenge to his charismatic authority with his major 
"ideological revision" of August 1939, when he struck a deal with Nazism's arch- 
enemy in the east. A public opinion indoctrinated according to the tenet of 
Bolshevik -Jewish conspiracy was startled, while many Nazi figures were shocked by 
the change of attitude that this decision involved. The Führer also remained 
unmoved by the exhortations of even his closest aides (Goering, Goebbels) to 
reconsider his decision to launch the campaign against Poland at that particular time. 
Success, however, proved the strongest integrative factor for the "Hitler cult" - an 
element that Mussolini did not enjoy after the Ethiopian campaign. Furthermore, 
with the prioritisation and launching of "Operation Barbarossa" in June 1941 Hitler 
re- united his personal strategy with the most crucial common Nazi values of anti- 
'4 Bottai, G., Vent'anni e un giorno (24 luglio 1943) (Milan 1977), pp. 79 -91 
15 Bottai, Vent 'anni, pp. 64 -7 




Bolshevism and anti -Semitism. The attack on the Soviet Union might have been the 
ultimate stage in his personal obsession with Germany's "historic" Lebensraum in 
the east, but it also offered opportunities for promoting other radical values and 
visions cherished by individual Nazi figures in the regime and party. The occupation 
of vast lands in the east in 1941 -3 gave the alibi for radical experiments in the new 
lands, created personal spheres of jurisdiction for many Nazis and provided a vast 
tabula rasa which could be reorganised along the lines of Nazi ideology's most 
extreme prescriptions. At the same time, the significantly more tangible threat of 
Bolshevism in Germany (due to her geographical proximity to the Soviet Union) 
provided a stronger factor for public loyalty (or lack of opposition) to the regime, 
even when defeat and collapse became a certainty. For the majority of the population, 
Hitler had led Germany into an unavoidable war with Communism and the Jews 
which would decide the fate of the whole German nation. Compromise with, or 
capitulation to, such an enemy was unintelligible, if not totally unacceptable. With 
"Barbarossa" Hitler had managed to combine his personal fate with that of Nazism 
and Germany as a whole, in a way that Mussolini failed to do after the Ethiopian 
campaign". 
Therefore, while territorial expansion and aggression were extensions and 
expression of central, shared "fascist" values, the interpretation of these values and 
the formulation of expansionist goals in the actual conduct of foreign policy received 
different degrees of support and loyalty in each regime and country. Foreign policy - 
making involved how such values and how national interests were translated into 
action. Despite the alleged infallibility of the two leaders, criticisms by other 
prominent fascists were voiced, questioning - although never totally rejecting - the 
cult of the leader. In the end, loyalty came down to the success or failure of each 
leader's interpretations and risks. When defeat came closer (and this happened much 
earlier in Italy than in Germany), when the leaders' personal strategy had abjectly 
failed, fascism did not matter anymore; the survival of the nation, which fascism had 
failed to serve, became the utmost priority for fascists and non -fascists alike. In Italy, 
such a separation was possible as other surviving institutions (the Crown and the 
" For the attitudes of German public opinion in 1941 -45 see Kershaw, I., The "Hitler-Myth". Image 
and Reality in the Third Reich (Oxford 1989), pp. 149 -225 
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Church, for example) could provide a stable constitutional and social transition to a 
post -Mussolinian era. In Germany, however, the failure of conservative opposition to 
assassinate Hitler in July 1944 left no such alternatives. Only Goebbels in 1944 
suggested shelving the Nazi tenet of anti -Bolshevism in order to strike a compromise 
with Stalin and thus save Germany from a total military defeat, but even those last - 
ditch efforts proved fruitless. A chapter in German history had to crawl to its 
devastating end before crucial redefinitions of what national interest involved could 
be considered. 
IV. Dealing with differences: the limits of a generic definition of fascist 
expansionism 
The limitations of a generic definition of fascist expansionism should be very 
carefully recorded and accounted for. While an obsessive emphasis on the specificity 
of each regime's views and policies obfuscates clear similarities between them, no 
plausible definition of generic fascism can be couched in terms of uniformity. As a 
"nationalism plus" phenomenon, rooted in autochthonous radical nationalist 
traditions, fascism itself retained distinctly national features and operated within 
long -term national structures. Apart from similarities in their ideological 
commitment to large -scale expansion, each regime recast particular national 
aspirations which inhered in the general cognitive model of the indigenous society. 
Furthermore, the realisation of their prescriptions depended on factors which were 
essentially impervious to, and uncontrolled by, their intentions. Economic resources, 
military preparedness and potential, international status, effectiveness of state 
structures, public loyalty to the state, were all fundamental components of foreign 
policy -making but could only partly be influenced during the short life -span of the 
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two regimes. They remained essentially different in each country and affected the 
intensity and effectiveness of each regime's policies18. 
Any conventional typology of generic fascism has treated Nazism, with its 
higher fighting and destructive power, vast expansionist ambitions and fanaticism, as 
the most extreme or accomplished variant of fascism19. Others have interpreted the 
unspectacular use of force and aggression by the Italian Fascist regime as evidence of 
its half -hearted commitment to the goal of large -scale expansion. Especially amongst 
Italian historians, attempts to overstate the ideological and political differences of the 
two regimes have for a long time commanded the majority view. The contrast 
between Nazi atrocities in the Second World War and the notably less aggressive 
behaviour of the Italian troops in the Balkans20; the more circumscribed expansionist 
plans of the Fascist regime compared to the millenarian racial aphorisms of the Nazi 
"new order "; the failure of totalitarianism in Italy as opposed to a projected image of 
a ruthless Nazi dictatorship based on extreme use of terror', have served both as 
empirical observations about the nature of the two regimes' policies and as 
indications of their ideological divergence. De Felice projected the argument even 
further, in the slippery territory of the leader's personality and of the people's 
"national character ", stating that Mussolini was not "cruel ", at least in the way that 
Hitler was23. D. Mack Smith developed the argument in a totally different direction, 
portraying Mussolini as a caricature in an "unserious comedy world" of his own, 
with little relevance to, or influence upon, the cataclysmic events of the interwar 
period". 
Of course, the potential of Italian Fascism for cruelty and terror was plainly 
manifested in a series of occasions, from the ruthless policies of "pacification" in 
Libya in the late 1920s to the racial policies in the Impero and the concentration 
18 Knox, M., "Expansionist Zeal, Fighting Power, and Staying Power in the Italian and German 
Dictatorships ", in Bessel, R. (ed.), Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Comparisons and Contrasts 
(Cambridge 1996), pp. 115 -33 
19 Payne, pp. 462 -70; Griffin, R., The Nature of Fascism (London & New York 1994), pp. 245 -8 
20 Steinberg, J., All or Nothing. The Axis and the Holocaust, 1941 -42 (London 1990) 
21 Germino, D. L., The Italian Fascist Party in Power. A Study in Totalitarian Rule (New York 1971), 
pp. 141 -4 
22 Perfetti, F., II dibattito sul fascismo (Rome 1984), pp. 10 -3 
23 De Felice, R., Mussolini il fascista, vol. 1: La conquista del potere, 1921 -1925 (Turin 1966), p. 470 
24 Mack Smith, D., Mussolini's Roman Empire (London 1976), pp. 252ff 
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camp at Ferramonti in southern Italy'', although still paling into insignificance 
compared to the extent of Nazi acts of horror in occupied Europe and Soviet Union. 
Similarly, even if the fixations of Mussolini and Hitler might have been of 
extraordinary importance in such leader -oriented systems, the crude "either -or" 
rigidity of the Führer's obsessions was significantly less pronounced or resolute in 
the Duce's worldview. The establishment of a "totalitarian" system in Italy was 
hampered by the fragmentation of public loyalty between state, Crown and Church. 
Mechanisms of political opposition were largely suppressed by the regime, but 
bodies like the Fascist Grand Council retained a quasi -pluralistic function which 
initiated the process for the dismissal of Mussolini from power in 24/25 July 1943. A 
similar potential for institutional opposition was not possible in Nazi Germany, 
where allegiance to the state traditionally overshadowed any other forms of loyalty 
and was further reinforced through the charismatic basis of the Führer's rule. As for 
foreign policy in particular, Nazi expansionism was more fanatically pursued, to the 
point of risking and eventually causing a major military confrontation which would 
decide the fundamental issue of world supremacy. Its effects were significantly more 
far -reaching than the unsuccessful Italian Fascist bid for Mediterranean mastery in 
1940 -41, not only in geographical scope but also in effectiveness. All these 
statements, however, underscore the importance of studying fascist expansionism 
both as an ideological commitment and as a process of translating it into reality. 
Notwithstanding the responsibility of the two leaders for the way their regimes were 
shaped, operated and acted, long -term economic, military and social structures of 
their countries were beyond their ephemeral reach. Discarding Italian Fascism as a 
farce or dismissing the ideological substance of its expansionist aspirations simply 
because effective foreign policy -making was hampered by limited economic 
capacity, absence of a militarist culture and failure of Fascist efforts to instil genuine 
loyalty to the state in the population, is to confuse the "fascist" with the "national ", 
the ideological with the political, the intention with the result. The challenge for any 
generic definition of fascist expansionism is to take note of these long -term 
differences and features in answering why such different societies converged upon a 
25 On the last issue see Capogreco, C. S., "I campi di internamento fascista per gli ebrei (1940- 1943) ", 
Storia Contemporanea, 22 (1991), pp. 663 -82 
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similar radical notion of territorial aggrandisement, why they chose to go to extremes 
in order to pursue it, and why they became allies in a horrifying undertaking. 
Concentrating exclusively on "what actually happened", as De Felice and Vivarelli 
urged", thwarts what Griffin has described as "a healthy dialectic between theory and 
empiricism '', which is indispensable for the understanding of fascism's long -term 
national roots, epochal nature and ephemeral success. In this sense, fascist 
expansionism remained both generic and specific to each country, recasting radical 
national aspirations with a distinctive "fascist" urgency, informing the general 
orientation of foreign policy- making, but also shaped into action under the 
confluence of national and international factors which remained largely impervious 
to fascist intentions. 
The value of the comparative approach to fascism (and to its expansionist 
tendencies in particular) lies in its capacity to raise intriguing questions about both 
the similarities and the differences between Italian Fascism and German Nazism78. 
Interpreting the expansionist ideologies and policies of the two regimes involves an 
understanding of a set of common "fascist" values and prescriptions (the "ideological 
minimum "), which explain the prioritisation of territorial expansion by the two 
fascist leaders. However, it also entails an awareness of national traditions, features 
of the two systems in the longue durée. A generic notion of fascist expansionist 
ideology, shared by the two regimes examined in this study, is validated by referring 
to the common values of the fascist "ideological minimum ". Yet, it is also challenged 
by idiosyncratic autochthonous factors in each country. This study has shown that 
fascist expansionism has to be examined as ideology, action and process (translating 
ideology into action and reality). The end -result (the actual policies and their effects) 
was different for each regime in style, dynamism, implications and effectiveness. The 
influence of internal and international factors, of competing domestic institutions and 
figures, of each leader's personal interpretations and intuitions, have been noted and 
compared. If such differences and contradictions are carefully accounted for, then the 
'6 Vivarelli, "Interpretations of the Origins of Fascism ", pp. 29 -43; De Felice, Intervista sad fascismo 
(Bari 1975), pp. 11 ff 
'-' Griffm, R., "Three Faces of Fascism ", Patterns of Prejudice, 30 (1996), pp. 69 -70 
28 Bosworth, R. J. B., The Italian Dictatorship. Problems and perspectives in the interpretation of Mussolini and 
Fasciser (London 1998), Ch. 9, esp. pp. 229 -30 
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notion of a generic fascist expansionism can be a valuable tool for analysis, 
providing crucial insight into the ideological visions and political practices of 
fascism in a way that no singular account for each regime is able to do. 
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